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This thesis proposes to define and to dramatize a relation between Deleuze studies and 
sound studies in terms of a conception of theoretical work as an experimental practice 
that bears not upon objects but upon Ideas—or rather, that reconfigures the sense of 
object in relation to a renewed conception of the Idea. This relation between two 
discourses will proceed through an engagement between the work of Gilles Delueze 
and that of John Cage, constituted as an “interference between practices”, with the 
intent of furnishing, to sound studies, a meta-theoretical reflection on the problem that 
sound poses to thinking, and on the conditions under which theory can respond to such 
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Introduction: The Contemporaneity of Sound Studies 
 
1. Dramatizing the Sonic Idea 
 
This thesis is intended as a contribution to the fields of Deleuze studies and sound 
studies with regard to the question of practice. That is to say, it offers, on the one 
hand, an analysis of Deleuze’s early work in terms of his interrogation of what it 
means to think, and, on the other, considers how this analysis might function as a 
methodological intervention in sound studies; yet it is not simply a question of what a 
“Deleuzian” sound studies would resemble, but of the ways in which Deleuze’s work 
allows us to reconceive the practice of studying as such. What is at stake, then, is the 
status of theoretical work as a concrete activity, and the ways in which this work may 
or may not intersect or engage with a particular object; if sound constitutes a 
privileged case, in this respect, it is insofar as, as I will show, the disciplinary 
constitution of sound studies is inextricable from this very problem, a problem 
immanently posed by sound to thought. Finally, then, if Deleuze offers a renewed 
conception of thinking as a form of activity, this conception will allow us to pose to 
sound studies the nature and status of its own practice—as well as, ultimately, the 
“object” of this practice. 
 
As the title suggests, then, my interest, principally, is in approaching sound as what 
John Mowitt terms a ‘disciplinary object’, where this designates the ‘volatile zone of 
indistinction between the world […] and the institutionally organized production of 
knowledge’ (2011, 2), an indistinction that manifests in the ambiguity of the referent 
itself: when we refer to the object of sound studies, do we refer to that which it is 
“about”, or to its ‘aim or purpose’ (1)? Do these two senses correlate, or do they 
diverge? Not only is this ambiguity constitutive for sound studies, with regard to the 
seemingly essential indeterminateness of its own object, as well as the uncertainty 
over how we might come to scrutinize said object, but it also constitutes a central and 
defining theme of Deleuze’s oeuvre. If Deleuze’s work is defined by its continual 
intersection with “other” domains—references to literature, visual arts, music, 
mathematics and the physical sciences, amongst many others, abound throughout his 
work—then, on this basis, it is also preoccupied with the question of philosophy’s 




practice with its own object: ‘philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and 
fabricating concepts’ (WP 2). It is this art of conceptual creation that Deleuze and 
Guattari1 had been “doing all their lives” (WP 1), under the name of philosophy 
(amongst many others).2  
 
On this basis, I want to present this thesis as, on the one hand, an investigation of the 
implications of such a claim with regard to sound studies. The claim that philosophy 
creates concepts falls back not only on the concept of the philosophical object itself (as 
we will hear in Chapter Two), but also, in a related sense, the object of philosophy as 
that toward which it is oriented: at the same moment, the object of philosophy is 
positioned internally to philosophy itself, in the form of the concept, and projected out 
of the present, becoming its “goal”; philosophy as the ‘system of the future’ (DR 142). 
If philosophy is the creation of concepts, then, what of those other objects of 
philosophy—the objects of philosophy’s “others”? How might philosophy encounter 
the sonic work, for instance, if its true focus is the concept? 
 
                                                        
1 This thesis focuses largely on Deleuze’s early texts, principally his work on Kant and 
Nietzsche in the early nineteen-sixties, and the elaboration of this work in Difference and 
Repetition. For this reason, I will largely refer only to Deleuze, and when discussing the 
collaborative texts I will focus on their continuity with Deleuze’s work. While I acknowledge 
that, until recently, Guattari has undergone a ‘problematic subsumption’ as Deleuze’s 
‘partner’, as Garry Genosko puts it (Genosko 2002, 1), and that, as Genosko puts it elsewhere, 
this subsumption has led to the treatment of the collaborations ‘as a whole determined by 
Deleuze alone’ (Genosko 2012, 154), nevertheless I justify my decision for two related 
reasons. Firstly, Deleuze himself remarked upon differences between his and Guattari’s 
understanding of certain concepts, such as the body without organs (TM 238) and on this 
basis, as Daniel W. Smith notes, one could read the concepts of the collaborative works as 
bearing distinct senses according to whether one reads them within the ‘trajectory’ of 
Deleuze’s work or of Guattari’s (Smith 2012, 124). Secondly, the relation of the collaborative 
works to Deleuze’s single authored works is complex, and a great deal of care is required in 
order to prevent reductive readings that fail to attend to the differences specific terms and 
concepts undergo between texts; to this end, I will largely avoid reference to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia in particular, insofar as, within the scope of this thesis, I am unable to provide 
this due attention.  
2 On the one hand, Deleuze is quite explicit in his rejection of attempts to proclaim the end of 
philosophy, whether it is in favour of the Heideggeran ‘task of thinking’ (BW 431-449) that 
would achieve what philosophy could not, or an attempt to step outside philosophy as such. 
Yet, on the other, Deleuze and Guattari, in particular, offer a range of alternate names under 
which their practice passes, later to be recuperated under the name of philosophy: 
‘RHIZOMATICS = SCHIZOANALYSIS = STRATOANALYSIS = PRAGMATICS = 




This problem will be a central topic of this thesis, insofar as it is vital to any 
conception of theoretical work as a practice—and therefore is implicated in the 
constitution of sound studies itself as a discipline. Yet an initial response, as a means 
to clarifying my own method, can be stated at the outset: that philosophy does not, in a 
strict sense, take sound as its object does not entail that it cannot engage with sonic 
practice; to the contrary, this “incapacity” forces us to move beyond the notion of 
philosophy as reflection upon an object, and the limitations of the concept of 
objecthood more generally, in order to present philosophy’s “others” as practices in 
their own right. Thus, rather than philosophy attempting to reflect upon a static, inert 
object that it scrutinizes from without, philosophical practice relates to other practices 
by means of what Deleuze terms an ‘interference’ (C2 268). If philosophy is creative, 
so too are those other domains with which it intersects: 
 
theory too is something which is made, no less than its object. For many 
people, philosophy is something which is not ‘made’, but is pre-existent, 
ready-made in a prefabricated sky. However, philosophical theory is itself 
a practice, just as much as its object. (C2 268) 
 
How is such an interference to be constituted? What are its conditions and its limits? 
These are the questions I wish to ask in relation to both sound studies and sonic 
practice—and, indeed, it is this relation itself that I ultimately wish to interrogate. If 
sound studies is to no longer reflect upon sonority as its object, how else might it 
proceed? Moreover, how might it do so in a way that affirms its own creativity at the 
same time as preserving that of the practice with which it hopes to interference? 
 
On the other hand, this thesis will be not a description but rather a dramatization of 
such a (re)conception of philosophical and theoretical practice.3 I use this term in both 
a general and specific sense. In the first case, I mean to suggest that this thesis will 
possess a performative dimension with regard to its argument: rather than simply 
                                                        
3 It is important to note a distinction between philosophy and theory that relates not only to 
their institutional framing and historical lineages but also, by extension, the very conception of 
thought as a practice implied in each case; on this topic, see Osborne 2011. For my purposes 
in this thesis, however, I will take as read the fact that, as Osborne states, ‘the current 
empirical answer to the question ‘What is theory (in the Anglophone humanities) after 
“Theory”?’ is most definitely ‘Philosophy’’ (22), and on this basis, simply note that, in the 
preceding quotation from Cinema 2, Deleuze also invokes such an equivalence; nevertheless, 
this is topic that must be thematised more fully with regard to the question of theory and/or 




providing an account of Deleuze’s conception of philosophical practice as a creative 
activity, and its possible application to sound studies, I wish to perform such an 
activity between Deleuze’s work and that of sound studies. The nature of this 
performance can be clarified by considering the more technical sense Deleuze gives 
this term: dramatization designates a renewed and distinctive relation between thought 
and sensation, between the Idea4 and its spatio-temporal effectuation; that is, 
ultimately, between thought and what it thinks or, in our case, between sound and its 
study. The drama is the concrete unfolding of the Idea, its determination in space and 
time, in a manner akin to the Kantian schema (DI 99), but divested of Kant’s appeal to 
a predetermined identity of the concept and the corresponding presupposition of a 
harmonious relation between thought and sensation. Deleuze’s ‘method of 
dramatisation’ seeks rather to explore the synthetic ‘power’ through which the schema 
is constructed beyond such limitations (DR 271), and thus implies not only a renewed 
conception of essence, but a ‘new image of thought’ (NP 96-98): thinking operates 
between the (differential) determination of the Idea in thought and its dynamic 
unfolding, its actualization in space and time, but, in so doing, does not presuppose a 
correspondence or harmony between the two—rather, it constructs or creates this 
relation through a synthesis of difference that does not appeal to a pre-established 
identity.  
 
Needless to say, this account requires much clarification, which this thesis will provide 
as it proceeds. Initially, however, I wish to simply emphasise, on this basis, what this 
thesis intends to achieve: on the one hand, a reconfiguration of sound studies’ relation 
to sound qua object, and, on the other, a concrete demonstration of sound studies as a 
theoretical practice constituted on the basis of such a reconfiguration. In sum, this 
thesis will attempt to produce in practice that which it describes in theory, while 
overturning the distinction between the two: a creative, constructivist theoretical 
                                                        
4 This term, a vital one for Deleuze, is effectively Deleuze’s reformulated conception of 
essence; thus, it refers both to Platonic forms and to the Kantian Idea—as that which (though 
differently in each case) provides the ground or unity for the diversity of what appears—but is 
divested, by Deleuze’s act of conceptual invention, of its presupposition of identity or stasis; 
the Idea becomes simultaneously differential and dynamic. This conception of essence will be 
outlined more fully in Chapter Three. To this end, I will primarily use the essence, rather than 
Idea, throughout; though it is generally not in keeping with Deleuze’s own usage, it will allow 
me to emphasise the continuity (and, thereby, the conflict) between my discussions of 




practice that operates in relation to, but not in reflection “on” or “about”, sonority. As 
a dramatization, this entails the differential production of an Idea of sound—that is, an 
account of what sound is—in and through an exploration of and experimentation with 
particular concrete cases in which this Idea has been effectuated. Importantly, 
however, these cases will themselves be conceived as “objects” of a distinctive 
practice, rather than simple cases subject to the imposition of a conceptual framing. 
 
Ultimately, the distinction between the critical and creative aspects of this thesis 
manifests in its oscillation between two related but distinct objects: the discourse of 
sound studies itself, on the one hand, and the work of John Cage, on the other. This 
coordination of objects is intentional: indeed, I wish to stress that sound studies has 
articulated its positions and defined its parameters in and through a continuous, 
conflictual and contested dialogue with the work of Cage. Thus, my critical 
engagement with sound studies both enables and demands a creative “interference” 
with the work of Cage, to the degree that it is in and through the latter that the former 
will receive its fullest justification. It is as a creative response to the demand of Cage’s 
work that this thesis ultimately offers a contribution to sound studies, insofar as such a 
response functions not as a solution to the uncertainties around which sound studies 
has continually turned, but as a reframing of the very problem of how thought 
responds to what it must think. Finally, then, this thesis functions as an experiment: it 
asks, what would sound studies be if it understood itself as a creative practice whose 
task was to produce the concepts that correspond to the work of musicians, sound 
artists, technologists, and all those whose concern it to explore and intervene in the 
capacities of sound? 
 
With this in mind, the bulk of this introduction will outline the concrete basis for such 
analyses—not only their validity, but their necessity; that is, it asks why sound studies 
is an object of concern, “today”? What is more, in what sense does the relation 
between sound and its study call for a response? In order to offer an initial defense and 
justification of my approach, then, I will turn to the discourse of sound studies itself, in 
order to assess its status and its contours, and, in particular, to emphasise not simply 
the particular problems upon which it has focused, but rather the fact that it has 
insistently pursued a meta-theoretical reflection on its own problematic status. It is on 




demands an interrogation of theoretical practice—and it is this demand that, in fact, 
constitutes the contemporaneity of sound studies. 
 
 
2. A Disciplinary Emergency: Sound Studies “Today” 
 
This thesis takes its initial orientation, then, from the questionable existence of a field 
called sound studies. The direction in which I will begin to pursue the sense of sound, 
or, put otherwise, the effectuation of the sonic Idea, will, first of all, follow the path 
traced out by this avowedly novel and contemporary discipline; yet this path, between 
sound and its study and back, will not be, as indicated above, a “merely” spatial 
figure, a static and stable abstract machine to map the conjunction of sense and 
sensation; it will be, simultaneously, a temporal one, in which this conjunction, 
whatever its conditions of success or failure, will be subject to an ineradicable 
dynamism, the dramatization of the Idea. How can sound come to be thought, under 
what conditions, and in which moments? As we will hear, this coupling of sound and 
thought, of sensation and sense, will necessarily oscillate between delay and 
anticipation, between a past in which we were not yet thinking sonority, and a to-come 
in which it “will have been” thought; each moment arrayed around the present, in 
which this delay and this anticipation modulate one another, and in which sound calls 
for us, as the unthought within thought, to take up the path of thinking. 
 
This dynamism is inscribed within sound studies itself to the very degree that it offers 
itself as a con-temporary discipline; that is, a field of study within which multiple 
temporalities are at play, and in which this very multiplicity is a mark of its intellectual 
currency.5 Sound studies perpetually marks itself as new, and thereby as meriting 
attention, precisely to the degree that it is overdue; what is more, it is continually re-
marked in this way, as always not quite done with the delay within which it is 
inscribed. In a 2005 review entitled ‘Is There a Field Called Sound Studies? And Does 
It Matter?’, Michelle Hilmes expresses this position with great clarity: ‘the study of 
sound, hailed as an emerging field for the last hundred years, exhibits a strong 
                                                        
5 I draw this sense of con-temporaneity from the work of Peter Osborne, in particular his 
recent text Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art, where he describes it as 




tendency to remain that way: always emerging, never emerged’ (249). Hilmes’ remark 
indicates that not only is the study of sound still not yet a fully established discipline, 
but that it may even have some inherent, essential tendency to remain in abeyance—
perpetually awaiting those who would claim this disciplinary space, and occupy this 
point of intersection between sound and its study.  
 
If we have heard, in subsequent years, steadily increasing amplitude in discussions 
around sound, a mass of publications and conferences articulating themselves under 
the name of sound studies, this is not to say that this space has finally been made 
habitable. Rather, sound studies’ occupation of this space situates itself upon explicitly 
uncertain ground, unsure of where precisely it is located, or of the security of its 
position. As a way to immediately evidence this, we can note that Jonathan Sterne, in 
his introduction to 2012’s The Sound Studies Reader, finds it necessary to cite the 
above remark from Hilmes, marking, even from within what John Mowitt calls ‘the 
decisive avatar of any and all new fields’ (that is, the “reader”), this moment of 
uncertainty, arrayed ambiguously between a history of perpetual emergence and its 
endlessly-delayed completion (2011, 10). The elapse of seven years may have made 
sound studies a recognizable field of academic endeavor, yet it has done little to erase 
its oscillating, elliptical temporal dynamic. The presents/presence of sound studies are, 
it seems, continually undercut by delay and deferral, in which sound studies has 
always not quite yet emerged. 
 
Such, then, is the present of sound studies—a present indexed, immediately and 
persistently, to an elsewhere, or, rather, an elsewhen. In this introduction, I aim to 
mark out the contours of this ambiguous disciplinary space, to trace the rhythms of its 
dynamic, in order to isolate the way in which this discourse has marked for itself an 
uncertain territory—or rather, a territory of uncertainty, in which the status of studying 
itself is at stake. As I hope to show, sound studies’ attempt to formulate itself as new 
and as pressing, to the very degree that it is belated and uncertain as a mode of 
analysis, forces us to take up a set of questions around the very activity of analysis 
itself. To echo Michelle Hilmes, we must ask: what is it, and what is it for? We who 
wish, today, to pursue and preserve the motivating impetus of cultural studies as a 
field of analysis—to wit, the desire for a mode of analysis that would bear 




that this analysis itself must be understood as both project and formation, rooted 
within a historical conjuncture and possessing the necessity imparted to it by that very 
conjuncture—must take up the question of why, today, sound demands study.6 As 
Stuart Hall puts it, in cultural studies there must always be something ‘at stake’, 
something upon which we are willing to wager our theoretical intervention (278). This 
is a further sense with which I want my opening remarks to resonate—the direction we 
are to take is not simply that of thinking subjects towards the object of our knowledge, 
but of practitioners of the concept directing our work towards what we hope it may 
still be possible for thinking to do. Why, then, does sound call for thinking? At play is 
the spatio-temporal topography of thinking itself: how can we think about sound, and 
why has such thinking still not taken place? 
 
As the preceding remarks have hopefully indicated, I do not wish to pose these 
questions in abstract, to the degree that this latter adjective has some pejorative 
sense—signifying thinking performed in a detached manner. Rather, I want to show 
how abstraction itself—which is to say a distance inherent to thought itself—is 
demanded by any concrete encounter with the questions themselves, posed and 
reposed within the discourse of sound studies; it is within this context that abstraction 
becomes something more than detachment, and within which its true power becomes 
evident.7 I will begin, rather, from the material, in the sense that one refers to “course 
materials”; I want to track, through the field of sound studies as it exists, (perhaps) 
today, the points at which its self-understanding manifests in an uncertainty over the 
very thinkability of sound—sound as that which cannot be thought, but must be 
thought, and whose paradoxical status qua (non)object of a discourse forces us to take 
up, as a problem, the very activity of thought itself, and the construction of its 
“objects”. To appeal, once again, to Stuart Hall, we must approach theoretical work as 
something that ‘historical conjunctures insist on’ (283, my emphasis)—which is to 
                                                        
6 My reference is to two highly significant texts reflecting on both the past and the future of 
cultural studies: Raymond Williams’ “The Future of Cultural Studies” and Stuart Hall’s 
“Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies.”  
7 I am alluding here to Deleuze and Guattari’s claim, in A Thousand Plateaus, that linguistics 
does not miss its object (which is to say, language as a practical reality, or, in Marx and 
Engel’s words, ‘practical, real consciousness’ (49)) by being too abstract, but rather by being 
‘not abstract enough’ (156). Clearly, there is a revision of the concrete/abstract relation taking 





say, call for—but which, for this very reason, is itself only ever a tentative and 
uncertain response to something that both exceeds and precedes it. 
 
I want to begin by situating my method, in this diagnostic reading of sound studies, in 
relation to that of a major figure within this “emergent” discourse: the above-cited 
John Mowitt. Mowitt’s work has not only contributed, in a sense we have yet to 
determine, to sound studies as a discipline, but has done so in a manner that positions 
the question of disciplinarity itself as central to any possible “contribution”. My own 
attempt, then, to map the terrain of sound studies according to what I have called the 
dramatization of the Idea is necessarily indebted to Mowitt’s pioneering work. I want 
to approach the “material” of sound studies by way of this work, to the very degree 
that this work raises the question of material itself as a disciplinary problem: a 
problem of delimiting a field, circumscribing an object, and determining the 
conditions under which the practice of thinking materializes itself in, first and 
foremost, a set of texts. 
 
In both of Mowitt’s two books on sound to date, Percussion: Drumming, Beating, 
Striking (2002) and Radio: Essays in Bad Reception (2011), there is an attempt to 
reflect upon the problem of how theory might “respond” to sound, on the one hand, 
and how such a response might coordinate itself as part of a field, as one response 
amongst many, on the other.8 I want to take up, initially, not only this question of 
method—of the how of studying sound—but also Mowitt’s own manner of posing this 
question in Radio in particular. As noted previously, in the introduction to this text 
there is an imbrication between the question of whether, and in what sense, radio could 
become an object of study, and what the object of such a study would be; in the first 
case, he refers to that which the study is exercised upon, and in the second, that which 
such a study hopes to achieve. What is more, as Mowitt indicates, each of these two 
questions, with their respective senses of the object, is inextricable from the seemingly 
more mundane question of the institutional determination of a field. Mowitt, having 
                                                        
8 Mowitt’s most recent book on sound, Sounds: The Ambient Humanities, was published in 
July 2015 and, as such, will not be considered directly here. However, it should be noted that 
Mowitt himself, in the introduction to this text, performs his own extension of the logic of the 
texts discussed here in relation to sound studies—though the texts he “samples” are different 
to my own choices (with the exception of Hilmes) and his interest and emphases, in doing so, 




set up this relation between two senses of the ‘object of radio studies’, finds it 
necessary to ask, as Hilmes did before him: ‘what evidence is there that something 
called radio studies has emerged as a field of academic endeavor?’ (7). What I want to 
take, principally, from this text is the way in which Mowitt draws these considerations 
together, demonstrating that the question of disciplinary emergence is of necessity 
connected to the object and objective of study; it is on this basis—a material basis—
that sound studies can be said to offer us some initial orientations for an attempt to 
think the sonic. This last point is key, for it is the very paradoxical dis-orientation of 
the paths sound studies has traced out that is, as I hope to show, the motivating 
impetus behind my own analysis. 
 
With this in mind, let us consider how Mowitt responds to his own version of Hilmes’ 
question—what evidence could we offer that radio studies might have emerged as a 
discipline? Evidently, an answer to this question points us towards what Mowitt refers 
to as ‘something like the conditions of emergency themselves,’ conditions whose 
‘signal’ he hopes to attune to by ‘cycling back and forth between radio and its study’ 
(4). Once again, the question of object, study, and field is articulated in terms of a 
distributed space across and between which we, as scholars, must navigate and upon 
which, I would suggest, thought itself takes (or perhaps makes) place—and the 
question of disciplinary emergence is a question of how this space is arrayed, how its 
distinctive topography is established; ultimately, that is, how the dynamism of the Idea 
(as the discipline’s specifically problematic object) is traced. As noted, I want to take 
up Mowitt’s method for investigating this space, in the case of radio studies, in order 
to transpose them to that of sound studies; however, I also want to take up something 
of the nature of this space Mowitt uncovers in his examination of radio studies—it 
possesses, as I have insisted upon above, a peculiar temporal dynamic which we can 
recover in sound studies itself. With this in mind, I will begin by outlining more fully 
Mowitt’s method, but with an eye (or rather, an ear) towards the specific conclusions 
his investigations draw. 
 
For Mowitt, the evidence for radio studies’ emergence is not to be sought in terms of 
some theoretical advance that would have, at last, made radio into an object of thought 
in the narrow sense, orientating the field towards the subsequent accrual of knowledge 




paradigm shifts’, but rather the ‘apparent banalities’ that form the ‘institutional 
micropractices of academic social reproduction,’ such as ‘conferences, […] 
publications, [and] reviews’ (7). Again, the lesson of cultural studies is well-learned: 
these two moments, the theoretical and the institutional, are entirely inextricable when 
it comes to determining the conjuncture within which we, as theorists, are operating—
or, put otherwise, the terrain upon which we navigate. On this basis, the evidence 
Mowitt adduces for radio studies’ existence is drawn from two articles in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education, and the introduction to a reader entitled Radio 
Reader: Essays in the Cultural History of Radio; texts whose function, institutionally-
speaking, is to describe, to summarise, or to otherwise account for the stakes and 
status of the field itself. What Mowitt is seeking here, however, is not simple 
description; rather, he casts his ear towards what he terms, following Derrida, the 
‘logic of iterability’ as it presents itself within the practice of citation (9). That is to 
say, these texts, which in their distinct ways attempt to account for and to describe 
radio studies as a discipline, in fact perform its very emergence by citing and re-citing 
certain names, texts, and concerns. As Mowitt puts it, the practice of citation ‘co-
produces something like the factual density of [the] scholarship’ that is cited, as well 
as both affirming and ensuring its ‘centrality’ (9). 
 
Such texts, then, indicate the strong sense in which we can refer to ‘institutional 
micropractices’ in all their materiality; what is indicated is the sense in which they 
actively produce, as opposed to merely describing, the ‘factual density’ of scholarship, 
within and alongside a set of institutional conditions, limitations, and orientations; 
they do so not within the domain of an intellectual activity supposedly decoupled from 
the material conditions within which it is performed, but rather through an active 
working on and in those conditions. The space of radio studies, as an emergent field, is 
therefore irreducibly material, in the sense in which Marx and Engels deploy the term 
in their materialist conception of history; it is the active working of this material—
textual, institutional, and otherwise, taken in both a subjective and objective sense—
that conditions the theoretical armature by means of which the field apprehends its 
object.9 Nowhere is this relation more clear than when Mowitt turns to the particular 
                                                        
9 The invocation of Marx and Engels here raises, implicitly, another of cultural studies’ central 
questions—that of the relation between base and superstructure. The sense in which the former 




contours of radio studies’ emergency; and it is this point where my interest shifts from 
Mowitt’s method of enquiring into the field’s existence, to the specific conclusions he 
draws about its distinctive topography. Before bringing Mowitt’s own method to bear 
upon sound studies, and thereby making material—in the sense of significant—the 
claims with which I opened regarding the particular dynamic of sound studies, I want 
to consider this institutional-theoretical intersection as it operates within radio studies, 
insofar as this operation draws attention to the distinctive temporality of this 
intersection. 
 
Mowitt hears the first subtle murmur of this temporal dimension in Peter Monaghan’s 
text for the Chronicle of Higher Education. Monaghan’s text situates radio studies, on 
the one hand, through a form of retrospection: ‘[Monaghan] makes it clear that the 
pursuit of the cultural studies of radio remedies a deficiency, it supplements a lack’ 
(8); it is a case, as Monaghan puts it, of the field ‘rectifying a deficiency’ (quoted in 
Mowitt, 8). That is to say, radio studies is situated in relation to a past marked, 
pejoratively, by the absence of such study. This deficiency and lack, in turn, allow us 
to figure radio studies as an intellectually ameliorative project, deriving its very 
positivity, its significance as a mode of study, precisely from this negative moment, in 
relation to which it functions as a timely response. To this end, Monaghan’s account 
deploys, in Mowitt’s words, ‘“intensifiers” like fast-growing, most-cited, spate, and 
the ever-reliable if utterly exhausted new’ in order to ‘perform the sudden, irreversible 
advent of a breakthrough’ (8, original emphasis), stressing the way in which it is 
precisely this belatedness of radio studies that provides it with its theoretical force. 
 
What must also be stressed here is that, according to the logic of iterability referred to 
above, the citations to which Monaghan applies these “intensifiers”—in this case, the 
work of none other than Michelle Hilmes—achieve their ‘factual density’ precisely 
through the act of citation itself, and, in particular, the capacity for such citations to be 
continually re-cited. When Mowitt turns to Thomas Doherty’s subsequent article for 
the Chronicle, he notes that Doherty’s specific characterization of the field of radio 
                                                                                                                                                                
Raymond Williams in his influential “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.” I 
do not intend to intervene in the debate here, except to indicate that the sense in which I use 
“condition” here is not to be understood in a narrowly linear fashion, but one which is 





studies is less important than the ‘reiteration, or repetition, of coverage itself’ (9). One 
might ask, on this basis, where this leaves the relation between the two objects of radio 
studies with which Mowitt and I both began—that is, that which it is “about”, and that 
which it intends to pursue. Mowitt is careful to counter any impression that this 
iterative (re)production of a field is intended to cast doubt upon the field’s 
substantiality, or to suggest that it is a matter of reverberations within the academic 
echo chamber; to the contrary, its significance is precisely that it forces us to trouble 
this distinction between what constitutes the theoretical “content” of a discipline, as 
opposed to its institutional “form”; put otherwise, we could say it is a question of the 
work of theory itself, in the fullest sense, and the way in which it produces its object. 
Mowitt suggests, in a manner that will become extremely significant for my 
engagement with sound studies, that, far from being an extraneous concern, ‘iterability 
can be shown to belong to the very object of radio studies’ (10). 
When Mowitt turns to Hilmes’ introduction to Radio Reader, this temporal dynamic of 
iteration, citation, and repetition is given an even greater significance by means of an 
allusion to Freud in one of the text’s subtitles, ‘Return of the Radio Repressed’. For 
Mowitt, this allusion, perhaps ‘unwittingly,’ provides us with a way of figuring more 
pointedly the relation of delay and iteration he tracks through these texts, and which he 
identifies as key to not simply the description of radio studies but rather, as indicated 
above, to its performative production as a field in and through such scholarly 
‘micropractices’ as, in this case, reviews and readers. For Mowitt, what the invocation 
of repression makes clear is the way in which the structure of delay figured by 
Monaghan into the very disciplinary logic of the field—in particular, the way in which 
the field, to invoke Hilmes’ review cited previously, matters—is not an empirical fact 
of intellectual history that can be separated from the theoretical content of the field, 
but is rather caught up with the very conditions under which this (or any other field) 
can emerge at all. For Mowitt, the iterative nature of the study of radio, by analogy 
with Freud’s account of repression, is not a case of merely re-covering an object 
previously overlooked, turning our scrutiny upon that which has been left too long in 
the dark; if this were the case, the belatedness of radio studies would derive, simply, 
from the socio-cultural and technological fact that radio was rapidly superseded by 
television as the central mass-broadcast medium of Western consumer capitalism in 




engagement it deserved. To the contrary, Mowitt remarks, ‘[i]f radio can return as the 
repressed, according to Hilmes, it is because the event of its advent and perhaps even 
more of its decline has acquired meaning, for the first time, with its return, its 
reiteration, in radio studies’ (12). 
As such, the delay through which the very re-iterative dynamic of radio studies’ 
emergence is conditioned is fundamental to both the existence and the significance of 
its object—in both senses. This dynamic is not merely one of retrospection—turning 
our eyes upon a lost object to uncover its cultural significance—but of retroaction, in 
which the significance of the object is produced across the distance that marks it: ‘In 
other, albeit somewhat cryptic words, radio must always have mattered twice in order 
to matter once’ (11). What clues, then, does this analysis offer us with regard to the 
similar dynamic we began to discern in relation to sound studies? To presage my own 
conclusion, I want to show how, in the transition from the specific concern of radio 
studies to the broader attempt to engage sonority “as such”, precisely the same spatio-
temporal dynamism of studying emerges—the studying of “studies” as marked, in 
relation to sound, by a structure of delay in which thought only ever comes later, in 
the form of an après-coup.10 The broader question I wish such an analysis to raise is 
that of how, within this dynamic constitution of the field across and between sonority 
and its study, we are forced to consider the very practice of studying itself, in order 
that we might begin to discern, if only in the faintest of whispers, what calls for us, 
today, to begin, at last, the task of thinking sonority—and what capacity we might 
possess to respond to such a call. 
 
 
3. Diagnosing The Delay: On “Not Yet” Thinking Sound 
 
As noted, then, I want to take up Mowitt’s own methodological procedure, and 
consider my own set of source texts, sounding them for their own iterative logics in 
                                                        
10 I use this term here not only to draw further upon the Freudian dynamic of retroaction 
within the uncovering of the repressed and traumatic content—with après-coup being the 
French translation of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit—but to gesture forward to the work of Bernard 
Stiegler, whose engagement with the intersection between time, thought, and technicity 
deploys this term in order to indicate the fundamentally retroactive nature of thought’s 




relation to the production of something called sound studies, with its own distinct 
“object”. First of all, I will return to Michelle Hilmes’ review, cited at the outset. It 
must be noted that, for Hilmes, the perpetually deferred completion of sound studies’ 
emergence has an explicitly pejorative sense; she goes on to suggest this deferral 
indicates that ‘it simply does not matter to enough people in enough disciplines that 
the study of sound consolidate and declare itself’ (249). Not only does this imply that 
this tendency implicitly demands a negative response to the second of her titular 
questions (that is, it indicates that sound studies does not, at least yet, matter), but also 
highlights the criteria by which, for Hilmes, emergency would be measured: sound 
studies would have to both consolidate and declare itself—functions which, following 
Mowitt, we could attribute to the very genre of publication in which Hilmes is 
operating here. Clearly, for Hilmes not only must the field’s territory be clearly 
circumscribed, and made consistent, but sound studies must also stake a claim for 
itself, for its existence and significance—it must make a noise. A failure to do so 
would render it definitively marginal: ‘Perhaps sound study is doomed to a position on 
the margins of various fields of scholarship, whispering unobtrusively in the 
background while the main action occurs elsewhere’ (249). What, we are impelled to 
ask, is the source of this tendency, which is pushing sound studies towards this 
unfortunate outcome? Why has the study of sound not yet, after a century of trying, 
managed to make itself heard? Only on condition of diagnosing this failure will we be 
able to, at long last, heed the call of sonority—even if such audition will, as we have 
heard above, be of necessity marked by its retroactive orientation. 
Hilmes herself proffers an explanation for sound studies’ delay—though, in the spirit 
of the iterative logic of citation identified by Mowitt, she claims to merely ‘echo the 
position that most writers on the topic attribute to sound,’ serving to both consolidate 
and declare a general position that we could identify under the name of sound studies, 
albeit a position that, paradoxically, declares sound studies to centre upon a 
fundamental incapacity (249). This explanation relates precisely to the paradoxical 
object of sound studies itself: ‘sound itself,’ as object of study, is, according to this 
generally-held position, the source of sound studies’ tendency to remain so much 
background noise, insofar as it is ‘constantly subjugated to the primacy of the visual’ 
(249). Sound “itself” is thereby contrasted to a sensory modality—vision—in relation 




have insistently figured as the central concern this thesis, is positioned as one that is 
necessarily mediated by a particular form of sense experience—a key attribute of 
sound would be, precisely, the sensory modality of audition that determines what 
sound is as object of analysis. What is more, this sensory modality would be, in some 
way we have yet to define, less satisfactory in supporting this relation between object 
and study, with the effect that sound studies is less capable of sustaining itself as a 
field.  
It remains to be heard the extent to which this incapacity of audition manifests itself as 
a spatio-temporal phenomenon—which is to say, a concrete dynamism marking the 
Idea of sonority—but even a casual glance at the way in which the distinction between 
audition and vision is commonly parsed within sound studies indicates the priority of 
the different temporal and spatial dynamics accorded to each: vision, as static and 
distanced, is contrasted to audition as immersive and dynamic.11 Do we not find here, 
incarnated in the sensory modality through which sound studies, of necessity, 
articulates itself as a field of study, the problem faced by the field’s conceptual self-
orientation: that is, an inability to get a clear view of the object it hopes to scrutinize, 
caught instead continually within a disorientating set of oscillations affecting the 
topological and temporal parameters of the field itself?  
This is no doubt a promising line of explanation, but one that leaves us beset with 
difficulties as budding sound students, to borrow Jonathan Sterne’s phrase. How 
would it be possible for sound studies to have done with its long emergency if the very 
way in which study can be brought to bear upon sound relies upon a mode of sensation 
whose capacity to produce knowledge is perpetually in question? Clearly, sound 
studies must diagnose more precisely the nature of this incapacity in order that it might 
ameliorate it; otherwise, the field itself will remain, as Hilmes fears, only a marginal 
concern. Yet it also seems that, for those working in the field, it is precisely the 
secondary, marginal nature imputed to audition, and thereby to “sound itself,” that 
provides sound studies with its significance and its contemporaneity. It is, as with 
radio studies, the very interplay of delay and retroaction that determines the object—in 
                                                        
11 For an exemplary case, see the opening of Aden Evens’ Sound Ideas: Music, Machines and 
Experience: ‘Partly because sound is dynamic, Western intellectual traditions show a marked 
preference for vision as the figure of knowledge. We articulate more effectively the fixed 




both senses—of sound studies; in a certain sense, then, the resolution of this delay may 
serve only to eliminate the very ground upon which sound studies established itself as 
a contemporary concern for cultural theory. We must not be too hasty to have done 
with the questionable nature of the sonic object—nor, it follows, with the emergency 
of sound studies itself. 
In order to unfold this argument more fully, I want to consider an almost exact 
repetition of Hilmes’ claim in David Suisman’s introduction to his edited collection 
Sound in the Age of Digital Reproduction. For Suisman, sound studies is a pressing 
concern for scholars today insofar as it may in fact mark a break within the history of 
Western knowledge itself. This history, according to Suisman, has relied upon a 
‘hierarchy of the senses’ in which audition is subordinated to vision; the citation of 
Aristotle to substantiate this claim suggests the degree to which the suppression of 
audition may in fact be coextensive with this history, putting the structural delay of 
sound studies at around twenty-five hundred years and counting (4). Vision, Suisman 
elaborates, ‘informs our knowledge of the world much more than the other senses,’ to 
the extent that ‘visual metaphors […] suffuse everyday language’ (4);12 such remarks 
are virtually identical to those offered by Hilmes, though she herself, to recall, 
professed merely to echo the position of ‘most writers on sound’. If Suisman therefore 
invokes the ‘unique possibilities that thinking about sound can open up,’ this is to the 
degree that, in some as-yet-undetermined way, thinking about sound—which is to say, 
the coupling of sound with its study, of thought with what it must think—must resist 
the dominant frame of reference through which such couplings have been articulated 
since the very origin of Western thought. For these bold and significant aspirations to 
be achieved, however, thought itself must somehow become aural. What could this 
mean? What relation might such sonic thinking have, moreover, to the spatio-temporal 
dynamic of studying itself? It is not easy to see what would enable us to constitute 
sound studies as a field at all—particularly so long as we continue to strain our eyes in 
looking for an answer, rather than attuning our ears to the call of thinking. 
This last remark must remain ambiguous for now. Prior to elaborating it more 
extensively—and returning, to that end, to my initial remarks regarding the spatio-
                                                        
12 For an instructive illustration of this fact for the English language, see the opening page of 
Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes (1). Jay also notes that the very term theory has its root in the 




temporal dynamism of thought itself as a practice—I want to turn my third and final 
example through which I aim to illustrate the centrality of delay and deferral to the 
very contemporaneity of sound studies: Jonathan Sterne’s “Sonic Imaginations,” the 
introduction to his 2012 edited collection The Sound Studies Reader. Once again, we 
are taking up an exemplary case of the ‘micropractices of academic social 
reproduction’; as John Mowitt puts it, and as we noted above, the reader is ‘no doubt 
the decisive avatar of any and all new fields’ (2011, 10). Again, we find here more 
evidence to suppose that the subsequent years have heard sound studies emerge from 
its marginality—could there be any clearer form under which a field could both 
consolidate and declare itself, as Hilmes demands? Yet Sterne’s introduction itself is 
replete with uncertainties around the very act of consolidation and declaration; it even 
affirms the very incoherence of both the object and the method of study whose 
conjunction would, as we have supposed, constitute sound studies as such. In seeing 
(or rather, auditing) why, we can begin to shift the angle of our analysis further 
towards the very nature of this conjunction itself. 
To begin, it is worth noting that Sterne himself is dubious about precisely the claims 
we have seen Hilmes and Suisman articulate above: that is, the notion that vision and 
audition are to be opposed according to a set of mutually-exclusive criteria, with one 
set being more suitable to the procedures of knowledge than the other. Sterne refers to 
this opposition as the ‘audiovisual litany,’ first elaborated in his 2003 book The 
Audible Past—one of the objects, as it happens, of Hilmes’ review cited at the outset 
(15-18); by this term he means to indicate this position’s implicit invocation of a 
universal, transhistorical essence for each of the senses. For Sterne, such an essential 
distinction between sensory modalities fails to attend to the historicity of the senses 
themselves, as gestured to by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts: ‘The forming of the five 
senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present’ (Marx, 353; 
quoted in Sterne 2003, 5). It was on this basis that the purpose of Sterne’s earlier study 
was, in part, to establish the relationship between advances in recording technology 
and practices of listening, within the ambit of a broader account of something like an 
aural modernity. This project presumes, of necessity, that claims such as those 
articulated by Hilmes and Suisman are reliant upon an unexamined premise: that the 
senses themselves remain static throughout history, with merely their relation at stake. 




of a delay marked principally by our incapacity to do so—ultimately, then, the claim 
that we must finally begin to think (about) sound—makes a set of assumptions about 
both sense experience and the relation of sensation to knowledge that, for Sterne, we 
are not entitled to make. 
Be that as it may, we can only note at this stage that, regardless of its consistency, the 
claim of a structural delay in our sonic thinking, related to some disjunction between 
sonority and thought itself, is present within the literature to the degree that Sterne 
himself must acknowledge it within his introduction, however much he might dispute 
its premises. What is most significant is that, in doing so, he must embrace within the 
ambit of sound studies a plurality of both objects and approaches to the degree that the 
very unity he is, at least implicitly, seeking to articulate in presenting the field’s very 
first reader is radically threatened—as we will hear, it is not even clear what sound 
“itself” might even be, qua object of analysis, nor how this object might become 
thinkable, at last. In concluding my account of the sound studies’ emergency, then, I 
want to emphasise the way in which the field not only finds itself incessantly caught in 
a dynamic of delay and suspension, at whose core is the very relation of thought and 
audition itself, but that this dynamic serves to undercut the very sense of the terms that 
the field hopes to conjoin. We are left, at last, with the question not only of how we 
might study sound, but also that of what both sound and its study might be—or might 
become. It is on these terms that I will ultimately circle back to the work of John 
Mowitt, to uncover in his work a suggestion as to how we might begin to probe this 
uncertain relation, having at last suspended the question of whether sound studies 
exists and matters in favour of the prior question—logically speaking, though in fact 
the question that only comes at the end in practice—of how, and in what sense, sound 
itself might call for thinking, to the very degree that it calls thinking itself into 
question. 
With this longer-range goal in mind, let us turn to Sterne’s introduction. In his 
presentation of the state of sound studies, as a means to introduce the texts the reader 
gathers together, Sterne is clearly well aware of the phenomenon that we have already 
audited: in defining itself as new to the very degree that it is marked by a delay, the 
emphasis of sound studies comes to be placed, insistently, upon the very possibility (or 




only implicitly, an acknowledgement of the ways in which this uncertainty oscillates 
between object and subject, between sound and its study—and it is this between that I 
want to insistently emphasise as the locus of my interest, the point at which I take 
sound studies to have identified, albeit rarely in an explicit way, a question of the 
practice of thinking itself.  
To this end, we can observe how Sterne notes, as we have in the preceding, the way in 
which ‘even the most basic attempts to define the one of the [sound studies]’s central 
concepts, “sound”,’ have forced the field to take up ‘abstract questions’ of an 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological nature (2012, 7). I want to focus 
attention on one such question mentioned by Sterne that is exemplary for my present 
concerns: the question of whether sound must be thought of in relation to a specific set 
of auditory capacities (as Sterne himself argued in The Audible Past), or if, on the 
contrary, we can figure sounds as ‘having their own “ontological” existence’ 
irreducible to any particular phenomenon of audition (7). That is to say, is sound to be 
thought for us, or in itself? Here, the relation itself occupies centre stage, the space of 
theory itself brought within the ambit of sound studies’ analyses: how might the 
thinking subject articulate sound? Must it be as something that it encounters from 
without, or as a phenomenon always-already indexed to the capacities of the thinker 
(however essential or contingent these may prove to be)?  
Sterne’s (necessarily brief) account of this question hedges his earlier commitment to 
the former option in The Audible Past,13 in order to stress the plurality of responses 
offered within the field itself, such that we can sense, at the heart of sound studies 
itself, a dissensus as to what it is that is to be studied. Most importantly, however, 
Sterne is unequivocal in claiming that it is not viable to simply opt out of this debate, 
even if the field itself has failed to identify an agreed-upon solution: ‘No sound student 
can write anything of substance without at least implicitly taking a position in these 
debates’ (8). The truth of this claim is borne out just as easily as Hilmes’ remark on 
the prevalence of the vision-sound opposition through a consideration of the literature 
                                                        
13 In this text, Sterne argues that the very concept of sonority only makes sense in relation to 
human capacity for audition, as it is only this capacity that distinguishes audible vibrations 
from inaudible ones, and therefore those that we call sounds from those that we do not: ‘Sound 
is a very particular perception of vibrations. You can take the sound out of the human, but you 
can take the human out of the sound only through an exercise in imagination’ (11). I will 




in the field—something that I hope to demonstrate as I proceed. Thus, the field itself, 
just as in Hilmes’ case, is invoked within the ambit of a debate that we might situate at 
the transcendental rather than empirical level; that is, it is not that this or that particular 
analysis of sound, or some fact of sonic history, that is a matter of fundamental dispute 
within sound studies, but rather the very nature of the discipline itself: under what 
conditions can sound be studied? The indisputable existence of the field itself should 
not be taken to mark an answer to this question, but rather to indicate the intractability 
of the question itself. 
 
I will return to this specific problem in sound studies at various stages of this thesis, 
insofar as it marks a vital intersection between the concerns of sound studies and 
Deleuze studies and, therefore, a privileged point for my own intervention. For both 
discourses, this question is the site of a struggle increasingly articulated as one over 
the future of theoretical and philosophical work as such: have we reached the limits of 
the implicitly idealist and phenomenologically-determined approaches that have (it is 
claimed) characterized cultural theory since the advent of the so-called “linguistic 
turn”, and is there, therefore, a necessity to formulate a form of theory that would be 
resolutely realist and/or materialist in its premises and its practices?14 My response to 
this, that will be unfolded both directly and implicitly during the course of this thesis, 
will be to seek to undermine this forced choice, and the presuppositions upon which it 
is based—which will pass under the name, central to Deleuze’s work, of the image of 
thought. Immediately, however, we can hear how what is fundamentally at stake in 
either formulation is the relation of a practice of thinking to the object upon which it 
reflects; it is, as indicated above, precisely the terms of this problem that Deleuze’s 
work brings into question, insofar as the problematic Idea of sound will take on a 
sense that radically reconfigures the sense of both object and essence. I will return to 





                                                        
14 Such a claim is well summarized in the introduction to the 2011 collection The Speculative 




4. Calling and Responding: Sound as Provocation 
In sum, then, this brief detour through the literature on sound studies (rather than, 
strictly, the literature of sound studies) gives us some indication as to how the field 
itself has been constituted over the last decade. Perhaps the most concise summary of 
this material would be to say that it indicates Michelle Hilmes offered us, in certain 
respects, a false choice (related to, but distinct from, the forced choice between the in 
itself or the for us, as I will indicate): sound studies exists precisely to the degree that it 
is still emerging, and not yet emerged. What is more, sound studies’ existence relies 
upon a meta-theoretical (re)cognition of this process, a reflexivity of the discourse in 
which emergency is not simply brought to a close but examined as it continues to take 
place; sound studies remains, as a field, in a state of emergency, and it is this state that 
gives the discipline its sense. From this, I draw the following conclusions. Firstly, 
sound studies is irreducibly and fundamentally caught in questions of the temporality 
of study itself, marking itself as ‘always emerging’ to the degree that it is always 
functioning across and within a temporal delay that is, in fact, constitutive for it as a 
field; put otherwise, sound studies is operating with a present that is always 
simultaneously pulling toward a past in which sound was not yet thought, and a future 
in which it will have been. As such, the study of sound raises the question of the 
temporal relation of study itself: the delay of the study becomes a study of delay. This 
leads to the second point: sound studies, by virtue of this temporal dis-orientation, 
raises the question of how, and in what ways, the conjunction of study and its object 
takes place—or makes a place for itself. I re-invoke, then, my opening remarks about 
the spatio-temporal dynamics of thought itself, but here as observations—or perhaps 
acts of listening—called for by sound studies itself. 
It is at this stage that I wish to recast these analyses in terms that are, once again, 
drawn from the work of John Mowitt. My aim here is to reformulate this general 
problem of sound and its study within the conceptual thematic of call and response, in 
a way that I hope draws greater attention to the specifically sonic dimensions of this 
spatio-temporal dynamics of studying, to which I take sound studies to be insistently 
drawing our attention. In Percussion: Drumming, Beating, Striking, Mowitt invokes 
this figure of call and response in the context of an account of what specifically 




theoretical practice, in this text, involves the construction of what we might say, 
bearing in mind the above-cited remarks from Radio as well as the opening discussion 
of Deleuze, is a specifically theoretical object—in Deleuze’s terms, a concept—which 
he terms the ‘percussive field’ (5); to foreground what will be a key concern of this 
thesis, we can note that on a preceding page he specifically refers to the activity of 
‘construct[ing] the concept of the “percussive field”’ in order to indicate the 
theoretical work his text is doing (3). This constructivist emphasis is designed ‘to 
imply both that [the concept] is imported into the domain of musical practice from 
elsewhere and that it is solicited from this elsewhere by what is taking place in musical 
practice’ (5). On the basis of my preceding formulations, then, we can say that the 
activity of studying involves the production of a specifically theoretical construct that 
is, on the one hand, exterior to that object that it is designed to study, and, on the other, 
is ‘solicited’ by that object. Or would this be, perhaps, to speak of two distinct objects 
whose correlation is at stake in the attempt at some grounding of theory’s analytical 
efficacy?15 As noted previously, Mowitt himself refers, in Radio, to a ‘volatile zone of 
indistinction between the world—whether physical or psychical—and the 
institutionally organized production of knowledge […] about that world’ in order to 
indicate this uncertainty surrounding the nature of the object in theory (2).  
I will return to this problem of the object at length in subsequent chapters, but firstly I 
wish to note that it is in attempting to clarify the sense and scope of this ‘solicitation’ 
made by music to theory that Mowitt invokes the figure of call and response. He 
remarks that, in the ‘idiom’ of rock-and-roll in particular, his analysis of the 
percussive field is ‘predicted or called for’ (5, my emphasis), and goes on to suggest 
that, in making such a remark, ‘part of [his] aim [is] to raise the issue of theory’ (12). 
                                                        
15 I use the term “correlation” deliberately here in order to bring within the ambit of my 
account recent debates within cultural theory and continental philosophy over the idealist 
inheritances of questions such as those I pose here. As mentioned previously, a re-turn to 
materialist and/or realist commitments on the part of philosophers and cultural analysts has 
been proposed as a way to move beyond the supposedly outplayed problematic we inherit 
under the moniker of the “linguistic turn”; the latter, to use a term coined by Quentin 
Meillassoux but now granted currency far beyond his initial usage, is incessantly focused on 
the “correlation” between the knowing subject and that which it knows, to the degree that what 
Meillassoux terms the ‘great outdoors’ of the world in-itself is excised from the bounds of the 
thinkable (7). To this degree, twentieth-century cultural theory and philosophy would be 
inescapably Kantian in its scope and significance. Needless to say, my remarks thus far should 
suggest that I do not take the problem of correlation to be so easily done with, though, as will 
become clear, I would seek to reframe the terms of this problem in such a way that the forced 




Part of the ‘issue’ of theory, for Mowitt, is the unfortunate fact that ‘theory often 
remains “for external use only”—that is, for application,’ wherein the ‘theoretical 
work is brought to the music, which is then illuminated through it.’ How might theory 
be written such that, rather than being applied from without, it rather ‘responds to the 
call of musical practice’?16 For Mowitt, it is a question of giving music ‘the authority 
to provoke theorizing’; theory responds to this provocative call by ‘discovering in this 
encounter other possibilities of elaboration, other orientations.’ From what we have 
already heard, we are gradually attuning ourselves to the possibility that music, and 
sound more generally, is ideally suited to make such a demand; not only is it 
something that insistently calls to us, as scholars, without, as yet, receiving a definitive 
response, but, in doing so, it raises ‘issue[s] of theory’ that reach as far as theory’s 
very nature as an activity, or a practice, of thought. 
On the one hand, this reformulation allows us to develop more precisely the 
suggestion, made above, that it is the very difficulty theory faces in relation to sound 
that grounds both the existence and significance of sound studies—it indicates, 
precisely, that sound is a provocation for theory, and the fact that theory is incapable 
of simply ‘smothering’ this provocation ‘like a salve,’ making sound all-too-thinkable 
by lowering the amplitude and eliminating the feedback, is, in fact, a marker of the 
necessity for attempting to think it. Sound, as seems clear from our preceding analyses 
of Hilmes, Suisman and Sterne, is calling for something that theory has, as yet, been 
unable to proffer; therefore, theory itself must discover ‘other orientations.’ Yet, on 
the other hand, there is another reading this reformulation may allow us to make of the 
current state of sound studies: we might ask why, for so long, this call has gone 
unheard, much less answered, and whether theory is capable of offering any response 
at all. As Sterne indicated, it is unclear what it is in sonority that calls for thinking—
does sound itself transmit the signal, or is it simply our own auditory capacities that 
                                                        
16 In this text, Mowitt is focused specifically on music, and hence some of the concerns we are 
dealing with here do not fall within the frame of his enquiry. The way in which the concerns 
and doubts of sound studies over the analysability of its object can be heard to emerge in 
concert with the progressive decoupling of sound from music in the realm of cultural practice 
during the twentieth century will be a central topic of Chapters Two and Three; at this stage, I 
would simply note that the very generality of the sonic is central to its problematic status as 
object of enquiry, and this generality is foregrounded precisely at the moment when the 
division between musical and non-musical sound ceases to be binding in the definition of a 
specific medium of cultural production. It is on this basis, historically speaking, that “sound 
itself” becomes a problem for thought, and hence John Cage is accorded a priority in defining 




are making themselves heard to us? Moreover, from Hilmes and Suisman we 
encountered the possibility that theory itself simply cannot operate in this register—
that is, we have encountered the continually re-iterated claim that, whether essentially 
or through the historical trajectory of Western knowledge, theory simply cannot listen 
at all. How, then, are we to proceed? 
As I have indicated previously, I do not consider these two interpretations to be 
mutually exclusive—that is, I take the provocation of sound studies to be precisely the 
demand to rethink our very capacity to respond, theoretically, to any call whatsoever. 
Moreover, I consider the very emphasis on the call and/as provocation within 
Mowitt’s text to indicate an initial line upon which to pursue this suggestion. In Radio, 
Mowitt draws briefly upon a philosopher for whom thinking is inseparable from 
calling: Martin Heidegger. Moreover, as we will see, Heidegger’s account of the 
relation between the call and thinking is one marked by delay, deferral, and an 
insistent uncertainty over our capacity to hear the call, to listen to what it tells us, and 
to respond accordingly. As such, I want to begin my account of what the provocation 
of sound might do to theoretical work, in particular, and thought, in general, by taking 
up a question I have posed insistently thus far in a Heideggerean register: why, today, 
does sound call for thinking? In pursuing this question, we will have to rewind and 
replay many of the insights sketched out above, renewing their meaning in a different 
key. Ultimately, it will be a question of resituating what has been presented above as a 
narrowly disciplinary affair—even if we can extend this discipline as far as the ever-
widening ambit of cultural theory in general—at the level of contemporary thought 
itself. As such, if we wish to ask, on the basis of sound studies’ provocation, why 
sound today might call for thinking, we are also obliged to ask what thinking might be 
today, and what it might still yet become. In doing so, we must investigate the 
contours of the con-temporary itself, in order to see precisely what new 
(dis)orientations thought, under the strain of making sound’s call audible, might be 









Chapter One: The Tele-Phonic Call of Thinking 
 
How can the theoretical work of sound studies be (re)figured as the response to a call 
emanating from the “object” of such studying—that is, from “sound itself”?17 
Moreover, what would constitute the objecthood of this object, if it no longer occupies 
the focal point of our subjective scrutiny, our act of theoria? Finally, what would be 
the nature of the renewed relation between that which calls and the work of the 
response? Both the distinct terms and their conjunction remain in question. It is these 
questions that we have inherited from John Mowitt’s investigation into the conditions 
of disciplinary emergency, and together they function as both a provocation and a task: 
we are incited to pursue the work of theory otherwise than as the extrinsic application 
of a pre-existing conceptual framework to an object supposedly given, to instead place 
thinking in contact with that which calls for theorization. This amounts to a re-
orientation of the fundamentally representational nature of the theoretical act as such, 
in which thought, the operation of the subject defined as thinking thing, apprehends 
and masters its object; thought, as we will hear, must become a passion, which, by the 
same token, will constitute its paradoxical becoming-active.  
 
In our survey of the field of sound studies, we discovered a set of animating 
constraints with which any attempt at such a reformulation contend: it seems that 
sound calls for theorization today to the very degree that it has still not been theorised, 
its emergence as a field predicated upon a perpetual emergency stemming from the 
resistance of sound itself to the prevailing theoretical models—or perhaps, at its limit, 
to the very image of thought itself. How are we to at last hear the call for theorisation 
that sound itself emits, today more than ever, if thought registers only optical stimuli? 
On the one hand, it is clearly a question of diagnosing the nature and the source of this 
theoretical deafness, upon which much of the most interesting work within sound 
studies bases its own significance. Are our limited capacities of response to blame, or 
is it perhaps the nature of the call itself? What strategies would offer themselves to us 
                                                        
17 As noted previously, the sense and the value of this term is the source of much debate in 
sound studies, insofar as the discipline founds itself upon the theoretical negligence of sound 
itself as an object—as distinct, for instance, from music, or even from sonic experience more 
narrowly. The emphasis upon this term—either to embrace or to repudiate its status as the 
object (in both senses, as Mowitt reminds us) of sound studies—is linked to the priority of the 
work of John Cage in such debates, insofar as “the sounds themselves” were Cage’s own 




for ameliorating this incapacity, based on the diagnosis proffered—what theoretical 
ear-cleaning techniques, what amplificatory conceptual devices, would aid us in at last 
making the call audible, in at last broadcasting an appropriate response?18 
 
The task of this chapter is to begin answering such questions through an interrogation 
of the figure of the call itself, sounding out its auditory resonances and testing its 
capacity to function as an immanently sonorous figure of theoretical work—a figure, 
moreover, that puts sonority as the service of a re-visioning (or, rather, re-auditing) of 
what it means to think. Yet, for this very reason, the call functions as an opportunity to 
sound the depths of philosophy’s resistance to audition, to which sound studies itself 
has so frequently alluded; in what ways might the figure of the call be susceptible to 
such noise-dampening tendencies, and what might it tell us about the possibility for 
resisting them? It is these questions that this chapter hopes to explore. 
 
 
1. Answering the Call: Heidegger’s Silence 
 
As noted in the introduction, the figure of the call for thinking deployed here is 
adopted from the work of Martin Heidegger, whose lecture course of 1951-52 Was 
Heisst Denken? poses the question of what calls for thinking and, simultaneously, of 
what is called thinking; that is to say, the title articulates the contiguity of the 
questions of thought’s definition, of what essentially passes under the name of 
“thinking”, and of its source, of that which solicits thinking from us—questions which 
are thereby taken to be inseparable. This figure of the call proposes to us, then, the 
necessity of articulating thought through the framework of a demand, in relation to 
                                                        
18 At the level of metaphor, such remarks display an unfortunate ableism, not uncommon in 
texts that indicate the relative inattention to sonority within the history of cultural theory and 
philosophy. I deploy them here in the hopes that my subsequent argument will help to mitigate 
these discriminatory implications, in two ways. Firstly, I wish to show that, in constructing 
what Deleuze refers to as an image of thought, the metaphorical-literal distinction does not 
hold—or, rather, that everything becomes literal in the act of laying out a plan(e) upon which 
thought can “take place” (see, on this point, François Zourabichvili’s account of Deleuze’s 
‘literality’ (DP 139, 142)). Secondly, and in relation to the particular status of this plane as 
real as well as ideal (which is to say, in Deleuze’s parlance, virtual), both sensory and 
conceptual capacities are always-already determined by concrete technical “supports” that 
determine their nature and range (and here Deleuze and Guattari would refer to a ‘machinic 
assemblage’); therefore any pre-given distinction between natural and artificial, innate or 




which the “activity” of thought would itself become a passion—thought would be 
defined, essentially, in response to that which calls for it, rather than through the 
(representational) act of the subject qua thinking thing, the cogito sum. It is this calling 
that would mark out that which essentially passes under the name “thinking”, from all 
the forms of pseudo-thinking that, in Heidegger’s account, endlessly bedevil it. 
 
To this extent, the figure of the call is already implicated within the texture of sound 
studies’ disciplinary constitution, as sounded out in the introduction: the call 
articulates the way in which some “object” solicits thinking from us, just as, according 
to sound studies, sound itself does “today”—and, to recall, the status and significance 
of this “today” remains in question. There is, with regard to this temporal dimension, a 
further key aspect of Heidegger’s account of the call of thinking that makes it a 
privileged vector for (re)formulating the demand of sound studies: for Heidegger, that 
which is called thinking has not yet taken place. As he famously puts it: ‘Most 
thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking’ (WT 
6). Thus, the very contemporaneity of “our time” is defined, by Heidegger as by sound 
studies, in accordance with a delay—thought is to be, at last, provoked in us to the 
very degree that we are marked, collectively, by its ongoing deferral, in and through a 
paradoxically constitutive “still not.” The question for Heidegger, much as for sound 
studies, then, is that of how to begin thinking, at last. This “at last” is not incidental, or 
pejorative; as Heidegger puts it, ‘[t]hat which is primally early shows itself only 
ultimately to men’ (BW 327), a claim that could equally mark the significance of 
sonority as of thinking within our to-be-determined contemporaneity.  
 
As prospective sound students attentive to the sonic richness of Heidegger’s discourse, 
then, we must ask: how are we “at last” to pick up the call to think sound, to make it 
audible, and to interpret that which it calls on us to do? It is in investigating the 
significance of such a demand that my own analysis will begin—a beginning that will 
ultimately only serve to bring into focus the question of beginning itself.19 
 
                                                        
19 To this end, Chapter Two will begin with this same question taken up in a new sense—one 
demanded by the results of Chapter One—and will therefore, effectively begin the thesis 
again, repeating this opening with a difference whose distance should be taken to mark the 
movement of thought itself. It will hopefully be made clear that this structural device is 





To begin with a repetition, let us consider the statement around which Heidegger’s 
lecture course of 1951-52 turns: ‘Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking 
time is that we are still not thinking’ (WT 6). Whatever it is that might be called 
thinking, then, and whatever might call for it, the present to which Heidegger 
addresses himself is defined by its absence—‘our thought-provoking time’ is the time 
of the ‘still not.’ Initially, then, we are incited to pursue this determination of our 
present—if, indeed, it remains “ours” sixty years later—as one which is thought-
provoking to the very extent that it is still not thinking, called to think insofar as the 
call continues to ring out, unanswered. Formulated in this way, thinking is, we can 
surmise, a question of transmission and reception—of picking up the call, at last.  
 
Given this, two questions press themselves upon us, as Heidegger’s deferred auditors 
(and the situation of the lecture hall must itself be borne in mind throughout): firstly, 
why is “our time” marked by this ‘withdrawal’ of thought, which is ‘not nothing’ (WT 
9) but which rather ‘draws us along’ with it; and, secondly, how might we begin to 
hear the provocation our time offers to us precisely in and through the drawing of this 
withdrawal? In tracing Heidegger’s response to these questions, we will be able to 
discern how the figure of the call is pushed towards a tele-phonic problematic—that is, 
a question of transmission and audition—that will, at the same moment, find itself 
repressed, divested of significance and consigned to a superficial level of his text. 
 
In taking up this question of ‘our thought-provoking time’, we are pursuing a 
diagnostic function for philosophy, or, perhaps, for the “studying” of studies in 
general—the philosopher or theorist as clinician of civilization, in a Nietzschean vein 
(see DI 140). We are attempting to articulate the present as a moment that lacks 
thinking, in the hope of ultimately curing ourselves of such thoughtlessness in and 
through this very articulation. Inseparable from Heidegger’s articulation of the call, 
then, is a critical engagement with his—and perhaps still our—present. In relation to 
sound studies, in particular, any engagement with the Heideggerean call must 
articulate this aspect of historico-temporal diagnostics. Thus, prior to asking how and 
why the call of thinking remains unanswered, it aids our investigation to seek some 
general account of this present in Heidegger; what, for Heidegger, was the nature of 





His answer is clear: “our time” is variously referred to as a ‘technological age’, an ‘age 
of the machine’ (WT 24), an ‘atomic age’ (DT 49) and an ‘industrial age’ (BW 436), 
to pick out a few instances that are roughly contemporaneous in his writings. It seems, 
then, that our time is equally defined, for Heidegger, by the presence of particular 
forms of technology as by the absence of thinking. Are these two moments, positive 
and negative, related? For Heidegger, this is certainly the case; and I want to offer a 
brief (and, therefore, somewhat schematic) account of this connection between thought 
and technics in Heidegger for two related reasons. Firstly, my argument that the figure 
of the call in Heidegger demands a tele-phonic articulation directly implicates a 
relation between thought, technics and audition; yet, as I will show, the con-
temporaneity of ‘our thought-provoking time’ is defined, precisely, by the reciprocal 
exclusion of two of these elements. Secondly, as a longer-term goal of my analysis in 
this chapter, I wish to claim that, following Bernard Stiegler, any attempt to define 
“our time”—that is, any attempt to articulate a collective temporality—must in fact 
appeal to a technicity that is necessarily constitutive for such a temporality; the 
reasoning for this will develop out of the tensions inherent in Heidegger’s own attempt 
to suppress such an articulation. In both these cases, I am to show that sound studies, 
in its very con-temporaneity, is bound up in the problem of thought and technics, a 
problem that, as I hope to indicate, turns upon the very status of the “and”.20 
 
With these goals in mind, let us take up the relation between the absence of thought 
and the (omni)presence of technology in Heidegger’s account of ‘our thought-
provoking time.’ As with thinking, however, we face an immediately hermeneutic 
problem: what is called technology? Though, as with thinking (and, famously, with 
Being), we might appeal to a generally-available sense of such a term, nevertheless 
Heidegger’s approach will not and cannot be satisfied with an appeal to common 
sense. The hermeneutic in Heidegger is always allied to the ontological; the question, 
more precisely, is: what is technology in essence? From Plato onwards, Western 
                                                        
20 As Lee Braver notes, for Heidegger, “and” was the ‘most important word in the title of 




philosophy has known that particular things cannot be offered as solutions to the 
question of essence; Heidegger himself retains this premise.21 Consider the following:  
 
Modern technology is not constituted by, and does not consist in, the 
installation of electric motors and turbines and similar machinery; that 
sort of thing can on the contrary be erected only to the extent to which the 
essence of modern technology has already assumed dominion. Our age is 
not a technological age because it is an age of the machine; it as an age of 
the machine because it is a technological age. (WT 24, my emphasis) 
 
Clearly, though “our time” is both ‘a technological age’ and ‘an age of the machine,’ 
these characterizations are not equivalent; rather the latter is derivative in relation to 
the former—and not simply in the sense that the machine is a subset of the broader 
category of technology. The key term here is essence, and everything hinges on 
understanding its function; without doing so, the superficially exclusionary relation 
between thinking and technology in Heidegger’s account of “our time” will remain 
obscure. 
 
To stress this import, let us consider a related, famous claim of Heidegger’s: ‘the 
essence of technology is by no means anything technological’ (BW 311). This 
quotation, from “The Question Concerning Technology,” is repeated almost verbatim 
in Was Heisst Denken?: ‘The essence of technology is above all not anything 
technological’ (WT 22). Needless to say, though Heidegger will invoke the classic 
metaphysical distinction between a thing and its essence—just as the essence of a tree 
is not itself a tree, in Heidegger’s example—he is not merely reiterating the traditional 
definition. For Heidegger, the essence of a particular being, or set of beings, is that by 
means of which it appears as what it is22—which, for Heidegger, must be rooted in 
Being itself, as distinct23 from all particular beings. A sufficient engagement with 
Heidegger’s account of the ontological difference (that is, the difference between 
Being and beings) is far beyond the scope of this thesis; I will only establish, 
                                                        
21 Deleuze engages with this argument in an important way at NP 71; see Chapter Three for a 
discussion. For a famous instance Plato (and one to which Deleuze is implicitly referring in 
the above-cited passage) in, see Republic, 200-202. 
22 As the introduction to Being and Time indicates, this conception of essence is central to 
Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology as investigating precisely the means by which 
things show themselves as what they are: the phenomenon is the self-showing of a thing, and 
the logos is that which lets something be seen as it is (BT 51-58). 




schematically, a few necessary points. For Heidegger, Being is “that” in and through 
which any particular beings appear to us, but is not itself a being—Being is that which 
gives beings to us, and Heidegger will insistently play on the homonymy between “it 
gives” and “there is” in German: es gibt. However, this giving of Being is covered 
over and concealed in the very beings that are given to us: Being itself, as Heidegger 
will put it elsewhere, ‘shows itself and withdraws at the same time’ (BQ 178); it shows 
itself as beings, but withdraws as Being. It is on this basis that we can understand 
Heidegger’s famous re-formulation of truth as aletheia, un-concealment: being 
withdraws in and through the very entities that it discloses to us, hence we “forget” 
Being itself in favour of those entities, or articulate Being as merely one (particularly 
significant) being amongst others. This occlusion of the ontological difference is, for 
Heidegger, at the core of Western metaphysics. 
 
With these general points in mind, we can intuit that, for Heidegger, the essence of 
technology must relate to the givenness of Being, rather than just to particular 
technical beings, such as ‘electric motors and turbines and similar machinery’ (WT 
24); these latter beings, as Heidegger notes, can be ‘erected only to the extent to which 
the essence of modern technology has already assumed dominion.’ This essence is 
defined, in Heidegger terms, as a ‘mode of revealing’ (BW 319); that is, a particular 
way in which Being is disclosed to us in and through a set of beings that are 
appropriate to this disclosure. A mode of revealing thus determines the kind of beings 
we can encounter; as such, technical beings are possible solely on the basis of the 
mode of revealing that constitutes technology’s essence, without which we would be 
unable to encounter them. Returning to the figure of the call with this in mind, we can 
note that, in Heidegger’s work, man is persistently positioned as passive in relation to 
Being, which gives beings to us (and references to Being in terms of a gift abound in 
Was Heisst Denken?). As Heidegger puts it, a particular way of revealing is initiated 
not through the activity of man, but through a ‘sending’ or ‘destining’ of Being (BW 
329). All the ‘technological activity’ that man engages in, and through which we 
might characterize industrial modernity, in fact ‘merely responds’ to this sending (BW 
326). The response, importantly, always comes after—in relation to that which calls to 
us, or that which gives to us, both thinking and technics can only ever be an after-





We are seemingly validated, then, in our initial intimation that problems of 
transmission and reception are central to Heidegger’s work with regard to Being as 
much as to thinking; and this proximity between the two is borne out when we ask, 
finally, was heisst denken? What is called thinking, and what calls for thinking? For 
Heidegger, both question are asking after the Being of beings. It is Being that ‘gives us 
[…] the gift of what must properly thought about’ (WT 17), and thinking itself can be 
defined as ‘relatedness to Being’ (WT 110); thought’s ‘proper trade,’ moreover, is ‘to 
rip away the fog that conceals beings as such’ in order to reveal them in their Being, to 
establish a ‘real openness in [man’s] relatedness to Being,’ an ‘essential relation’ 
without which man could not be ‘save[d]’ (WT 89). Heidegger is even more explicit 
on this point in the “Letter on Humanism”: ‘Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of 
Being’ (BW 220). Thus, what calls out to us to be thought is Being itself; thinking 
would be our response to this call. Yet, was not the essence of technology itself a 
sending of Being, and technological activity our response to it? It is once again a 
question, then, of two types of connection or two relations of transmission between 
Being and man—one of which does not deserve to be called thinking. 
 
This reading is borne out by the fact that in certain instances Heidegger will articulate 
the conflict between thinking and technology in terms of two kinds of thinking; 
technology is itself allied with what Heidegger calls ‘one-track thinking’ (WT 32), or 
‘calculative thinking’ (DT 46). In elaborating this distinction, there are two points I 
want to make. Firstly, that the contrast between the two demands to be articulated in 
terms of the problem of transmission and mediation, wherein the latter is distinguished 
from the former by a failure to hear the call sent to us by Being in an authentic way. 
Secondly, I want to indicate how this problem itself leads us to the question of the 
meaning of “thinking”, and how we, as auditors, are to hear what is essentially named 
through that word, as against those resonances it bears in our unthinking technological 
age. Drawing together these two points, I hope to indicate that Heidegger’s discourse 
repeatedly draws us towards a tele-phonic account of the call of thinking—while 
nevertheless rendering such an account impossible. Ultimately, I want to indicate that, 
in a manner that cuts contrary to Heidegger’s own language, and even to the topology 





Taking up the first point, then: in what sense is the ‘one-track’ or ‘calculative 
thinking’ that characterizes the essence of technology somehow exclusionary of 
genuine thought? In order to observe the broad thrust of Heidegger argument we need 
to clarify the nature of the ‘sending’ or ‘destining’ of Being that constitutes the 
essence of technology. Heidegger defines the mode of revealing proper to modern 
technology as enframing (Gestell), and what it reveals to us is not any particular 
technical object (which is to say, it is not determined by, for instance, machinery as 
opposed to handicrafts, even if Heidegger sometimes seems to be suggesting this), but 
rather beings as a whole as a standing-reserve (Bestand); that is, beings are revealed as 
something on-hand for our usage, ready and waiting to meet our needs. As Heidegger 
puts it: ‘The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to 
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and 
stored as such’ (BW 320). Subsequently, he qualifies this storing as a form of 
“standing-by”: ‘Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering’ (BW 
322). Enframing, then, is the name for the mode of revealing in which all beings 
appear to us as ‘the objectlessness of standing-reserve,’ that pre-ordered and always 
available set of indistinct “things”, no longer even objects, on which we may rely and 
of which we may make use without ever explicitly thematising their nature, their 
significance, or even their existence. 
 
In sum, then, enframing, as the essence of technology, discloses all beings as standing-
reserve, as an indistinct mass, ordered and maintained on-hand to meet our needs. This 
ordering places man in a position of apparent dominance: ‘…the illusion comes to 
prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct’ (BW 
332). This is necessarily an illusion, for Heidegger, insofar as, to recall, all revealing, 
even that of enframing, is ultimately a sending or destining of Being, to which all the 
activity of man ‘merely responds’ (BW 326); as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, 
‘the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human 
handiwork’ (BW 324); hence, not only is the essence of technology not anything 
technological, it is also ‘not anything human’ (WT 22). It is in this sense that 
enframing ‘conceals revealing itself’ at the same moment as it ‘drives out every other 
possibility of revealing (BW 332-33); enframing essentially conceals revealing by 





Let us return, with this in mind, to the characterization of thinking from the “Letter on 
Humanism”: ‘Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of Being.’ This remark is 
particularly instructive insofar as it requires of Heidegger a clarification regarding the 
status of the genitive, a clarification that will allow audition to intrude into thought 
itself:  
 
The genitive says something twofold. Thinking is of Being inasmuch as 
thinking, propriated by Being, belongs to Being. At the same time thinking 
is of Being insofar as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being. As the 
belonging to Being that listens, thinking is what it is according to its 
essential origin (BW 220, my emphasis).  
 
Thinking must listen to the call of Being in order to be that which is genuinely called 
thinking; the one-track thinking that marks the essence of technology does not do so, 
insofar as it does not attend to its own status as a response to that which calls. Rather, 
it positions all beings as effectively determined in and through human activity, and 
subordinate to the immediate demands of the latter. It is therefore ‘one-sided,’ because 
it does not register the call coming from afar—from Being—and remains only with 
and alongside beings; it does not register that these beings are, in fact, a gift of Being, 
for which we must give thanks. It should be no surprise, on this basis, that one of 
Heidegger’s first attempts to characterize authentic thinking in the ’51-’52 lectures 
passes by way of an etymological connection between thinking and thanking (WT 
159). 
 
Such formulations indicate that, for Heidegger, if we are at last to begin thinking, then 
thought must become a passion at the same moment as it becomes audition; that which 
calls for thinking can only be heard through recognizing that man himself receives the 
call, and does not send it, and in listening closely to both that which calls to us, and 
what it calls on us to do. For Heidegger, humanity can become ‘truly free’, and so 
escape the ‘supreme danger’ with which technology, qua enframing, confronts “us”, 
‘only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens’ 
(BW 330).24 We are in a position to ask, then: how we are at last to begin thinking, for 
                                                        
24 I will return to the problem of the collective subject in Heidegger later in this chapter; at this 




Heidegger? How are we to (re)establish our essential relatedness to Being, and 
overcome the fact that ‘man does not yet turn sufficiently toward that which, by origin 
and innately, wants to be thought about’ (WT 7)? To do so, we must listen to that 
which calls for thinking, and to hear what is truly named in that call; yet, I hope to 
show that, for Heidegger, such an authentic encounter with the call of thinking is itself 
not audible but rather necessarily silent, and that, for the same reason, it must bypass 
any and all forms of transmission and mediation—that is, any insinuation of the 
technical. In spite of the insistently tele-phonic formulations that we have already 
encountered sustaining’s Heidegger’s discourse, it will emerge that, if we are finally to 
begin thinking, the call to which we must attend must be stripped of its tele-phonic 
character. Tracing out both why this is the case, and how it is achieved in Heidegger’s 
text, will be highly instructive for my broader argument. 
 
 
2. Listening Without Sound 
 
I have established that ‘our thought-provoking time’ does not yet think insofar as the 
dominance of modern technology, or, more precisely, the mode of revealing which 
underpins this dominance, prevents us from attending to that which calls for thinking: 
namely, Being itself. How, then, are we to at last pick up this call? Moreover, upon 
picking it up, how are we to understand what it is calling on us to do—that is, what is 
called thinking? We know that Being calls upon us to think; we know that thinking 
involves a form of relatedness to Being that technology, qua enframing, covers over. It 
would seem, in the first instance, that we are being invited to finally listen to the call 
that Being addresses to us, and to attend to the sense of this hailing; that is, we are 
incited to hear that which calls to us, and to understand that which is addressed to us in 
and through this call. Moreover, we must register, above all else, that this call comes 
from afar, from somewhere beyond us: it is neither our doing, nor our possession. The 
problem of beginning to think is a tele-phonic one, a problem of transmission, 
mediation, and audition—or so it would seem. 
 
Above, we have heard Heidegger articulate thinking in both sonic terms, through 
references to listening, and in terms of transmission, through the dynamic of sending 




wherein thinking would necessarily be called for, and this calling would indicate an 
appropriate response. Insofar as the problem faced by those who would authentically 
learn to think today is the dominance of modern technology, which reduces the giving 
of Being to the imposition of order upon beings, this figure, with all its tele-phonic 
resonance, serves to re-position thinking in terms of the priority of that which calls for 
it, and which ‘gives food for thought’ (WT 17). Yet this tele-phonic dimension is at 
risk of introducing into thinking a technical dimension that, for Heidegger, is not even 
the central threat to thinking in ‘our thought-provoking time’, but a superficial 
manifestation of this threat. For the problem of the tele-phonic is the problem of the 
medium, of the means of communication—that is, the problem of the instrumental, 
precisely the problem that any questioning concerning technology must surpass in 
order to reach the essential confrontation between technics and thought, as the opening 
moves of “The Question Concerning Technology” indicate. Instrumentality itself lies 
outside the true confrontation between calculative and meditational thinking, between 
that which is simply called thinking and that which authentically passes under this 
name. Therefore the medium, the milieu and the intermediary, cannot and must not be 
able to insinuate itself into that authentic ‘relatedness’ which would establish, at last, 
what is called thinking—or else thinking itself would become irreducibly technical, in 
a sense that, for Heidegger, is fundamentally inessential. 
 
It follows, then, that though the relation between thinking and technics may be 
implicitly staged as a contrast between two types of connection and two forms of 
transmission, Heidegger will find it necessary to eliminate all forms of mediation from 
not only that which will authentically be called thinking, but even from the essence of 
technological activity itself, effectively consigning both transmission and audition to a 
“merely” ontic register, outside the terrain upon which the struggle for the future of 
thinking would take place. Doing so, as may be apparent, will immanently unsettle 
Heidegger’s attempt to deploy the figure of the call as a model for thought: a call 
without distance, that covers no space or time, and institutes no gap between sending 
and responding, is not a call at all, and cannot, therefore, successfully characterize 
what is called thinking. Heidegger is effectively caught in a double-bind: in figuring 
Being as something that addresses itself to us from afar, to which we must hope to 
finally respond but which we are nevertheless capable of misunderstanding, Heidegger 




to or dependent upon man; yet in seeking to eliminate all (inevitably ontic, irreducibly 
technical) forms of transmission and mediation from this calling, he is forced to posit, 
if only implicitly, that the call of and for thinking can be apprehended im-mediately. 
To do otherwise would be to introduce technicity (and, as I hope to argue, audibility) 
into the essential relation between Being and thinking—a point that Bernard Stiegler 
will embrace in his reading of Heidegger, as I will go on to elaborate—yet resisting 
this possibility risks reintroducing precisely the self-contained cogito against which 
the figure of the call is directed. 
 
Before proceeding to consider that other major figure of calling in Heidegger’s work, 
the call of conscience in Being and Time, wherein the difficulty of Heidegger’s 
positioning on this point is most evident, I want to examine the way in which it 
already introduces a practical difficulty into the situation of the lecture course—that 
is, how it troubles the relationship between Heidegger and his auditors.  For if we are 
to begin to learn thinking, as Heidegger hopes we might, we are faced with the titular 
problem of what is called thinking—but this problem, in context of the lecture hall, is 
an auditory problem. What are we to understand in and through this sound Heidegger 
articulates and directs towards us: thinking. Although, of course, Heidegger does not 
say this, Heidegger says: denken. We must set this aside for now. Not only does 
Heidegger say thinking, he says we are still not thinking. As Heidegger’s deferred 
auditors, we must listen, and respond, to that which the statement names under the 
word “thinking”; what is it that we are still not doing exactly? Heidegger is well aware 
that one might object to his claim, perhaps pointing to ‘a lively and constantly more 
audible interest in philosophy’ (WT 4, my emphasis), or the fact that ‘there were at no 
time such far-reaching plans, so many inquiries in so many areas, research carried on 
as passionately as today’ (DT 45). Needless to say, this is not the thinking to which 
Heidegger refers—to the contrary, this voluble activity is the aforementioned ‘one-
track thinking’ or ‘calculative thinking,’ to the degree that it attends only to beings and 
not to Being, and has ‘the same essential origin as […] the precision of technological 
process’ (WT 54). What is at stake here is what is called thinking—what does this 
word name, and how are we to hear it, in a way that is not that of enframing, in a way 
that does occlude the giving of ‘that which, by origin and innately, wants to be thought 





The most pressing of Heidegger’s ear-cleaning exercises, then, propaedeutic to at last 
receiving the call sent to us by Being, are those that would prevent us from hearing 
only what is typically signified by the word “thinking”; if ‘we can learn thinking only 
if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally’ (WT 8), this means that 
we must be careful not to hear too readily that which is ‘named in the call’, too quickly 
understand ‘what it calls on us to do’ (WT 127). When the call calls on us to think, it 
is of no use to note that ‘[a]ll of us already have some ideas about the word “think”,’ 
since it is precisely such ideas that are to be placed in question. Thus, if we wish to 
begin learning to think, ‘it has become necessary to improve our ability to listen’ (WT 
55) in order that we might, at last, listen to Being: ‘…thinking is of Being insofar as 
thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being. As the belonging to Being that listens, 
thinking is what it is according to its essential origin’ (BW 220). In sum, then, for 
Heidegger we must not only hear what is truly called thinking in and through all the 
ready meanings we might attach to this word, but what we would hear is itself an 
injunction to listen. 
 
However, Heidegger himself will indicate to us that, whatever it may seem, this is 
simply not an auditory problem at all—that is, the confrontation between two senses 
of the word thinking bears no relation to the sounds that the listener may hear and 
subsequently misinterpret. Indeed, the very conception of discourse as involving 
‘terms’ that ‘first appear spoken when they are given voice,’ that are ‘at first a sound 
[…] perceived by the senses’ to which ‘signification attaches,’ is, for Heidegger, 
entirely false (WT 128-29). This instrumental conception in which ‘terms are like 
buckets or kegs out of which we can scoop sense’ (and note that Heidegger equates 
sound with tools here) misrepresents the true experience of audition. For, in fact, 
Heidegger’s (phenomenological) conception of discourse bypasses the ‘mere 
resonance’ of the ‘purely sensual aspect of the word-sound’ (WT 150). It is worth 
quoting Heidegger in full here: 
 
In order to hear the pure resonance of a mere sound, we must first remove 
ourselves from the sphere where speech meets with understanding or lack 
of understanding. We must disregard all that, abstract from it, if we are to 
extract, subtract only the sound and resonance from what is spoken, if our 
ears are to catch this abstraction by itself, purely acoustically. Sound, 
which in the conceptual field of this supposed “at first” [that is, when 




construct that is at no time perceived alone, by itself, nor ever at first, 
when we hear something spoken.  
 
The supposedly purely sensual aspect of the word-sound, conceived as 
mere-resonance, is an abstraction. The mere vibration is always picked out 
only by an intermediate step—by that almost unnatural disregard. Even 
when we hear speech in a language totally unknown to us, we never hear 
mere sounds as a noise present only to our senses—we hear unintelligible 
words. But between the unintelligible word, and the mere sound grasped in 
acoustic abstraction, lies an abyss of difference in essence. (WT 129-130) 
 
From within the ‘sphere where speech meets with understanding or lack of 
understanding’—that is, the sphere in which, we, as Heidegger’s auditors, may 
succeed or fail in understanding what he means by “thinking”—the ‘mere vibration’ of 
sound is ‘an abstraction,’ to which we would have to proceed by a mental effort. 
Sound is separated by ‘an abyss of difference in essence’ from meaning; as he goes on 
to state, ‘[a]s hearers, we abide in the sphere of what is spoken, where the voice of 
what is said rings without sound’ (WT 150, my emphasis). 
 
My claim is that the equivalence between sound and instrumentality indicated here 
demands Heidegger suppress the tele-phonic nature of the call for thinking, insofar as 
this call cannot be reliant on the necessarily, irrecoverably ontical nature of the 
technical object. What is thereby excluded and suppressed is the question of the 
medium and of transmission—a question that, as we will hear from Bernard Stiegler, 
is the instrumental question par excellence. However, in evading these questions in 
order to prevent their encroachment into the essence of the call itself, Heidegger finds 
himself forced to shore up the channel between Being and humanity, to make it direct 
and immediate in a way that cuts directly against the very function of the figure of 
calling itself. This is nowhere more apparent than in the structurally related figure of 
the call of conscience deployed in Being and Time, to which I will now turn. 
 
 
3. “It” Calls: Conscience Between The Who and The What 
 
In the context of my analysis here, the central question of Being and Time is the 
question of the who—that is, to whom does Being address itself? As I hope to 




distinguished thereby from the what, that is, from all other entities which do not have 
this capacity, at least potentially, to listen to Being—including, significantly, technical 
objects, named in Being and Time as the ready-to-hand. As my above remarks 
indicate, my intention is to demonstrate that Heidegger is forced to eliminate the tele-
phonic character of the call from his work, and introduce a direct line between Being 
and its addressee; in turning to the account of this addressee in Being and Time, where 
it is termed Dasein, we will be able to observe that not only must the who be preserved 
from the what in the guise of technical objects—that is, the instrumental—but that the 
figure of the call in this text operates to reaffirm this distinction, re-calling Dasein to 
its essential relatedness to Being, over and against those entities which do not have 
such a privileged connection. On this basis, we might suggest, setting aside the perils 
of the “turn” separating Being and Time from the later texts, that the call of conscience 
would serve the function of putting Dasein on the line with Being itself, allowing us to 
at last begin thinking.  
 
Whatever the validity of this proposition within the Heideggerean corpus, in offering 
an account of this possibility we will once again hear how the figure of the call cannot 
help but insinuate both technics and audition into the very essence of the relation 
between Being and Dasein, and thereby into thinking itself, engendering a tension at 
the core of Heidegger’s existential analytic that will ultimately frustrate the divide 
between the who and the what. Ultimately, exploiting with tension will allow us to not 
only define the recipient of Being’s call in technical terms, but to reinstitute the 
technicity of this calling as such. 
 
To begin, then, let us ask: who is Dasein? I will outline some key aspects of 
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein in Being and Time, in order that my subsequent 
account of the call of conscience is sufficiently clear; however, it should be noted that 
this is not by any means meant to be an exhaustive account of that analysis, 
empahsising only a very small number of key points.  
 
Dasein is the being that understands Being, insofar as it has an essential relation to its 
own Being: ‘Dasein, in its Being, has relationship towards that Being,’ and thus 
‘Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being’ (BT 32). 




Dasein is ‘ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an 
issue for it.’ This is as much to say that ‘Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is 
ontological’; it is the being that, in essence, can encounter Being’s transmission across 
the gap that separates beings from Being. Yet the claim that Dasein understands its 
Being as an issue indicates a further vital point: Dasein’s Being is an issue for it 
insofar as it understands its Being as indefinite and incomplete, not in fact but in 
principle. That is, the ‘issue’ Dasein encounters in relation to its Being is what 
Heidegger will later, significantly, refer to in terms of nullity (BT 329), an absence of 
determination that Heidegger famously relates to the indefiniteness of death; until 
Dasein reaches this always-receding point of termination, at a moment that can never 
be fully foreseen nor rendered in experience, it will be perpetually ‘ahead-of-itself’, 
projected towards this ‘not-yet’ of its end (BT 303).  
 
However, contrary to the Sartrean handling of this point,25 Dasein does not simply 
approach the ‘issue’ that is its own Being in a free and undetermined manner; rather, if 
Dasein is ‘ahead-of-itself’, and therefore ‘understands itself in terms of a possibility of 
itself’, this possibility is derived from the world into which it is, in Heidegger’s term, 
‘thrown’—that is, the world that it encounters as preexisting it, already established and 
providing a set of limitations and constraints upon the ways in which it can “deal” 
with the issue that its own Being provides. Far from freely choosing amongst an 
endlessly open series of possibilities, Dasein is confronted by a relatively 
circumscribed set of choices that it is able to make. As Heidegger puts it, ‘[i]n existing 
as thrown […] Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities,’ which are set out for it 
in advance (BT 330). 
 
It is on this basis that Dasein is essentially temporal for Heidegger, and the 
investigation of Dasein’s understanding of Being will be, of necessity, an investigation 
of temporality. As Stiegler puts it:  
 
Dasein is temporal: it has a past on the basis of which it can anticipate and 
thereby be. […] Dasein is in the mode of “having-to-be” because it never 
                                                        
25 The “Letter on Humanism” constitutes, in large part, an attempt to refute Sartre’s 
interpretation of the claim from Being and Time that existence constitutes the essence of 
Dasein (see Sartre 1989, 26). Interestingly, according to Dosse, Deleuze attended Sartre’s 




yet totally is; inasmuch as it exists it is never finished, it always already 
anticipates itself in the mode of “not yet”. Between birth and death, 
existence is what extends itself between “already” and “not yet”. (T1 5) 
 
Insofar as Dasein ek-sists in ‘perpetual incompletion,’ it is ‘incomparable with a 
what,’ and it is this status that ‘gives it a privileged and exemplary status among 
beings by its having access to Being’ (T1 214). That is to say, Dasein, as the who, is 
related to Being, uniquely, insofar as it stands outside of itself. In Heidegger’s own 
terms, Dasein ‘stretches along between birth and death’ (BT 425).  
 
The context in which this standing out “takes place”, in which this “between” is 
determined, continually and without fixed resolution beyond the deferred inevitability 
of death, is what Heidegger terms the world. In standing outside of itself as 
temporal—and Heidegger here makes use of the term ec-static to characterize this 
self-externality at the root of temporality (BT 377)—Dasein is essentially in-the-
world. This is not to say that Dasein is “in” the world as water is in a glass (BT 79), 
nor alongside it as a table stands by a door (BT 81); rather, Dasein as Being-in-the-
world is a ‘unitary phenomenon’ that must be ‘seen as a whole’ (BT 78, my 
emphasis), and Dasein, in a certain sense, is the world “in which” it exists. Rather than 
a subject set against an object—or the world as totality of such objects—Dasein is, 
again, between subject and object, as ‘the Being of this ‘between’’ (BT 170). 
 
Having established these preliminaries, in a cursory fashion, we are now in a position 
to ask: how is Dasein’s relatedness to Being dependent, in this case, upon the 
receiving of a call? In answering this, we have simply to ask: how does Dasein 
understand the possibilities amongst which it is able to choose, and how does it make 
such a choice? In indicating Heidegger’s answer to this question in Being and Time, 
we see once again the tragic dimension figured into man’s essential relatedness to 
Being—all too often, Dasein simply abdicates the necessity to choose, and allows 
choices to be made on its behalf, just as, in the later texts, it will fail to listen to the 
call of Being through the dominance of enframing as a mode of revealing. In doing so, 
it fails to listen to the address essentially made to it by Being, failing to acknowledge 
the essential understanding it possesses of its own significance, its status as a who. As 
we will hear, the function of the call of conscience is to re-call Dasein to this essential 





To establish this, let us consider the way in which Dasein gives up its own essential 
capacity to choose amongst possibilities, to acknowledge and take up the essential 
indeterminacy of its own Being. As noted above, insofar as it is thrown into a world 
that it did not choose, it is inevitable that Dasein will encounter a set of pre-established 
possibilities; what is more, this encounter will take place primarily through its 
engagement with Others. Dasein’s “there”, its world, is populated by Others who it 
recognizes as also having the character of Dasein, and through whom Dasein is able to 
understand itself—‘Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with’ (BT 161). It follows 
from this that Dasein does not always apprehend itself in terms of its essential 
indeterminacy—rather, as with what is called thinking, Dasein is liable to 
misunderstand its essential nature, by interpreting itself only according to a set of 
generally-available possibilities embodied in Others. Though Heidegger’s 
argumentation on this point is elaborate, I will be schematic of necessity: having been 
thrown into a set of pre-established possibilities by which its world is always-already 
determined, and which in fact grounds any possibility of Dasein’s having-a-world,26 
Dasein tends to become absorbed within this world and to live it vicariously through 
the possibilities already revealed through those Others: in its ‘everyday Being-with-
one-another,’ Dasein ‘itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. 
Dasein’s everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they 
please’ (BT 163-64). 
 
These Others are not particular people who Dasein comes across; rather, they are what 
Heidegger refers to as das Man, and which Macquarrie and Robinson translate as ‘the 
“they”’, in the sense of people in general—what “they” do, say, or think, perhaps 
better rendered by the pronoun “one”. Living this way ensures that each Dasein is 
interchangeable, and that ‘every Other is like the next’ (BT 164); the “they” demands 
a ‘“leveling down” of all possibilities of Being’ into ‘averageness’ (BT 165). In and 
through this leveling down, Dasein avoids any encounter with its own, necessarily 
unique possibilities of Being, the distinct and unsolvable question that is its own Being 
                                                        
26 Heidegger cautions against any interpretation wherein Dasein’s involvement within a pre-
established world, and the “falling” that results from this, can be surmounted once and for all; 





in/as time; in Heidegger’s parlance, Dasein does not encounter itself authentically 
(eigentlichkeit): ‘Everyone is the other, and no one is himself’ (BT 165). Thus, as 
noted above, Dasein generally fails to understand itself qua Da-sein, the Being who 
ek-statically stands out into the there and which, on this basis, lives itself as yet-to-be-
determined. In order to understand itself authentically, Dasein must somehow recover 
its Self from this lostness in the “they”: ‘As They-self, the particular Dasein has been 
dispersed into the “they”, and must first find itself’ (BT 167). How is this finding to be 
achieved? 
 
It is the call of conscience that, for Heidegger, enables Dasein to find itself—through 
the call (Ruf), Dasein is ‘summoned [aufgerufen] to itself—that is, to its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being’ (BT 318); it ‘summons Dasein’s Self from its lostness in the 
“they”’ (BT 319). Having established, briefly, this structural role for the call of 
conscience, we can note immediately that the same question obtains as with the call of 
thinking: how does this call reach Dasein, and how is Dasein to interpret what the call 
transmits to it? In exploring these questions, I want to note how, yet again, the figure 
of the call pulls Heidegger towards a tele-phonic problematic, while once again 
demanding the tendential suppression of both mediation and audition; moreover, in 
Being and Time this tension even more clearly implicates the problematic location of 
technics within Heidegger’s work. Thus, expounding the contours of the call in its 
earlier incarnation will allow us to turn, subsequently, to the work of Bernard Stiegler, 
whose work will explore and, ultimately, exceed, the limits Heidegger sets upon his 
own conception of technicity, in a way that is highly significant for my overall 
argument. 
 
To begin, then, we can note that, if the call of conscience is a ‘mode of discourse’ (BT 
316), and ‘gives us ‘something’ to understand’ (BT 314), then we once again face the 
question of meaning and communication—how does the call transmit this information 
to us? In this instance, Heidegger is even more explicit in the centrality that hearing 
has in discourse: ‘Hearing is constitutive for discourse’ (BT 206). Beyond this, 
‘hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its 
ownmost potentiality for Being.’ Thus, we need not be surprised that Heidegger would 
place such emphasis on the ‘voice of conscience’ (BT 313). Yet, once again Heidegger 




Heidegger’s position here is no different from that we have heard him articulate to his 
auditors in 1951 and ’52, as is evident from the following: 
 
What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the 
creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the 
north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. 
It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure 
noise’. 
[…] 
Likewise, when we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we 
proximally understand what is said, or—to put it more exactly—we are 
already with him, in advance, alongside the entity which the discourse is 
about. […] Even in cases where the speech is indistinct or in a foreign 
language, what we proximally hear is unintelligible words, and not a 
multiplicity of tone-data. (BT 207, original emphasis) 
 
Once again, the distinction between meaningful words and meaningless sound is taken 
as secondary; when we discourse with Others, we ‘already’ and ‘proximally’ 
understand what is said, in a manner that is not dependent upon audition. Thus, 
Heidegger will distinguish hearing in an physiological sense from what he terms 
hearkening: defined by Heidegger as ‘more primordial than what is defined ‘in the 
first instance’ as “hearing” in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of 
sounds’ (BT 207), hearkening ‘has the kind of Being of the hearing which 
understands.’ Hearkening, then, indicates Dasein is ‘essentially understanding,’ and 
‘already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world,’ without ‘first 
hav[ing] to give shape to the swirl of sensations.’ Thus, Heidegger goes on to remark, 
didactically: ‘Only he who already understands can hear’ (BT 208). 
 
Yet this hearing-that-understands is itself beset with difficulties, insofar as, as 
indicated above, what Dasein usually understands about its Self and its world is what 
“they” understand—it is, in fact, on the basis of this established understanding that it is 
possible for Dasein to understand “in advance” in the first place; that is, if we 
understand immediately, without passing through an encounter with the medium of 
communication (in this case, sonority), it is insofar as Being-in-the-World and Being-
with-Others involve being immersed in an existing set of significations: ‘Proximally, 
and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, 
which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the 




which Dasein is generally immersed is referred to by Heidegger as idle talk (Gerede). 
Through idle talk, Dasein discourses with others in terms of a pre-established and 
shared horizon of intelligibility that is itself never brought into question or explicitly 
thematized: it possesses an ‘average intelligibility’ such that what is discussed ‘is 
understood only approximately and superficially’ (BT 212); it is a form of ‘gossiping’ 
or ‘passing the word along.’ As Frances Dyson notes, this form of discourse demands 
to be figured as noise: ‘Gerede [idle talk] approaches the archaic sense of rumour: a 
continuous, confused noise, clamour, or din’ (89). Yet, as we have established, it 
cannot be noise in any acoustic sense, which lies wholly outside of understanding; 
indeed, the issue here, as with what is called thinking, is that understanding has been 
established in advance of hearing—‘[h]earing and understanding have attached 
themselves beforehand to what is said-in-the-talk as such’ (BT 212). It follows, then, 
that however the call of conscience is to cut through the noise of idle talk, it cannot do 
so at an auditory level, for the inauthentic understanding of Being expressed in the 
discourse of idle talk is already within the ‘sphere where speech meets understanding’ 
(WT 129). 
 
For Heidegger, then, Dasein often finds its ‘possibilities […] presented to it by the 
way in which the “they” has publicly interpreted things,’ and the ‘presenting of these 
possibilities’ is itself ‘made possible existentially through the fact that Dasein, as a 
Being-with which understands, can listen to Others’ (BT 315, my emphasis). In 
‘[l]osing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the “they”, it fails to hear its own 
Self in listening to the they-self’ (my emphasis). Yet, given that such listening is itself 
already not an auditory phenomenon as such, we should not be surprised to discover 
that the call of conscience, the function of which is to precisely call Dasein back to its 
Self from such lostness in the “they”, does not retain any auditory dimension. In fact, 
for the call of conscience to address us, to call us back from our lostness in the “they”, 
it must in fact proceed in the opposite direction—it must bear even less connection to 
sonority than the discourse of idle talk. Following his account of hearkening, 
Heidegger goes on to outline another ‘essential possibility of discourse’ of which the 
call of conscience will make use: ‘keeping silent’ (BT 208). Such silence stands 
against the ‘speaking at length’ or the ‘talking extensively’ that ‘does not offer the 
slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced,’ but which rather ‘brings 




signification of thinking brought to those too busy proclaiming ‘everywhere a lively 
and constantly more audible interesting in philosophy’ (WT 4) to attend to the 
provocation that we are still not thinking. Thus, when articulating the ‘mode of 
discourse’ of the call (BT 316), Heidegger remarks: ‘Conscience discourses solely and 
constantly in the mode of keeping silent’ (BT 318, original emphasis). It is this 
constitutive silence that ensures conscience is able to serve its function of 
‘summon[ing] Dasein from its lostness in the “they”’ (BT 234), drawing Dasein 
beyond not only hearing in the narrowly “psychological” sense, but even hearkening 
as a hearing that is immediately meaningful in relation to the everyday significations 
passed around in the idle talk of das Man. 
 
In spite of this disavowal of the role sonority might play in the calling of conscience, 
and of meaning in general—a view which, as we have heard, does not change when 
Heidegger goes on to take up a different call in the early nineteen-fifties—
nevertheless, the call of conscience continues to demand a tele-phonic figuration. Not 
only do auditory metaphors insist in Heidegger’s account of how we “hear” the call 
through the din of idle talk, but the very fact that the call exceeds us—that is, it comes 
from outside us and catches us unawares—suggests that it is somehow transmitted to 
us by means of some medium. Nevertheless, as in the call of thinking, these tele-
phonic resonances must be suppressed, at risk of fracturing the architecture of 
Heidegger’s text. In making this claim, I want to turn to the work of Avital Ronell, 
whose The Telephone Book traces the persistence of the tele-phonic within the auto-
dialling by which Dasein hails itself in an uncanny silence. In considering her work on 
this aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, we will hear how the problem of mediation 
insistently resurfaces in his attempt to figure the silent call, and how such mediation 
places Heidegger in an untenable position: either to make the call immediate, and 
thereby appeal to a self-contained and self-present cogito against which Being and 
Time insistently directs itself (see BT 46, 95 and 122-134 for Heidegger’s critical 
engagement with Descartes in particular), or to introduce technicity into the call itself 
by accepting that the self-relation essential to Dasein can only be established 
instrumentally. 
 
It is important to indicate, initially, the significance that the telephone does and does 




mere technological object’ (13); it is, ultimately, a ‘synechdoche of technology,’ if 
perhaps not of technology’s essence. The tele-phonic structure has certain key 
functions which we have already observed operating within the call of thinking: in 
answering the telephone, ‘[y]ou don’t know who’s calling or what you’re going to be 
called upon to do, and still, you are lending your ear, giving something up, receiving 
an order’ (2). To the degree that we are still not thinking, and especially to the degree 
that this not-thinking is dissimulated through our preoccupation with a calculative, 
technologically-determined pseudo-thinking, then the call to think can only address us 
from a space beyond our capacity to reckon or to predict—we cannot yet know, prior 
to picking it up, what we are to be called upon to do, and Heidegger himself will 
ultimately only invoke a certain readiness with which we can prepare ourselves. 
Doubtless, this is precisely the aspect of the call, as a figure of thinking, that attracted 
our attention initially—in relation to sound studies, it functions to draw together both 
the reorientation away from ocularly-determined subject-centred scrutiny as a model 
for theoretical activity, and the way in which sound seems to demand to be thought, to 
call upon us to engage in the task of thinking it. 
 
Yet, of course, Heidegger himself cannot explore this structural relation implicit 
within the call, insofar as he ‘elaborates an idea of techné that largely stands under the 
shadow of the negative. It has a contract out on Being…’ (16). Nevertheless, Ronell 
will suggest that the call in Heidegger—der Ruf of Being and Time but also, 
particularly in a highly suggestive footnote to be discussed subsequently, the call of 
and for thinking—is ‘readable in terms of a telephone call’ (25), a fact that has 
important implications for the consistency of his text. Effectively, Ronell’s reading 
opens up the point at which Stiegler will seek to intervene—the point at which 
Heidegger’s articulation of a techno-phonic problematic (calling and responding, 
sending and receiving) exceeds his own delimitation of the sphere of the technical. 
 
In reading Ronell’s work on this point, we must return to our initial characterization of 
Dasein as the who over and against all possible whats. Ronell takes up this aspect of 
the text by noting that Heidegger’s thinking on technology depends, from its very 
earliest formulations, on the attempt to distinguish, within the analytic of Dasein, the 
Other (as an-Other who) from the Thing (as mere what): ‘Being toward Others is 




primarily because this ‘Other’ that Dasein encounters ‘has itself the same kind of 
Being as Dasein’ (BT 163; see Ronell, 53). Dasein’s Being-with is dependent upon 
this relation to the Other that would also have ‘the same kind of Being as Dasein,’ and 
is therefore central to Heidegger’s attempt to articulate Dasein against and beyond the 
interiority of the subject affirmed within the classical tradition—thus, the famous 
analysis of Being-in-the-world, for Heidegger, ‘[shows] that a bare subject without a 
world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated “I” 
without Others is just as far from being proximally given’ (BT 152). Yet this Being-
with-Others, as an ‘autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being,’ must also be 
distinguished from the relation to those ‘Things’ which form elements within ‘a ready-
to-hand, environmental context of equipment,’ insofar as the former is in fact 
constitutive for the latter: ‘such Things [that is, tools] are encountered from out of the 
world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others—a world which is always mine too 
in advance’ (BT 154). Being-with-Others, for Heidegger, precedes and determines the 
possibility of all instrumentality—for the same reasons as it also precedes and 
determines any encounter with “mere” sound. That is, in each case the worldhood of 
Dasein is pre-saturated with meanings and significations, collective in nature, that 
predetermine any possible engagement with the ready-to-hand at the same moment as 
they exclude a non-meaningful sonic experience. 
 
Yet, when we turn to the call of conscience, as Ronell notes, we are faced with a 
question that seems to undercut this vital distinction between the Other and the 
technical object, between an-Other Dasein and a ready-to-hand piece of equipment: 
who or what makes the call, and who or what is called by it? Is it the Other who calls 
us up, or is it a Thing that transmits the call to us tele-phonically? Or is it perhaps 
something else, which would frustrate this very division? In order to clarify the stakes 
of these questions, let us recall the nature and significance of the call of conscience for 
Heidegger, extending the brief outline given above. Conscience is not, as might 
readily be imagined, merely an empirical figure for Heidegger—the “voice” one 
“hears” when one feels guilty, as a social or psychological phenomenon; the ‘fact’ of 
conscience, as Heidegger himself notes, is disputed (BT 313). Heidegger aims to 
thematise conscience, rather, in a ‘purely existential matter,’ as a ‘primordial 
phenomenon of Dasein’ (BT 313, original emphasis). What this phenomenon consists 




and we can note that here, as elsewhere, the term “summon” is, in German, aufrufen, 
whose connotations include to call up, to place a phone call. 
 
If Dasein requires that such a summoning subsists as a ‘primordial phenomenon,’ it is 
insofar as the Being-with-Others indicated above tends to take on a particular form, in 
which Dasein ‘stands in subjection to Others,’ such that ‘[i]t itself is not; its Being has 
been taken away by the Others. Dasein’s everyday possibilities of Being are for the 
Others to dispose of as they please’ (BT 164).  ‘Others’ in this case are precisely ‘the 
“they”’ encountered above as purveyors of the call-disrupting noise that separates us 
from that which is authentically called thinking (BT 164). Dasein’s lostness within this 
generic set of ‘everyday possibilities,’ as opposed to its own authentic potentiality-for-
Being, is here (re)figured as the problem of an auditory fascination, in a way that our 
previous encounter with idle talk seemed to forbid: 
 
Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the “they”, [Dasein] fails 
to hear its own Self in listening to the they-self. If Dasein is to be able to 
get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, […] then it 
must first be able to find itself—to find itself as something which has 
failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that it listens away to the 
“they”. This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the 
possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given 
by Dasein itself. (BT 315-16, my emphasis) 
 
The function of the call, then, is to summon Dasein from this lostness, to cut through 
the noise of idle talk in order to allow Dasein to ‘hear its own self’ once again. Yet in 
this formulation we already encounter the tension between the call’s tele-phonic 
resonances and their ultimate elision—clearly, this call is tied to the auto-affection of 
hearing oneself, as against all transmission emanating from an external source within-
the-world that Dasein has become lost in; we can also note that such formulations, on 
Heidegger’s part, sit uncomfortably with the previously cited insistence on the 
primordial nature of Dasein’s Being-with-Others.27 
 
                                                        
27 Derrida critically analyses the function of ‘hearing-onself-speak’ as ‘absolutely pure auto-
affection’ in the work of Husserl, grounding the self-presence of the subject (Derrida 2011, 
68); this argument is later extended into his broader account of the relation between speech 
and meaning in Of Grammatology, where it is referred to as the ‘system of “hearing 




If the call calls on Dasein to hear itself, rather than listening to the “they”, where does 
this call originate? Here, we can return to Ronell’s claim that Heidegger’s response to 
this question unsettles the distinction between Other and Thing, between who and 
what, upon which the entire conceptual edifice of the call of conscience is founded. It 
seems that it can neither simply be an-Other, as that Being who has the same Being as 
Dasein’s own, insofar as it precisely within the genericity of such Others that Dasein is 
caught in its lostness; but nor can it be the present-at-hand or ready-to-hand Thing, 
object or tool, whose very disclosure as entitiy is dependent upon Dasein always-
already being situated within-the-world (Dasein’s facticity). To this extent, then, the 
call cannot and must not be tele-phonic—it must be situated, immediately, within the 
compass of Dasein itself, and only on this basis could it call Dasein from the noisy 
involvements with the “they”, and the instrumental ensemble of ready-to-hand 
equipment which sustains these involvements. The call cannot be transmitted, and it 
must not be audible, at risk of reintroducing precisely these elements that Dasein is to 
be called away from. If we read the subsequent passage to that quoted above, we can 
see that this is exactly the case: 
 
The possibility of [Dasein’s] thus getting broken off [from listening-away] 
lies in its being appealed to without mediation. Dasein fails to hear itself, 
and listens away to the “they”; and this listening away gets broken by the 
call if that call, in accordance with its character as such, arouses another 
kind of hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is lost, has a 
character in every way opposite. If in this lost hearing, one has been 
fascinated with the ‘hubbub’ of the manifold ambiguity which idle talk 
possesses in its everyday ‘newness’, then the call must do its calling 
without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. 
(BT 316, my emphasis) 
 
Listening away, then, is opposed to an im-mediate audition; the exteriority in and 
through which Dasein ‘fails to hear itself,’ drowned out by the ‘hubbub’ of ‘idle talk,’ 
is counterposed to a call which ‘arouses another kind of hearing’ whose ‘character’ is 
‘in every way opposite,’ and which remains, in a sense that seems no less ambiguous 
than the noise through which it cuts, internal to Dasein. What, then, could this other 
kind of hearing be, which would be neither the psychologically-determined audition of 
mere sound, nor the immersion in the endlessly-circulating noise of the everyday? 





As we can recall, and now are in a position to better understand, this hearing is 
fundamentally related to the inaudible, to a ‘keeping silent’ (BT 318, original 
emphasis) by means of which Dasein hooks up to its Self, bypassing a detour through 
exteriority that may leave it contaminated with the ‘manifold ambiguity’ of the 
everyday ‘hubbub’ (BT 316). If calling is, for Heidegger, a ‘mode of discourse,’ he 
nevertheless asserts that ‘[v]ocal utterance […] is not essential for discourse, and 
therefore not for the call either’ (BT 316): the ‘voice’ of conscience is ‘not so much 
[…] an utterance’ as a ‘giving-to-understand,’ operating in a sphere in which meaning 
is definitively decoupled from sonority—precisely that sphere which we must inhabit, 
as discussed previously, in order to hear sense in the call of and to thinking.  
 
It seems, then, that this ‘summoning’ or ‘proclaiming’ (in both cases, the German is 
Ausrufen) seeks to pull Dasein back to itself from itself—but from modality of its Self 
that is caught up in and with the ambiguity of Being-with-Others: if the call ‘reaches 
the they-self of concernful Being with Others,’ nevertheless one is always called ‘[t]o 
one’s own Self’ (BT 317, original emphasis); we are left, then, with an ambiguity over 
this ‘they-self’ that seems to be, in some sense, not fully a self. On the one hand, it 
cannot be a question of calling Dasein out of the world, since Dasein is primordially 
within-a-world; and yet, Dasein must nevertheless withdraw from a certain aspect of 
the world which seems to manifest itself, insistently, in sonic terms—and thus, the 
call, for all its tele-phonic resonance, must push towards a metaphorics of silence and 
immediacy. However, Ronell’s emphasis on the question of the who and the what in 
Heidegger, the question of Thing and Other from which we began, allows her to 
ultimately identify a point at which this series of distinctions through which Heidegger 
seals Dasein off from the interpolation of techno-phonic noise begin to pull apart. All 
this turns upon the question that we have yet to face directly: if Dasein picks up the 
call of conscience, who or what is this they-self-outside-the-Self that is hailed, and 
who will she find on the other end of the line? Who or what calls Dasein back to its 
Self, and from who or what is it called back? If, as we have heard, the answer must be, 
in both cases, “Dasein”, it is also clear that for related reasons, it simultaneously 
cannot simply be Dasein; the call itself insistently pulls apart the figures at each end of 






On this point, Ronell remarks: ‘The possibility of posing this as “what” or “who” may 
point to a technological contamination, suggesting Dasein’s uncertain properties 
(individualised, solitary self, or generally grasped) to resemble the effects of techné 
under study, which is to say that “what” or “who” suspends, if momentarily, the 
ontological difference of Thing or Other’—and does so from “within” Dasein itself 
(57). Supporting Ronell’s point, we can cite Heidegger’s own ambiguity on this 
question: ‘Conscience summons Dasein’s Self from its lostness in the “they”. The Self 
to which the appeal is made remains indefinite and empty in its “what”’ (BT 319). At 
the other end of the line, the same problem obtains: it cannot, as such, be our Self that 
calls us back to ourselves, insofar as this implies an act of volition whose ground 
would be undetermined; to the contrary, and as with the telephone call which 
Heidegger resolutely resists as a model, the call is  
 
precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared 
for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against 
our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call 
undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the 
world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond me. (BT 320, original 
emphasis; see Ronell, 31, 57) 
 
Here we find all the tension of Heidegger’s account of the call manifested in a tele-
phonic articulation—both from me and beyond me, from an ‘it’ that is ‘beyond me’ 
and yet is simultaneously within me, to my self that is both more than merely a what 
but seemingly less than a who, at least prior to picking up this interdiction, unexpected 
and unprepared-for, of the it. The play of immediacy and tele-transmission mirrors and 
reinforces that of audition and silence—and can we suppose that, if the what is not so 
easily separable from the who, then the noise of the ‘they’, and the ‘listening away’ 
that is enamoured of it, will not be so easily screened from the channel through which 
it calls what? 
 
Bearing in mind the technico-temporal dimensions that insist within this calling, can 
we, in returning to the call of thinking from where we began, observe the same 
process, to the degree that this call was also heard to be arrayed against both sonority 
and technicity? That is, if, in the call of conscience, we found that Heidegger’s appeals 




hear, in that analogous attempt to make the call to thinking similarly non-sonorous, the 
same rumbling of a repressed tele-phonics?  
 
In a pair of footnotes, Ronell suggests as much. She claims that ‘[i]n a sense, What is 
Called Thinking? presents itself as the drama of unprecedented long distance’ 
(419n25), a long distance that we have heard manifest in the constitutive delay through 
which, for Heidegger as for sound studies, the call is always registered retroactively—
such that, though ‘thought generally responds to a call,’ it only does so ‘without 
naming it, or giving it thought, as such’ (WT 168, quoted in Ronell, 419n25). It is in 
this way that modern technology, as a mode of revealing and a destining of Being, 
covers over this essential nature, and thereby maintains its unthematized and self-
concealing dominance; as Ronell notes, it is neither coincidence nor a mere external 
relation that ensures that ‘[a]t the heart of his calling structures, Heidegger never 
ceases to raise the question concerning technology,’ though he may never make 
‘arrangements for an explicit hookup’ (420n25); the call is ‘situate[d] […] ineluctably 
within a technological age’ to the degree that technicity inheres within its very tele-
phonic structuring, a tele-phonicity irreducible, for Ronell as much as for Heidegger, 
to the technical object passing under that name.  
 
The call, then, is for Heidegger ‘far from being incomprehensible and alien to thinking 
[...,] on the contrary, it always is precisely what must be thought and thus is waiting 
for a thinking to answer it’ (WT 165; Ronell, 419n25). Yet this waiting seems, for 
Heidegger, to tend towards forming a de jure structure of thinking as such, rather than 
a de facto ‘condition of modern man’ (WT 7), and thereby becomes caught 
inextricably within a delay that demands to be formulated through the problematic of 
tele-technicity—an outcome that Heidegger himself must ward off, through 
inconsistent appeals to immediacy and silence. In turning now to the work of Bernard 
Stiegler, I hope to pursue a path out of the impasse Heidegger has led us towards, by 
affirming, following Stiegler’s lead, this inevitable imbrication of thinking and 
technics—and, what is more, their conjunction in the question of temporality, the 
question of the contours of “our thought-provoking time”. In so doing, I hope 
ultimately to return to the diagnosis from which we began—that sound calls for 
thinking today—and to ask, from within an account of that still-elusive con-





4. Technics and “Our Time”: De-Severance and Disorientation 
 
Beginning from the question of how, as sound students, we might respond to the call 
to thinking that seems to emanate from sound today—in the hope, ultimately, of 
reformulating the question of thinking as such away from an ocular model of 
subjective scrutiny—we have traced one articulation of such a figure, in the work of 
Martin Heidegger. In doing so, we have uncovered a set of proximities between 
Heidegger’s concerns and those of sound studies, mired nonetheless in a seemingly 
inextricable impasse. Certainly, Heidegger’s articulation of thought and, for want of a 
better term, the subject through the figure of the call sought precisely to attain that 
reversal of polarity we had sought at the outset, articulating thought as a passion 
dependent upon that which forces it to take place, that which solicits thinking in us; 
what is more, it did so as part of a more general questioning into the conditions of our 
contemporaneity, ‘our thought-provoking time’, in which the call might finally be 
received. Nevertheless, both in the writings of the early nineteen-fifties and in Being 
and Time, the auditory and the technical dimensions of calling—in both cases 
seemingly inextricable and ineradicable—were suppressed, consigned to a merely 
metaphoric register, subsisting as a (supposedly) superficial element of Heidegger’s 
discourse. 
 
Yet our path thus far is not to be taken as simply the scouting of a “blind alley”, the 
better to affirm my own purported solution—or, for instance, to counterpose 
Heidegger’s failures to Deleuze’s success. To the contrary, what Heidegger has 
opened up is a fertile terrain for our own questioning, beginning from the problem he 
has left to us—how are we to affirm what Heidegger was unable to, that thinking and 
temporality each may be entwined with the technical and the auditory? Moreover, we 
must confront an unexamined aspect of the investigation thus far: why do these terms 
seem so insistently to intertwine? Must sound studies necessarily pursue the question 
of technics?  
 
Responding to these questions is the task of the remaining two sections of this chapter. 
Firstly, I will take up the intersection of the tele-phonic and the techno-phonic with the 




affirming ‘our thought-provoking time’—and the thinking that might finally take place 
within it—as irreducibly technical. Finally, I will turn to the contemporary 
soundscape, in order to sound out the specific intersections of technics and audition 
that situate, within our “today”, the call to sonic thinking. 
 
In this section, I aim to treat two questions that have thus far remained both implicit 
and largely unanswered in my account of Heidegger and the call of thinking, and 
which offer us an initial way to approach the work of Stiegler. Firstly, though we have 
encountered the peculiar dynamics of the call of conscience, and its function as re-
calling Dasein to its essential relatedness to Being, nevertheless we have not asked 
what, in serving this function, is addressed to Dasein in the call. The first question, 
then: what does conscience say? Secondly, we have, thus far, only considered in any 
detail Heidegger’s quite specific (and, as I hope to have indicated, problematic) 
understanding of technology —or, rather, its essence—in his later works, though we 
have made a number of references to mediation and instrumentality, and to the 
ambiguous status of the ready-to-hand in Being and Time. The second question that 
must be asked, then: what do we mean by technology? As we will see, if answering 
the former question will take us into Stiegler’s significant and imaginative rereading of 
Being and Time, the second will focus us on a key aspect of this rereading: the 
questioning of the instrumental, so rapidly dismissed by Heidegger at the outset of 
“The Question Concerning Technology,” yet so powerfully entwined with his attempt 
to perform an existential analytic of Dasein. 
 
Taking the first question, then: what does conscience tell Dasein in calling it out of its 
absorption in the “they”? Heidegger is clear on this point—or, rather, direct: the call of 
conscience says ‘Guilty!’ (BT 325). Such a claim returns us to the problem of 
understanding: it was necessary for the call to be silent insofar as understanding 
bypasses sonority, indeed bypasses all mediating support in order to convey itself im-
mediately—at least, if such understanding is to be authentic. How do we understand 
this address from the call of conscience, then, that marks us as guilty? How are we to 
interpret what conscience is telling us? It is here that Heidegger again confronts the 
necessary decoupling of meaning and transmission that has so troubled his attempt to 
articulate conscience as a call. On the one hand, as with those auditors of his lecture 




addressed to us—what is called “guilty”? Secondly, such an address cannot, as we 
have heard, pass by way of any sonorous element—whatever is conveyed, however it 
is to be understanding, this discourse must take place in silence.  
 
Heiegger is able to resolve this dual problem by stating that if conscience must remain 
silent, then, even in saying ‘Guilty!’, it will in a certain sense say nothing, if this 
saying is correctly understood. As Heidegger puts it: ‘What does the conscience call to 
him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no 
information about world-events, has nothing to tell’ (BT 318). If conscience keeps 
silent, then, it is insofar as it says precisely nothing: ‘The fact that what is called in the 
call has not been formulated in words, does not give this phenomenon the 
indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but merely indicates that our understand of what 
is ‘called’ is not to be tied up with an expectation of anything like a communication’ 
(BT 318, my emphasis). Keeping silent and saying nothing, then, is necessary in order 
to bypass communication—eliminating, at one stroke, the tele-phonic, in order to 
address to Dasein the “nothing” that will call it back to its authentic Self. 
 
What, then, is the relation between the fact that the call says nothing at the same time 
as it calls out to us as ‘Guilty!’? Again, this latter must initially be screened for all 
connotations that would tie it to ‘our concernful Being with Others,’ and therefore 
with our fallenness into the “they” (BT 317). As such, guilt is not to be defined as 
having committed a morally unjust act for which one now feels responsible and for 
which one is defined as owing some kind of reparation—it must be ‘detatched from 
relationship to any law or “ought”’, which would ultimately frame guilt as a form of 
‘lack—when something which ought to be and which can be is missing’ (BT 328). 
Here, Heidegger is drawing on the literal sense of the German schuldig as debt, as an 
extension of this sense of responsibility (BT 327). Such an empirical notion of lack or 
debt, related to some particular act, would imply the possibility of not being indebted, 
and therefore suggest that Dasein’s being-guilty is a contingent, empirical fact rather 
than an essential, ontological aspect of Dasein. This, of course, is not what Heidegger 
intends. 
 
Against this all-too-empirical figure of responsibility-as-indebtedness formulated in 




“not” of the nothing that conscience calls to us as indicating something beyond 
empirical lack: ‘we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as “Being-the-
basis for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not’”—that is to say, as “Being-the-
basis-of-a-nullity”’ (BT 329, original emphasis). Here, Heidegger is calling us back to 
our initial characterization of Dasein as the Being whose Being is an issue for it, 
insofar as it is fundamentally undetermined. This nullity that conscience re-calls us to 
is derived fundamentally from the aforementioned quality of Dasein as possibilizing—
that is, Dasein’s Being is an issue for it insofar as it ‘understands itself in terms of 
possibilities’ rather than in terms of particular fixed states or determinate and stable 
characteristics (BT 331).  
 
In understanding this relation between nullity and Dasein’s possibilizing, it is key to 
remember that these possibilities are to a certain degree determined in advance, not 
freely assumed by Dasein itself; Dasein is ‘something that has been thrown; it has 
been brought into its “there”, but not of its own accord’ (BT 329). Thus, Dasein 
‘projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown,’ and though Dasein 
‘has to lay the basis for itself,’ it can ‘never get that basis into its power’ (BT 330); 
ultimately, Dasein ‘constantly lags behind its possibilities.’ This lagging-behind the 
possibilities upon which Dasein projects itself is precisely the nullity to which the call 
of conscience refers; the call of conscience can call Dasein back from its fallen 
involvement in the “they” insofar as ‘[t]his nullity is the basis for the possibility of 
inauthentic Dasein in its falling’ (BT 331); Dasein can always simply take up the 
possibilities into which it has been thrown, rather than actively choosing amongst 
them with anticipatory resoluteness. Dasein’s nullity is its essential incapacity to bring 
the foundation of its own Being into the ambit of its control—and, therefore, its nullity 
is simultaneously the very possibility of its fallen involvement in a world it has not 
chosen. 
 
It is here that we can turn to Stiegler’s vital intervention. In the first volume of 
Technics and Time, Stiegler establishes an interpretation of the essential indebtedness 
of Dasein that is fundamentally technical, and which ‘undermines any possibility of 
placing in opposition authentic time and the time of calculation and concern’ (T1 187); 
indeed, Stiegler will propose the ‘hypothesis of a technological time (the time of 




may be clear, a pivotal point in my argument—that is, a point that allows us to change 
tack at a crucial juncture, preserving the initial impetus of my investigation but 
pursuing it in a new direction. If, as Stiegler proposes, the tension we have articulated 
in Heidegger’s work within the imbrication of technics, temporality and thinking—a 
tension that manifests itself in and through the problem of the tele-phonic—can be 
resolved insofar as we embrace a solution Heidegger himself renounced—namely, 
affirming the technical basis of the who—then we are in a position to reconsider the 
question of what calls for thinking, today, in a manner that no longer must exclude 
auditory phenomena. Instead, as I hope to claim, it will allow us to position the 
domain of sound as something that calls for thinking today to the very degree that it 
allows us to sound out the very scope and parameters of the to-day, the very 
collectivity of the con-temporaneity to which sound studies insistently appealed. This 
pivot will be jointed, operating in two stages: firstly, I will outline, briefly, Stiegler’s 
reading of conscience and guilt in Heidegger, and indicate how it allows him to defend 
his claim that the temporality of Dasein is technical through and through; secondly, 
and following from this, I will turn to the second volume of Technics and Time to 
assess his characterization of our con-temporaneity in terms of a fundamental 
disorientation. This will lead to the concluding section of this chapter, in which I 
assess the audibility of such disorientation through accounts of the contemporary 
soundscape drawn from recent music journalism. 
 
To begin, then, let us consider Stiegler’s interpretation of Dasein’s guilt. As we have 
established, the guilt to which conscience re-calls Dasein is the guilt of its 
thrownness—that is, the fact that Dasein is always-already given over the possibilities 
it has not chosen, and that therefore it encounters itself in terms of a fundamental 
nullity. It is this nullity that underpins its very status as temporal, insofar as Dasein can 
never have done with determining itself in and through those very possibilities through 
which it is “what”—or rather who—it is. Stiegler puts it as follows: ‘Dasein is marked 
by facticity, in which Da-sein is there not in the sense that being is given to it but in 
the sense of its having to be, which means: Dasein is time. All that it is given is a 
feeling of having-to-be, of a de-fault of being…’ (T1 199). De-fault here translates 
défaut, which, as the translators note, indicates failure and lack, while also indicating 
that this “failure” is originary for Dasein; as in Heidegger, Dasein is guilty by default, 





Stiegler’s key intervention is to ask after the status and provenance of this having-to-
be, and of the already-there to which Dasein may only ever respond through an après-
coup, after the fact.  If Dasein’s facticity is derived from that fact that it’s world is 
‘always already there, having always preceded the mortal who, whatever he or she 
does, arrives too late, inheriting all the faults of his or her ancestry, staring with the 
originary de-fault of origin,’ then this always already manifests itself, necessarily, 
through technics (T1 199). That is, the only way in which Dasein can encounter this 
past which it is but ‘which is not properly speaking its past since it did not live it’ is 
through some technical support—the non-lived past of Dasein is ‘a fault that is always 
already there and that is nothing but technicity,’ and which Stiegler thinks under the 
name of epimetheia (T1 207). It is this problem of transmission that, as we saw, 
Heidegger insistently suppressed in the case of the tele-phonic, and that Stiegler seeks 
to reclaim; for, as Stiegler notes, the already-there upon which Dasein depends, given 
its essential nullity, its de-fault of origin, can only be given to it through technical 
means. 
 
Though Stiegler’s argument is complex, we can trace the salient points. For 
Heidegger, Dasein’s capacity to anticipate—that is, to pro-ject itself into the future—
involves a ‘return to its past and its present’ (TT1 232). As Heidegger, puts it, 
‘anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back 
understandingly to one’s ownmost “been”’, that is, apprehending the “already there” 
of the world into which Dasein is thrown in and through the possibilities encoded 
within it, from amongst which Dasein must choose (BT 373). Yet it is here that 
Stiegler sees technicity insinuating itself into Dasein’s temporal constitution as 
ecstatic, outside-of-itself:  
 
this return to its past and its present can only be the return to a past that is 
not its past […] it can only be a pros-thetic return. […] The past is 
transmitted to it: it is its own only insofar as Dasein is its past, that is, 
anticipates from it. […] Dasein is only this past that it is not. (T1 232, 
original emphasis) 
 
Stiegler asks after the conditions of access to this non-lived past, upon which the very 




pros-thetic and the supplementary, the point where Dasein and technicity converge 
upon the ec-static, the outside-itself, that is, upon time as such:  
 
Dasein is outside itself, in ec-stasis, temporal: its past lies outside it, yet it 
is nothing but this past, in the form of not yet. By being actually its past, it 
can do nothing but itself outside itself, “ek-sist”. But how does Dasein 
eksist in this way? Prosthetically, through pro-posing and pro-jecting 
outside itself, in front of itself. (T1 234) 
 
Thus, on Stiegler’s reading, what conscience addresses to Dasein is not merely caught 
up in a metaphorics of technicity, through its tele-phonic resonances, but conveys, in 
and through this calling, precisely what Heidegger hoped to elude—the imbrication of 
the who and the what, the technical condition for Dasein’s self-relation evoked in the 
fundamental nullity that is its being-in-de-fault. Ultimately, technics is, for Stiegler, 
nothing but the ‘process of exteriorization’ as such, the ‘pursuit of life by means other 
than life,’ the standing-out of life as constituted in and through the inorganic (T1 17) 
—or, in sum, the ‘what that constitutes the very being of the outside of the who […] 
that is, the ecstatic and temporal transcendence of Dasein’ (T1 219). 
 
This, of course, is precisely the opposite of what Heidegger aimed at in his thinking of 
technics in the early nineteen-fifties—in his questioning concerning technology, not 
only does Heidegger counterpose the authentic relatedness to Being (which is called 
thinking) to the technological relation of enframing, but in doing so he bypasses the 
“merely” instrumental account of technics almost immediately and, as such, does not 
attempt to think the specificity of the what. In Being and Time, however, Heidegger 
pays close attention to the ready-to-hand, that is, to the set of entities that support an 
‘in-order-to’ (and therefore, ultimately, all pro-jection and possibilizing) by being 
available for Dasein to use (BT 97). We do not have the scope to investigate 
Heidegger’s fascinating analysis of equipment as ready-to-hand in Being and Time, 
nor to assess the full scope of Stiegler’s engagement with it; however, we can 
investigate one central property that will return us to our consideration of our 
principal, auditory problematic—and which will push us towards a closer 
consideration of the relation between technics and time, in terms of the unresolved 





With regard to instrumentality and equipment defined as the ready-to-hand, we are 
pushed towards the problem of the spacing of this to-hand: the capacity to “grasp” the 
tool is clearly not a question of physical proximity between two entities, for reasons 
we have already established regarding the distinction between who and what and, 
more generally, the spatiality peculiar to Dasein’s Being-in-the-World. On this basis, 
we should not be surprised for Heidegger to later articulate the distinction between the 
human and the animal by not only claiming that the latter are ‘poor in world’, but that 
they also, for related reasons, do not have hands (WT 16). It is on this point that 
Stiegler will make his intervention regarding Heidegger’s thinking of the instrument: 
though Heidegger ‘thinks the instrument […,] he does not think it fully through’ (T1 
245); what he overlooks is the ‘dynamic of the what, irreducible to that of the who’ 
(T2 7). Pursuing a specific instance of this overlooking will allow us not only to move 
closer to both Heidegger’s account of equipment in Being and Time, and the 
understanding of technics that Stiegler, in part, extracts from it; it will also allow us to 
return to the auditory problems that technical objects introduced into Heidegger’s text. 
 
It is with the question of proximity, of the closeness of the at-hand, that we will find 
Heidegger once again turning to an auditory example—and doing so in a manner the 
will, as Stiegler himself indicates, provoke a rereading of the above-cited passage on 
the sound of the motorcycle.  The spatiality implied in the readiness-to-hand of 
equipment is connected to what Heidegger terms Dasein’s ‘essential tendency towards 
closeness’ (BT 140; see T1 250). This tendency manifests itself through a ‘bringing-
close’ that Heidegger terms ‘de-severance’ (BT 139-40), a tendency that, needless to 
say, does not simply refer to bringing things into physical proximity. Rather, closeness 
refers precisely to the at-handness of equipment—the relations of proximity and 
distance are determined not according to ‘Objective distances of Things present-at-
hand,’ but rather with the possibilities of engaging with and making use of the 
particular entity, incorporating its ‘in-order-to’ into one’s concernful dealings with the 
world in a given case (BT 141). 
 
It is in offering examples on this point that Heidegger makes two highly significant 
claims—both for Stiegler’s analysis and for my own. Firstly, he offers the general 
point that if ‘[s]eeing and hearing are distance-senses,’ this is insofar as they are able 




proximally beyond what is distantially ‘closest’’ (BT 141). But this de-severance is 
supported by prostheses that are themselves, as Stiegler notes, forgotten: ‘When, for 
instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantially that 
they are “sitting on his nose,” they are environmentally more remote from him than 
the picture hanging on the opposite wall’ (BT 141; see T1 251). As Stiegler puts it: 
‘Here we have, in primordial terms, the naturalized character of prostheses, through 
whose naturalization we see, feel, think, and so on’ (T1 251). Re-calling the 
suppressed tele-phonics of the call of thinking, can we figure this as an instance of 
precisely this forgetting of the prosthetic? 
 
Let us turn to the first of two examples deployed by Heidegger that suggest this 
argument. Firstly, and significantly for our earlier reading of John Mowitt’s work, the 
radio:  
 
All the ways in which we speed things up, as we are more or less 
compelled to do today, push us on towards the conquest of remoteness. 
With the ‘radio’, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday 
environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’—a de-
severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized. (BT 
140) 
 
This passage is read by Mowitt as an implicit reflection on the acousmatic character of 
the radio—not simply ‘in terms of the invisibility of the sound source’, but in relation 
to a ‘dilemma that arises as an ontological structure of Dasein’ (2011, 41). In the first 
instance, on Mowitt’s reading, this passage offers ‘an insight into the essential spacing 
of the being of Dasein […] that Heidegger virtually picks up through the radio’ (41)—
it is, as Stiegler would have it, the ‘possibilities of the what [that] are constitutive of 
the very possibility of the who’ (T1 253), and the who must therefore be thought from 
the ‘dynamic of the what’ that determines these possibilities (T1 243). Without this 
dynamic, the ‘essential tendency towards closeness’ that marks Dasein would lack all 
support, anything that could give it a factical reality (BT 140). 
 
With regard to the specificity of this technical and prosthetic constitution of the who in 
its essential spatiality, the radio not only supports and conditions Heidegger’s thinking 
of this constitution, it enacts it in a manner that points us back to our opening 




be visualized’; thus, the tele-technical prosthesis of the radio pushes the essential de-
severance of Dasein to a degree where it ‘[points] to an asymmetry in the ontological 
structure of Dasein itself’ (Mowitt 2011, 42). In Mowitt’s terms, ‘[r]adio is thus 
obliging hearing to speed out ahead of seeing,’ and, in doing so, ‘may well cast the 
shadow of the acousmatic upon philosophy itself, to the extent that the source of its 
sounds, its rumblings, falls outside its construal of the visual field’ (42). If, as Stiegler 
states, ‘at its very origin and up until now, philosophy has repressed technics as an 
object of thought’ (T1 ix), might it not be the case that this repression is coextensive 
with the elision of the sonic that, according to sound studies scholars, can be dated 
back to precisely this origin? 
 
If we return to Heidegger’s forgetting of the prosthetic character of Dasein’s ec-stasis, 
both spatially and temporally, we can see that, at least in this case, such a supposition 
is not without merit. Let us consider, once again, the passage in which Heidegger 
dismisses the possibility of noise intruding into audition: 
 
What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the 
creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the 
north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling.  
It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure 
noise’. (BT 207) 
 
In “over-hearing” the sonority of the phenomenon in favour of its object-source, 
Dasein simultaneously forgets the technical status of both this source and its 
transmission. In keeping with phenomenological intentionality, one hears the sound of 
the motor-cycle, and at the same moment the tool and its sonic qualities are elided—
both tool and sound refer to, in Stiegler’s words, an ‘already-there’, a ‘fore-having’ 
whose technical and tele-phonic conditions are necessarily forgotten in the act of 
listening as such. The world, in its closeness and its immanent significance, must 
screen out its own tele-technical and auditory conditions in order to function. And are 
not this fore-having and this closeness precisely what enabled the call of conscience to 
reach Dasein immediately, and silently? 
 
Yet the dynamic of the what—for instance, the invention of the radio—undercuts this 
stability of the world, the closing-off of that ‘sphere in which speech meets with 




encountered except as always-already enmeshed in a set of meaningful relations. For if 
the extremity of the radio’s de-severance frustrates the equivalence of sound and 
vision as ‘distance-senses,’ allowing their technical support to obtrude, it does so 
through its essentially acousmatic character, troubling, at the same moment, the 
intentionality of audition and the unity of Dasein’s world. The radio’s de-severant 
character relies on Dasein hearing the sound “of” whatever is transmitted, rather than 
the sound “of” the radio itself—I must immediately hear the motor-cycle, not the 
sounds it produces, nor the tele-technical apparatus that transmits them to me, in order 
for it to have a successfully de-severant effect. That is, in order for the radio to bring 
things close, the apparatus itself must remain remote, just as spectacles themselves are 
not seen when they bring into focus the picture on the far wall. But it is precisely the 
specific technical capacities of this what—in this case, the radio’s capacity to present 
the sound of an object without that object itself being present (that is, to operate 
acousmatically)—that enable such bringing-close in the first place. What Heidegger’s 
remark indicates here is that the dynamic of the what, in this case the invention of the 
tele-technology of radio, occasions a rupture in this relation of veiling and unveiling 
by which the technical support enables and extends our perception. The radio’s 
bringing-close of that which is so distanced as not to appear at all has the potential to 
fracture the unity of the world as such—the unity that kept out both sound and 
technics, at the same moment—by ‘accomplish[ing] a de-severance of the world’ as 
such, a de-severance that ‘cannot yet be visualized’ (BT 141) 
 
Bringing all of these threads together, we can simply note another, brief example that 
Heidegger makes us of in this section of Being and Time—as spectacles are to sight, 
so ‘the telephone receiver’ is for hearing. In de-severing the voice of the Other—
whose meaning is im-mediately heard—the telephone receiver, though it ‘slides itself, 
as it were, along certain portions of one’s body […] is farther remote than the 
acquaintance whom one encounters ‘across the street’ (BT 141-2). Even as it brings 
close that which, distantially, remains so far as to be unencounterable without 
technical supports and prostheses, the tool itself passes beyond the audible range as a 
very condition of its functioning. The repression of the tele-phonic that we have 
insistently encountered is here reframed as the necessary forgetting of the technical 




disrupts the very coherence of Dasein’s world on which the tool’s smooth operation 
depended. 
 
In sum, then, for Stiegler Heidegger necessarily forgets not only the essentially 
prosthetic character of Dasein’s world, but the way in which said prostheses, in and 
through their own histories, transform the status and scope of that world. What 
Heidegger forgets is that ‘[e]very epoch is characterized by the technical conditions of 
actual access to the already-there that constitute it as an epoch’ (T1 236); thus, if our 
age is without doubt a ‘technological age,’ this is insofar as the entire possibility of an 
“age” is itself technical through and through. We can even find, in Heidegger’s remark 
on the radio, a suggestion that could be turned against his own articulation of the call 
of thinking and ‘our thought-provoking time’: perhaps we are ‘still not’ thinking to the 
very degree that we have ‘not yet’ come to terms with the effect of radio, or of the 
tele-phonics of thinking as such? From the perspective of sound studies, we might say 
that the question is less one of finally being able to ‘visualize’ these effects, as to 
pursue another path—to claim that the real issue is we have not yet made audible ‘[a]ll 
the ways in which we speed things up’ (BT 140). It is such a possibility that I will 
investigate in the following section. 
 
 
5. “No Future”: Sounding Con-temporaneity 
 
In the second volume of Technics and Time, Stiegler takes up the refrain that weaved 
through the first volume while never coming explicitly to the fore: the cry of no future. 
Today we are perhaps more familiar with this notion through the formulation, first 
articulated by Fredric Jameson and taken up more recently by Mark Fisher, that it is 
easier to imagine the end of the world than then end of capitalism; which is as much to 
say that the future oscillates between an indefinite extension of the present or a final 
collapse, a future that is the eradication of any future whatsoever.28 If the possibility of 
at last beginning to think is itself indexed to the time of the “not yet”—a time that, as I 
                                                        
28 Mark Fisher cites this remark in Capitalist Realism and claims that it is ‘atrributed to both 
Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek’ (2). Jameson makes the claim in The Seeds of Time (1994, 
xii), though later he will repeat it with an uncertain attribution of ‘as someone has observed’ 




hope ultimately to indicate, is not simply to be thought of as a present-to-come—then 
this eradication of the future is, simultaneously, the destruction of thinking itself, its 
final collapse from the “still not” into the “never”.  
 
This time, as we have established, is for Stiegler inextricable from ‘techno-genesis,’ 
from the dynamic of the what; the future of thinking, in the double sense of the 
genitive, is bound to the history of technics. As Stiegler himself puts it:  
 
Technics thinks, and must not the connection to the future be redoubled as 
the thought of technics, as what technics thinks? Isn’t it necessary to think 
what we think as technics, as it thinks? It thinks before us, being always 
already there before us, insofar as there is being before us; the what 
precedes the who, has always already pre-ceded it. The future—which is 
the “task of thinking”—is in the thinking of (by) technics. We must 
understand this “of” in two senses that, taken together, produce time: to 
think technics as the thought of time (re-doubled). (T2 32)29 
 
Thus, in finally re-turning to the problem of how to begin thinking, we must ask after 
what remained implicit in our account of sound studies—the status of the con-
temporaneity to which it laid claim, and its necessarily technical conditions.  
 
It is from within this nexus of temporality, technicity, and thinking that I hope to 
ground the claim from which this entire chapter has taken its impetus: that sound calls 
for thinking, today. If this is the case, then it is necessary for us to think the contours 
of this “today” both within and against those forces that, for Stiegler as much as for 
Heidegger, threaten to close off all possibility of a future for thinking. My claim will 
be, following from my analysis of Heidegger’s repressed tele-phonics, that the 
conjunction of temporality and thinking must pass by way of an account of both 
technics and audition as the repressed of philosophy. In pushing this doubtless 
speculative claim, I want to investigate more fully Stiegler’s own diagnosis of ‘our 
                                                        
29 Keith Ansell Pearson makes a related point in his work on Nietzsche: ‘given the techno-
phobic nature of the philosophical tradition, thought today needs to embark on a new 
negotiation with technology’ (Ansell Pearson 1997, 4); insofar as Ansell Pearson reads 
Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche extensively in this text, as well as its accompanying volume 
Germinal Life, his work would provide a vital starting point for establishing, more fully than 
this thesis can, the connections between Deleuze’s work and that of Stiegler with regard to the 




thought-provoking time’ as the time of disorientation, and to ask the extent to which 
its conditions might be audible as much as technical.  
 
In so doing, I want to continue two related lines of thinking that have emerged from 
our initial consideration of the function of the call in Heidegger, and which will 
ultimately bring us back round to the question of thinking sonority today: firstly, the 
relation between the elision of technics and of audition from the history of philosophy, 
and their reintroduction through the question of the con-temporary—that is, through 
the production of a collective temporality; secondly, the sense in which all thinking 
capable of registering the tele-techno-phonics of “our thought-provoking time” must 
take the form of a response, a retro-action named by Stiegler as the après-coup. 
Concluding our analyses of this chapter, then, I hope to have indicated more fully what 
it might mean to begin thinking sonority, at last, today—that is, what might truly be at 
stake in the emergence of sound studies. 
 
To be without a future does not mean simply to be aware of the imminent moment at 
which one’s life will end—such a knowledge is, in fact, constitutively impossible for 
the Heideggerean who, insofar as futurity is necessarily the ‘undetermined’ by means 
of which Dasein retains its capacity to possibilize (T1 6). Death, as the lack of a 
future, is always the not-yet, and always in question. Rather, to be without a future is 
to lack the ‘cardinal points’ that function as ‘directional markers’ for temporality (T2 
2-3) while nevertheless retaining the future’s inherent indeterminacy that defines it as 
futurity; these cardinal points are what give us particular futures we can strive 
towards, pursue and seek out; they are the possibles amongst which Dasein can choose 
(and we therefore know, already, that they bear some relation to the world as already-
there). If Dasein is essentially ‘stretched-along’ in time, then these points are the posts 
upon which it is stretched, determining the vector and the distance of its ek-stasis. 
How has “our time” come to be characterized by the loss of such points, and the 
correlative lack of a future—that is, through the unleashing of what Stiegler calls 
‘disorientation as such’ (T2 3)? In order to answer this, we must reopen the question of 
the relation between the who and the what—for it is within this space that both 
orientation and its loss are negotiated. 
 




contra Heidegger, in some linear fashion; such a claim could too easily suggest a 
direct correspondence or isomorphism between the two, at risk of collapsing all 
distinction between them. This is not Stiegler’s intent. Rather, his project is to locate 
temporality itself in this very difference that subsists between them:  
 
The who is nothing without the what, since they are in a transductive 
relation during the process of exteriorization that characterizes life […]. 
The who is not the what: a transductive relationship can occur only 
between different terms. There is a dynamic of the what, irreducible to that 
of the who […], but that requires the dynamic of the who as its anticipatory 
power. (T2 6-7)30 
 
This transductive relation ‘[spans] an irreducible tension, a tension that is time itself’ 
(T2 2); it is within this tension that Stiegler observes an ‘originary disorientation’ 
proper to technics itself—the disorientation of the who in and through the dynamic of 
the what, the ‘metastable’ coupling of techno-genesis and socio-genesis. This 
originary disorientation between techno- and socio-genesis is ‘converted’, through the 
‘[a]djustments’ provided by cardinal points, into a ‘space of difference […] between 
here and there, public and private, profane and sacred…’—or, between now and then. 
These adjustments, and the points on which they rely, must be actively achieved: ‘If 
such adjustments are the engine of all motivation, and if they must be oriented, it is 
because the orient (the other) is missing’ (T2 3). That is to say, disorientation, as much 
as technicity, and the exteriority both imply, are originary; they must be adjusted after 
the fact, through an après-coup, in order that we may orient ourselves. 
 
The emphasis placed on socio-genesis here, as coupled to techno-genesis, brings us 
back to a key issue put in play by Stiegler’s reading of Heidegger on the relation of the 
who and the what: if we began by asking after Heidegger’s diagnosis of ‘our thought-
provoking time,’ and the significance of the absence of thought that marked it, we 
                                                        
30 The notion of a transductive relation refers to the work of Gilbert Simondon, discussed at 
length in The Fault of Epimetheus. Deleuze makes reference to Simondon at various points, 
most directly in the short review ‘On Gilbert Simondon’ collected in Desert Islands (86-89). 
For a discussion of the notion of transduction, see Combes 2013, 7-9; as Combes notes, one of 
the principal features of transduction is the way in which it ‘metaphysics and logic merge’ in 
and through it—it is ‘applies to ontogenesis and is ontogenesis itself’ and to this degree 
‘“transgresses” the Kantian limits on reason’ (8). As will hopefully become apparent, to this 





ultimately came up against Being and Time’s attempt to insist upon the distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic temporality, through the essential ‘mineness’ of 
Dasein. It was upon this premise that the entire analysis of conscience, both as a 
struggle between the individual and the “they” and between the who and the what, was 
found to turn. It follows from this that all forms of intratemporal relation—including 
the possibility of a shared or collective time by which we would be oriented—would 
be inauthentic, for Heidegger, in relation to the originary temporalizing of temporality 
performed by Dasein itself, in its singular relation to its own indeterminate Being.  
 
Elements of this position remained audible even in the broader historical 
considerations implicit in the lectures of the early fifties: if calculative thinking was to 
be resisted, it was, at least in part, insofar as it relied upon a standardized and pre-
formatted mode of temporality. As Heidegger himself puts it, calculative thinking 
‘reckons with conditions that are given […]. We take them into account with the 
calculated intention of serving specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite 
results’ (DT 46, my emphasis). Thanks to calculative thinking, we, mankind as a 
whole, can determine temporality collectively according to a coincidence between 
projection and occurrence, between act and result; the indeterminate working of 
temporalization itself is eliminated, not incidentally but as the target of calculation as 
such. Technics thus defines not only a modality of thinking but the collective 
determination of temporality itself, and we can read here a further clarification of the 
necessity, for Heidegger, of eliminating all transmission and mediation from Dasein’s 
authentic self-relation: both the technicity of the instrument and the noise of the “they” 
must be purged from the connection, for they each mark an inauthentic determination 
of the time that is Dasein’s essential Being. 
 
It is on this basis of this broader problem within Heidegger’s work that, in order for 
Stiegler to invoke the technical determination of a fundamentally collective 
temporality, Dasein—the Being whose exteriorization marks the temporalizing of 
temporality—must become an explicitly collective entity, a possibility that was, at 
best, only hinted at in Heidegger, and contradicted by his emphasis on its irreducible 
“mineness”:  
 




indicate that only the I can be the instance of indetermination. And yet 
Heidegger sometimes refers to the Greek Dasein—which could not be an I. 
This is a genuinely primal question since if the Dasein must finally be a we, 
the opposition between intratemporality and authentic temporality would 
be problematic. Understanding the Dasein as a we would inscribe 
indeterminacy firmly within idiomaticity, which is consistent with 
Heidegger’s last proposals but incompatible with Being and Time’s 
propositions. (T2 67) 
 
As noted, then, the collective determination of temporality—Dasein as a we—would 
undercut the vital Heideggerean distinction between “mere” intratemporality defined 
fundamentally in terms of instrumental practices (the chain of “in-order-tos” that 
impart significance to the ready-to-hand) and the authentic temporalization of 
temporality based upon Dasein’s own anticipatory resoluteness in the face of its 
essential finitude—its being-toward-death. Stiegler, in arguing for the co-imbrication 
of indeterminacy and idiomaticity, opens up an analysis of temporality that is 
essentially collective, while nevertheless retaining, as we will hear, a vital role for the 
singularizing processes by which the individual “gives themselves” their own time. 
Idiomaticity is, in this sense, precisely the orientation by means of which a collective 
time is derived from the originary, technically-condition disorientation that is the 
essential indeterminacy of Dasein—which is to say, its temporality. The loss of 
orientation, and the lack of future, is therefore a technically-conditioned crisis of 
idiomaticity, related, in a way we must establish, to the calculation of this 
indeterminacy that Heidegger so feared. 
 
Stiegler’s diagnosis of “our time” in terms of this problem of orientation is clear: ‘This 
cardinal orientation is not successfully occurring today; thus we are suffering from 
disorientation as such’ (T2 3). Originary disorientation, no longer orientated in and 
through the transductive relation between the dynamic of the what and the anticipatory 
capacity of the who, is ‘at its most extreme limit today’ (T2 2), a limit that may in fact 
be the limit of the “today” as such—that is, the capacity to produce a coherent 
temporal unity. It is experienced as speed: ‘Speed is our experience of a difference in 
forces […] this differential of forces-as-potential is the difference of rhythms between 
human beings and organized inorganic beings (technics)’ (T2 11). Disorientation as 
such is acceleration, insofar as this differential relation, experienced as speed, 




technical development […] dramatically widen[s] the distance between technical 
systems and social organisations, as if, negotiation between them appearing to be 
impossible, their final divorce seems inevitable’ (TT2 3). 
 
This final divorce is the loss of the future and, simultaneously, the loss of thinking, 
insofar as the two are coupled in and through the uncertain genitive: the future of 
thinking. As Stiegler reaffirms, what Heidegger allows us to think, even if he himself 
could not help but suppress it, is the way in which ‘technological conditions for access 
to the already-there may condition the very possibilities of our anticipation’ (T2 18); 
what is at stake, then, is ‘the future of the non-lived past’ (T2 3). Between these two, 
the ‘presence of which “today” consists’, the presence of the present, is in ‘crisis’: 
‘Today is thus an other time’ (T2 61), a time without precedent. If this is the today to 
which sound studies appeals—the contemporaneity in which the call for thinking 
sound will at last become audible—then we must pursue the source and the status of 
this “otherness”. Which amounts to asking—how has the transductive relation 
between the what and the who become decoupled to the point that disorientation as 
such has come to mark the uncertain contours of our “today”? We can identify two 
related aspects of this decoupling operating in the second volume of Technics and 
Time: real time and the industrialization of memory. Each must be thought through the 
other. 
 
Let us begin from the former, and proceed to the latter. At the opening of this chapter, 
I suggested that Heidegger’s attempt to extricate the figure of the call from all tele-
phonic resonance—to make it silent and immediate—effectively demanded the 
eradication of the call itself, insofar as the call requires what Stiegler, following 
Derrida, terms différance: spatialising-temporalizing, differing and deferring. So too, 
as we have seen, does temporality itself—temporality stems from the différance that 
marks the transductive relation between the who and the what. In the phenomenon of 
“real time,” Stiegler gestures to the same tendency taking place, not simply within the 
history of philosophy and its (conjoined) suppressions of technics and audition, but 
rather within the very dynamic of the what itself. Without this delaying-deferring, 
without the gap between call and response, there is no possibility of receiving the 
call—that is, no thinking, and no future. Thus, what is called “real time”—the way in 




transmission and quasi-instantaneous forms of capture and distribution (such as, for 
instance, the radio broadcast)—may in fact be ‘the de-temporalization of time, or at 
least its occultation’ (T2 63). 
 
If real time risks the erasure of the différance through which time itself is constituted, 
it is insofar as a process of selection is necessary for any event to “take place” as 
such—a process that Stiegler terms ‘event-ization’. It is here that real time is 
connected to the industrialization of memory:  ‘All events are inscribed in a memory, 
and event-ization is memory’s functioning.’ It is selection which ‘gives information 
value’ (T2 115), insofar as ‘“what happens” only happens in not being “everything,”’ 
and thus it is not simply the registration of a totality of things which take place but 
rather their active construction into a particular event through technical means. It is 
clear from this that the “today” we are seeking could never be the moment of presence 
between the past, as a former present, and the future, as a present to come. Rather it is 
this “between” in the very same sense that Dasein is the stretching-along between birth 
and death: it is nothing other than then tension of this disjuncture, operating in and 
through différance. The present, then, is that contested spacing-temporalizing through 
which Dasein returns to “its” non-lived past, as a condition of all anticipation. Thus, 
‘[a]ll events are inscribed in a memory, and event-ization is memory’s functioning’ 
(T2 100). 
 
What is distinctive about our “today” is therefore not the fact that it lacks simple 
presence, but the fact that this différantial construction of the present is no longer 
possible when real-time’ becomes the ‘operator’ of the ‘transformation of the 
conditions of reification and event-ization’ (T2 100). This is to say that the condition 
of an event’s taking place, its “happening,” are increasingly subjected to its immediate 
or instantaneous dispersal, its ‘“direct” or “live” transmission’ which is premised upon 
an informatic temporality of ‘light-time’ (T2 114). The significance of real time, then, 
is the effect of the resulting compression of space and time on event-ization: under the 
auspices of “real time”, an event must happen everywhere at once, “instantaneously”, 
in order to be an event at all; as a result, ‘[t]elecommunications networks 
deterritorialize,’ through an ‘industrial decontextualisation [that] occludes différance’ 
(T2 143-4). The spatialising-temporializing that allows for the construction of a 




anticipation, the what as the non-lived past from which it anticipates—is eliminated. 
 
It is here that Stiegler’s remarks on real time—that is, on a form of tele-transmission 
that would be, as we have heard previously with Heidegger, an occlusion of the 
phenomenon of calling as such—connects to the more general focus of his arguments 
around disorientation and speed: the industrialization of memory. Ben Roberts has 
noted a shift of emphasis between volumes one and two of Technics and Time, from 
technics as exteriorization and pros-thesis, to technics as mnemotechnics (Roberts, 
55), a shift borne out in my own reading; while the focus of the first volume, as noted 
above, was Dasein’s capacity to exteriorize itself through pro-sthetic pro-jections, the 
second volume focuses more directly on the conditions for such projection within the 
already-there, the non-lived past that is preserved in and through technics—indeed, 
that is coextensive with technicity as such. As Stiegler puts it, ‘Technics does not aid 
memory: it is memory’ (T2 65). The thinking of technics therefore requires a ‘politics 
of memory,’ insofar as memory is ‘always the object of a politics, of a criteriology by 
which it selects the events to be retained’ (T2 9); that is, insofar as it determines the 
conditions of event-ization and, at limit, the contours of the “today.”  
 
It is the very possibility of such a criteriology that the combination of real time and the 
industrialization of memory threatens to eliminate: a quasi-immediate event-ization is 
made possible thanks not only to the possibilities of tele-transmission (e.g. satellite 
transmission or internet streaming) but also to what Stiegler terms ‘analogic and 
numeric technologies’, technologies that ‘tend to efface […the] deferred modalization 
of temporality’ (T2 62). These technologies, such as the ‘telephone, photography, 
phonography, cinema, [and] radio broadcasting […]’, have replaced the anticipatory 
dynamic of the who, in its transductive relation to the what, with the production of 
what Stiegler terms ‘industrial temporal objects’ (Stiegler 2011, 56). We can borrow 
Stiegler’s own gloss on this term: 
 
A temporal object—a melody, film or radio broadcast [and perhaps, 
therefore, the duration of a tele-phone call]—is constituted by the time of 
its passing […]. It is an object that passes. It is constituted by the fact that 
like the consciousness that it unites, it disappears as it appears. With the 
birth of public radio (1920), followed by the first television programs 
(1947), the program industries produce the temporal objects that coincide 




they are an object. This coincidence enables consciousness to adopt the 
time of these temporal objects. The contemporary cultural industries can 
thus make masses of viewers adopt the time of consumption of toothpaste, 
cold drink, shoes, cars, etc. (Stieger 2011, 56; original emphasis) 
 
Re-calling Dasein’s de-severant encounter with the radio, then, what is at stake for 
Stiegler is not simply the im-mediate reduction of Dasein’s world through the elision 
of (almost) all différance, as was the case (in modified terms) for Heidegger, but, at 
the same moment, the reduction of Dasein’s pro-sthetic exteriorization—which is to 
say, its temporalization—to a standard, operating in and through the industrially-
produced and formatted temporal objects that can be ‘internalised,’ simultaneously, by 
‘tens or hundreds of millions’ of auditors (56). For Stiegler, it follows that, ‘[a]s 
enormous systems of synchronization the cultural industries, especially television’—
though Heidegger’s remarks on the radio’s capacity to produce effects that ‘cannot yet 
be visualized’ may demand we alter this—‘are machines to liquidate [the] self,’ 
insofar as this self is ‘a singularity’: ‘I can only say I because I give myself my own 
time’ (56). 
 
Thus, Stiegler defines “today” as the eradication of one form of temporality in favour 
of another, reduced or formatted version: that is, if real time pushes towards the 
elimination of the work of différance, and in this sense the elimination of temporality 
as such, then the industrialization of memory in and through the industrial temporal 
object replaces this work of time—what Heidegger termed the ‘temporalizing of 
temporality’ (BT 278)—with a ‘hypersynchronisation constituted by the programs’ of 
the culture industry (Stiegler 2011, 57).31 Counter-intuitively then, for Stiegler the 
present as constituted through a process of différance—that is, a present that is never 
simply present—is increasingly replaced with a strict synchronicity that would, in fact, 
fit with the more traditional definition of the present through the presence of the now, 
but which, for Stiegler, constitutes the eradication of temporalization as such. Thus, 
our “today” would be defined as con-temporaneity through the conjunction of all the 
various, multiple and complex workings of temporalizing that mark the singularity of 
the individual in a standardized and universal nexus—a contemporaneity that can, 
                                                        
31 “Program” here situates the ‘programming industries’ as the ‘current form’ of a ‘general 
economy of the program’ as defined, in Derrida’s Of Grammatology, as ‘life becoming 




paradoxically, only be defined as disorientation, to the degree that it lacks the 
différance between here and there, then and now, upon which time itself is oriented 
(see T2 65). With a surfeit of industrially-formatted memory and “no future”, we fall 
into a perpetual present that the individual cannot inhabit, but which is the possession 
of ‘nobody,’ or, in Heidegger’s terms, the “they” that, in fact, is not and can never be 
any given person, any Dasein in its irreducible ‘mineness.’ 
 
The question that remains to us, and that sound studies demanded we take up, is to ask 
how, and in what ways, this “today” can be the site of our finally beginning to think 
sonority—can we, today, listen to sound’s call for thinking, at last? If this today is to 
be figured, necessarily, as technical, in a way that Heidegger himself enabled us to 
think without being able to acknowledge, can it also be made audible? In the final 
section of this chapter, I wish to map out the contours of the contemporary 
soundscape, and to ask the extent to which the soundmarks32 of this auditory 
topography confirm or challenge those we have elaborated from Stiegler. In doing so, 
I hope to finally return to, or rather, to re-call, the problem of thinking as such; if 
Stiegler has shown that the future of thinking is the thought of technics, then, from our 
analysis of the imbrication of technics and sonority in Heidegger’s own account of this 
future, we are permitted to ask whether it might also be sonic. Grounded upon this 
possibility, evoked implicitly throughout this chapter, I will turn to the work of Gilles 
Deleuze, and ask, once again, what does it mean to begin thinking, at last? 
 
 
6. New Noise: Stockpiling and Retromania 
 
Thus far, we have heard how the call of thinking has allowed us to uncover a repressed 
tele-phonics within Heidegger’s thought, and, from this, proceeded to a technical 
determination of the “today” within which this call might finally become audible. Yet 
it remains to be heard how this technically-constituted con-temporaneity offers itself 
to thought as something to which we must listen—in a manner different from 
Heidegger’s own insistence that we listen to Being. Which is to ask, once again: in 
what sense does sound, specifically, call for thinking, today? In pursuing this question, 
                                                        




I want to pursue two related lines of thought. Firstly, I want to uncover the ways in 
which Stiegler’s concern with disorientation is audible in recent music writing from 
both journalists and artists, who have, in and through their engagement with 
contemporary sonic practice, immanently sounded out precisely the same issues, and 
identified proximate causes; in effect, this will function as an initial indication of the 
possibility of thinking from sonority, insofar as listening itself will be seen to produce 
certain theoretical results commensurate with those established above. 
 
Yet the conceptual implications of this possibility must be carefully assessed, and this 
leads to the second line of thinking I wish to pursue—and, ultimately, this task will be 
the focus of the remaining part of this thesis. In order to begin laying the groundwork 
for such an assessment, I will frame my engagement with contemporary music writing 
through the pivotal work of Jacques Attali, whose Noise: The Political Economy of 
Music is not only a foundational text for sound studies, but is so to the very degree that 
it asks after the ways in which sonority might function as a spur for thinking. Attali’s 
work, then, will provide a link between the attempt to make audible the above 
engagement with the technico-temporality of thinking and the broader question of 
method—that is, of the possible responses to sound’s call for thinking.  
 
Attali’s work does not have merely methodological significance, however. Rather, I 
also hope to show that the speculative claim outlined above that the repression of (the 
thought of) technics identified by Stiegler may be functionally related to the elision of 
sonority claimed by sound studies—and that, therefore, the future of thinking may 
demand their conceptual imbrication—can be discovered as already present in Attali’s 
text, and is, therefore, built into sound studies’ very foundations. Not only does this 
text avow a suppression of sonic thinking coextensive with the philosophical tradition 
as such, but, just as significantly for my account here, its plea for a form of ‘thinking 
through music’ situates the possibility of this thinking within an analysis of the ‘today’ 
that is, at its root, techno-phonic (Attali 1985, 3). If Attali’s text is, rightly, still much-
read and cited in texts on and around sound studies, I hope to avoid any risk of 
redundancy by situating it (against its own broadly semiological and post-structuralist 
tendencies) within the above-outlined lineage of post-deconstructive 
phenomenology—not without risk, certainly, of placing a certain amount of stress 




conclusions through different resources, I can, in fact, strengthen the generally rather 
limited argumentation the text itself provides. 
 
Initially, then, I want to consider Attali’s work, before examining the way in which 
both his concerns and Stiegler’s are audible in contemporary debates around listening 
and sonic practice. To this end, we can return to Attali’s bold claim with which the 
text opens: 
 
For twenty-five centuries, Western knowledge has tried to look upon the 
world. It has failed to understand that the world is not for the beholding. It 
is for hearing. It is not legible, but audible. (3) 
 
Such a statement, as indicated previously, marks a recurrent trope within the 
articulation of sound studies’ contemporaneity, as well as possessing an interesting 
proximity to Heidegger’s own remarks on the “still not” of thinking—as well as his 
ultimately metaphorical remarks on the necessity of ‘listening to Being’. This 
proximity to our preceding concerns becomes even more pressing in Attali’s 
subsequent evocation of the ‘thought-provoking time’ in which this demand to think 
sonically is encountered: 
 
Today, our sight has dimmed; it no longer sees our future, having 
constructed a present made of abstraction, nonsense, and silence. […] By 
listening to noise, we can better understand where the folly of men and 
their calculations is leading us, and what hopes it is still possible to have. 
(my emphases) 
 
Though Attali’s characterization of “today” in relation to ‘abstraction, nonsense, and 
silence’ is not yet clear in its precise meaning, his invocation of the ‘folly’ of 
‘calculations’ takes us directly back to Heidegger’s own characterization of ‘our 
thought-provoking time’ in terms of a calculative pseudo-thinking; and, ultimately, 
Attali too is incited to invoke hope, that we may escape the trajectory upon which such 
calculations are ‘leading us’—towards, perhaps, what Heidegger termed the supreme 
danger. Regardless of the specific nature of this hope, it is nevertheless pitched against 
a present that has lost its future, thanks precisely to the limiting of our present to 
calculative action. Clearly, we remain on familiar terrain here. 
 




that I wish to outline here, as means to providing my own account of the soundscape 
of our contemporaneity—that is, the contemporaneity from which sound studies hopes 
to think. Firstly, I want to consider, somewhat briefly, Attali’s own suggestion as to 
how we might position sound, not as object of a new theoretical discipline—a 
positioning that risks retaining the ocular aspect encoded in theory itself—but as 
something that itself performs theoretical operations, in a sense we must examine; 
thought would then seek to track and to map out the immanent theoretical capacities of 
sound itself. This first aspect is, therefore, more narrowly methodological—though, in 
this regard, only preliminary, as Chapter Two will indicate more thoroughly. 
Secondly, I want to indicate how Attali’s own deployment of this method produces an 
account of our “today” that relies, implicitly, upon the same logic as Stiegler’s account 
of disorientation through the industrialization of memory. This, more substantive 
aspect will then allow me to examine the ways in which recent examinations of “our 
thought-provoking time” within the discourse of music journalism echo and amplify 
this logic in and through a listening practice—albeit one whose own methodological 
implications are rarely made audible. 
 
For Attali, the theoretical work that, for him, is performed by sonority stems from the 
claim—which is, again, a familiar one within sound studies—that sonority has an 
essential relationship to temporality; what is distinctive about Attali’s approach is that 
this relationship to time does not simply manifest phenomenologically in the act of 
listening (and the associated time consciousness), but is rather indexed to larger-scale 
historical transformations. Such an approach was, as noted above, already an explicit 
element of Stiegler’s account of the industrial temporal object, and, more broadly, his 
relationship to both Husserlian and Heideggerean phenomenology. What is vital about 
Attali’s work, placed in this context, is the central role he ascribes to auditory 
experience as a form of technico-temporal diagnostics—that is, the priority of listening 
as a way of sounding out the mutations of the temporal object, and therefore of the 
technically-determined transformations of temporality as such. In sum, for Attali, 
‘music makes mutations audible’ (4); that is to say, music sounds out the 
transformations of a given social order, transformations that, given our above 
arguments, can only be thought as rooted in technicity. Music’s priority here is 
dependent upon two, mutually-reinforcing reasons, which I will consider in turn—one 




specific status of music in relation to the mapping of the social. 
 
Firstly, music, for Attali, is definable according to a set of ‘codes’ that reflect (and this 
word bears its own difficulties) the social order in which it is produced: ‘All music can 
be defined as noise given form according to a code…’ (25). For Attali, this coding is 
an articulation of power that is coextensive with the establishment of society as such: 
'All music, any organisation of sounds is then a tool for the creation or consolidation 
of a community, of a totality. It is what links a power center to its subjects, and thus, 
more generally, it is an attribute of power in all of its forms.' This exercise of power, 
which defines the intersection of music and collectivity, is on the order of a regulation 
and regularisation, against the chaotic uncertainties of uncoded noise: 'music localizes 
and specifies power, because it marks and regiments the rare noises that cultures, in 
their normalization of behaviour, see fit to authorize' (19-20); even more bluntly, he 
states that '[t]he code of music simulates the accepted rules of society' (29, original 
emphasis). On this basis, Attali will claim that music ‘has no usage in itself, but rather 
a social meaning expressed in a code relating to the sound matter music fashions and 
the systems of power it serves’ (24); music models the imposition of order that defines 
the social as such. Thus, ‘the production of music has as its function the creation, 
legitimation, and maintenance of order’ (30), and one can listen to the dominant order 
of a given society in the music it produces. 
 
From this definition of music in relation to power and order, it follows that, when the 
social order undergoes a transformation, so does the coding that reciprocally 
determines the boundary between music and noise. This leads us to the second point. 
Attali affirms that music has a privileged role in this coupling of the aesthetic and the 
political, not only thanks to its temporal nature (after all, there are visual arts that are 
time-based, such as theatre or dance), but thanks to its immateriality. Though I will not 
follow Attali to the letter on this point, not least because it is not clear exactly what is 
meant by “material” in this context, nevertheless the framing of music’s conceptual 
and theoretical significance he derives from it bears consideration:  
 
[Music’s] styles and economic organization are ahead of the rest of society 
because it explores, much faster than material reality can, the entire range 
of possibilities in a given code. It makes audible the new world that will 




things; it is not only the image of things, but the transcending of the 
everyday, the herald of the future. (11) 
 
Once again, a dynamic of delay is audible here—the visible articulation of what music 
uncovers in and through its exploration of a given social code is belated in relation to 
what can already be heard; insofar as, according to Attali, thinking itself has been 
articulated in ocular terms, then thought too must come after the fact, as an après-
coup. Sonic thought would therefore not only mark the (desired) future of thinking—
that is, a mode of thinking extricated from the limitations of the visual sphere—but a 
thought of the future: it would articulate, through sonority, what aspects of our future 
are already audible in our present—that is, what aspects of “our thought-provoking 
time” already allow us to hear the future of thinking. 
 
Beyond the methodological interest of such a claim—to which we will return—the 
specific results of Attali’s own attempt to listen to the future audible within our present 
offer some significant, specifically auditory corroboration for Stiegler’s own diagnosis 
outlined above. In general, Attali’s account identifies four principal ‘networks’, that is, 
distinct ways in which noise has been organized into music, arranged into a broadly 
historical sequence; that is to say, these networks are, effectively, ways of determining 
a particular epoch, a collective time, including the present. Importantly, these 
epochs—our thought-provoking time amongst them—are defined as sites of tension, 
across and between these networks, which never hold unitary sway over the time that 
they determine. Moreover, Attali is careful not to suggest any simple linear succession 
to the various networks he identifies; though there is necessarily the supersession of 
one by another, such that music can be prophetic of social changes, nevertheless, as 
with social change, it is not a question of the wholesale replacement of one mode by 
another: just as new institutions do not simply supplant or eradicate old ones, nor do 
new musical codes eradicate old forms of musical practice. This leads to some just 
caution on Attali's part, mitigating some of the more bold statements of his theoretical 
intent: 'The simultaneity of multiple codes, the variable overlappings between periods, 
styles, and forms, prohibits any attempt at a genealogy of music, a hierarchical 
archaeology, or a precise ideological pinpointing of particular musicians' (19). That is 
to say, it is not possible to precisely delineate boundaries and transition points, nor to 




theoretician who would wish to engage music's prophetic capacity is to study the 
structuring and ordering of 'differences', which are 'done violence' by noises that '[call] 
into question' those differences, rather than to study homogeneous periods and read 
them back onto particular social organisations⁠.33 
 
With this caveat in mind, let us consider Attali’s auditory diagnosis of his present—
which may or may not remain ours, forty years later. The two networks that are of 
most interest to us are those that, for Attali, mark the point of tension that defines our 
present in terms that, as we will hear, are reminiscent of the Heideggerean conception 
of time as ek-stasis: that is, our present, far from being a self-contained point on the 
line of time, is stretched out between a network that gathers up the entirety of the past, 
and one that attempts to exceed the already-there in the name of an unheard-of 
future—networks that he names repetition and composition, respectively. I will 
consider repetition first, outlining Attali's characterization of it in relation to Stiegler’s 
own analysis of contemporary disorientation and the industrialization of memory, 
before turning to the mode of composition, which Attali considered to be embryonic at 
the time of writing, and of which, for this reason, he offers a less specific 
characterization. In so doing, I wish to draw attention to the way in which the call for 
thinking that emanates from sonority merges, simultaneously, with the question of 
method—that is, a question of musical and theoretical practice—and with that of the 
time “in” which such practice could “take place”. That is, I hope to show that, within 
Attali’s account, so influential for sound studies, we find conjoined precisely those 
elements upon which I have insistently focused from the outset: what would it mean, 
today, for sound to call for thinking, with due emphasis on each of these terms? The 
way in which we can hear Attali posing such a question will allow me to return, at last, 
to this fundamental question—this question of the fundament, or of grounding—and to 
re-pose it once again, with a distinct set of resources. 
 
Initially, then, and with this broader goal in mind, I will provide an overview of how 
                                                        
33 This notion of difference relating to difference by way of a particular ordering is, on the one 
hand, a common structuralist trope, present already in Saussure’s general linguistics, where 
language is lacking in positive terms (Saussure 1986, 118); on the other hand, the statement 
has something of a Deleuzian valence, insofar as Deleuze’s reconfiguration of structuralism 





Attali defines the network of repetition. Fundamentally, the shift to repetition is, for 
Attali, defined by a technological innovation—what is more, a mnemo-technical one, 
in precisely the sense that fascinated Stiegler: for Attali, it is the possibility of 
recording sound that 'thoroughly shattered' the preceding network, representation (85), 
in a manner that acted contrary to its initially intended utilisation (86-88). It is 
important to note that this grounding of the shift between networks in technological 
advancement is not a simple determinism, and Attali avers that the technological 
conditions (instrumentation, for instance) for a new network often emerge before the 
other conditions necessary to allow for such a transformation (35); such caution can be 
re-figured in terms of Stiegler’s own insistence on the “différantial” relation between 
socio-genesis and techno-genesis.34 What is key here is the way in which Attali figures 
sound recording in terms of a broader genealogy of recording-as-technics that is 
immanently related to social order. As Attali puts it: ‘Recording has always been a 
means of social control, a stake in politics, regardless of the available technologies’ 
(87). Following Stiegler, we could also say, reciprocally, that the available 
technologies are themselves always recording technologies, the exteriorization of 
memory, and if, according to Attali, ‘[s]tockpiling memory, retaining history or time 
[…] has always been an attribute of civil and priestly power,’ then we can say that the 
thinking of technics is not only always a thinking of the technico-temporal, it is also a 
thinking of the technico-political—a theme that has remained implicit throughout our 
invocations of a collective temporality. 
 
The mnemo-technical aspect of recording that instigates the transition to the repetition 
network is defined by Attali as the stockpiling of time; that is, recording allows the 
musical performance, which must take place in and over time, to be stored, preserved, 
and recovered; it allows for the production and re-production of determinate units of 
time, or, in Stiegler’s (Husserlian) terminology, temporal objects. Thus, in Stiegler’s 
parlance, recording produces an industrial temporal object—a temporal object 
produced on a mass scale thanks to its formatted repeatability, or, to take up Stiegler’s 
terms again, its ortho-thetic character. For Attali, the real effect of this new recording 
capacity, implied by a pejorative connotation of 'stockpiling,' is that music is 
accumulated, rather than experienced, and the temporality of the industrial temporal 
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object never coincides with that of the experience of the subject:  
 
The major contradiction of repetition is in evidence here: people must 
devote their time to producing the means to buy recordings of other 
people's time, losing in the process not only the use of their own time, but 
also the time required to use other people's time. Stockpiling then becomes 
a substitute, not a preliminary condition, for use. People buy more records 
that they can listen to. They stockpile what they want to find time to hear. 
(101, original emphasis) 
 
Thus, Attali affirms the technico-phenemonlogical dianogistics of Stiegler, with a 
renewed emphasis: not only is the time of the individual formatted according to the 
parameters of the industrial temporal object (in the case of the recording network, we 
could refer to the three-minute form of the pop single, itself notoriously determined, 
initially, by the capacity of a single side of a 7” vinyl record), but these objects are 
themselves accumulated in quantities that could never coincide with the time of 
experience itself. What is more, this disjuncture is manifest at the level of 
temporality’s collective production—my time is exchanged for the time of others, but 
this exchange becomes dissymmetrical to the degree that my time approaches, 
asymptotically, a vanishing point, as the present of my experience is overwhelmed by 
the mass of the already-there to whose dimensions it can never be extended.  
 
Again, then, in terms used previously, it is a question of the already-there assuming 
dimensions whereby it can no longer be re-assimilated; Dasein can no longer 
possibilize on the basis of its past, insofar as its past exceeds its capacities for 
anticipation, and collective temporality is itself ruptured through this very process. 
Attali himself gestures in this direction, redoubling the cry of no future: 
 
if our societies seem unpredictable, if the future is difficult to discern, it is 
perhaps quite simply because nothing happens, except for the artificially 
created pseudoevents and chance violence that accompany the 
emplacement of repetitive society. (89-98) 
 
We observe here the paradoxical dynamic that Stiegler extrapolated from Heidegger: 
in and through the hyper-formatting of calculability that, for Stiegler as much as for 
Heidegger, marks the specificity of modern technology, we do not, in fact, manage to 




predictability; to the contrary, we encounter disorientation as such, insofar as this 
formatting exceeds our capacities to make our own time. That is to say, “our time” is, 
in an important sense, no longer ours at all—and this fact is audible, today. 
 
The prescience of Attali’s account of the contemporary soundscape is evident from 
even a cursory consideration of the four decades since its publication—the past twenty 
years, in particular, have been defined by not only a wholesale transformation in the 
production, distribution, and consumption of music through the emergence and 
subsequent omnipresence of digital and network technologies, but a subsequent crisis 
in the very status and significance of music as such—all of which we could define in 
terms of a the exacerbation of stockpiling, the amplification of repetition. That is to 
say, as the capacities for amassing and accessing the sonic stockpile rapidly increase 
and extend, the relation between lived time and the time of the already-there becomes 
increasingly decoupled, with music occupying the vanishing space between—in the 
overwhelming noisiness of our shrinking, disoriented present. It is now possible to 
carry around far more music than one will ever find time to listen to on a device small 
enough to fit comfortably in one’s pocket; moreover, this is not a mere technological 
possibility, but a significant, and possibly dominant, mode of musical consumption. 
What becomes of music qua coding of the social under these conditions—and what of 
our capacity to think through it, today, as Attali insists we must? 
 
These questions are not only implicit in Attali’s account of the network of repetition, 
as well as Stiegler’s analysis of disorientation and the industrial temporal object, but 
have also been a preoccupation in recent music journalism. Within a particular strand 
of this discourse, which is in principle focused upon the sound of the present, there has 
been a focus upon contemporary musical cultures as either enabled or threatened by an 
informational deluge—the impossible surfeit of the already-there, the overloading of 
the sonic archive, leading to the impossibility of inhabiting a musical present with any 
coherent sense of its possible futures, much less a capacity to pursue them. I want to 
focus, in particular, on two texts by Simon Reynolds, his book-length study 
Retromania and an accompanying article for The Wire titled “We Are All David Toop 
Now,” alongside various entries in a series published by the latter magazine titled 
“Collateral Damage,” designed to encourage musicians, label-owners and bloggers to 




Attali and Stiegler’s accounts of the technico-temporality of the present in relation to 
the specifics of today’s soundscape. In so doing, I hope to indicate how insistently the 
concerns over the scope of this present link the construction and consolidation of “our 
time” to the technical conditions of access to the already-there, even within a discourse 
attentive only to how “our time” sounds. Thus, I hope to reaffirm my initial 
supposition that, if we ask how sound might call for thinking today, we must not only 
confront the status of thought within our present, but also the ways in which this 
present is itself an uncertain, fragmentary unity—and it is to this extent that it is, as 
Heidegger has it, thought-provoking. 
 
Let us begin, then, with the work of Simon Reynolds, a music writer whose work has 
insistently intersected with both theoretical concerns (including consistent, if brief and 
allusive, references to the work of Deleuze and Guattari), and, what is more, has been 
continually caught up in the problematic temporality of pop music itself; his earlier 
books on dance music and post-punk, for instance, are retrospective reflections on 
future-oriented, often avowedly futurist musics that nevertheless affirm a “popular” 
status in terms of their relation to a collective present (see Reynolds 2005, 2013). In 
2011, Reynolds released a large work that once again takes up these broad themes, 
entitled Retromania: Pop Culture’s Addiction to its Own Past. As implied by the title, 
this text attempts to expound and investigate a temporal disorientation that is directly 
(though, in this text, with an uncertainty of causal connection) allied to technological 
transformations, and which brings into question the very contemporaneity of “pop” 
itself.  
 
To this end, the book’s first section, significantly subtitled ‘Now,’ provides a series of 
meditations on the saturation of contemporary culture with its own past, now 
indefinitely preserved and continually, instantaneously accessible thanks to 
digitisation and file-sharing; it is Reynolds’ descriptions of how this reciprocal 
determination is audible today that is most important here. He makes his position clear 
at the outset: ‘Instead of being about itself, the 2000s has been about every other 
previous decade happening again all at once: a simultaneity of pop time that abolishes 
history while nibbling away at the present’s own sense of itself as an era with a 
distinct identity and feel’ (x-xi). This is precisely Stiegler’s diagnosis filtered through 




through a reciprocal relation between past and future that Stiegler refers to as epochal 
redoubling; the différantial production of a singularized temporality—a “now” or a 
“today”—is no longer possible. This state of affairs, the eponymous ‘retromania,’ is 
neither random nor unprecedented, but rather directly allied, for Reynolds as much as 
for Stiegler, to a process of technological acceleration that has dissolved spatial 
boundaries just as it has compressed temporal ones: ‘From landscapes dramatically 
altered through development […] to new technologies affecting the feel and rhythm of 
everyday life, the world in which you had felt at home gradually disappeared. The 
present became a foreign country’ (xxvi). Time, it seems, can no longer “take place.” 
 
Accounting for this broader cultural shift is beyond my remit; here it merits simply to 
focus on Reynolds shared sense of the way in which our contemporary disorientation 
is registered through a delay. For Reynolds, the roots of this disorientation, for music 
at least, can be located in the middle of the nineteenth century: ‘Developed in the 
nineteenth century but defining the twentieth, recording in all its forms is what 
ultimately created the conditions of possibility for retro’ (xxxv). Again, the figure of 
the delay-deferral obtrudes into the relation between technics, temporality, and, 
increasingly audition—what we hear, “at last,” are the consequences of a rupture 
imperceptible at the time, whose symptoms remained inaudible until today. Reynolds 
goes on to quote Ariel Pink, whom he elsewhere refers to as a ‘godfather’ of 
hypnagogic pop (348), a largely US-based scene of exemplarily retro-fixated, drone-
heavy pop music, drenched in reverb and full of gestures towards a half-remembered 
late-eighties youth: ‘It’s a total paradigm shift, it’s completely screwed with our 
brains,’ says Pink of the shift between music sold as scores and music sold as records, 
‘The recording medium actually crystallises an event and makes it more than the sum 
of the score. The feel of the moment is captured. That has changed everything—
people being able to revisit memories like that’’ (xxxv). 
   
Thus, we find Reynolds—and, as we will go on to hear more fully, musicians 
themselves—engaging precisely the concerns articulated by Stiegler and Attali, and, 
ultimately, even Heidegger. The connection is made even more explicitly in Reynolds’ 
comments on ‘music and memory in the time of YouTube’ (55). YouTube, for 
Reynolds is a ‘potent symbol’ of ‘the astronomic expansion of humanity’s resources of 




high-speed internet connections. The significance, however, lies not only in quantity, 
the sheer mass of the already-there, but rather in its ease of access: ‘In the pre-Internet 
era, there was already way more information and culture than any individual could 
digest. But most of this culture data and culture matter was stashed out of our 
everyday reach, in library museums, and galleries. Nowadays search engines have 
obliterated the delays involved in searching through a library’s murky, maze-like 
stacks’ (57). Reynolds himself notes that his book on post-punk would have been far 
easier to write had it not preceded the launch of YouTube by eighteen months—and 
for evidence of this, simply search YouTube for any of post-punk’s major bands 
(Wire, for instance, or This Heat) and listen to the copious amount of material, 
including full albums uploaded as single videos, available within seconds.  
 
For Reynolds, this capacity, emblematized by YouTube, has ‘utterly transformed’ our 
‘relationship to time and space’ (58), in two principle ways: firstly, through the 
preservation of an overwhelming amount of music history just a few clicks away from 
the interested listener, as opposed to the previous tendency for records to be deleted or 
go out-of-print, making them very difficult to find a few years after release if they 
were not highly successful; secondly, a new mode of listening, as this superabundance 
comes ‘at the cost of disempowering the power of art to dominate our attention’ (71), 
and the listener is increasingly placed in a ‘flighty state of distraction,’ a ‘vacillatory 
suspension of skipping and skimming’ that is ‘really an insidious form of paralysis’ 
(73). On reflection, even Reynolds himself is unsure if YouTube would have truly 
helped him write his post-punk history; the ease of access would be offset by the way 
in which he could ‘easily have lost [himself] in endless clips of live footage, ancient 
promo videos and TV appearances’—perhaps, at its limit, merely a Web 2.0 version of 
lostness in the “they”, awaiting a call of conscience that could never cut through the 
cacophony. 
 
On this basis, temporality, technicity, and subjectivity are here tied together in a 
mutually-reinforcing dynamic of dispossession and insecurity, which matches up both 
with Stiegler’s analysis of contemporary disorientation as well as with a critical 
account of postmodernity: ‘The rearrangment of time and space in the internet age 
seems to be mirrored by distortions in one’s sense of self, which feels splayed and 




featured in The Wire magazine in 2012 and republished in an expanded version on 
Reynolds’ blog under the title “Tales of Toopographic Oceans” (I will refer to the 
latter version here), we hear precisely this deployment of music to perform a 
diagnostics that is now both technico-temporal and psycho-pathological, as the crisis 
of disorientation, just as Stiegler feared, becomes a crisis of subjectification.35 The 
eponymous David Toop—whom we now all are, and who thus becomes a figure of 
subjectification as such—is a music writer known for his eclecticism and expansive 
knowledge of musical esoterica and exotica (both these terms, as Reynolds note, 
relative and based upon a steadily-vanishing contrast between the proximate and the 
distant, the familiar and the foreign, or, in Stiegler’s chosen terms, the occident and the 
orient); he is a pioneering representative of what Reynolds terms xenomania, the 
overwhelming desire for the alien, the other. This desire was, in Toop’s case, the 
object of a gradual, progressive fulfillment through years of painstaking accumulation 
of musical exotica—including ‘journeying to the Amazonian jungle to record the 
Yanomami tribe’s shamanic rituals.’ Regardless of the means of its fulfillment, to 
which we will turn shortly, this accumulative drive is, in Attali’s terms, very clearly an 
extreme modality of stockpiling, premised upon the mnemo-technics of phonography 
and pushing towards the infinitization of the archive. At its root, the desire is self-
annulling; in pushing ever-wider the boundaries of the phonographically-caputured, 
the very distance upon which the drive itself turned is increasingly deprived of its 
conditions, eliminating the ‘cardinal points’ through which the relation between self 
and other can itself be sustained. 
 
For Reynolds, this self-annulling is precisely what has taken place. If Toop is the 
archetype and precursor of a generalized tendency now encompassing and defining an 
equally generic “we,” then in and through this extrapolation into a collective 
process—and thanks to the technical conditions of this collectivity—something vital 
has changed, such that, if “we are all David Toop now,” then this subjective figure has 
itself become something other than what it marked in relation to an individual (the 
                                                        
35 In passing, I want to note that, in expanding the coupling of technics and temporality to 
include the production of subjectivity—something already implicit in Heidegger and then 
explicit in Stiegler—allows us to discern, once again, the trace of Nietzsche’s definition of the 
philosopher as diagnostician or symptomatologist of civlisation; a definition that Deleuze will 





actually-existing person named David Toop), in a way that bears direct connection to 
Stiegler’s analysis of disorientation. Toop’s xenomania and its fulfillment were 
premised, as noted previously, on the distinction between here and there, then its 
satisfaction retained an element of delay and deferral—that is, it was structured 
through différance. As Reynolds puts it: ‘analogue-world collecting [or, we could say, 
stockpiling] involved physical exertion and travel, distance and delay structured music 
consumption according to a rhythm of hunt and capture, ingestion and digestion’; it 
possessed an orient-ation. Yet, the transformation of the mnemo-technical conditions 
under which this particular modality of stockpiling took place has ensured that ‘any 
kid with a broadband connection can access the sort of dizzying diversity of listening 
experience that took Toop a lifetime of obsessive dedication to accumulate.’ If ‘any 
kid’ is now equivalent to David Toop, it is on condition that the very structuring of 
time and space, a structuring that was the operator of Toop’s xenomaniacal desire, is 
short-circuited, and its affective resonance thrown decisively into question. 
 
Thus, we can read Reynolds’ remark that ‘today’s xenomania is entwined with 
globalization and the distance-abolishing effects of the internet’ as both a summary of 
his position and as an implicit gesture of technico-temporal diagnostics performed 
through the auditory experience of a “today”; what is more, we can observe how 
Reynolds’ conclusion is directly proximate to those of Stiegler and Attali, as well as a 
more general critical interrogation of postmodernity. Here, the crisis of subjectification 
is articulated through the account of a collective listening subject passing under the 
name “David Toop”: the ‘always-there plenitude’ of the online archive offers a 
‘plenitude [that] incites restlessness, the audio equivalent of checklist tourism.’ We are 
incited to re-call here not only Stiegler’s fears over the effects of the industrial 
temporal object, but also Heidegger’s own account of a powerlessness to think that 
marks our thought-provoking time; though there may be ‘everywhere a lively and 
constantly more audible interest’ in listening—just as Heidegger heard such an interest 
in philosophy—nevertheless, such ‘taking an interest’ may not amount to what is 
called thinking—a call whose sense we have (deliberately) left in question to the 
degree that it may, I hope, include both the auditory and the philosophical within its 
ambit (WT 4). 
 




as means to a questioning of how we might respond to this provocation—which is to 
say, before taking up once again the question was heisst denken?—it must be noted 
that is not only Reynolds who sounds off on these concerns extrapolated from the 
experience of listening to our present. Responding to the increasingly voluble debates 
around online file-sharing and the digitization of music distribution and consumption, 
The Wire magazine began a series titled “Collateral Damage,” in which artists, label 
owners and music bloggers were invited to offer their own diagnosis of, and response 
to, the soundscape of our thought-provoking time. I am interested less in the specifics 
of the positions taken, or their respective merits, than in the way in which they mark 
out certain points of convergence upon what I would call, following Deleuzian 
terminology to be analysed subsequently, a problem. To this end, I want to consider, 
very briefly, various statements made during the course of these debates that align 
with the concerns outlined above, effectively mapping my engagement with technics 
and temporality, extrapolated from Heidegger and Stiegler, onto the sonic present. 
 
We can begin with the piece that indirectly triggered the discussion that would 
subsequently unfold in the magazine’s pages: Kenneth Goldsmith’s “Epiphany,” from 
the April 2011 issue (subsequently published online in the version cited here, under 
the title “Collateral Damage: Kenneth Goldsmith”). Goldsmith recounts his encounter 
with online file-sharing (in this case, the early peer-to-peer music-sharing service 
Napster) in terms resonant with Attali’s account of stockpiling and with Stiegler’s 
industrialization of memory: ‘It was as if every record store, fleamarket and charity 
shop in the world had been connected by a searchable database and had flung their 
doors open, begging you to walk away with as much as you could carry for free.’ 
What is distinctive about Goldsmith’s piece is his evaluation of this transformation of 
the technical support for the already-there: he is unabashedly positive about its effects. 
Though he alludes to the effects of disorientation by noting that ‘file sharing is non-
contextual’—and hence no longer situated spatio-temporally in terms of a linear 
chronology or an articulation of proximity and distance—and though he also reaffirms 
Reynolds’ account of the collective listening subject by noting that ‘[j]ust like you, 
I’m drowning in my riches […] I’ve got more music on my drives than I’ll ever be 
able to listen to in the next ten lifetimes,’ and that ‘records that I’ve been craving for 
years […] are languishing unlistened-to,’ nevertheless he affirms these facts as 




in which culture is distributed have become profoundly more intriguing than the 
cultural artefact itself.’  
 
The implications of Goldsmith’s claim here are, in fact, highly significant in relation 
to the nature of the sonic object itself qua ‘cultural artefact,’ and we will have 
opportunity to revisit their specifically sonic inspiration in the work of John Cage. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that those who more-or-less directly respond to 
Goldsmith’s provocation do not share his evaluation. Chris Cutler, who opens the 
“Collateral Damage” series proper with a direct response to Goldsmith, is a member of 
avant-rock group Henry Cow and owner of Recommended Records (ReR), and 
evinces a Stieglerian concern for the intersection of technics and temporality that is 
audible within sonic experience itself: Cutler asks after the ‘social, cultural and moral 
costs’ of so much “free” music (that is, music that can be easily procured without 
direct cost regardless of the legality), and remarks that ‘[s]ometimes it’s not only our 
attention span that has evaporated down to bug durations, but our future-directed 
thinking altogether’ (Cutler 2011). The present, reduced to ‘bug durations’ (and we 
should note that Stiegler, in Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, equates 
attention capacity to the constitution of the social as such (Stiegler 2010)) leaves us 
without a future that can be thought, and, perhaps therefore, without a future of 
thinking in both senses.  
 
Amanda Brown, who co-runs the Not Not Fun label and performs as LA Vampires 
(and, formerly, as part of the duo Pocahaunted, pioneers of the hypnagogic pop sound 
referred to by Reynolds), shares these concerns: referring to a non-specified “us” (the 
allusions to an implicit collective subject are frequent in the course of the “Collateral 
Damage” series, with many clearly sharing Reynolds’ impetus to try and define the 
contemporary listening subject) as ‘digital hoarders,’ whose music collections are now 
‘bulging iTunes libraries stuffed with tracks whose cumulative ‘value’ is measured in 
total playing time (days and days’ worth, even months)’ (Brown 2011). The ‘cyber-
waste,’ she goes on to remark, ‘is astounding.’ The effects of this stockpiled surfeit of 
industrial temporal objects—measured in an improbably-dilated clock time rather than 
through names of artists or albums, or through associated affective resonances or 





The climate of indiscriminate cultural channel-surfing seems to be having 
an effect on our collective attention spans, too. Albums are ditched in 
favour of one or two key tracks; we even fast-forward through YouTube 
clips. When music has been reduced to the status of junk mail, and groups’ 
entire discographies are skimmed and dismissed in half an hour, what depth 
of understanding or appreciation for these creations can we have? How do 
we remember what we’ve eaten if it’s been swallowed, not chewed? 
 
Odd metaphor notwithstanding, the capacity to orient and integrate experience 
temporally—in relation to retentions and protentions of various kinds—is clearly what 
is at stake in this conjunction of technics, temporality, and audibility; we are still, it 
seems, try to hear our thought-provoking time. The clearest expression of this problem 
is perhaps that of Eric Lumbleau, former operator of the Mutant Sounds blog, which 
specialised in uploading obscure, hard-to-find and out-of-print records—and thereby 
functioned as an operator of the technico-temporal tendency that renders David Toop’s 
xenomania into the characteristic of a collective listening subject. Lumbleau refers to 
our thought-provoking time as the ‘ahistorical nowever in which we’re all currently 
adrift; this vertiginous zone in which every last vestige of our collective cultural 
legacy past and present exists as freely interchangeable atomized particles with no 
meaningful breadcrumb trail left to daisy-chain them together’ (Lumbleau 2011). Its 
différantial construction short-circuited by industrialised memory and a disorienting 
“light time”, our present is no longer the site where temporal ek-stases are interlinked 
and coordinated; it is a time effectively without time to the degree that it has—and can 
hear—all time, at once. 
 
Having established the way in which my preceding account of contemporaneity in 
terms of disorientation is immanently sounded out within recent music writing, we are 
able to note that, if sound calls for thinking today, it is to the degree that this “today” 
itself is audibly problematic, lacking any clear referent, much as sound itself, within 
the ambit of contemporary academic discourse, troubles the very status of the 
theoretical object. To this last point I will return at length. At this stage, I simply wish 
to affirm how the question of the ways in which sound calls for thinking today—as 
sound studies has repeatedly claimed it does—turns upon a technico-temporal 
diagnostics of this “today” that can, in fact, be performed through sound, albeit on a 
methodological basis that we must now consider. In the preceding, we have assessed 




call itself is inextricable from such conditions; thereby, we have moved beyond the 
impasse the Heidegger’s formulation of the call—silent and immediate—left us in. 
Yet, we are no further in articulating the nature of thinking as the response to this 
call—which Heidegger insisted it must be, in spite of the distortions it introduced into 
his philosophical project. Within the contours of our thought-provoking time, then, we 
must ask: what relation between thinking and listening, such that we might finally hear 
the call, and begin to think sonically, at last? 
 
I want to conclude this chapter by laying out, briefly, Attali’s account of such a 
response to the call of thinking sonically, one that would methodologically cut across 
the distinction between theory and practice by allowing researchers to, in Attali’s 
words, to ‘theorize through music’ (4); that is, to trace out in thought precisely the 
exploratory simulations that music, qua social coding, itself immanently produces. 
Today, such theorizing must focus on the network that may potentially supplant the 
temporality-eradicating stasis of repetition, which Attali names composition. Attali's 
overview of the composition network is necessarily somewhat tentative, insofar as he 
considers it to be 'in embyronic form' (20); nevertheless, we can characterise it most 
generally as 'freedom' acting 'against normality' (original emphasis). This freedom is 
essentially a de-linking of music and society, wherein music ceases to create order 
from noise in the name of a dominant social power and its enforced normalisation, but 
rather acts as 'something fundamentally outside all communication […] a solitary, 
egotistical, noncommercial act' which is 'performed for the music's own enjoyment 
[…] with no other goal than his own pleasure' (32). Attali qualifies that this free act is 
not purely a solipsistic gesture, and that '[c]omposition does not prohibit 
communication' (143); rather, '[i]t makes it a collective creation, rather than an 
exchange of coded messages,' in which each creative act creates its own code or 
'plug[s] into a code in the process of being elaborated by the other.' Rather than the 
ceaseless iteration of a given code that defined the networks of both representation and 
repetition (though differently in each case), composition allows for 'a collective 
questioning of the goal of labour' beyond the self-evidence of the requirement to 
communicate within a given code and provide use-value for the listener. This is a 
decentralised network, 'a new practice of music among people' (141)⁠. Coupled here, 
then, is a distinction between communication and creation—the shift from the former 




ultimately, between the saturation of the past and the reinstatement of a future that 
itself is the object of such a creation.  
 
Clearly, Attali considers this 'embryonic' network of composition, and the creation 
upon which it turns, to be liberatory, yet he notes that it 'is not easy to conceptualise' 
(134), and that, in fact, 'the new relation it creates between man and matter, 
consumption-production and pleasure, have never been expressed in theory before' 
(142); that is to say, insofar as music is exploring new possibilities of organisation in 
advance of society itself, the theoretical tools for analysing these new possibilities 
have not yet been created. As with Heidegger’s thinking of Being, and Stiegler’s 
thinking of technics, thought itself remains to-come, and it is this repeated argument 
for the necessity of theoretical inventiveness that I wish to re-emphasise here by way 
of a conclusion. For Attali, it is precisely these new, nascent, liberatory forms of 
musical production (and, therefore, of social organisation) that demand we overcome 
our theoretical deafness, and begin to listen to the world; if we are to attend to these 
new possibilities, we need the requisite methods for clear listening. It is on the basis of 
today’s noise, with all its technico-temporal resonances, that sound calls for thinking; 
but it does so in a manner that necessitates thinking itself becomes something new, in a 
sense we must interrogate. I would like to quote at length Attali's powerful articulation 
of this necessity:  
 
Conceptualising the coming order on the basis of the designation of the 
fundamental noise should be the central work of today’s researchers. Of the 
only worthwhile researchers: undisciplined ones. The ones who refuse to 
answer new questions using only pregiven tools […] Today, a new music is 
on the rise, one that can neither be expressed nor understood using the old 
tools, a music produced elsewhere and otherwise. It is not that music or the 
world have become incomprehensible: the concept of comprehension itself 
has changed; there has been a shift in the locus of the perceptions of 
things. (133, my emphases) 
 
New sounds require new theories; there is no timeless repository of concepts that will 
allow us to uncover the significance of whichever thing we focus them upon, but 
rather we must fabricate them under the constraint and necessity of that which we 
encounter. It is this fundamental point which, I argue, remains absolutely significant in 
Attali's analysis, and which I want to preserve and take up in this thesis—that is, it is 




began will require a response which does not reduce it to an existing framework, but 
which is capable of conserving its absolute novelty. As the stress put on 
“undisciplined” indicates, doing so may demand not only that we enquire into the 
conditions of disciplinary emergency, but that we, as indicated in the introduction, 
place in question the very status and significance of disciplinarity as such. Perhaps, as 
suggested previously, this perpetual emergency might be precisely what is necessary 
to make sound thinkable, and to make thought audible? 
 
To summarise, then, Attali's claim that music 'simulates' social order in advance of 
society itself leads him to the position that we must, for theoretical and political 
reasons, attend to the contemporary sonic contestation, repetition versus composition. 
Yet to do so we need to unfold the fraught question of why precisely 'Western 
knowledge' has failed thus far to listen to the world, and to give a fuller account of 
what these new theoretical practices capable of doing so will involve (3); Attali's 
diagnosis is incisive, but his approach is largely promissory, indicating a task to be 
undertaken rather than presenting the results of an investigation. It indicates the 
direction, rather than any clear outcome. A fundamental premise of my investigation 
will be that in order to pursue this path further, we need to pose a series of basic but 
far-reaching questions involving the nature of theoretical activity as such: what does it 
involve, and of what is it therefore capable? It is these questions that the following 
chapter will engage, by means of re-posing the question from which we began: what is 
called thinking?  
 
Yet, this question will be the target of my subsequent analysis, rather than its starting 
point. For what remains unspoken in the speaking of and around the call—and what 
remains unheard in ours attempts to listen to it—are that other, correlative and 
ineradicable demand the question places upon us: what calls for thinking? If, in the 
preceding, we found it necessary to pursue the question of the “today” of such calling 
away from Heidegger’s own answers to the two questions—which are, in effect, one 
answer: Being—then, with this “today” brought into focus it is necessary to sound out 
our alternative, and to hear what it really says. If our answer has all along been that 
sound calls for thinking, today, then we must ask that which has remained implicit in 
the preceding discussion: what, exactly, is called sound? I hope to show that it is in 




simple, propositional fashion—that the question of what is called thinking can attain 




































Chapter Two: Sounding the Image of Thought 
 
To begin, again, with a repetition: what calls for sonic thinking, today? That such a 
call is no doubt audible manifests in not only the range and volume of works on sound 
within cultural theory, but in the arrogation of these works to an avowedly novel 
disciplinary framing: sound studies. Yet the audibility of this discipline, as discussed 
in the introduction, constitutes itself around a failure, both historical and 
contemporary—the failure to make sonority thinkable, to respond successfully to the 
call it emits. The preceding chapter served to both demonstrate this failure, by means 
of an engagement with the figure of the call itself in the work of Martin Heidegger, 
and to reaffirm its contemporaneity, by returning to the question of contemporaneity 
itself; through an engagement with the work of Jacques Attali and the writings of 
various music journalists, label owners and performers, we heard that not only does 
our “today” demand to be thought, but that this demand itself is audible. Finally, we 
were left with an injunction: to create the theoretical tools to respond to this demand, 
to make it audible, and to think through the auditory channels by which it is 
transmitted to us. 
 
This latter task is one I hope to take up in the remaining two chapters of this thesis—
however, its positive formulation will have to be deferred, once more, to the third. 
Prior to this, I want to take up and to reconsider the twin failures around which the 
introduction and first chapter circled: the apparent historical failure to think sonority to 
which sound studies ceaselessly refers, on the one hand, and, on the other, Heidegger’s 
failure to reorient thought in relation to that which calls for it, and to give that which is 
called thinking an immanently sonorous determination. In this chapter, then, I want to 
draw on Gilles Deleuze’s account of the ‘dogmatic, orthodox and moral’ image of 
thought in order to diagnose these failures, and assess their extensive ramifications for 
our attempt to think sonority, at last (DR 167). The attempt to creatively respond to the 
call for thinking sonority will be heard, in the last instance, to require a critique of this 
image, in favour of what Deleuze calls a thought without image—a thinking that, far 
from offering a means to “finally” resolve sound studies’ long dissensus over its own 
existence and significance, will rather seek to affirm its delay-deferral as a positive 
condition. Ultimately, the goal of this thesis will be to embrace that which was initially 





To begin, then, let us repeat the repetition: what calls for sonic thinking, today? The 
answer is, of course, obvious: sound itself. Yet there are two difficulties that sound 
studies has ceaselessly encountered in affirming this response: not only does thinking 
itself, in its historically-dominant modes, exclude the possibility of an encounter with 
sound, there is no consensus over what sound itself is that would enable us to 
ameliorate this exclusion. If sound studies is an attempt to at last begin thinking sound, 
it faces not only a constitutive incapacity traceable to the conceptual frameworks of 
philosophy and cultural theory, but a fundamental disagreement over what is to be 
thought. In turning, initially, to the debates within sound studies over these two related 
issues, I want to indicate how the terms of these debates, and the corresponding sense 
attributed to the claim that sound calls for thinking, serve to appeal implicitly to an 




1. Beyond the Audiovisual Litany: On the Essence of Sound 
 
In the introduction, we repeatedly heard the claim that sound has not yet become an 
“object” for cultural theory to the degree that it resists being thought according to the 
criteria deployed by such theory—criteria that are generally accused of betraying an 
ocular bias. In returning to such claims and examining them more fully, what is at 
stake is not the truth or falsity of their accounts of sonority, but the stakes of the debate 
itself—that is, the way in which it attempts to determine the what that calls, and how it 
conceives of the “essence” of this what. Ultimately, it is a question of how the various 
positions within this debate invoke or resist a relation to what I will go on to thematise 
as “sound-in-itself”, and how these positions themselves appeal to an implicit 
determination regarding not simply the nature of thinking, but the possibility of 
thought encountering something beyond itself, that would call for thinking. 
 
To begin, I will quote another exemplary declaration on this theme, this time by Aden 






Music resists theorization at every step. As a form of art that is set in time, 
that takes its time, a piece of music does not sit still to be observed. One 
cannot subject sound to a persistent observation; rather, one can only listen 
and then, maybe, listen again. Music is apprehended in chunks of time. 
Partly because sound is dynamic, Western intellectual traditions show a 
marked preference for vision as the figure of knowledge. We articulate 
more effectively the fixed image than the dynamic sound. (2005, ix)  
 
This passage contains a variety of archetypal claims regarding the relation of sound 
and theory familiar from the introduction—in particular, a relationship between 
sonority, temporality, and dynamism that is counterposed to the stasis and fixity of 
vision. It is the latter, rather than (and indeed, to the exclusion of) the former, that 
forms the privileged ‘figure of knowledge’ for ‘Western intellectual traditions’ (and 
we can recall proximate formulations from both Michelle Hilmes and David Suisman 
on this point), insofar as there is observed to be a correspondence between the 
methodological and epistemological criteria these traditions have deployed and the 
essential characteristics of vision. For instance, we can consider the theoretical 
privilege accorded to the subject-object relation, which demands a well-defined and 
grounded demarcation of the two that can only be frustrated by the necessary 
proximity and immersion of sound⁠ but preserved by the detachment of the optical 
observer—a point to which I will return. To attempt to apply this “traditional” figure 
of knowledge to sonority leads to an internal conflict, insofar as the criteria deployed 
to determine such knowledge are immanently resisted by the qualities of sound; the 
criteria of what constitutes the knowability of an object serve to make sonority 
immediately and formally unknowable unless it can be stripped of its innate 
characteristics and reduced to visual figures. 
 
It is precisely this gesture of reduction that Evens diagnoses as constituting the more 
specific failure on the part of musicology and cultural studies, in particular, to hear the 
call for sonic thinking emanating from sound itself. In spite of their attempts to 
‘surmount [the] difficulty’ presented by the mismatch between sonority and the 
criteria of knowledge, according to Evens they only manage to do so by more or less 
implicitly screening out what is proper to sound qua sound. While musicology makes 
music visual by focusing on the score, and thereby reducing a musical work to its 
visual representation rather than its sonic experience, cultural studies ‘emphasises 




For Evens, then, ‘neither musicology nor cultural studies listens to the material 
specificity of music; neither discipline attends enough to music as sound’ (x). If 
Evens’ work is exemplary for my argument, then, it is insofar as he claims the 
necessity for a specifically sonic form of theoretical engagement heretofore lacking in 
the existing disciplines which do engage with music, and he attributes this lack to a 
fundamental—if only briefly discussed—limitation in existing modes of knowledge. 
Ultimately, Evens demands that we place under a question mark the resources derived 
from existing theoretical frameworks; at best, they will require modification, and at 
worst they will serve only to reinforce the theoretical elision of sound by screening out 
what is distinctive about at vis-á-vis visuality. Significantly, then, Evens, just as with 
Attali, must advocate a form of theoretical inventiveness—sound studies, unable to 
rely on existing methods, must work to create new modes of theoretical engagement. 
 
What I want to emphasise is the way in which Evens’ argument here is based upon a 
particular answer to the question what calls for thinking—or rather, a particular 
interpretation of the answer to this question (namely, sound) that determines, as a 
result, the valid responses to this call. For Evens, sound studies must base itself upon 
the attribution of certain essential qualities to sonority; sound itself calls to be thought 
in particular ways according to its own essence, and any mode of thinking that cannot 
respond adequately will serve only to prolong the delay marking sound studies’ 
emergency. Yet this particular articulation of the call for sonic thinking, grounded in 
an a priori mismatch between existing theoretical forms and the nature of sonority as 
object—that is, between sound and its study—has nevertheless drawn some criticism 
from within sound studies itself; in particular, in the influential work of Jonathan 
Sterne, referred to briefly in the introduction. I want to re-turn to this criticism neither 
to affirm nor to refute it, but rather to assess the scope of interpretations the call for 
sonic thinking has received, particularly in relation to the nature of sound as what 
calls; from these various interpretations, I hope to draw certain conclusions regarding 
the implicit relation between thought and what it thinks that is appealed to in each 
case. 
 
Though Sterne, in his 2003 book The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound 
Reproduction, acknowledges that ‘sound is not usually a central theoretical problem 




follow Evens, Attali, Hilmes, Suisman and others, in either generalising this into the 
broader claim that ‘vision is the social chart of modernity’ to the exclusion of sound, 
or locating this relative lack of attention in some essential characteristic of sound itself 
that would inherently resist knowledge (3). He argues, to the contrary, that in spite of 
the relative dearth of work on sound in cultural theory, nevertheless ‘[t]here is a vast 
literature on the history and philosophy of sound,’ reflecting the fact that ‘[b]etween 
about 1750 and 1925, sound itself became an object and a domain of thought and 
practice’ (4). Sterne notes that during this period ‘sound and hearing were 
reconceptualised, objectified, imitated, transformed, reproduced, commmodified, 
mass-produced and industrialised,’ but this historical complexity can only be occluded 
by appeals to the essential nature of sound (2).  
 
Thus, the very gesture of invoking a mismatch between the nature of sonority and 
Western knowledge, for Sterne, implicitly appeals to a set of ‘biological, 
psychological, and physical facts’ as the ‘necessary starting point for the cultural 
analysis of sound’—that is to say, for any form of sonic thinking—thereby requiring 
that any such analysis be premised upon an unchanging substratum, a nature beyond 
historical variance and cultural modulation, and therefore, ultimately, an ontological 
register thinkable in-itself (15). Ultimately, according to this argument, any reliance by 
sound studies on claims regarding the ’supposed natural characteristics of sound’ can 
only serve to ‘[set] up experience as somehow outside the purview of historical 
analysis’ (14)—history becomes ‘something that happens between the senses’ (16), 
each of which retains its ‘special characteristics’ (15), and the changes that dominate 
the period of Sterne’s focus (which we might, following him, loosely designate as 
“modernity”) become simply external variations to an in principle continuous essence 
of sound. 
    
For Sterne, then, if there is to be a distinct disciplinary framework that could be 
termed sound studies, its value would not reside in ‘claims about the transhistorical 
and transcultural character of the senses’ (18) in the form of an ‘audiovisual litany’—
this latter being Sterne’s term for the delineation of a set of opposable characteristics 
distributed between vision and audition, such as distance and immersion, or statsis and 
dynamism (15). If this litany serves to position history as ‘something that happens 




Marx, to produce ‘histories of the senses’ themselves (5)—a history that would be 
internal to the senses, and that would begin ‘by positing sound, hearing, and listening 
as historical problems rather than as constants on which to build a history’ (22). Yet, 
as should be clear from the preceding, Sterne bases his argument on a set of premises 
that are themselves open to challenge, relying, as they do, upon a specific 
interpretation of the what that calls. There are two that are particularly striking for my 
purposes: firstly, the claim that the very notion of sound itself is tied to a particular 
capacity of the human body to transform a certain range of vibrations into an 
experience of audition; and secondly, the claim that this bodily capacity is itself 
mutable, such that any phenomenological account of this auditory experience 
‘presupposes culture, power, practice, and epistemology’ (13).  
 
According to Sterne, then, not only do ‘human beings reside at the centre of any 
meaningful definition of sound’ (11), insofar at is the human capacity to hear that 
distinguishes sound from other forms of vibration, but this figure of the human around 
which and according to which sound must be thought is itself historical—‘[s]pecies 
have histories,’ and therefore ’[s]ound history indexes changes in human nature and 
the human body’ (12). This positive determination of the task of sound studies, as a 
historical (and, implicitly, materialist) endeavour, does have, significantly, its negative 
moment: it follows from Sterne’s claims here that ‘[i]t is impossible to “merely 
describe” the faculty of hearing in its natural state’ (10); not only is this natural state a 
product of historical circumstances, technological conditions, cultural norms, and so 
on, but so too is the language in which we would so describe it. As Sterne puts it, 
‘[t]he language that we use to describe sound and hearing comes weighted down with 
decades or centuries of cultural baggage,’ and this is never more so than when we 
purport to present our claims as universal—‘claims about the transhistorical and 
transcultural character of the senses often derive their support from culturally and 
historically specific evidence’ (18). Thus, if sound calls for thinking, this call cannot 
be taken to emanate from beyond the predetermined limits of the thinkable—
particularly, the historical mutability of language as the vehicle for thought—but 
rather must be located immanently within the processes of transformation to which 






In sum, then, for the purposes of my argument what is implicitly but significantly at 
stake in the contrast between Sterne’s critical engagement with the ‘audiovisual litany’ 
and the essentialist claims of Evens (as well as Attali and Suisman, as heard 
previously) is not the response to the question what calls for thinking—in both cases, 
it is sound that demands to be thought today, if not, in Sterne’s case, “at last”—but the 
sense of this response, and the correlative response from thinking that it itself 
demands. For Sterne, sound necessarily refers to human experience, and is therefore 
an empirical and historically-determined designation—it has no (determinable or 
thinkable) transcendent referent whose identity could be appealed to as the source of 
sound studies’ unity. Yet Evens does not simply invoke, contrary to this, a universal 
nature of sonic experience; rather, he raises the problem of the relation between 
experience and object. That is to say, as Sterne interprets all claims regarding the 
essence of sound as necessarily applying only to sonic experience, he excludes in 
advance the possibility of thinking the sonic object beyond experience. 
 
In order to assess more fully the implications of this dispute, and the implicit 
conditions upon which it is constructed vis-à-vis the nature of thinking, I want to turn 
to a debate between sound studies scholars Seth Kim-Cohen and Christoph Cox over 
what they term, following Douglas Kahn, “sound-in-itself” (Kahn 1999). In so doing, I 
am again not intending to affirm or critique any particular solution—rather, my 
interest is in the conditions under which the problem is posed, the distinctions it 
implicitly relies on, and, ultimately, the image of thought it appeals to. It is this image 
of thought that will determine, in the last instance, not simply the truth or falsity of the 
identification of the what that calls, but the very possibilities thought possesses in 
relation to this what, its capacity to respond—it will define, finally, the orientation of 
thinking in relation to that which calls for it, in and through the conjunction of sound 
and its study. 
 
 
2. Sound-in-Itself, or The Kantian Inheritances of Sound Studies 
 
In what is at this stage a familiar gesture, Kim-Cohen begins his 2009 book In the 
Blink of an Ear: Toward a Non-Cochclear Sonic Art with a diagnosis of the delay 




have yet to find their proper orientation, but instead find themselves ‘hitting a wall’ 
(xix), for Kim-Cohen this is because they remain caught up in methodological 
presuppositions which the visual arts have long-since undermined: the wall obstructing 
studies of sound marks the dead-end of a ‘phenomenological cul-de-sac.’ In order to 
remedy this, Kim-Cohen sets out to propose and defend a ‘conceptual turn’ for sonic 
theory culminating in a ‘non-cochlear sonic art’ (xx). My interest in Kim-Cohen’s 
argument here, to reiterate, is less its validity than the manner in which it is premised 
upon a set of methodological claims regarding the capacities of thought—or rather, its 
incapacity—and how these claims, though intending to reinstitute a différantial 
relation between thought and what it thinks, effectively cuts the connection by making 
the thinkable fundamentally reducible to the interiority of thought itself. 
 
To begin, I want to emphasise that what Kim-Cohen confronts under the name of the 
‘sound-in-itself tendency’ is not simply a possible theoretical position but a theoretical 
and practical trend within both twentieth-century sonic practice and its conceptual 
framing; the former is identified principally with Pierre Schaeffer and (ambivalently) 
John Cage, and the latter with Husserlian phenomenology (115). In the first instance, 
Kim-Cohen articulates this link through Pierre Schaeffer’s claim that ‘[f]or years […] 
we often did phenomenology without knowing it’ (8).36  Musique concrète, the sonic 
practice Schaeffer pioneered, involved a focus on the ‘sonic object’ which was treated 
as divorced from any imputation of or reference to its source (that is, in Schaeffer’s 
terms, acousmatically) (9), and this focus of listening was to be attained by a 
procedure of ‘reduction’ which, as Kim-Cohen notes, is terminologically equivalent 
and methodologically proximate to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (12). In 
both cases, for Kim-Cohen, there is an ‘essentialist’ emphasis upon a ‘reversible flow 
of ontological-experiential relations’ in which ‘all information that might shade our 
auditory experience with signification, with historical contingency, with social import’ 
is bracketed out and what remains is the ‘in-itself’ of sound, accessible in its pure state 
(13). Kim-Cohen does qualify that, for Husserl and Schaeffer alike, it is not a question 
of a ‘thing-in-itself’ in Kantian terms, the noumenon beyond any phenomenal 
experience of it, but rather the reality of the object ‘as perceived by a listener’ (14); on 
Kim-Cohen’s interpretation, the function of reduction in Husserl is primarily 
                                                        




transcendental insofar as it seeks to exclude, as an analytical gesture, any supposition 
about the “external” reality of the object of experience (12) and instead to study the 
essential structure of experience as such.37 
 
The term ‘sound-in-itself,’ then, is Kim-Cohen’s coinage (borrowed, as noted, from 
Douglash Kahn) to describe a post-Schaefferian tendency within both the theorisations 
and the practices of sound art and experimental music, a tendency that focuses on the 
‘revelation of phenomena’ rather than their socio-cultural significance or their 
aesthetic organisation (112). Kim-Cohen identifies an arrogation of the influences of 
Schaeffer and Cage on this point, though for Kim-Cohen ‘Cage’s loyalties are divided’ 
(113); the reading of Cage which ‘one-dimensionally and unproblematically’ positions 
him as an advocate of the sound-in-itself tendency ‘takes only partial account of 
Cage’s oeuvre’ (116), ignoring, for Kim-Cohen, the explicitly conceptual nature of his 
attention to process and structure (113-14); I will return to this point in my own 
discussion of Cage subsequently. Nevertheless, here we can begin to see the broadly 
political vector of Kim-Cohen’s aims in his critique of the sound-in-itself tendency: 
the attention to sound-in-itself is necessarily apolitical, according to Kim-Cohen, 
insofar as it wants to extract from sonority an essential matter which is prior to or in 
excess of its social mediation. Thus, for example, Christian Kubich’s famous 
Electrical Walks, in which the listener is provided with headphones that amplify the 
sounds of electromagnetic fields and an itinerary around the city in which the piece is 
being presented, have received readings that focus on hearing the sounds of the city as 
simply ‘the exposition and translation into sound of electromagnetic fields’ and which 
therefore ‘decline to engage the rich cultural, technical, social, ontological 
implications of [the sounds’] origins’ (115).  Ultimately, this orientation (146) is 
resistant to a politicised analysis whilst itself suggesting a normative judgment: the 
positing of a ‘prelinguistic’ experience of sound, for Kim-Cohen, ‘would locate most 
of human experience in falsity and impurity’ (111), given that ‘being human is a state 
                                                        
37 With regard to Husserl’s account of the object things are rather more complex than is 
indicated here; what is primarily at stake is the transcendence of the object in relation to any 
given empirical act of knowing or experiencing, such that the same object can be encountered 
in distinct circumstances; the mind-independent existence of the object is not in question, 
insofar as non-existent things can still become objects for consciousness in a way that, for 
Husserl, is not to be immediately distinguished from objects of direct perception. For a clear 





inexorably tied to language―some would say state in or of language’ (112). 
 
It is here that I wish to draw attention to the parameters of Kim-Cohen’s argument: the 
critique of sound-in-itself is dependent upon an account of the capacities of human 
cognition in relation to the objects of experience, which are essentially linguistic in 
nature, and therefore cannot be articulated beyond the necessary interiority of 
experience itself. Thus, the imputation that the sound-in-itself should not be focused 
on by sonic theory, given the occlusion of the socio-cultural register follows from such 
a focus, is allied to a claim that it cannot serve as a theoretical locus; not only is the 
tendency limiting and reductive in scope, it is also simply not possible as a grounding 
for analysis or interpretation of sound art works. It is important to note, at this point, 
that Kim-Cohen does not suggest the sound-in-itself does not exist, so much as argue, 
following Wittgenstein’s injunction that what cannot be spoken of must be passed over 
in silence (see Wittgenstein 2002, 89), that even if there were a ‘strata of experience 
prior to language,’ it follows from our immersion in language that ‘there is nothing we 
can do with it’ and therefore ‘it seems wise to put it aside and concern ourselves with 
that of which we can speak’ (112).  
 
Thus, thought receives its a priori determination: regardless of the nature of that which 
calls, our capacities to respond must proceed according to a set of limitations that 
effectively reduce this call to our capacities of theoretical audition. Again, my interest 
is not in Kim-Cohen’s specific claim here—that all experience is linguistic is nature, 
thus sound cannot be thought beyond its significatory function (an argument 
interestingly proximate to that we heard from Heidegger in the preceding chapter)—
nor even his diagnosis of phenomenology in terms of an equivocal appeal to the in-
itself; rather, it is the image of thought upon which his argument relies. According to 
this image, thinking is inextricable from an interiority of the thinking subject 
determined (in the sense of circumscribed or limited) in advance. Effectively, Kim-
Cohen claims that if we are at last to hear the call to think sound, and constitute sound 
studies as a coherent discipline, we must disavow the hope of hearing this call as being 
sent from afar; despite, then, his attempt to reintroduce the process of différance into 
the thinking of sound, he is only able to articulate this process this side of the gap 
between thought and what it thinks. Much as with Heidegger, distance and 




sound itself is merely epiphenomenal—just as Evens feared would be sound’s fate in 
cultural theory. 
 
In turning to the work of Christoph Cox, whose has intervened in this debate in order 
to critique Kim-Cohen’s position, I want to emphasise two points: firstly, I want stress 
how, for Cox, this image of a pre-determined and interiorised relation between thought 
and what it thinks is implicitly Kantian in structure, and secondly, how Cox proposes a 
particular reading of Deleuze’s work that can direct us towards a ‘beyond’ of the 
‘dualistic program’ that Kantianism bequeaths to cultural theory and philosophy (Cox 
2011, 147). But firstly, let us once again note how Cox does not dispute one of Kim-
Cohen’s central premises: that we are still not thinking sound. Again, it is the sense of 
this declaration that is at stake, the diagnosis of this “still not” and the corresponding 
possibilities of at last beginning to think sound. In a further similarity, the foregoing 
failure to think sonority is indexed to a demand for sonic thinking that theoretical and 
conceptual work encounters from without—the demand of sound art as ‘a confluence 
of experimental strategies in music’ that ‘emerged in the late 1960s’, for whom John 
Cage is, once again, a principal representative (145). For Cox, then, the failure to think 
sonority manifests specifically, and symptomatically, in the ‘undertheorized’ status of 
sound art as an aesthetic practice, the elision of these objects, or the silence of theory 
when confronted with them. Sound art is lacking its appropriate theoretical and 
conceptual response insofar as the ‘prevailing theoretical models are inadequate to it’, 
having been ‘[d]eveloped to account for the textual and the visual’. Such approaches 
thereby ‘fail to capture the nature of the sonic’ (146).  
 
What is this nature, that renders sonority incapable of becoming an object of 
theoretical scrutiny? We can infer this, negatively, by considering his account of these 
models, which are broadly designated under the heading of the ‘linguistic turn,’ and 
which are ‘concerned with signification, representation, and mediation’ (146). For 
Cox, ‘contemporary cultural theory,’ which is dependent upon such models,  
 
manifests a problematic Kantian epistemology and ontology, a dualistic 
program that divides the world into two domains, a phenomenal domain 
of symbolic discourse that marks the limits of the knowable, and a 
noumenal domain of nature and materiality that excludes knowledge and 





What is fundamental here, if only implicit, is the fate of sound as that which calls for 
thinking within this procedure of division—that is, the way in which transcendental 
idealism requires a splitting of the object between that which is encountered in 
experience and that which falls beyond it, between phenomenon and noumenon; a split 
that is, in Kant, occasionally aligned with a distinction between object and thing.38 
Sound, it seems, becomes an object for theory only condition of no longer being a 
thing-in-itself. 
 
On the basis of its Kantian inheritances, scholars in sound studies—the exemplary 
case, for Cox, being Kim-Cohen—have abjured the possibility of thinking ‘sound-in-
itself’ in favour of shoring up the Kantian dualism. The existing approaches rely upon 
a division between experience and the in-itself that is irreducible; as a result, ‘nature is 
either cast aside as in-significant or deemed a cultural projection, a social 
construction’ (147). These are, as I have shown above, ‘presuppositions and 
conclusions [which] are fully evident’ in Kim-Cohen’s work, insofar as Kim-Cohen 
dismisses any appeal to the materiality of sound as ultimately requiring an essentialist 
absolutism in which linguistic mediation is a fault to be atoned for, expiated as far as 
possible in the name of a “truer” raw experience of sound-in-itself. For Cox, this is too 
give far too much ground, and the problem is in fact the dualism itself: ‘A rigorous 
critique of representation would altogether eliminate the dual planes of culture/nature, 
human/non-human, sign/world, text/matter’ (148). However, this must be done not in 
the Hegelian direction, “inwards” towards the ideal, but rather “outwards,” ‘toward a 
thoroughgoing materialism that would construe human symbolic life as a specific 
instance of the transformative process to be found throughout the natural world.’ 
Sound, on this basis, can finally be thought in-itself, not as ‘a world apart, a unique 
domain of non-signification and non-representation’ but as ‘an asignifying material 
flux,’ designating an “object” (in an ambiguous, non-Kantian sense we must yet 
                                                        
38 As Dominique Pradell notes, Kant’s use of the German Ding, Gegenstand, and Objekt is 
inconsistent (Pradell, 360-68). However, there is a tendency to reserve the latter two for that 
which is given in experience, while the former finds its most prominent usage in the Ding-an-
Sich, the thing-in-itself as that which can be postulated as subsisting beyond any experience 
but cannot, for that reason, be known. Gegenstand and Objekt, both frequently translated as 
“object”, can be distinguished, as Howard Caygill notes, insofar as the former generally refers 
to a ‘given intuition’ and the latter is the unity imposed upon this intuition ‘under the condition 




determine) that is ‘firmly rooted in the material world and the powers, forces, 
intensities, and becomings of which it is composed’ (157). 
 
With regard to the figure of the call, then, Cox is attentive to the ways in which the 
Kantian solution restricts thought to “this side” of a divide between world and 
experience, such that, in practice, what appears to be sent from afar is in fact merely 
the reflection of a pre-existent subjective interiority; contrary to this, he claims that 
thought can, in fact, encounter something that is radically external to it, not simply as 
it is reflected in thought but as it “really” is as an element of an immanent and material 
nature. Prior to taking up the relation of interiority and exteriority more explicitly, and 
examining at length its implications for the project of thinking sonority, I want to 
consider an aspect of Cox’s own “solution” to this problem that is highly significant 
for my own analysis: as mentioned above, one of Cox’s key representatives of the 
philosophical possibility of eliminating the “dual planes” that would condemn thought 
to an inescapable interiority is Gilles Deleuze. 
 
Cox's appeal to Deleuze is largely confined to the famous distinction between the 
actual and virtual, which he considers to be an extension the distinction between the 
Apollonian and Dionysian 'art impulses of nature' outlined by Nietzsche in The Birth 
of Tragedy―in both cases, it is a question of naturalizing the distinction between 
empirical case and transcendental condition, rendering it immanent to matter rather 
than imposed by 'external agency' (151; see Nietzsche 2000a). Thus, in Cox’s account, 
Deleuze’s actual/virtual distinction is, in spite of the ‘Kantian language’ Deleuze 
deploys, in fact ‘thoroughly non-Kantian’ (152). Though he notes Deleuze does rely 
on a distinction between ‘what appears’ and the ‘conditions for the possibility of this 
experience,’ an exemplary Kantian distinction, in Cox’s reading the distinction lies in 
that these conditions, for Deleuze, are ‘thoroughly material, immanent in nature itself’ 
(153). This reading appeals to Deleuze’s repeated and important injunction that 
transcendental conditions must condition real, not possible, experience; as he states in 
Difference and Repetition: ‘In fact, the condition must be a condition of real 
experience, not of possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic 
conditioning’ (DR 192).  
 




problems in relation to Deleuze’s engagement with Kant, the complexity and 
significance of which will be outlined in a subsequent section, but which can 
immediately summarized by the following claim, from the same text: ‘Rather than 
being concerned with what happens before or after Kant (which amounts to the same 
thing), we should be concerned with a precise moment in Kantianism, a furtive and 
explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, much less by post-
Kantianism…’ (DR 70). Prior to tracking this moment, however, we can consider a 
second issue, that underpins the necessity of rethinking the relation of Deleuze to Kant 
with regard to the call for sonic thinking: while Kim-Cohen attempted to preserve the 
différantial relation between thought and what it thinks, and hence the structure of 
calling, in a manner that served only to resituate that which calls within the ambit of 
thinking’s pre-determined capacities to respond, Cox risks, on the contrary, collapsing 
the distance entirely in the opposite direction, where thought is placed immediately in 
contact with the ‘asignifying material flux’ of sonority (157), with this latter already 
identified as the “what” that calls for thinking—that is, as the essence of sonority. To 
clarify, my claim here is not that what Cox seeks—a materiality philosophy of 
sound—is impossible, but rather that, without a thorough investigation of its 
conditions, such a philosophy risks constructing itself on precisely the same basis as 
that it opposes: a direct proximity between thought and its object, with the latter 
identified in advance as being amenable to the former. 
 
In sum, then, though Kim-Cohen and Cox avow entirely opposed “solutions” to the 
problem of how to at last respond to the call for sonic thinking, based on distinctive 
interpretations of what it is that calls, their analyses nevertheless refer to an implicit 
image of what it means to think, of what thinking can do—including the premise that 
its activity is based upon its capacity to determine, in advance, the nature of the what 
that calls for thinking, and whether this “what” subsists beyond or within the 
interiority of thinking itself. Again, my claim here is not that either or both Kim-
Cohen or Cox are wrong in their identifications; rather, I want to point to the way in 
which both rely upon the attempt to identify the what as such—with an emphasis on 
“identify” here. The very sense in which we understand the call is itself determined by 
the notion of a conjunction between a definite object of the call and a corresponding 
capacity to respond—but what if this interpretation, in particular the identifiable form 




what if taking up the call as a relationship of proximity between thought and what it 
must come to think serves to elide calling as such, and with it, the possibility that 
audition could genuinely be thought, at last? It is on the basis of these speculative 
claims that I want to turn directly to the theme of the image of thought in Deleuze, and 
to consider the ways in which it can help us clarify and expand this problem—that is, 
how it can help us to hear differently the claim that sound calls for thinking. 
 
 
3. Implicit Presuppositions, or How to Begin? 
 
Deleuze’s extended reflection upon the problem of the image of thought in Difference 
and Repetition begins with the difficulty of beginning: ‘Where to begin in philosophy 
has always—rightly—been regarded as a very delicate problem, for beginning means 
eliminating all presuppositions’ (DR 164). We might add that this has insistently been 
the question sound studies addresses to itself: how to begin thinking sonority, at last? 
The question, then, for sound studies as for philosophy, is how one might begin from 
the beginning; and one should note the irony (or, perhaps, humour39) of Deleuze 
raising this problem at the central point, and conceptual caesura, of a text which has 
already begun many times, with so many differences and repetitions—a stylistic 
gesture towards Deleuze’s ultimate response to this problem, that one must always 
begin from the middle.  
 
Deleuze distinguishes two forms of presupposition against which our attempts to 
begin, to finally begin thinking from the beginning, must be posed, whether we are 
attempting to think sound or anything else: those that are objective, and those that are 
subjective. If the former are more clearly evident in a philosophical discourse, as 
                                                        
39 Deleuze rigorously distinguishes irony and humour throughout Difference and Repetition 
and The Logic of Sense. Though both function as a way to ‘overturn moral laws,’ they do so in 
different ways; the former achieves this overturning through an ‘ascent toward principles’ 
while the latter is an ‘art of consequences and descents’ (DR 5-6). In The Logic of Sense, in 
particular, this is developed into a methodological typology, in which irony, as a technique of 
ascent, remains caught within the individual who becomes coextensive with being, while 
humour designates the ‘art of the surfaces and of doubles, of nomad singularities and of the 




‘concepts explicitly presupposed by a given concept,’40 then the latter are subtler, 
more difficult to identify, being ‘implicit presuppositions contained in opinions rather 
than concepts.’ These implicit presuppositions ‘[have] the form of “Everybody 
knows…”’ (DR 165), indicating what is presumed to be known by everyone ‘in a pre-
philosophical and pre-conceptual manner.’ These are therefore not terms of a 
philosophical discourse, not concepts, definitions, or principles that are explicitly 
stated as grounds for a demonstration (one can think here of Spinoza’s definitions and 
axioms in the Ethics), but precisely those presuppositions which the philosophy in 
question does not articulate because it takes them to be always-already given and 
therefore requiring no defense; as such, the philosopher can ‘assume the universality 
of his41 premisses’ and ‘claim innocence, since it [“his” philosophy] has kept nothing 
back’ (DR 165). Nothing, that is, ‘except the essential’—subjective presuppositions 
‘in the form of a natural capacity for thought which allows philosophy to claim to 
begin, and to begin without presuppositions.’ 
 
It is precisely this set of subjective presuppositions, implicitly appealing to a ‘natural 
capacity for thought,’ that Deleuze terms an image of thought; as he and Guattari 
formulate it in a later text, it is ‘the image thought gives itself of what it means to 
think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought’ (WP 37).42 The 
immediate difficulty, in relation to the problem of where to begin in and for 
philosophy, is that, for Deleuze, such an image would not actually function to allow 
philosophy to begin, but would, on the contrary, ‘reveal instead that philosophy is 
powerless to truly begin’ (DR 165). Rather, if these subjective presuppositions are 
allowed to subsist it becomes ‘a question of rediscovering at the end what was there in 
the beginning […] a question of recognising, of bringing into light or into the 
conceptual or the explicit, what was simply known implicitly without concepts’ (DR 
                                                        
40 Deleuze’s example here is Descartes’ criticism of Aristotle’s definition of man as a rational 
animal insofar as it presupposes the definitions of rational and animal (Descartes 2003, 24). 
41 I retain the masculine pronoun as given in the English translation here, but would also 
suggest that this figure of the philosopher as neutral conduit for universal truth is a specifically 
phallomorphic conceptual persona, such that the ‘he’ can be taken as an integral element of the 
position Deleuze is miming here. 
42 A key allusion here is Kant’s “What does it Meant to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”, which 
directly unfolds the moral underpinnings of the image of thought, qua orientation, that 
Deleuze will go on to develop in relation to Nietzsche (DR 167): Kant emphasises ‘pure 
rational faith’ as a ‘signpost or compass by means of which the speculative thinker orients 




165). It is this conception of philosophy as a circle that begins to suggest the 
conservative implications of the image of thought, and Deleuze’s use of the term 
recognition in the preceding quotation is even more suggestive. As Deleuze goes on to 
emphasise, it is by virtue of operating through the ‘supposition that thought is the 
natural exercise of a faculty’ (DR 166) that the image of thought functions as ‘the 
figure in which doxa is universalised by being elevated to the rational level’ (DR 170). 
What is ‘universally recognised,’ doubtless, is ‘not a particular this or that,’ not any 
particular empirical case of thinking nor any specific proposition that may be posited 
in the activity of thought—not, for instance, the claim that sonority must be thought in 
relation to human auditory capacities, or the contrary—but rather only ‘the form of 
representation or recognition in general,’ in the form of a ‘good will on the part of the 
thinker and an upright nature on the part of thought’ (DR 166, original emphasis). Yet 
this is precisely the danger: given this image of thought, ‘it matters little whether 
philosophy begins with the object or the subject […] as long as thought remains 
subject to this Image which already prejudges everything’ (DR 167). 
  
This last point is key. With regard to sound studies, we have heard from 
representatives of two distinct and contrasting positions regarding the significance of 
sound as that which calls for thinking—that is, regarding what is called “sound”. Kim-
Cohen and Sterne refer sound studies back to subjective auditory experience, and 
linguistically-mediated and socio-historically variable conditions, while Evens and 
Cox appeal to an ontological register in which sound can and must be thought outside 
of the limitations of the subject—that is, it is positioned as an object. Yet, the 
implication of Deleuze’s remark here would be that, if in each case the image of 
thought can be heard to interfere in the call that sound “itself” emits, then this 
distinction is more apparent than real. Though the figure of the call has been 
insistently taken up, in relation to sound studies, as that which would allow us to begin 
thinking from sonority, in a manner that would, it was hoped, evade the ocularcentric 
biases of our existing conceptual frameworks, so long as the image of thought qua a 
priori orientation of thinking continued to supervene, this shifting of the starting point 
would be functionally irrelevant; from object to subject or subject to object, nothing 
changes. It follows that if this image of thought is not subjected to a thoroughgoing 




the subject will be an optical illusion; an illusion, moreover, that can be located in the 
object-form itself, as I will go on to elaborate.  
 
In order to clarify this point, I want to briefly return to our encounter with Heidegger, 
and reinterpret Heidegger’s silencing gesture as effectively the audible result of the 
image of thought coming to supervene upon the figure of the call itself. We can begin 
by repeating the results of the preceding analysis as follows: Heidegger effectively 
eliminated tele-phonics from the call of thinking insofar as that which called—
Being—was ultimately always-already encompassed within thought in principle, even 
if, in fact, this thinking was only achieved “at last”. Thus, in “The Question 
Concerning Technology”, Heidegger will state what is effectively a methodological 
principal for his thinking as a whole, underpinning both his sense of the task of 
phenomenology and his continual return to the Greek “origin”: ‘That which is primally 
early shows itself only ultimately to men’ (BW 327). With regard to the call of 
thinking, this manifests in terms of what Deleuze will describe as ‘the theme of a 
desire or a philia, of an analogy—or rather, a homology—between thought and that 
which is to be thought’ (DR 210n11). If Being calls for thinking, this calling is 
simultaneously what ‘gives food for thought’, and thought itself is essentially a 
thanking for this gift (WT 159). Hence the imbrication, in Heidegger, of thinking and 
memory: ‘Memory is the gathering and convergence of thought upon what everywhere 
demands to be thought about first of all’ (WT 11); thinking is always necessarily 
‘thinking back’. 
 
It follows from this that the distance separating thought and what calls for thinking 
comes to define only the forgetfulness of metaphysics in which beings are separated 
from Being; thinking is, by definition, the thinking of Being in both senses of the 
genitive, and hence must effectively short-circuit the call. Ultimately, as Corijn van 
Mazijk puts it, thinking and Being are, for Heidegger, ‘really two sides of the very 
same coin’ (2013, 342). Though Heidegger may affirm the necessity of preserving in 
thought the ontological difference between Being and beings—and though Deleuze 
provides a positive evaluation of Heidegger on this point (DR 77-79)—genuine 
thought is that which encompasses their reciprocal implication without mediation: the 
im-mediate proximity of veiling and unveiling. As an attempt to figure the dependence 




however inevitable it may be from the perspective of human history: thought and 
Being are united in principle, though they diverge in fact. If, in What is Called 
Thinking?, then, the call of thinking is ‘far from being incomprehensible and alien to 
thinking’ but ‘precisely what must be thought’ (WT 165), this is to the degree that 
Being, as what calls for thinking, is defined in terms of an essential relation to thought. 
 
This essential relation between thought and what it must think is precisely what 
Deleuze intends by the image of thought as the ‘natural exercise of a faculty’, and 
moreover, is an exemplary case of the way in which such an image ensures thinking is 
a ‘question of rediscovering at the end what was there in the beginning’ (DR 165). 
Heidegger appeals to the image of thought as a subjective presupposition: though he 
does not explicitly assume the meaning of thinking or Being as a concept within his 
discourse, he nevertheless invokes a ‘pre-ontological and implicit understanding of 
being’ (DR 211n11; see also 164). In order to avoid the silencing attendant upon 
Heidegger’s articulation of the call of thinking, then, we must subject this image to a 
critique. 
 
In order to begin outlining such a critique—and, in particular, placing such a critique 
directly on contact with the concerns of sound studies—I want to examine a highly 
significant commentary on Deleuze by François Zourabichvili which emphasises and 
elaborates, in an extremely convincing manner, the problem of interiority and 
exteriority in relation to the image of thought, thereby allowing us to more clearly 
connect Deleuze’s analyses to my foregoing engagement with the relation between 
thought and what it thinks in terms of the call for thinking. Firstly, then, let us consider 
this image in which thought confronts that which it must think, its object, as something 
exterior to it and which calls to it from a distance—in our case, the sonic object which 
we must find means to conceptualise. On the basis of the image, it follows that the 
confrontation between thought and sound must take place through a play of interiority 
and exteriority, in which the interiority of thought is counter-posed to and 
complemented by the exteriority of the object. Yet this model is immediately faced 
with an immense, perhaps insurmountable, difficulty: if thought was to confront its 
object from without, how could thought not fail to grasp the object as such? We 
encounter, once again, the Kantian problematic, as well as that of sound-in-itself—





Yet, as Zourabichvili elaborates from Deleuze, it is precisely in and through this 
framing of the problem that the image of thought comes to intervene, and to determine 
any possibility of a solution. A key aspect of Zourabichvili’s analysis, and its value for 
my exposition, is the way in which he shows that the very presupposition of an 
interiority of thought, which would constitute its nature and its pre-existence in 
relation to any act of thinking, suffices to make the exteriority of what it thinks only an 
apparent or relative exteriority, in which thought only confronts that which already 
accords with its operations—which is to say, it eliminates the tele-phonic dimensions 
of calling. As a result, for Zourabichvili, this image of thought ensures that ‘all 
cognition [connaissance] is already re-cognition [reconnaissance]’ (DP 47). The 
consequences of this for the activity of thinking are clear: all thinking is accomplished 
in advance of its being thought, and there can therefore be no possibility of thinking 
again or thinking anew, as Attali has demanded in relation to sonic theory. If we wish 
to maintain this possibility of thinking anew, the possibility for thought to be an act of 
creation—and indeed to stress this as thought’s highest possibility, as Deleuze himself 
will—then the struggle against an image of thought which makes thinking into 
recognition will be of paramount importance. Initially, then, we must consider how 
this model comes to obtain its hold over thinking, and to establish recognition as the 
ultimate orientation of thought within this dogmatic image. 
 
Zourabichvili begins his account by stating that ‘[t]he most general problem of thought 
is perhaps that of its necessity,’ that is, of ‘how to arrive at a necessary thought’—
‘[t]he thinker is happy when he no longer has a choice’ (DP 44). From where would 
thought derive such a necessity? Philosophy, according to Zourabichvili, has 
‘recognized the relation of necessity with exteriority’: a necessary thought would 
derive its necessity from an outside that gives a ‘precise content to what must be said 
or thought’ (DP 44). This necessary thought, determined by an exteriority to which it 
must conform, would be, precisely, truth. The truthful thought would therefore be 
‘double[d] […] with a correlate outside the mind’ which constrains this thought to 
think and gives it its necessity, and to which it owes its very status as truth; here we 
find the familiar image of truth as the correlation between thought and the world, in 




correspond. ‘Philosophy,’ then, ‘readily admits that the fate of thought depends on its 
relation to exteriority.’  
 
In the context of my argument here we might reformulate this, and declare that the fate 
of sonic theory depends on its relation to sound as something which calls for thought 
from without and which it must somehow apprehend, to which it must come to 
conform, via a method that remains uncertain—yet such an interpretation of the call, 
as we have heard, does not suffice to ensure that thinking will actually begin, as 
opposed to simply allowing sound itself to enter into the circularity of recognition.  
We must understand, then, the contours and elements of such an interpretation of the 
call, of the relation between thought and what it must think. The significance of 
Deleuze’s intervention on this point is to be found in the following ‘diagnosis’: 
‘however much philosophy recognises in truth an element independent of thought, it 
ends up interiorizing the relation and postulating that thought and truth have an 
intimate or natural relation.’ That is, in his account of the image of thought that 
functions as the subjective presupposition for philosophy, Deleuze will indicate that in 
spite of (or perhaps, indeed, on the basis of) figuring that which it thinks as something 
external to it, calling to be thought from afar, philosophy only ever succeeds in 
thinking a ‘relative exteriority’ to which it already, in advance, gives the form of ‘an 
external reality that is identical to itself’ (DP 45). 
 
The image of thought, then, is an implicit and subjective presupposition about what it 
means to think, which is taken to be something that ‘[e]verybody knows, in a pre-
philosophical and pre-conceptual manner’ (DR 165), and which predetermines, 
thereby, the possible orientations of thought. But what characterises more specifically 
the ‘dogmatic, orthodox or moral image’ that marks the history of philosophy, across 
all the various explicit commitments that distinguish schools and periods, is precisely 
the primacy of recognition as a model of thinking, in which what thought confronts is 
always already amenable to its operations in principle, and is only ever re-covered in 
practice. Whatever practical difficulties we may face as thinkers, through a lack of 
method or a failure of memory, laziness or distraction, we are nevertheless assured 
that ‘thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially 
wants the true’ (DR 167). Thought, then, is not only the ‘natural exercise of a faculty,’ 




for truth belongs by right to thought as a faculty,’ and ‘there is a relation of affinity 
between the thinker and what he is seeking’ (DP 46). Although ‘[t]hought does not yet 
know what is true, [...] it at least knows itself to be well-endowed for the search, [and] 
a priori capable of finding it’ (DP 44-45). The image of thought as ‘dogmatic, 
orthodox or moral,’ specifies not only that thought is a natural capacity with which 
everyone is endowed, but that thought is also ‘naturally upright’ (DR 170); thought is 
in principle capable of auditing the call, if in fact it has yet to receive its transmission. 
 
On the basis of this presupposition, thought becomes orientated in principle towards 
the truth which is purportedly external to it—not only can we take it that everybody 
knows, without concepts, what it means to think, we can also take it that this thinking 
naturally desires truth, and is capable of attaining it. If, in practice, thought is deviated 
from this inherent aim by lack of method, by errors or mistakes, these are not 
constitutive but rather entirely contingent in relation to the internal necessity of 
thought itself—instead of truth being dependent upon something external to thought, it 
is now error that characterises this exteriority. Or, rather, if both truth and error are 
exterior to thought, then ‘[e]xteriority, in philosophy, is thus divided: truth no less than 
error finds its source outside of thought—yet we have an essential and intimate 
relation with the former, and only an accidental relation with the latter’ (DP 46). 
Truth, then, is the necessary exteriority of thought, which thought already possesses 
by right even if in fact it is often led astray by the contingent exteriority of error. If 
thought can succeed in thinking the ‘good outside’ of truth, then, it is insofar as it 
always already ‘lies in the depths of our hearts.’ Yet there remains a question, here, of 
how this postulate of an upright nature of thought, and an affinity of thought with the 
true, can be sustained in relation to the world that thought encounters—this postulate 
would not be able to maintain its authority if it were continually challenged by the 
world to which it is applied. How does the world itself come to conform to this 
presupposition of a natural affinity between thought and truth?43 
 
                                                        
43 In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze refers to Kant’s own framing of this problem from 
the Critique of Pure Reason: ‘if cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes 
light, sometimes heavy […] my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when 
representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar’ (KC 11; quoting CPR A 100-101). 
That is, if we did not encounter, in the world, a certain regularity, our mind would never have 





In order to respond to this difficulty, the postulates of a natural capacity for thought 
and an affinity between this thought and truth requires a further postulate to sustain it, 
one that is no less subjective even if it addresses the world that we think, rather than 
the thinker who encounters it. If ‘[w]e do not seek truth without postulating it in 
advance,’ as bearing a natural affinity with the thought which seeks it, this is because 
we do not seek truth without ‘presuming, before having thought at all, the existence of 
a reality’ (DP 47) which conforms to our thinking. Zourabichvili emphasises that 
Deleuze’s critique of this presumption is not aimed at ‘the reality of a world’ as such, 
an emphasis consistent with his opposition to narrowly ontological readings of 
Deleuze,44 but rather takes aim at the notion of a ‘“truthful world” [...], identical to 
itself, a docile world faithful to our expectations whenever we try to know it.’ If we 
are able to postulate a natural relation between thought and truth, this is insofar as the 
world itself is presumed to be truthful by conforming to our capacity to think it. This 
ensures that what thought does not yet think, the necessity and truth derived from the 
exteriority of what it must come to think, is nevertheless determined in advance as 
‘homogeneity and identity.’ If thought, then, is naturally disposed towards the ‘good 
outside’ of truth, this is insofar as this outside is itself inherently truthful. 
 
Taking these three postulates, then, of a natural capacity for thought, an affinity 
between thought and truth, and the truthfulness of the world, we see that, on this basis, 
thought already possesses in advance the exteriority that is its object and which gives 
it its necessity—this exteriority is made relative to the thought that has already, in 
principle, determined it. It is for this reason that Zourabichvili will claim, as noted 
above, that this ‘relation between thought and truth is the model of recognition’ (DP 
47). Thought ‘in a certain way precedes itself by prejudging the form of its object’ as, 
precisely, thinkable, and as such ‘the object of thought is less the object of a discovery 
                                                        
44 The original text of Zourabichvili’s Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event specifies on two 
occasions that the reality of the external world is not a problem for Deleuze. The first case is 
cited above, but the second is perhaps clearer and more strongly-formulated: ‘It should be 
understood that the existence or nonexistence of a world exterior to the thinking subject is not 
at stake here, and that such a question has no meaning within the Deleuzian problematic’ (DP 
65). The introduction added to the text in 2004 pushes these two claims even further, to 
declare polemically that ‘[t]here is no “ontology of Deleuze”’ (DP 36). It is significant, in this 
regard, that in the decade between the publication of the original text and the addition of this 
introduction, Alain Badiou published his Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, in which he outlines 
a strongly ontological interpretation of Deleuze’s philosophy. The problem of Deleuze’s 




than of a recognition.’ The immediate consequences of such an image of thought for 
philosophy are as evident as they are, for Deleuze, disastrous: ‘The form of 
recognition has never sanctioned anything but the recognisable and the recognised; 
form will never inspire anything but conformities’ (DR 170). Thought finds itself 
gifted with an affinity with truth only on condition that it may only encounter a world 
that is already in conformity with it, and, at the limit, thought will think nothing other 
than its own image, of which the world is a reflection. What is more, and more 
troubling for Deleuze, is that the truthfulness of the world, as determined by its 
inherent thinkability, appeals to an existing sense of what thinking is—if the world is 
to be made, in advance, amenable to thought, this can only be insofar as we know what 
it is to think. The criteria of thinkability must already be possessed—that is, we have 
an image of thought. Ultimately, what will unite the eight postulates of the image of 
thought, as Deleuze enumerates them, will be precisely this claim that we know what 
thinking is, and it is this claim that will form the locus of Deleuze’s struggle. 
 
Having established, in broad terms, then, the way in which the image of thought 
functions as the a priori orientation of thinking according to a natural capacity and a 
model of recognition, it is hopefully clear that this image functions as a diagnostic tool 
for not only the failure of Heidegger’s articulation of the call, but the widely-affirmed 
failure of sound studies to as yet begin thinking sonority. My claim is that those 
affirmations are likely to remain self-fulfilling—and that, therefore, sound studies will 
be ‘powerless to truly begin’—so long as this image continues to supervene, and 
makes of sound an object of recognition; that is, so long as the what that calls for 
thinking is too readily identified, whatever the precise nature of this identification 
(whether idealist or materialist, for instance). In order to demonstrate this claim more 
fully, I want to turn to an instance of the what that calls for thinking—that is, an 
instance of sonic practice—that, given its insistence as a reference point within the 
discourse of sound studies, seems to be an exemplary case of the way in which sound, 
in fact, continues to evade such identifications: the work of John Cage. 
 
Cage’s work marks a focal point for struggles in sound studies over the conditions of 
possibility for thinking sonority, insofar as his work poses quite explicitly the 




difficulty of determining the relation between sound and thought.45 By taking up this 
theoretical difficulty, in the first instance, in relation to Cage’s attempt to embrace the 
entirety of sound (and we might say, ‘sound-in-itself’) within the ambit of his 
compositional practice—an attempt that was, as I hope to show, the animating impetus 
for his most significant and challenging inventions—then we can observe quite clearly 
the extent to which, by presuming Cage’s work to be in some way already thinkable 
through some existing theoretical framework, we make it recognisable in the sense 
elaborated above.  
 
My claim here, then, is that it is only by virtue of forming yet another element of a 
relative exteriority that we could claim Cage’s work is thinkable in principle, precisely 
because we must invoke an existing set of capacities on the part of thought in order to 
do so; capacities, moreover, that could be assumed to stretch as far as the limits of all-
sound, which would be uniformly and indifferently thinkable. Not only does such an 
assumption, which, as I have shown, was common to the counterposed projects of 
Kim-Cohen and Cox, raise all the problems discussed previously with regard to the 
presuppositions that it must rely upon, but, even further than this, it also implicitly 
assume the failure of Cage’s project as such. That is to say, the assumption of the 
necessary thinkability of an all-sound music can only assume that Cage was not able to 
fulfill his intention, evident in his work from the late nineteen-thirties onwards, to 
move beyond the limitations of the already-audible within music through a procedure 
that was avowedly experimental, in a strictly-defined sense. My argument, then, will 
be as follows: insofar as Cage’s intent to produce an all-sound music would ultimately 
animate his embrace of an experimental compositional practice, a practice which, as I 
will show, is orientated against an image of thought in which the world is, in principle, 
already known, then any theoretical approach to his work that does not articulate itself 
as experimental, but implicitly or explicitly relies on a set of existing capacities for 
                                                        
45 It would perhaps be more accurate to say meaning rather than thought here, given that it is a 
particular relation between intention and expression, and the subordination of sound to a mere 
vehicle for this relation, that forms the strategic adversary of Cage’s compositional practice. 
However, it will hopefully become clear that the term “thought,” as used here and throughout, 
can capture both the limited, representational model of semantically-determined and 
subjectively-coherent experience and cognition from which Cage aims to liberate sounds, and 
a broader creative and experimental practice which, in fact, can characterise Cage’s own 









4. “The All-Sound Music of the Future” 
 
In order to establish this argument, we can first note that, from his earliest mature 
works, 46 Cage’s musical focus was on overcoming the distinction between musical 
sound and noise—his embrace of all-sound was couched, initially, in terms of an 
opposition between those sounds included within and those excluded from the ambit 
of musicality.47 A vital moment in the development of this preoccupation, emphasised 
                                                        
46 I say “mature” here in order to distinguish the pieces composed from 1938 onwards from 
those that came before—while the former can be positioned quite clearly in relation to the 
subsequent developments of Cage’s compositional practice, the latter are focused upon forms 
and principles that Cage would come to abandon almost completely in the late thirties. Cage’s 
earliest compositions date from a period spent in Paris after dropping out of Pomona College 
in 1930, aged eighteen, and were ‘derived from calculations of a mathematical nature’ (Cage, 
quoted in Pritchett 1993, 6), while subsequent pieces composed during the mid-thirties were 
based on ‘serial and contrapuntal ideas’ that ‘were never again to appear in his work after 
1938’ (10). The website of the John Cage Trust describes Metamorphosis (1938) as ‘his last 
work to be composed in a serial and contrapuntal style,’ while Pritchett similarly gives this 
year as the date when Cage’s ‘professional career as a composer’ began (6). It is notable, in 
this regard, that Cage is still suggesting, in “The Future of Music: Credo,” likely given that 
year, that the ‘new methods’ which will allow for composers to ‘make use’ of the ‘entire field 
of sound’ will ‘[bear] a definite relation to Schoenberg’s twelve-tone system’ (S 4-5). It is 
therefore not strictly a question of a definitive and complete break with and rejection of 
serialism on Cage’s part, so much as the crossing of a threshold that would divorce him 
irrecoverably from many of its central concerns, while nevertheless retaining certain aspects of 
its orientation. Virgil Thompson would later include in his review of the 1945 prepared piano 
concert at the New School the remark that ‘Mr Cage has carried Schonberg’s twelve-tone 
harmonic manoeuvres to their logical conclusion’ (Thompson, quoted in Tompkins 1968, 96), 
and it is clear that Cage’s embrace of all-sound entailed his rejection of serialist means in a 
gradual and uneven fashion. This is further indicated by his friendship with Pierre Boulez in 
the late nineteen-forties and early nineteen-fifties, occasioned by the (seeming) proximity of 
their work, which in Boulez’s case was derived (via a polemical critique) from the project of 
total serialism initiated by his teacher Olivier Messiaen (see Griffiths 2010, 3-21). 
47 Cage emphasises this aspect of inclusion and exclusion in his retrospective account of this 
period of his work in the “Lecture on Nothing”: ‘Noises, too, had been dis-criminated against; 
and being American, having being trained to be sentimental, I fought for noises. I liked being 
on the side of the underdog’ (S 117). Though facetious in its phrasing, this remark 
nevertheless points towards the increasingly socio-political dimension that Cage’s attempts to 
“liberate sound” would take on during the nineteen-sixties, as it adopted an increasingly 
explicit orientation against the power-dynamics implied by this constitutive exclusion of noise 
from music. In this regard, we can note that, historically speaking, the gesture of exclusion, as 
constitutive of the properly musical, has often formulated itself in specifically Euro- and 
ethnocentric terms; as Michael Chanan argues, citing the work of the musicologist F. Albert 




by Cage himself as well as the various biographical accounts of his musical 
development,48 is an idea expressed by Oskar Fischinger, an abstract filmmaker who 
had asked Cage to compose music for a film he was making. As Cage describes it: 
 
When I was introduced to [Fischinger], he began to talk with me about 
the spirit which is inside each of the objects of this world. So, he told me, 
all we need to do to liberate that spirit is to brush past the object, and to 
draw forth its sound. (FTB 73) 
 
According to Kenneth Silverman, this ‘concept of incarnate sound animated Cage’s 
thinking about music for the rest of his life’ (Silverman 2010, 26).  In Cage’s account, 
it was this idea of Fischinger’s that ‘led [him] to percussion’ (73), that is, to the form 
of music for which he would become initially known and which would be the central 
focus of his compositional practice until his development of the prepared piano in 
1942. This embrace of percussion was both a direct extension of Fischinger’s idea 
(Cage’s percussion pieces would often make use of everyday and household objects, 
as opposed to percussion instruments49) and one element in a more general project that 
he would first articulate in the important lecture “The Future of Music: Credo,” and 
which would form a core element of his musical thinking through the nineteen-
                                                                                                                                                                
wrote, in accordance with whatever rules were current, to be ‘music’, thus excluding all non-
European music, as well as all European music which did not fall within the ambit of the 
dominant culture’ (Chanan 1994, 78). We can note, in this regard, that Cage’s own early work 
for percussion orchestra found itself engendering comparisons to Balinese gamelan music 
(Patterson 2002, 41); further, as discussed briefly below, his musical thinking during the 
nineteen-forties developed alongside and in dialogue with a growing interest in South and East 
Asian music and philosophy. As Chanan himself notes, however, there is an issue here of the 
degree to which Cage’s appeal to and creative (mis)use of East Asian philosophical (and to a 
far lesser extent, musical) sources manifests ‘certain habits of thought rooted in the mentality 
of the colonizer’ (264); Pierre Boulez, for his part, was explicit in accusing Cage of 
Orientalism in his attitude to these sources. An engagement with this problematic falls beyond 
the scope of my project here, but it must nevertheless be acknowledged as a significant point 
of tension in any attempt to analyse Cage’s work; certain key elements of it will be outlined in 
Chapter Three and the Conclusion. 
48 In particular, see Pritchett 1993, 12; Larson 2012, 60-61; Revill 1992, 51-52, 60; Silverman 
2010, 24-26. Silverman quotes Cage as saying that Fischinger’s remark ‘set [him] on fire’ 
(25). 
49 For instance, Living Room Music (1940) is ‘for unspecified instruments,’ and the score 
suggests that ‘[a]ny household objects or architectural elements may be used as instruments’ 
(Pritchett 1993, 20). Examples given include ‘magazines, newspapers or cardboard’ for the 
first player and ‘table or other wooden furniture’ for the second. This was, in a certain respect, 
a necessity related to the cost and difficulty of obtaining a range of percussion instruments, as 
well as the amateur nature of the performers Cage was able to secure for his percussion 
ensemble—including, for a period from late 1937 until he and Xenia moved to Seattle in 1938, 




forties—the project of embracing ‘any and all sounds that can be heard’ (S 4).50 I will 
consider this lecture, along with related texts from the subsequent decade, in order to 
establish clearly his first fully-articulated position on, as the title indicates, the future 
of music—that is, on what music is not yet but might become; this future, as we will 
hear, demanded, for Cage, a break with harmony and other tonal forms of 
organisation. 
 
The lecture sets out clearly the central motivating ‘disagreement’ from which this 
future of music envisioned by Cage would emerge as that ‘between noise and so-
called musical sound’ (S 4), rather than, as ‘in the past,’ ‘between consonance and 
dissonance.’ Whereas dissonance remains, as Michael Chanan puts it, ‘an integral part 
of the system’ of tonality, insofar as consonance and dissonance are ‘opposite ends of 
a continuum’ defined by the harmonic series (Chanan 1994, 232),51 noise, on the 
contrary, designates ‘the inarticulate sounds that fall outside the system’ by virtue of 
lacking a fundamental tone. The continuum between the poles of consonance and 
dissonance, then, is orientated by reference to the primacy of tone, while the 
opposition between musical sound and noise cannot be anchored in this way. Though 
this opposition also forms a continuum, insofar as any pitched sound will have a 
                                                        
50 Here and subsequently, I have removed the capitalisation of quotes from “The Future of 
Music: Credo” for the sake of readability. 
51 Chanan here notes the significance of Schoenberg’s quasi-evolutionary theory of harmony. 
For Schoenberg, dissonant chords are initially produced “accidentally” within the harmonic 
system by the interaction of the melodic line with the harmonic ground; the tone that produces 
the dissonant chord is termed a ‘passing note’ or ‘non-harmonic tone’ insofar as it falls 
‘outside the harmonic scheme of the piece in question’ (Chanan 1994, 67). As Chanan goes on 
to explain, ‘[a]t first these strange harmonies can only be admitted to the harmonic system 
when suitably prepared and resolved,’ but are then subsequently ‘admitted to the system’ 
through being ‘recuperated by the powers of harmonic integration’ (67-68). ‘As a result,’ 
Chanan continues, ‘at no time was the system [of harmonic tonality] closed; on the contrary 
[…] it was forever expanding and contracting’ (68). This expansion led, for Schoenberg, to the 
point where ‘the repertoire of acceptable dissonances’ increases to the point where 
‘chromaticism became acute and relentless’ and ‘the key system began to suffer from a loss of 
definition.’ This is, of course, the point where Schoenberg’s atonalism, his ‘emancipation of 
the dissonance,’ is brought into effect, as the end-point of this evolutionary trajectory. In a 
sense, Cage’s attempt to replace the consonance-dissonance opposition with one between 
musical sounds and noises is an extension of this project to the incorporation of sounds that, 
lacking a fundamental tone, are not even dissonant. However, this extension ultimately 
demands a rejection of the Schoenbergian perspective, which still implied a fundamental 
reliance upon harmony, insofar as it is only with reference to the priority of harmony that 
consonance and dissonance form the limit points—limits that are relative in relation to the 
field of all possible sound. In this regard, it is important to note that, in Cage’s account of his 
studies with Schoenberg, the latter told Cage that he had ‘no feeling for harmony,’ and that 




timbre determined by overtones that are inseparable from but irreducible to the 
fundamental, it is a continuum that stretches to cover the entire field of sonority, rather 
than limiting itself to discrete steps (241).  
 
As Cage puts it, then, the use ‘for musical purposes’ of ‘any and all sounds that can be 
heard,’ rather than simply the ‘particular steps in the field of sound’ that characterised 
‘so-called musical sound,’ demanded that a struggle be undertaken in the name of 
noise, insofar as noise designated precisely those sounds that fall outside of the 
discrete steps of the tonal system—the ‘academically forbidden “non-musical” field of 
sound’ was noisy by (negative) definition (S 5).52 Thus, the pursuit of an all-sound 
music, for Cage, demanded an embrace of noise. Percussion music, for Cage, was a 
tactical element in this broader struggle: it marked ‘a contemporary transition from 
keyboard-influenced music to the all-sound music of the future’ insofar as ‘[a]ny 
sound is acceptable to the composer of percussion music.’  Yet percussion music, as a 
nascent form of this all-sound music of the future, posed clearly the problem that any 
such music would have to confront—its mode of organisation. That is to say, though 
Cage may advocate, following Edgard Varése, the substitution of the term ‘organised 
sound’ for ‘music’ (S 3), this nevertheless implied particular methods for organising 
this new body of noisy sonic material. This posed a problem that would underpin both 
Cage’s iconoclastic attacks on the Western classical tradition during the nineteen-
forties, and, ultimately, his embrace of an experimental compositional method from 
the early nineteen-fifties. It is, for this reason, a key moment in my establishment of 
Cage’s work as a struggle against recognition, and against a particular sonic form of 
the dogmatic image of thought. 
 
Already in “The Future of Music: Credo,” Cage is aware of the way in which his 
embrace of noise through percussion music, as well as the electronic experiments he 
was conducting, sporadically and as money and institutional access permitted, 53 at the 
                                                        
52 For an exemplary case of this negative definition of noise, see the opening pages of Hegarty 
2007.  
53 The period of the late nineteen-thirties saw the first of Cage’s long and ultimately fruitless 
endeavours to establish a centre for experimental music that would help facilitate such 
researches, for which at the time he was reliant upon access to radio studios. He refers to the 
importance of such centres for the development of the ‘all-sound’ music he envisages in the 
“Future of Music” piece (S 6). For details of his initial attempts in this direction, see 




same time, demanded a revision of the very basic premises of musical structure: ‘The 
present methods of writing music, principally those which employ harmony and its 
reference to particular steps in the field of sound, will be inadequate for the composer, 
who will be faced with the entire field of sound’ (S 4). That is, the attempt to embrace 
noise within music will require that the organising principles of the latter—the 
‘musical habits’ (S 9) that serve to ground the recognisability of a certain set of sounds 
as musical—must be challenged and, ultimately, replaced. As he puts in an article 
from 1942, entitled “For More New Sounds,” in writing for both new technologies and 
percussion instruments  
 
the composer is dealing with material that does not fit into the orthodox 
scales and harmonies. It is therefore necessary to find some other organized 
means than those in use for symphonic instruments. The sounds cannot be 
organised through reference to an underlying fundamental tone since such a 
tone does not exist. (Cage, in Kostelanetz 1970, 66).  
 
The existing modes of sonic organisation are inapplicable to noises insofar as, lacking 
in a fundamental tone, the latter cannot be incorporated into the system of pitch-
relations that characterised musical organisation in the Western tradition from its 
Greek origins—and had become anathema to the even stricter set of permissible 
relations that characterised classical tonal harmony, the defining form of musical 
organisation in the Western concert tradition from around the mid-eighteenth century 
onwards.54 However, it is precisely these existing modes of organisation that underpin 
the recognisability of music as such, entailing thereby the exclusion of noise from 
within the remit of music simply by definition. The question Cage raises here, then, is 
whether there can be a form of music that is not dependent upon or reducible to the 
existing ways of organising sound—and that thereby would not be (immediately) 
recognisable as music—and which would thereby be able to incorporate sounds that 
were by definition non-musical. I will not discuss in detail, at this point, the specific 
alternatives Cage himself developed and formulated this period, which will be the 
topic of Chapter Three, but rather focus on the way in which this search for an 
alternative required an increasingly strident opposition to the traditions that 
                                                        
54 Chanan notes that percussion was actually ‘altogether absent’ from the ‘early classical 
orchestra and the consort it grew out of’; it was ‘only after Berlioz that a limited range of 




constrained the possibilities for sonic organisation, and the ultimate rejection of an 
intentional imposition of order that this opposition would entail. 
 
A particularly significant moment in the trajectory I am tracing here is Cage’s 
subsequent expansion of the argument of “For More New Sounds” in the 1948 lecture 
“Defense of Satie,” which develops the logic of his overall project in a more polemical 
direction—a direction so polemical, in fact, that, after presenting the lecture at Black 
Mountain College, Cage would not be invited back until 1952, when his long-time 
friend Lou Harrison had taken over as head of the music department (Tompkins 1968, 
117). A clear sense of this rhetorical shift can be seen in the following, famous 
declaration: 
 
With Beethoven the parts of a composition were defined by means of 
harmony. With Satie and Webern they are defined by means of time 
lengths. […] Was Beethoven right or are Webern and Satie right? I 
answer immediately and unequivocally, Beethoven was in error, and his 
influence, which has been as extensive as it is lamentable, has been 
deadening to the art of music. (Cage, in Kostelanetz 1971, 81) 
 
Cage’s advocacy of a structure based on duration will be discussed more fully 
subsequently, but what is central to my argument at this stage is both the critical edge 
to Cage’s argumentation here, and the reasoning that underpins the opposition he is 
proposing. A structure based on duration, for Cage, is preferable to the position he 
attributes to Beethoven insofar as ‘duration’ or ‘time length’ is the only attribute of 
sound that is common to both sound and its ‘opposite’ and ‘necessary partner,’ that is, 
‘silence.’ While Cage’s position on silence here is a preliminary one, and the shifts 
that this position underwent will be considered in the following chapter, we can 
nevertheless note that a durational structure, unlike a harmonic one, can, in principle at 
least, incorporate all forms of sound rather than just those that are pitched. As Cage 
puts it in “Forerunners of Modern Music,” an article published the following year that 
explores many of the same ideas, ‘[a]ny sounds of any qualities and pitches (known or 
unknown, definite or indefinite), any contexts of these, simple or multiple, are natural 






This shift away from harmony toward duration as the structural principle of 
composition is therefore central to the possibility of an ‘all-sound music of the future’ 
that Cage envisaged in “The Future of Music: Credo” (S 5). The ‘artificial’ nature of 
harmonic structure must be eradicated, in favour of a music that would ‘structure itself 
from the very roots of sound’ so as to be able to embrace, in principle, any sound 
whatsoever (Cage, in Kostalenetz 1971, 80-81). However, what is vital to note here is 
that these structural principles admitted of a compositional freedom at the level of 
content—though the structure may be determined according to time-lengths, the actual 
sonic elements themselves remained amenable to choice. At this point in Cage’s 
development, then, he still maintained ‘two fundamental and opposed elements’ as 
determining the ‘function’ and ‘meaning’ of a piece of music: Law and Freedom (84). 
This opposition (and, indeed, opposition as such) is foreign to Cage’s subsequent 
thinking, insofar as it implies both a collective agreement, in the case of Law, and an 
appeal to ‘matter[s] of the heart’ and ‘improvisation,’ in the case of Freedom (83-
84).55 A key task of the remaining part of this thesis is to examine in detail the shifts 
that would lead, over the course of the subsequent four years, to a complete revolution 
in Cage’s views on this point—and, moreover, to demonstrate how this revolution is 
entailed by the pursuit of his very earliest compositional goals, as their logical 
extension. As a result, my presentation of this transformation will be cumulative, 
rather than linear, tracing and retracing the various shifts involved from different 
perspectives as my argument develops, and any single account should not be read as 
definitive. Given the current emphasis of my analysis, my initial presentation will 
therefore on the way in which there is a degree of consistency between these earlier 
discussions of the conditions of possibility for an all-sound music and his subsequent 
account of his work as experimental. 
 
The experimental nature of Cage’s attempt to move beyond the limitations of 
specifically musical sound is presented clearly in “Experimental Music,” first given as 
an address to the Music Teachers National Association in Chicago in 1957. In this 
text, Cage explains that his work aimed to explore the possibilities of a ‘total sound-
                                                        
55 As Cage himself will later describe it, in the first of his three lectures at Darmstadt in 
September 1958: ‘Composition, then, I viewed, ten years ago, as an activity integrating 
opposites, the rational and the irrational, bringing about, ideally, a freely moving continuity 
within a strict division of parts, the sounds, their combination and succession being either 




space’ beyond the ‘steppingstones twelve in number’ (S 9; see also 16, 183) of the 
dodecaphonic scale, and the ‘musical habits’ that underpin this limited range of sonic 
possibilities. As such, the essay marks a refinement and extension of Cage’s thinking 
discussed above, insofar as it turns upon a distinction between the necessarily limiting 
‘discrete steps’ of the existing forms of sonic organisation—that is, our ‘musical 
habits’—and the far greater richness of sonic possibilities that lie beyond these 
narrowly-delimited boundaries (S 9); in order to embrace these possibilities, one must 
‘be willing to change one’s musical habits radically.’ However, this apparent 
proximity conceals a highly significant and fundamental transition that marks the 
distance between the two, a transition indexed by Cage’s embrace of the term 
‘experimental’:    
 
Formerly, whenever anyone said the music I presented was experimental, 
I objected. It seemed to me that composers knew what they were doing, 
and that the experiments that had been made had taken place prior to the 
finished works, just as sketches are made before paintings and rehearsals 
precede performances. […] Now, on the other hand, times have changed; 
music has changed; and I no longer object to the word “experimental.” I 
use it in fact to describe all the music that especially interests me and to 
which I am devoted, whether someone else wrote it or I did myself. (S 7) 
 
This shift in attitude is premised upon a ‘parting of the ways, where it is realised that 
sounds occur whether intended or not’ and where one, as a result, ‘turns in the 
direction of those [one] does not intend’ (S 8). Cage makes very similar remarks in a 
nearly-contemporaneous article entitled “Experimental Music: Doctrine,” but with a 
few highly-significant additional details, and which I will therefore quote at length: 
 
Objections are sometimes made by composers to the use of the term 
experimental as descriptive of their works, for it is claimed that any 
experiments that are made precede the steps that are finally taken with 
determination, and that this determination is knowing, having, in fact, a 
particular, if unconventional, ordering of the elements used in view. 
These objections are clearly justifiable, but only where, as among 
contemporary evidences in serial music, it remains a question of making 
a thing upon the boundaries, structure, and expression of which attention 
is focused. Where, on the other hand, attention moves towards the 
observation and audition of many things at once, including those that are 
environmental—becomes, that is, inclusive rather than exclusive—no 
question of making, in the sense of forming understandable structures, 
can arise (one is tourist), and here the word “experimental” is apt, 




in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of 
which is unknown. What has been determined? (S 13) 56 
 
There are a number of vital formulations in this passage, and a number of them will 
only receive a clear account subsequently; however, what is most important at this 
point is the shift from the determination of an object which possesses an 
‘understandable structure’ toward the ‘audition of many things at once,’ a shift which 
entails an experimental attitude insofar as it prevents an advance knowledge. 
Therefore, referring back to my preceding account of Zourabichvili’s work, we can 
say that it disrupts the equivalence of cognition and re-cognition by placing a caesura 
between composition and audition; one does not know (in advance) what a body can 
hear.57  
 
Though Cage’s declaration here implicates the more specific case of the use of chance 
procedures within his compositions (which I will discuss in Chapter Three), it is also 
applicable to the broad thrust of his project as such, insofar as that which is known 
prior to the act of composition can be precisely only those musical habits or, in the 
terms Deleuze borrows from Nietzsche, established values, against which his work 
struggles (NP passim). It is these habits regarding the construction of music, and the 
‘discrete steps’ upon which they rely, that enable something to be recognisable as 
music, and this recognisability is itself, as established above, the criterion upon which 
                                                        
56 Significantly, this definition of “experimental” is cited approvingly by Deleuze and Guattari 
in Anti-Oedipus as part of their discussion of ‘art as “experimentation”’ (AO 405); references 
to Cage in Deleuze’s work are relatively rare, and the most extended engagement, in A 
Thousand Plateaus, is broadly critical, though focused on the prepared piano works which 
precede the major shifts in Cage’s compositional thinking toward chance and indeterminacy. 
57 I allude here to Deleuze’s consistent invocation of Spinoza’s formulation ‘we do not know 
what a body can do’ (Spinoza 1992, 105; see NP 36, SPP 17, D2 60, TP 284, ECC 123). For a 
discussion of this aspect of Deleuze’s work in relation to sonic theory, see Goodman 2010, 99-
104; and Cimini, 2010, 135 and passim. Goodman uses the alternative reformulation that ‘[w]e 
do not yet know what a sonic body can do’ (191, original emphasis), which captures more 
accurately the implications of the Spinoza’s univocal ontology than my own, insofar as the 
“body” referred to by Spinoza is not the human body but rather ‘a mode which expresses in a 
definite and determinate way God’s essence insofar as he is considered as an extended thing’ 
(Spinoza 1993, 63). As such, “body”, in Spinoza’s sense, refers to any finite extended thing, a 
sound as much as a physical human body, and “audition” in this sense would be the interaction 
between two bodies (each of which would contain a multiplicity of others). However, at this 
stage in my argument I am focusing on the listening experience in isolation from 
considerations of the sonic object, which will be discussed shortly, as well as broader 
ontological considerations, dealt with in Chapter Three; my formulation here therefore is an 
accompaniment to Goodman’s, but one which must be acknowledged to be, from a Spinozist 




something can be affirmed as already thinkable. Though this argument cannot yet be 
established in full, I want to suggest here, as an gesture towards my overall intention, 
that an approach to Cage’s work that does not acknowledge the need to move beyond 
a dogmatic image of thought as model of recognition, and that does not approach 
Cage’s work as something that is in fact unthinkable according to a natural and 
therefore already-existing set of capacities of thought, but nevertheless something that 
may become so beyond such an image, can only assume the failure of his project as an 
attempt to push, experimentally, at the limits of the audible. 
 
 
5. The Sonic Object = x 
 
In order to elaborate this position more clearly, and defend it more fully, I want to 
extend my characterisation of the image of thought in order to assess, from Deleuze’s 
own account, how it actually supervenes upon thinking as an activity, limiting and 
channeling it according to the model of recognition discussed above. Firstly, however, 
I will reiterate elements of the above analysis in order to indicate why I take such an 
account to be vital. Within the postulates of the dogmatic image of thought, what 
offers itself to thought as the exteriority to which it must conform, and which thereby 
grounds its necessity and its truth, is merely the object of a sublime philosophical 
sleight-of-hand—the possibility that thought might be unsettled by this encounter with 
its outside, and that this necessity may force it down strange and obscure paths, is 
eliminated in advance by ensuring that thought only ever encounters that which is 
already subordinated to it in principle, if not yet in fact. Thought submits to a 
simulated passion, relinquishing its authority only once it already knows what it is to 
encounter, once it knows that the world itself has become truthful. However, though 
these three interrelated claims would sustain the image of thought as a model of 
recognition, they remain incomplete without an account of how this internalised 
relation between thought and its object can be sustained in the activity of thinking—
that is, we have not yet properly resolved the problem, raised above, of how the 
natural affinity of thought with truth is ratified by what it encounters, by the reality of 





Of course, the claim that the world itself is truthful is a necessary component of this 
resolution, but it remains an equivocation so long as the conditions of possibility for 
such truthfulness are not exhibited—how can we know the world is truthful, without 
thereby presuming what we hope to demonstrate, namely that the world itself is 
knowable by us? That is to say, if we claim that thought has an affinity with truth 
because the world itself is truthful, the grounding of truth in a correspondence between 
thought and world finds its justification continually deferred from the subjective to the 
objective pole—the subject has a natural capacity to think the true that is 
countersigned by the objective truthfulness of the world which it thinks, but without 
either pole providing sufficient reason for this state of affairs. This relay precipitates 
us towards the vertigo of groundlessness, as each term appeals to the other in an 
endless oscillation; how are we to recover our stability, to recover our image in the 
world beyond this mise en abyme?58 
 
A prominent mode of philosophical justification for this reciprocal correspondence 
between thought and world is one that Deleuze finds to be characteristic of ‘dogmatic 
rationalism’ but also present in Humean empiricism: the invocation of a ‘pre-
established harmony’ (KC 12). This notion of a pre-existent and universal ‘harmony 
between subject and object’ (KC 58) serves to underpin the ‘accord between the order 
of ideas and the order of things’ but, in doing so, it ‘demand[s] a theological principle 
as source and guarantee of this harmony’ (KC 12). It must postulate, in addition to 
thought and the world it thinks, a third term which links them while being reducible to 
neither (finite) thought nor to the world itself.59 Zourabichvili amplifies this point: if 
the ‘“truthful world”’ possesses a ‘presumed identity,’ insofar as ‘thought [gives] an a 
priori form to what it does not yet know,’ then that which ‘guarantees [the world] an 
identity’ can only be a ‘transcendence,’ something beyond or outside the world that is 
capable of providing it with a ground (DP 47). For this reason, ‘[b]elief in an external 
                                                        
58 I allude here to Christian Kerslake’s important monograph Immanence and the Vertigo of 
Philosophy, which focuses on the meta-critical problem of grounding pursued in post-Kantian 
German Idealism and, ultimately, in Deleuze’s work too—in particular, the problem raised by 
the methodological immanence of the critical procedure (the critique of reason by reason 
itself) and extended by the ontological commitment to immanence that Deleuze pursues in 
relation to Nietzsche and Spinoza. This problematic will be raised more clearly in the 
subsequent discussion of Deleuze’s relation to Kant. 
59 This interposition of a third term into a relation in order to ground it is, as we shall see, is 





reality refers in the last instance to the position of a God as the absolute outside,’ the 
ultimate transcendence which, as in Leibniz, ensures the harmony by selecting, from 
amongst all possible worlds, that which has the maximal degree of convergence (see 
DR 60-62, 332; LB 75). This fundamentally theological element that underpins the 
dogmatic image will be extremely important for Deleuze insofar as it does not 
disappear once it no longer forms an avowed and explicit presupposition of 
philosophy, but rather retains its influence, migrating from the atemporal beyond of a 
strictly theological transcendence to reside at the heart of the human subject itself.60  
  
To summarise my argument thus far: if the difficulty of how thought can come to 
think its outside is resolved, within the dogmatic image of thought, by surreptitiously 
folding this outside into the ambit of thought in principle, such that thought by right 
can articulate this exteriority within itself, there remains the problem of how this 
folding operates, and from whence it derives its justification. Such a justification is 
ultimately dependent upon a claim that is less philosophical than moral and 
religious—and it is for this reason that it must remain an implicit presupposition, never 
brought to the surface of a philosophical position, never forming an element of its 
conceptual elaboration but providing the support on which such elaboration can be 
unfolded. This is precisely why Deleuze characterises the image of thought as 
‘dogmatic, orthodox or moral’ (DR 167, my emphasis), and why Nietzsche will form a 
key ally in contesting it, as we will hear. However, the central antagonist in Deleuze’s 
struggle against this image of thought, as well as its most equivocal and ambivalent 
representative, is neither rationalism nor empiricism—and recall that the differences 
between the two are more a matter of the specific ‘construction’ of this image rather 
than its fundamental traits (DR 167)—but rather the critical philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant. In order to assess the full scope of Deleuze’s account of the image of thought, 
and the stakes of his resistance to it, we must turn to the elements of the dogmatic 
image of thought that are most specifically Kantian—even if, as we shall see, Kant 
                                                        
60 This shift will be central to my account of the image of thought in Deleuze, insofar as it is 
this shift that characterises Kant’s critical project, for Deleuze. It is ultimately this retention of 
a theological supplement that marks Kant’s critical project as a failure for Deleuze, and it is 
therefore the element against which a true critique must turn: ‘By turning theology into 
anthropology, by putting man in God’s place, do we abolish the essential, that is to say, the 





himself, for Deleuze, is a thinker who gestures to the possibility of moving beyond this 
image. 
 
This Kantian element of the dogmatic image of thought can be found in the postulate 
of common sense, which Deleuze interposes between the upright nature of thought and 
the model of recognition outlined above. He outlines the ‘precipitation’ of these three 
‘postulates’ as follows: ‘the image of a naturally upright thought, which knows what it 
means to think; the pure element of common sense which follows from this “in 
principle”; and the model of recognition—or rather, the form of recognition—which 
follows in turn’ (DR 170). It is this ‘element of common sense,’ then, which mediates 
between thought, as natural exercise of a faculty, and the object of thought as re- and 
pre-cognisable, and provides the grounding of their a priori relation. This notion of a 
common sense will provide the additional detail necessary to draw together Deleuze 
and Zourabichvili’s account of the dogmatic image of thought with Cage’s insistent 
critique of music as mode of self-expression, insofar as both will presuppose an a 
priori limitation of the thinkable and the audible according to the demands of the 
communicable. On this basis, then, I will turn to Deleuze’s own engagement with this 
aspect of the image of thought in Difference and Repetition, and connect this postulate 
of recognition, with its moral underpinnings, to Cage’s critical engagement with the 
demand that music be a form of expression. Together, these two moments will form a 
simultaneously philosophical and aesthetic challenge to sound studies—how to push 
our engagements with sound outside of this model, both conceptually and practically? 
 
To begin to elaborate the Kantian inheritance of the dogmatic image of thought, and 
the postulate of common sense, in particular, we need to firstly consider the facultative 
model of thinking that Deleuze adopts from Kant. A faculty refers to a distinct 
capacity or power of thinking;61 in its most general sense, it designates the relations 
established between a representation, an object of which it is a representation, and a 
subject to which the representation is given. As Deleuze defines it, ‘[w]e can 
                                                        
61 The German term here is Vermögen. While “faculty” is standard in English translations, and 
Deleuze uses the French faculté in his discussions of Kant, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood’s 
translation of the Critique of Pure Reason for the Cambridge Edition translates the term as 
capacity rather than faculty throughout. Though I will use “faculty” here to maintain 
consistency with Deleuze’s French, and the English translations of it, the active sense of 




distinguish as many faculties of mind as there are types of [this] relation’ (KC 3, 
original emphasis).62 To take two important examples by way of clarification, the 
faculty of knowledge relates a representation to the object ‘from the standpoint of its 
agreement to or conformity with it,’ while in the faculty of the ‘feeling of pleasure or 
pain’ the representation is ‘related to the subject, in so far as it affects the subject by 
intensifying or weakening its vital force.’ In what sense, however, do these various 
relations denote a capacity or power of the mind? It is vital to note the modification 
implicit in the “re-“ prefix of re-presentation here, as indicating an element of activity 
on the part of the subject: what appears to us immediately in intuition is simply a 
‘sensible empirical diversity’ and, as such, ‘intuition […] is not a representation, nor 
is sensibility a source of representations’ (KC 7).63 Representations, on the contrary, 
must be produced through an active synthesis of this diversity encountered in 
sensation. As Deleuze puts it: ‘The important thing in representation is the prefix: re –
presentation implies an active taking up of that which is presented; hence an activity 
and a unity distinct from the passivity and diversity which characterise sensibility as 
such.’  
 
                                                        
62In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines ‘representation in general’ as a ‘genus’ under 
which one can find various perceptions (as ‘representation with consciousness’); a perception 
‘that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation,’ while an ‘object 
perception’ is a cognition, which are either immediate, and are termed intuitions, or mediate 
(‘by means of a mark’) and are called concepts (CPR B 376-77). The delineation continues 
beyond this point, but what is important to note is that all these various aspects under which an 
object is given to a subject are specifications of representation as the genus which unifies 
them, which supports Deleuze’s summary here. 
63 Strictly speaking, Deleuze’s claim here is inconsistent with Kant’s own account in the 
‘Transcendental Logic’: ‘Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the 
first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second 
the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of 
concepts); […] If we call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is 
affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth 
representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding’ (CPR A 50-51, 
B 74-75). However, in his discussion of the syntheses that allow for the representations given 
in sensibility to be determinable by the understanding, Kant does seem to suggest that the 
representability of the manifold given in intuition is dependent on the synthesis of time: 
‘Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such 
if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions from one another’ (A 
99); one possible implication of this passage (if not the only one) is that prior to the synthesis 
of apprehension, sensibility cannot be said to possess representations. This possibility allows 





The various faculties, then, refer not only to ‘the different relationships of a 
representation in general,’ but also to ‘a specific source of representations,’ insofar as 
the faculties must actively produce these representations and each does so in a 
different manner. In the case of the faculty of knowledge as defined above, for 
example, it is the understanding that operates as the source of these representations 
which are related to objects ‘from the standpoint of [their] agreement or conformity 
with it’ (KC 3), by means of the particular synthetic activity of which the 
understanding alone is capable.64 
 
This is, of course, the core of Kant’s infamous ‘Copernican Revolution.’65 Deleuze 
defines the ‘fundamental idea’ of this revolutionary gesture on Kant’s part as follows: 
‘substituting the principle of a necessary submission of object to subject for the idea of 
harmony between subject and object’ (KC 12); the object is “submitted” to the subject 
by the active application of the capacities of cognition to produce representations. 
Rather than assuming a correspondence or harmony between thought and the world, 
Kant’s model of a determining subject with a set of faculties, functioning as capacities 
                                                        
64 The three syntheses, mentioned in the previous note, by which the ‘sensible empirical 
diversity’ is transformed into representations are central to the account of common sense, as 
well as to Deleuze’s analysis of its insufficiencies, particularly insofar as the syntheses 
converge upon recognition as the third synthesis (DR 171, see CPR A 95-130). It is 
recognition which allows us to ‘go beyond synthesis’ toward knowledge, insofar as it is ‘the 
act by which the represented manifold is related to an object’ (KC 13); in order to perform this 
function, however, it requires both the form of the object to which these representations can be 
related in a unified way, and the unity of the subject which apprehends them. In Deleuze’s 
view, Kant does not deduce these forms but rather ‘traces’ them from ‘the empirical acts of a 
psychological consciousness’ (DR 171). 
65 The famous passage in Kant, from the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, runs as follows: ‘Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform 
to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that 
would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once 
try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the 
objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility 
of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are 
given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not 
make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire 
celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if 
he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest’ (CPR B xvi-xvii). The theme of 
necessity as involving the imposed conformity between thought and object, discussed above, is 
clearly implicated here, and offers the clearest sense of why this revolution is significant for 
my argument; in his “Copernican revolution,” Kant is reversing the order of determination by 
which necessity obtains in thought—from the necessity of thought conforming to the objects it 
encounters, to these objects being necessarily apprehended in a certain manner according to 




to produce representations, seems to offer precisely what we were seeking: an 
explanation for how the world can be made truthful, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, how it can become a relative exteriority. While a dogmatic rationalist position, 
as noted above, would demand a theological guarantor of the truthfulness of the 
relation between thought and world, Kant seems positioned to eliminate such a 
theological presupposition by making this correspondence something that is actually 
produced by the subject itself;66 as we will hear, however, this is not something Kant 
is ultimately able to achieve, and the theological element is ultimately retained in an 
implicit form. At this stage, however, we can give a fuller account of this activity of 
the subject by turning to the postulate of common sense, which describes how a 
particular relation between the various faculties is made into an element of the 
dogmatic image of thought. This will ultimately allow us to identify how 
recognisability is imposed upon the world according to the requirements of the 
dogmatic image of thought, and ultimately provide us with a model of thinking against 
which Deleuze aims to target what he terms a ‘true critique’ (DR 176). 
 
Each faculty, then, is distinguished by its unique capacity to produce representations, 
as well as a distinctive way of relating them to both the subject and the object of these 
representations, in the appropriate sense of the genitive in each case. This implies a 
further innovation on Kant’s part that Deleuze will make central to his own use of this 
facultative model: though previous philosophers utilised the idea of distinctive 
capacities of the mind, Deleuze remarks that ‘[o]ne of the most original points of 
Kantianism is the idea of a difference in nature between our faculties’ rather than a 
simple ‘difference in kind’ (KC 19, original emphasis). Each faculty not only relates 
                                                        
66 This notion of production must be carefully qualified here, insofar as Kant maintained an 
empirical realism (KC 13) and, as such, the productive capacity of the faculties only goes so 
far. Phenomena, as that which we encounter in experience, are strictly speaking not ‘products 
of our activity’ but rather ‘affect us in so far as we are passive and receptive subjects.’ That is, 
while we produce coherent representations from these phenomena through an a priori 
synthetic activity, the actual empirical data which are given to be synthesised remain 
independent of the subject. Thus, as Deleuze puts it: ‘In Kant, the problem of the relation of 
subject and object tends to be internalized; it becomes the problem of a relation between 
subjective faculties which differ in nature (receptive sensibility and active understanding).’ 
This ambiguity can be observed, in particular, over the question of whether or in what sense 
sensibility actually produces representations—a question that will lead to the major 
developments of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Deleuze is particularly critical of the 
way in which this model leaves us only with an ‘extrinsic conditioning’ of ‘possible 
experience’ rather than an ‘intrinsic genesis’ of ‘real experience’ (DR 192), a problem of 




the representation to the subject and object differently, but also generates these 
representations in a distinctive manner: as well as referring to ‘the different 
relationships of a representation in general,’ “faculty” also ‘denotes a specific source 
of representations’ (KC 6, my emphasis). An important example of this is the 
difference between the faculties of sensibility and understanding as sources of 
representations: while sensibility produces intuitions, defined as ‘a particular 
representation which relates immediately to an object of experience,’ understanding, 
on the other hand, produces ‘a representation which relates mediately to an object of 
experience, through the intermediary of other representations’ (KC 6).  
 
The various faculties, then, are defined simultaneously by differing relations between 
subject and object, as well as different sources of the representations that underpin 
these subject-object relations. However, there is immediately a problem here, and one 
that will be highly important for Deleuze’s analysis of the image of thought: how do 
we ensure that these various faculties relate to one another in a consistent and coherent 
way? How do we ensure that they converge? To put it another way, if the faculties 
differ in nature, and if each of them produces distinct representations and different 
subject-object relations, how are they able to interact in such a way that we can ensure 
that these representation refers in each case to the same subject and the same object? 
The solution to this problem is provided by the postulate of common sense. 
 
Before analysing Deleuze’s technical framing of common sense, we can briefly 
reconsider the problems faced by the image of thought determined as recognition for 
which we are pursuing a response. Above, we defined recognition, in terms drawn 
from Zourabichvili, as indicating the way in which thought only encounters an 
exteriority that is already in principle amenable to it, such that this exteriority is pre-
determined by the requirements of thinking and is, as such, always-already thought. 
However, we lacked a clear account of how such a model of thinking could be 
sustained, without claiming, dogmatically, that the world simply is that way, thanks to 
the beneficent work of a deity who ensures the correspondence. Refiguring recognition 
according to the facultative model drawn from Kant suggests a way to develop such an 
account, insofar as it relies on a principle of the active submission of the object 
encountered to the capacities of the subject to determine such an encounter. However, 




ratify the model of recognition—indeed, Deleuze’s engagement with Kant will turn 
upon the fact that his philosophy revealed, but did not pursue, an entirely different 
possibility. However, in practice Kant was able to shore up the difficulties of the 
model of recognition by coupling the facultative model of cognition with the postulate 
of common sense. Deleuze’s analysis of the postulate of recognition, and the dogmatic 
image of thought more generally, in Difference and Repetition, draws extensively on 
this Kantian inheritance, and it is to this analysis we now turn. Having completed this 
account, we will then be able to return to the resistance of John Cage to what I take to 
be a sonic equivalent of common sense, and provide a more detailed engagement with 
his attempts to compose otherwise. 
 
In Difference and Repetition, then, we can find recognition defined in a more technical 
manner as ‘the harmonious exercise of the faculties upon a supposed same object,’ 
such that ‘the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or conceived’ 
(DR 169). That is, though the faculties may operate as distinct sources of 
representations, each of which involves a different relation of subject to object, the 
model of recognition demands that these various faculties are exercised harmoniously, 
converging upon a ‘supposed same object’; the difference between these various 
modes of apprehension is limited in advance by the necessity of this conjunction. 
Deleuze develops this point further by claiming that thought itself, in the dogmatic 
image, simply is recognition defined in this manner, insofar as “thought” designates 
not the exercise of a particular faculty, but rather ‘the unity of all the other faculties 
[...] which it aligns with the form of the Same in the model of recognition’ (DR 170). 
If each faculty, then, involves not only a different relation between representation, 
subject, and object, but also a distinct source for such representations, it is the model 
of recognition and the unity of the faculties in thought that ensures each of these 
distinct faculties converge, such that it is, in each case, the same object that is 
represented, and the same subject who thinks this representation: recognition is 
‘expressed in the form of the unspecified object as correlate of the “I think” to which 
all the faculties are related’ (DR 171). If the image of thought presents thought as the 
‘natural exercise of a faculty,’ then what is naturalised thereby is not simply the form 
of one cognitive activity amongst others, but the very unity and convergence of all acts 




coherent, with thought designating nothing but this unity in its necessity and its 
universality. 
 
To what extent, however, does this just shift the terms of the problem, from an accord 
between thought and world to an accord between distinct faculties, without offering a 
real solution? Deleuze frames the problem as follows:  
 
It would seem Kant runs up against a formidable difficulty. We have seen 
that he rejected the idea of a pre-established harmony between subject and 
object; substituting the principle of a necessary submission of the object to 
the subject itself. But does he not once again come up with the idea of 
harmony, simply transposed to the level of faculties of the subject which 
differ in nature? Doubtless this transposition is original. But it is not 
enough to invoke a harmonious accord of the faculties, nor a common 
sense as the result of this accord; the Critique in general demands a 
principle of the accord, as a genesis of common sense. (KC 19) 
 
This principle of the genesis of common sense, of the accord of the faculties and, 
indeed, of the faculties themselves, is to be found, on Deleuze’s reading, in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement, and it is this search for a principle of genesis that 
will lead us to the ‘precise moment within Kantianism’ that Deleuze wishes to pursue, 
a ‘furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, much less by 
post-Kantianism,’ in which ‘for a brief moment we enter into that schizophrenia in 
principle which characterises the highest power of thought, and opens Being directly 
on to difference’ (DR 70-71). However, prior to this moment, which will be taken up 
in Chapter Three, I want to explore more thoroughly the aesthetic implications of the 
harmonious accord of the faculties that underpins the image of thought-as-recognition; 
in returning to Cage, we will now be able to more precisely elaborate the claim, 
outlined above, that his work was staged quite explicitly against such a harmonious 
relation and the communicability that it both demanded and allowed. This will further 
substantiate the broader claim of this chapter: that sonic theory must aspire to a 









6. Critique or Communication 
 
One of Cage’s most famous declarations, and the one that best stands as a summary of 
his aesthetic orientation, occurs on three separate occasions in the writings and 
lectures collected in Silence: ‘I have nothing to say and I am saying it’ (S 51, 109, 
183). Though the difficulties, both philosophical and aesthetic, in both interpreting and 
carrying out such an act of saying nothing are multifarious, and indeed Cage himself 
produced a prodigious variety of compositional strategies to this end over the course 
of his long career, nevertheless we can immediately note the force of this refusal—the 
refusal to communicate, the refusal to simply say something. If we note here that in the 
facultative model outlined above the harmonious accord of the faculties is a 
precondition for any communication, we can begin to draw together the philosophical 
and the compositional problematic: 
 
common sense appears not as a psychological given but as the subjective 
condition of all ‘communicability’. Knowledge implies a common sense 
without which it would not be communicable and could not claim 
universality. (KC 18-19) 
 
To what extent is the model of communication conditioned by common sense 
equivalent to that which Cage refuses by saying nothing? To establish that this more 
than a nominal proximity, I want to consider briefly a vital part of the reasoning that 
underpinned Cage’s turn away from self-expression as a rationale for, and goal of, 
composition during the course of the nineteen-forties and his still-controversial 
attempt to ‘let sounds be themselves rather than vehicles for man-made theories or 
expressions of human sentiments’ (S 10): the necessarily disjunctive relation Cage 
observed between a sound, the affective responses it produces, and the meanings it 
bears. 
 
In 1944, Cage’s piece The Perilous Night for prepared piano was premiered in New 
York, to press reactions that Kay Larson describes as ‘hostile and clueless’ (117). 
Though this was not unusual during the period (or even today), and, on Larson’s 




concerts” for which he was becoming known at the time,67 this event was, in Cage’s 
recollection, to mark a significant shift in his compositional practice, and one which 
propelled him towards both the specific strategies and overall aesthetic orientation for 
which he ultimately became widely-known.  
 
What is most significant for my argument here is that Cage’s music during this period 
was avowedly expressive in a manner that was, as noted above, soon to become 
anathema to his work. Though the significant majority of the works during this period 
were for the prepared piano and/or percussion ensembles, and thereby continued to 
embrace the incorporation of non-musical sound that had animated Cage’s work since 
the late nineteen-thirties, they were nevertheless orientated toward conveying 
emotional states to the listener—states, moreover, that were frequently bleak. Both 
Larson and Kenneth Silverman tie the ‘sadness and anxiety’ of the prepared piano 
pieces of this period to the disintegration of his marriage at this time, with Larson 
emphasising strongly the traumatic nature of this experience as a catalyst for his turn 
to South and then East Asian philosophical resources (Silverman, 62; Larson, 109-
121); yet what is vital for my purposes is less the biographical sources of the music 
                                                        
67 As Larson describes, ‘[d]espite his brilliant debut concert at the Museum of Modern Art in 
February 1943, Cage’s percussion revolution wasn’t being received in New York with the 
enthusiasm he must have anticipated. Except for astute reviews by Virgil Thompson, the 
critics mostly ignored or attacked him’ (109-110). Silverman, on the other hand, emphasises 
both the positive responses to the percussion concert at MoMA (55), and the encouraging 
reviews from Thompson and Lou Harrison for a piano concert of his music at the New School 
for Social Research in 1945 (57-59). He also notes that the joint concerts that Cage and Merce 
Cunningham began to stage at this time, with the first taking place on April 5th 1944 and 
containing the premiere of The Perilous Night referred to previously, were well-received: 
‘Cage and Cunningham’s first joint concert received enthralled reviews’ (63), and ‘[t]he 
partners quickly followed up with another success, then another’ (64). This suggests that either 
Cage misapprehended at the time, or misremembered later, the nature of the response to the 
piece in particular, and the concerts of this period more broadly. It is also possible, however, 
that the reviews Silverman cites were the exceptions, or that the response in the hall was far 
more negative than the published critical responses. Regardless, Cage’s own account of how 
he perceived, and responded to, the reactions to this piece retains its significance in relation to 
the development of his compositional practice, regardless of its strict accuracy—on this point, 
we can note that in an interview with Richard Kostelanetz, published in 1971 but conducted in 
1966, Cage remarked that he had ‘nothing but opposition until 1949 and 1950’ (Kostelanetz 
1971, 15). This general negativity is also averred by Calvin Tompkins, who declared in 1968’s 
The Bride & the Bachelors: Five Masters of the Avant-Garde that ‘[t]he attitude of most New 
York subscription audiences, and most New York musicians for that matter, toward works by 
Cage is almost invariably hostile’ (70). Interestingly for my current argument, Tompkins also 
refers to Cage’s music as being ‘less recognizable […] by nineteenth-century standards […] 
than any other music being written in the 1960s, and ears tuned to nineteenth-century 




than the way in which, for Cage, his attempt to express himself through these pieces 
was deemed to be a failure—not only in practice, but ultimately in principle. It was 
this failure that would lead him to re-evaluate the possibility of what he had described, 
in “The Future of Music: Credo,” as the ‘all-sound music of the future’ (S 5), and to 
embrace the idea that this music would be dependent on an affirmation of chance—
that is, as noted above, that it must be experimental. In order to trace this transition 
and uncover its logic, I want to consider Cage’s response to the “failure” of these 
expressive works, and how it can be figured as a failure of communication. 
 
Cage describes his response to the performance of The Perilous Night as follows:  
 
I had poured a great deal of emotion into the piece, and obviously I 
wasn’t communicating this at all. Or else, I thought, if I were 
communicating, then all artists must be speaking a different language, 
and thus speaking only for themselves. The whole musical situation 
struck me more and more as a Tower of Babel. (Cage quoted in Larson 
2013, 119; CWC 43) 
  
In Larson’s analysis, ‘Cage’s deliberate turning away from self-expression begins 
here,’ with the realisation that his intention to communicate through his music was a 
failure.68 But what, precisely, did this failure amount to? And how was Cage able to 
                                                        
68 It is important to note here that expression and self-expression need to be distinguished; 
while I would affirm Larson’s claim that the dissatisfaction with the self-expressive pieces of 
this period marks an important transformation in Cage’s work, I would emphasise that the 
‘turning away from self-expression’ only ‘begins’ here, insofar as Cage was only gradually to 
explore and uncover the true scope and implications of making music non-intentionally; 
during the period from 1945 to 1950 he continued to have a certain expressive component to 
his pieces, even if they were avowedly not self-expressive. In particular, we can consider the 
way in which certain pieces from this period attempted to dramatise elements of the South 
Asian philosophy he was beginning to engage with at the time, under the influence of the 
Indian musician Gita Sarabhai, who he met in 1946: his major prepared piano work Sonatas 
and Interludes (1947-48) was, in Cage’s words, an ‘attempt’ at ‘the expression in music of the 
“permanent emotions” of Indian tradition’ (Cage in Kostelanetz 1971, 129), while The 
Seasons (1947) and String Quartet in Four Parts (1949-50) both ‘attempt to express the 
traditional Indian view of the seasons as quiescence (winter), creation (spring), preservation 
(summer), and destruction (fall)’ (Cage, quoted in Pritchett 1993, 40). As Cage himself 
explains: ‘As soon as I began to study oriental philosophy, I introduced it into my music. 
People then were always pretending that a composer had to have something to say. So, what I 
was saying was nothing more than what I had understood about oriental philosophy’ (FTB 
41). These pieces are therefore no longer attempting to express personal feelings, and 
therefore are no longer strictly forms of self-expression; rather, they hope to convey certain 
universal characteristics which are cosmic in scope, and which Cage had encountered in his 




draw from this failure the conclusion that he would ‘stop writing music until [he] 
found a better reason than “self-expression” for doing it’ (Larson 2013, 120; Cage 
1991)? Though we might agree with Larson’s assessment of the significance of this 
moment for Cage’s development, it nevertheless does not seem clear that the particular 
failure of this piece would entail the radical conclusion that self-expression is an 
insufficient reason for writing music. In order to draw such a conclusion, Cage’s 
failure to express himself in practice in this particular case must be figured as 
indicating an in principle difficulty for any attempt to communicate through music. 
We must draw out Cage’s logic carefully here, and, in doing so, I will show that it 
impinges directly upon the preceding discussion regarding communication as 
recognition—that is, as necessarily determined by a harmonious exercise of the 
faculties. It is from the perspective of this proximity that we are able to understand 
Cage’s wholesale rejection of it as the rationale for writing music. 
 
Firstly, let us examine the specific nature of the failure that Cage discerned in his 
expressive pieces of this period; doing so can help us to clarify his reasoning on this 
point, insofar as it raises the very question of what actually constitutes a failure of 
communication, and what the necessary conditions of its success would be. In “An 
Autobiographical Statement,” published in 1991, Cage offers a slightly modified 
account of the response his melancholy, expressive pieces received: ‘I noticed that 
when I conscientiously wrote something sad, people and critics were often apt to 
laugh’ (Cage 1991). The additional detail given here is important, even if seemingly 
minor: the failure to communicate manifested itself in a disjunction between Cage’s 
intention to express a particular feeling and the response of the audience, which 
encountered the piece as bearing an entirely different affective valence, one that is 
typically taken as diametrically opposed to and exclusive of the intended one. Either 
the piece is sad, or it provokes laughter; Cage intends the former, and the audience 
                                                                                                                                                                
broadly expressive function for his music, insofar as it remained dependent upon the intention 
of the composer; it is worth noting here that these pieces emerge from the relatively brief 
period in which Indian and South Asian philosophy was prominent in his composition and his 
aesthetic thinking; from the late 1940s, the Zen Buddhism of D. T. Suzuki would supersede 
these references to become a decisive and transformative influence. For a detailed discussion 
of these developments in Cage’s work, see Patterson, 2002; Larson 2013, 122-155; and 
Crooks, 2011; I will discuss this point briefly in Chapter Three. However, Cage would 
ultimately retain a central principle that he discovered in the writing of Ananda 
Coomaraswamy during this period, if his turn to chance would ultimately alter its sense: ‘Art 




hears the latter. The failure that animated Cage to reject self-expression, then, denotes 
the lack of correspondence that he observed between the moments of transmission and 
response, insofar as it is precisely this correspondence that is taken to define 
communication as such—the shared experience of an affective state through the 
medium (in the sense of milieu or middle) of the piece itself. The successful 
communication would be one in which these two moments are equivalent—what was 
there at the beginning is retained at the end; or, we could say, when there is a 
correspondence between call and response. The immediate question that such a failure 
poses is how to ameliorate it: how would it have been possible for The Perilous Night 
to successfully produce an affect of sadness in those who heard it? Or more generally, 
how is it ever possible for the moment of transmission and of reception to coincide? 
Which is to ask, ultimately: what are the conditions of a successful communication? 
As I hope to show, that Cage will ultimately reject communication in principle as the 
purpose of music is not simply due to this particular failure, but rather due to a 
fundamental insight into the nature of these conditions induced by this failure—ones 
which, in Cage’s account, will be strikingly similar to these encountered in my 
discussion of Kant above. 
 
In establishing this similarity, we can initially observe the degree to which the 
question that emerges here regarding the conditions of communicability is proximate 
to the one we observed facing Kant, above. In the latter case, the problem was as 
follows: if the subject imposes itself upon the object by means of the various faculties, 
and the representations that these faculties produce, we then encounter the problem of 
how these faculties are to be exercised harmoniously, how their various 
representations are to be made to converge upon one and the same object, insofar as 
these representations are precisely not part of the objects themselves but products of 
our encounter with them.  How are such a convergence and such a harmony to be 
maintained, when it does not seem to be a necessary aspect of our cognition—even 
(and, indeed, especially) if we constantly observe it in fact, as a vital element of 
everyday experience? As Deleuze puts it, this convergence is the ‘subjective condition 
of all ‘communicability’’ (KC 18), insofar as it grounds the possibility of 
recognition—the ability to say, as Descartes does, ‘It is of course the same wax which 
I see, which I touch, which I picture in my imagination, in short the same wax which I 




it is this convergence that is required to guarantee the repeatability of this recognition 
between distinct subjects, which is exactly the condition we were searching for in the 
discussion of Cage. Kant’s answer to this problem, as noted above, is to invoke 
common sense as a subjective presupposition; it is not an objective and explicit 
conceptual proposition, but rather an appeal to what everybody knows—thought, as the 
natural exercise of a faculty, demands this convergence. 
 
I will consider Deleuze’s critical engagement with Kant’s appeal to a dogmatic image 
of thought in more detail below, but prior to this we can observe how this postulate of 
common sense would function as a condition for communication in the case of music 
in particular: the piece of music, to communicate successfully, must be heard, felt, and 
understood in the same way by everyone who encounters it, with the composer as 
having determined in advance the necessity of this convergence by virtue of his 
intention to communicate. For communication to be successful, then, the object, in this 
case a sonic one, must be apprehended in the same manner on different occasions, 
such that it is recognisably the same sonic object in each case by virtue of it bearing 
the same qualities and engendering the same responses (in this case, conveying 
sadness). Contrary to this, Cage’s pieces produced a disjunction—he heard, felt, and 
understood them to be sad, an expression of his troubled emotional state at the time, 
whereas the critics were moved to laugh. By the criteria of communication 
(convergence and harmony, recognition and repeatability), this constitutes a failure; 
but it is only a failure according to those criteria. That is, it is only if one’s intention is 
to produce an object of recognition that one may declare the disjunction between 
composer and audience to be a failure—for if one, on the contrary, embraces the 
freedom of the listener in relation to what they hear, then any response is equally valid 
from the perspective of its accuracy (although only from this perspective, as discussed 
below). The prospect of misunderstanding would become, in a certain sense, moot—or 
perhaps, indeed, something to aspire to. 
 
How, then, was Cage pushed toward this latter conclusion? As noted previously, 
Cage’s work from its very earliest stages sought to embrace the entirety of sound as 
musical material, and this was still present in the expressive pieces of the mid-
nineteen-forties insofar as the prepared piano, for which they were composed, was 




unpitched and timbrally-complex sounds.69 Yet these sounds remained, at this early 
stage, simply the material which could be used compositionally: in “The Future of 
Music: Credo,” Cage saw the potential of ‘electrical instruments’ as being precisely 
that they would ‘make available for musical purposes any and all sounds that can be 
heard’ (S 4). As Douglas Kahn puts it, in a discussion of the same article: ‘More than a 
decade before Cage’s dictum of letting sounds be themselves came into being, he was 
interested in capturing and controlling sounds’ (Kahn 1999, 98). In the failure of his 
pieces to produce the intended response, however, Cage came up against an internal 
contradiction between the availability of all sounds and the criteria under which they 
could be used in the strictly purposive sense. Within a communicational framework—
where the intention of the composer must successfully predetermine the experience of 
any particular listener—the usefulness of ‘all-sound’ is not uniform. There are, on the 
contrary, pre-determined criteria of exclusion and inclusion which will ultimately 
appeal to the ‘musical habits’ Cage was hoping to abjure; or, in Deleuze’s 
terminology, the established values which actually condition the supposed universality 
and naturalness of thinking-as-recognition in the dogmatic image of thought. Only 
certain sounds are suitable to engender an act of recognition on the part of the listener, 
and, as such, success will require a limitation of the field of possible sounds. 
 
It is in pursuing this logic that we find the link between the pursuit of all-sound that 
was present from the earliest stages of Cage’s work and the principle that would 
become the core determinant of Cage’s work from 1950 onwards: the renunciation of 
intention in an attempt to ‘let sounds be themselves’ (S 10), and the embrace of 
experimentation. We can articulate this in terms of the foregoing analysis as follows: 
in order to allow for a strict equality amongst all possible sounds, we must avoid not 
only individual preferences70 but also the intentions which shape those preferences 
                                                        
69 This greater timbral and harmonic variety of noises as against musical sounds was similarly 
invoked by Luigi Russolo as part of the rationale behind his art of noises. As Douglas Kahn 
puts it: ‘[Russolo] valorized “the great variety in the timbres of noises in comparison to the 
more limited ones of sounds”’ (Kahn 1999, 80). Russolo’s The Art of Noise was listed by Cage 
in 1960-61 as one of ten books that had ‘the greatest influence on his thought’ (Kostelanetz 
1971, 138); Cage’s annotations to the list suggest that he first encountered the book in 1935, 
and it is highly likely, on this basis, that it formed a major influence on his thinking during this 
period. 
70 As Cage puts it in “Experimental Music: Doctrine” (first published in 1955, with the 
dialogue from which I quote here added on publication in Silence in 1961): ‘Pitches are not a 




according to the requirements of communication—namely, the recognisability of the 
object through the harmonious accord of the faculties. We can infer from the foregoing 
that, contrary to this model, any compositional practice which wishes to embrace all 
sound must of necessity engender disjunctive relations between the faculties, and 
therefore demands the necessary failure of communication—otherwise it will be 
limited to only certain sounds according to the conditions of recognisability. I will 
consider this notion of a disjunctive relation between the faculties, or a ‘discordant 
harmony’ as Deleuze puts it (DR 183), in more detail in Chapter Three, but prior to 
this I want to conclude my initial engagement with Cage’s turn away from self-
expression by noting that we can observe this notion of a disjunctive relation already 
at present in Cage’s own work, insofar as he affirms the irreducibility of sounds to any 
particular experience of them—he makes sound something unrecognisable in 
principle. The correlate of renouncing intention is letting sounds be themselves, but 
this involves making the object something other than our representations of it. 
 
If we return once again to the postulate of common sense, we can recall that it 
involved not only the presupposition of a convergence between the faculties, but also, 
necessarily, the unity of the subject and object which the faculties relate to one 
another. That is, common sense requires that for all the variety of representations of a 
given object, which come in as many different types as there are different faculties of 
cognition (KC 3), there is nevertheless a single object to which they are related and a 
single subject which encounters it. It follows from the Copernican revolution that this 
unity cannot be grounded in the object as it is in itself, insofar as this would contradict 
the ‘necessary submission of the object to the subject’ by invoking properties of the 
object independently of how we encounter it (KC 19); the assertion of the unity of the 
object in itself could only be, from the perspective of the critical method, a dogmatic 
one, insofar as it would appeal to a ground for experience that is itself not given in 
experience. Kant outlines the problem as follows: 
 
 What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to 
and therefore also distinct from cognition? It is easy to see that this 
object must be thought of only as something in general = X, since outside 
                                                                                                                                                                
(S 16). The answer, of course, was to ‘give up the desire to control sound’ (S 10), and thereby 




of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this 
cognition as corresponding to it (CPR A 105). 
 
Deleuze elucidates Kant’s position here as follows: for Kant ‘the manifold [of what is 
given in intuition] would never be referred to an object if we did not have at our 
disposal objectivity as a form in general’ (KC 14), precisely because the object in itself 
cannot be given in experience and therefore cannot act as ground for the unity of this 
manifold. This “object = X” is therefore the ‘correlate of the ‘I think’ or of the unity of 
consciousness; it is the expression of the cogito, its formal objectivation.’71 It is this 
object-form to which all the distinct representations (I hear, I feel, I understand) are 
related, and thereby given as various representations of a single object to a unified 
subject, even if, as a result of Kant’s necessary limitation of his account to objects of 
possible experience, ‘the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other 
than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the 
representations,’ rather than the object in itself (CPR A 105).72 As such, it is also 
without particular content—as the “x” indicates, it is not this or that object, being 
rather the condition of possibility for any object whatsoever. It is therefore, precisely, 
a subjective presupposition that underpins any particular act of cognition while being 
irreducible to (and not given in) any of these particular acts.73  
 
The object, then, is precisely the form of unity that determines the convergence of 
representations; it is, precisely, the object of recognition (DR 176). But is there not 
another possibility—that instead of an object of recognition, there could be an object 
                                                        
71 Though I focus here on the objective pole of this correlation, Deleuze’s own critical 
engagement with Kant’s account of the synthesis of experience will focus particularly on the 
presupposition of a conscious, active, and self-identical subject as the operator of these 
syntheses—hence the significance of his articulation of a set of passive syntheses which 
ground the active syntheses of conscious representation while not themselves being conscious 
(see DR 92 for a significant formulation of this position). Henry Somers-Hall emphasises this 
critique of the subject’s role in synthesis as a central element of Deleuze’s formulation of a 
transcendental empiricism (Somers-Hall 2012, 11-40). 
72 The material cited here from the First Edition is, in Deleuze’s words, ‘suppressed’ in the 
Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, in order to ‘hide’ the ‘tracing method’ by 
which ‘Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a 
psychological consciousness’ (DR 171). However, ‘[a]lthough it is better hidden’ in the 
second edition, this method ‘nevertheless subsists.’ 
73 As Somers-Hall puts it: ‘Such a concept [of an object in general] has been shown to be 
necessary for experience, as the manifold of intuition cannot itself be presented in such a way 
as to allow us to know it without it. As with the categories, this object is a precondition for 
experience and as such cannot show up within experience without generating an infinite 




that registers as a ‘fundamental encounter’? In such an encounter, rather than 
converging upon a single, identical object, each faculty ‘grasps that in the world which 
concerns it exclusively,’ that which ‘cannot be grasped from the point of view of 
common sense’ (DR 180); this is not to say that it would a different object that is 
grasped in each case, but rather the object = x would become difference in itself. 
Though this possibility pushes us towards the very core of Deleuze’s philosophy of 
difference, and therefore must be considered closely and in detail, which will be the 
task of the subsequent chapter, we can note, immediately, a correspondence between 
the negative condition of such a possibility (the refusal of the postulate of identity in 
the object) and Cage’s resistance to communication. That is, Cage’s desire for the 
liberation of sounds demanded a resistance to the impetus of communication, insofar 
as it was precisely the requirements of communication necessitated that sounds 
become an object of recognition, and, as such, become a static and generic unity. By 
considering briefly this aspect of Cage’s thinking, we can move towards Deleuze’s 
account of what a true critique, as the ‘destruction of an image of thought which 
presupposes itself’ (DR 176), would truly involve. 
 
In this regard, then, we can consider a number of significant statements by Cage that 
draw together the resistance to communication with the necessity for the sonic object 
to operate according to a disjunctive encounter—that is, an encounter in which the 
object itself can bear a variable series of responses without offering any strict criteria 
of correctness or demanding any continuity across this series.74 Firstly, in 
“Experimental Music: Doctrine,” Cage argues that there is a disjunction between 
sounds themselves and the ‘man-made theories or expressions of human sentiments’ 
for which they are simply a ‘vehicle’ (S 10); as such, to ‘let sounds be themselves’ 
involves no longer utilising them in this fashion, no longer taking them to be in 
themselves signifying or communicational when, in fact, these properties have been 
imposed upon them in a form of limitation that simultaneously makes sound into a 
                                                        
74 This is not to say that the object of encounter (as opposed to recognition) would be entirely 
random in terms of its apprehension, which would serve to make it entirely undifferentiated; 
Deleuze will continually oppose this forced choice between conceptual determination 
according to a priority of identity, on the one hand, or a complete lack of determination, on the 
other. Deleuze’s revised concepts of series and structure, particularly prominent in Difference 
and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, are precisely attempts to provide a model of 
determination that does not invoke a priority of identity, and which thereby hopes to avoid 




generic and interchangeable material substrate in the service of these properties. Cage 
will distinguish, on this point, between sounds and words, in which the latter are 
sounds shaped in a specific way in order to perform this communicative function: ‘if 
something were being said, the sounds would be given the shapes of words’ (S 10). 
This is not to say that, for Cage, words must be used in this fashion, and indeed many 
of his later writings, and the readings he would give of them, emphasised the non-
signifying sonority that subsists within words themselves; rather, in the writings of this 
period words and speaking primarily designate, metonymically, all intentionally 
communicative operations that, on this basis, are required to compromise with the 
conditions of communicability by limiting the range of sounds used.  
 
Insofar as, for Cage, words are precisely sounds submitted to these limiting conditions, 
then words are therefore only an extremely narrow subset of the field of total sounds; 
as a result, sounds that are not given the form of words should not thereby be expected 
nor demanded to perform the function of this limited subset. Cage reiterates the point 
in a talk first given in 1956, titled “In This Day…”:  
 
We are not, in these dances and music, saying something. We are simple-
minded enough to think that if we were saying something we would use 
words. We are rather doing something. (S 94) 
 
We can see Cage gesturing obliquely toward his own practice as precisely the act of 
saying nothing, which will be unfolded in more detail subsequently, but at this point 
the emphasis of my argument is on Cage’s resistance to communication as necessarily 
involving a subordination of sound to the intentions of the composer, precisely insofar 
as the sounds themselves, the sonic objects, are not coextensive with the meanings 
they bear in a given instance; they are always able to be heard otherwise, as Cage 
discovered in practice when trying to write sad music. Convergence, then, is not a 
given; it must be imposed, extrinsically, by making sounds into a vehicle for a 
particular and limited set of meanings on condition of no longer hearing them freely, 
no longer letting them act. 
 
However, the appeal to let sounds be themselves by no longer subordinating them to a 
communicative intention does not demand that we simply hear sounds as they are; this 




itself” tendency that Cage is taken to (partially) exemplify, overemphasises certain of 
Cage’s proclamations at the expense of others. It is important to be clear on this point, 
for if Kim-Cohen’s reading were correct then my argument here would not stand up: 
Cage’s compositional practice would demand a listener who only heard, operating not 
on a disjunction of the faculties but the limitation to a single one, which, according to 
the ontological implication of the term sound-in-itself, would operate identically in 
each listener insofar as the sonic object itself would be said to determine its own 
apprehension. With regard to this claim, we can consider a statement by Cage which 
must be read alongside the two remarks distinguishing sounds and words cited 
previously, and which will allow me to substantiate my claim that Cage’s resistance to 
communication is, simultaneously, an attempt to allow for a disjunctive use of the 
faculties. 
 
Returning to “Experimental Music: Doctrine,” then, we can note that certain remarks 
would certainly suggest an interpretation of the sort offered by Kim-Cohen; in 
particular, Cage describes a ‘new listening’ that would ‘[n]ot [be] an attempt to 
understand something that is being said’ but rather ‘[j]ust an attention to the activity of 
sounds.’ However, immediately prior to this quotation, we find the following remarks, 
which I will quote at length: 
 
Hearing sounds which are just sounds immediately sets the theorizing 
mind to theorizing, and the emotions of human beings are continually 
aroused in encounters with nature. Does not a mountain unintentionally 
evoke in us a sense of wonder? otters along a stream a sense of mirth? 
night in the woods a sense of fear? Do not rain falling and mist rising up 
suggest the love binding heaven and earth? Is not decaying flesh 
loathsome? Does not the death of someone we love bring sorrow? And is 
there a greater hero than the least plant that grows? What is more angry 
than the flash of lightning and the sound of thunder? These responses to 
nature are mine are will not necessarily correspond with another’s. And 
sounds, when allowed to be themselves, do not require that those who 
hear them do so unfeelingly. (S 10) 
  
It is only on the basis of an intention to communicate that any particular response of 
this sort may be evaluated according to its correctness in relation to the supposed 




x.75 For Cage, eliminating this intention, and the criterion of convergence that it 
sustains, does not thereby demand the simultaneous suppression of affective or 
conceptual elements that the listener may encounter alongside the sonic object, but 
rather the suspension of any necessary relation of these elements to the object itself. 
Again, we must not conclude, from this, that all responses are equivalent, but simply 
that no single response can appeal to the unity and recognisability of the sonic object 
to ground its exclusive claim, the necessity of its relation, precisely because there is no 
necessary convergence between the “I hear”, the “I feel”, and the “I understand” of a 
particular sonic experience—the sonic object = x is, in this case, avowedly not an 
object of recognition, but an object of encounter, in a sense that I will go on to 
elaborate. 
 
In a later account of his resistance to communication, Cage will not only present his 
thinking in terms that are even closer to the Kantian problematic outlined above, but 
also emphasise something of the ethical aspect of this resistance, which will gradually 
come into focus more fully as my argument progresses—in this regard, we can note 
that Cage’s explanation in this later account resonates with the broadly anarchist slant 
of his socio-political thought from the nineteen-sixties onwards. In an interview with 
Daniel Charles, collected in For the Birds, Cage remarks upon the tendency to take his 
resistance to communication as the pursuit of an emotionless listening:  ‘sometimes, 
when I speak, I give the impression that I am against feelings. But what I am against is 
the imposition of feelings’ (FTB 148). The distinction here is precisely the one 
emphasised above: communication is the ‘imposition’ of a certain response demanded 
by the composer in accordance with the pre-determined identity of that which calls, 
without which the composer’s work would be considered to fail—or, perhaps, without 
which the listener would have failed to hear “correctly”. In a highly Deleuzian fashion, 
Cage goes on to distinguish communication from dialogue:76 in the latter case, 
                                                        
75 In strictly Kantian terms this formulation is somewhat imprecise, insofar as for Kant the 
object = x must be without any empirical content; as such, we should more precisely say that 
the sonic object can be the focal point for a convergence of the faculties insofar as it takes up 
the formal position of the object = x, a position which itself is irreducible to any particular 
occupant. 
76 Deleuze and Claire Parnet’s book of dialogues, cited here in its second edition as Dialogues 
II, was, as the translator’s introduction describes, ‘commissioned as a conventional book of 
interviews,’ but Deleuze quickly felt this ‘had the effect of forcing him into a position in 




‘nothing imposes itself,’ whereas the former, on the other hand, is ‘always imposing 
something,’ whether this be ‘a truth’ or ‘a feeling.’ This something to be 
communicated, or rather, to be imposed, is an object: ‘Communication presupposes 
that one has something, an object, to be communicated’ (FTB 148).   
 
As the discussion progresses, Charles suggests the term ‘music-objects’ for works in 
which ‘a particular feeling is imposed on the listener’ (FTB 149), and Cage goes onto 
relate the ‘music-object’ formulation to the ‘will of the composer,’ as something 
imposed upon sounds in order to make them into objects (150). It is this imposition of 
the object-form upon sounds (which, at this stage in Cage’s thinking, are identified as 
processes rather than objects) that conditions the judgment of a successful or failed 
listening, or what Cage terms here a ‘correct understanding.’ It is only on condition 
that sounds are made, through the imposition of the composer’s will, into music-
objects that a judgment regarding the correctness of the listener’s understanding can be 
made; the ideal of correctness is strictly illegitimate when applied to sounds beyond 
this limiting imposition of the object-form: ‘With a music-process, there is no ‘correct 
understanding’ anywhere. And consequently, no all-pervasive ‘misunderstanding’ 
either.’ There is a strict equality of understanding in regards to a listening experience 
so long as that experience is not limited to the audition of a pre-given object-form 
imposed upon it by the composer—that is, the question of the validity of the relation 
between a sound and its accompanying elements (a feeling, an image, a concept) is 
rendered irrelevant. I would once again stress, however, that it does not follow from 
this that any response is equivalent or neutral, but rather that they are no longer 
indexed to the transcendent criteria of success qua recognition. That there are other 
forms of evaluation—just as there are non-representational modes of determination—
is a central premise of Deleuze’s philosophy; and, I will argue, such a premise is vital 
in avoiding reductive misreadings of Cage’s work as advocating an uniform and 
                                                                                                                                                                
forced, external ordering being placed on [his] thought.’ Instead, the book was produced in ‘a 
format in which each chapter is a ‘dialogue’ consisting of two halves which link and operate 
together in a multiplicity of ways.’ As a result, instead of forming a direct, linear, and imposed 
transmission between two poles—that is, as a communication—the texts were produced 
between Deleuze and Parnet. As Deleuze himself put it: ‘What mattered was not the points – 
Félix [Guattari], Claire Parnet, me and many others, who functioned simply as temporary, 
transitory and evanescent points of subjecitvation – but the collection of bifurcating, divergent 
and muddled lines which constituted this book as a multiplicity and which passed between the 




indifferent affirmation of any and all forms of sonic practice and modes of listening. 
Though the question of immanent criteria of evaluation will be raised more fully as 
my argument progresses, on this point I will quote a vital statement of Cage’s, whose 
sense must be considered carefully: ‘Permission granted, but not to do whatever you 
want’ (YM 28).77 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, largely critical material, we can identify a vital positive 
task that we must now pursue in order to articulate more fully and more convincingly 
the nature of the encounter with sound beyond the narrowly-determined constraints of 
the music-object—particularly insofar as I want to suggest such an encounter does not 
entail the straightforward indifference of infinite equal possibilities. These are 
difficulties, moreover, which any attempt to theoretically engage Cage’s practice in a 
systematic and coherent way cannot ignore. What confronting these difficulties 
ultimately amounts to is asking after a coherent and rigorous account of how sound 
can be encountered beyond or in excess of recognition—what would the precise nature 
of such an experience be, and how can it be determined without appealing to either a 
pre-given identity (and therefore ultimately referring back to recognition and the 
image of thought), or to an ‘undifferenciated78 abyss’ lacking in any means to 
distinguish between different forms of sonic practice and listening experience (DR 36, 
LS 118)? This amounts to asking: what would sound freed from utility or purpose 
actually sound like? Or, to use Cage’s parlance, how can we engage with sound in a 
form of purposeless play? These questions require us to not simply oppose the image 
of thought as representation, recognition, and communication, but to actively diagram 
an alternative—a thought without image.  
 
                                                        
77 Marjorie Perloff notes that Cage ‘frequently refers back to this aphorism in his later work’ 
(Perloff 2012, 33n9), and her essay “Difference and Discipline: The Cage/Cunningham 
Aesthetic Revisited” makes precisely the point I am emphasising here: ‘Cage may have 
insisted […] that “Each listener’s experience is his own” [YM 32], but that is not to say that 
the composer thinks all responses are equally valid’ (29).  
78 I use Paul Patton’s neologism here, coined for his translation of Difference and Repetition, 
in order to capture a distinction between differenciation and differentiation made in Deleuze’s 
French; the former refers to a difference between constituted identities that pre-exist the 
relation between them, whereas the latter designates the immanent relation of difference to 
difference that underpins Deleuze’s alternative model of determination; see DR viii for 
Patton’s explanation. However, in the passage cited here from The Logic of Sense 





Chapter Three: Revaluating the Essence of Sound 
 
In the preceding chapter, I repeated the question “what calls for sonic thinking, 
today?” in order to interrogate the identity of the “what” that calls—that is, the essence 
of sound.79 In doing so, I attempted to uncover, via the work of Deleuze, the implicit 
presuppositions that the very question of identity rests upon: namely, the presumed re-
cognisability of that which calls for thinking, a recongsibility that entails, in the last 
instance, its a priori encompassment by thought in principle, whatever difficulties may 
be encountered in fact. In sound studies as in Heidegger, we thereby encountered a 
vicious circularity80 that would ultimately recuperate the history of delay and deferral 
affirmed, conditionally, by both: the fact that we are still not thinking was discovered 
to be ultimately only an empirical condition whose epiphenomenality was 
transcendentally guaranteed. Ultimately, according to such an image of thought, we 
need only to find the conditions under which we can affirm our pre-established natural 
capacity for thought in order to make this possibility a reality (DR 165-66).81 
 
Contrary to this, my argument is that, as Deleuze puts it, such a position makes us 
‘powerless to truly begin’ (DR 165), insofar as, between a beginning and an end that 
ultimately coincide, in Nietzsche’s phrase, ‘nothing will have happened’—thinking 
will not have “taken place” (Nietzsche 2000b, 53). What is at stake, then, is the 
temporality of thinking itself—not only the “today” that has insisted, throughout, in 
                                                        
79 In his discussion of essence in “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger 
describes the ‘ancient doctrine’ of essence as being ‘what the thing is’ (BW 310); this 
whatness of essence is traditionally counterposed to the thatness of existence, a tradition that 
Heidegger famously subverts through his definition of Dasein as the being whose ‘essence lies 
in its existence’ (BT 67). 
80 In Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges the circularity of his argument, but claims that 
this circularity does not constitute a ‘vicious circle’ but rather a ‘positive possibility of the 
most primordial kind of knowing’ (BT 195); the famously circular opening to “The Origin of 
the Work of Art” makes a similar claim. The difference from Deleuze here must be carefully 
judged, to the degree that Deleuze continually evokes the necessity to begin ‘from the middle’; 
an important text in judging this difference more precisely would be Pierre Klossowski’s 
Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, which, as the title would suggest, offers a reading of the 
eternal return in precisely these terms—a reading, moreover, that bears significant relations to 
Deleuze’s own. Deleuze discusses Klossowki’s work in the appendices to The Logic of Sense, 
but the most direct discussion of his reading of Nietzsche occurs in “On the Will to Power and 
the Eternal Return” (DI 117-127). 
81 As Deleuze puts it, with reference to Descartes, the invocation of a natural capacity for 
thought inherently oriented toward the true suggests that, though ‘it is in fact difficult to 




the thinking of the call, but the relation between this “today” and the still not that is, 
paradoxically, our contemporary provocation to begin thinking. Yet this argument is 
not offered as a “purely” philosophical demonstration that would subsequently find its 
application to the field of sound, as a specific case of a general problem. Rather, my 
hope was to show how this problem itself occurs audibly within the sonic practice of 
the twentieth-century—and, in particular, in John Cage’s attempt to confront, 
precisely, the sonic as such, beyond the relative interiority that compromises the 
distinction between musical and non-musical sound. It would be to this degree that 
sound would call for thinking today—it would force us to re-think what is called 
thinking. 
 
If the preceding chapter diagnosed the negative conditions of our powerlessness to 
begin, through a critical account of the image of thought as recognition and an 
analogous exploration of the limits of composition as communication and self-
expression, then the task remaining for this chapter is to encounter the positive 
conditions under which such an image can be contested. Finally, we must ask: how are 
we to stop recognizing and begin creating? It is this distinction that, as I hope to 
demonstrate, underpins Deleuze’s counterposition between the image of thought and a 
thought without image and their respective relationships to temporality, as well as, in 
the last instance, defining the task of philosophy. At the same moment, this distinction 
underpins, implicitly, Cage’s own affirmation of experimentalism as a way to ‘let 
sounds be themselves’ (S 10); such a letting be would, contrary to its immediate or 
evident sense, require an active creation directed against the all-too-familiar musical 
structures through which sounds are intentionally and expressively deployed.82  
 
This chapter, then, will seek to articulate the sense of creation as that which exceeds 
and contests the recognizable, and, in doing so, will extend the analyses of the 
preceding chapter in establishing a resonance between two related but irreducible lines 
of thinking—one that proceeds through concepts, the other through sounds. Finally, 
this resonance will allow us to (re)turn to the question of the relationship between 
                                                        
82 In the same sense, Deleuze will insist that the artist begins not with a ‘white and virgin 
surface,’ but with the ‘clichés that are already lodged on canvas before the painter even begins 
to work’ (FB 8; see also FB 61-63). Thus, ‘it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, 
even to shred’ before one can begin to create (WP 204). In Cage’s terms, it is necessary to be 




thought and sound as one of its “objects”, and to offer a reformulation of this problem 
that will allow us to preserve, rather than to cover over, the differing-deferring 
function of the call for thinking.83 
 
 
1. Evaluating the Question: What is Sound? 
 
To begin, I want to repeat the gesture of the preceding chapter, by taking up and 
reevaluating the question from which that chapter proceeded, namely: what calls? 
Which is to say: what is called sound? If Cage’s early work was, as we have heard, an 
attempt to produce an ‘all-sound music of the future’ (S 4)—an attempt that required 
what we can call, paraphrasing and re-appropriating Deleuze, the destruction of an 
image of music that presupposed itself—then this work implicated, as both Seth Kim-
Cohen and Christoph Cox acknowledged in distinct ways, a claim on the essence of 
sonority. Yet in elaborating and extending the critical moment of Cage’s work into its 
positive dimension, I want to show how the destruction of the image of music entails a 
reevaluation of the sense of essence itself; that is to say, though Cage doubtless 
repeatedly invokes ‘sounds themselves’, the imputation of an essential identity to 
sound cannot survive the critical destruction upon which it is based. Thus, this chapter 
will seek to trace how Cage was to gradually draw the consequences of the rejection of 
self-expression outlined in the preceding chapter in a manner that not only required his 
development of an explicitly experimental method, but that this method itself was 
dependent upon a concomitant revaluation of the nature of sonority. 
 
What, then, is sound? As indicated previously, Cage’s early work was based upon a 
precise answer to this question; thus, in a pivotal text from 1949, “Forerunners of 
Modern Music,” Cage states: ‘Sound has four characteristics: pitch, timbre, loudness 
and duration’ (S 63). Further, in a dialecticising turn of phrase, Cage adds: ‘The 
                                                        
83 I reinvoke, here, the “concept” (which is ‘neither a word nor a concept’) of a differing-
deferring relation that Stiegler elaborates from Derrida’s formulation of différance as ‘the 
irreducibility of temporalizing’ (Derrida 1973, 130), or the ‘(active) movement of the 
(production of) difference’; it is worth noting here that difference ‘seemed to [Derrida] to be 
strategically the theme most proper to think out (if not master) […] in what is most 
characteristic of our “epoch”’ (135-6), particularly to the degree that both “we” and “epoch” 




opposite and necessary coexistent of sound is silence’. From this, in an explicitly 
syllogistic fashion, Cage draws the consequence: 
 
Of the four characteristics of sound, only duration involves both sound 
and silence. Therefore, a structure based on duration (rhythmic: phrase, 
time lengths) is correct (corresponds with the nature of the material), 
whereas harmonic structure is incorrect (derived from pitch, which has 
no being in silence). (S 63) 
 
This preliminary position is exemplary in many respects: not only does it invoke a set 
of essential characteristics of sonority, but it also suggests, on the basis of those 
characteristics, a ‘correct’ approach to composition, the very correctness of which 
would derive from its correspondence to the ‘nature’ of sound as the ‘material’ of 
music.84 Yet on the basis of the analyses of the preceding chapter, we can hear how 
this position would eventually become problematic: not only did this deductive 
approach to the problem of structure fail to solve the practical compositional issue of 
how to embrace the entirety of sound within music—the problem of the relation 
between form and method remained, as I will discuss subsequently—but this 
approach, for this very same reason, was still at the service of an expressive function 
for music. 
 
My claim, in sum, is that Cage’s position regarding the essence of sonority, despite 
functioning as a spur to the pursuit of an ‘all-sound music of the future’ by evoking a 
set of essential characteristics sufficient to encompass and to determine the nature of 
this ‘all’, would ultimately itself become subject to the critical impetus that such a 
pursuit would involve. Indeed, as I will show, the very question “what is sound?”, the 
question of essence, is irrecoverably tied to precisely the outlook Cage found it 
necessary to escape, namely, the image of thought as recognition. In order to 
demonstrate this, I want to begin by considering an aspect of Deleuze’s work that is 
rightly famous: his antipathy to the very question “what is x?”. Expressed initially in 
1962’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, and taken up subsequently in “The Method of 
                                                        
84 Michael Nyman summarises this point in a manner close to my own interest: ‘Cage had 
discovered the simplest and most direct way of letting music develop more according to the 
logic of sound, unhampered by any (non-sonic) pseudo-logics of methodological strictures’ 




Dramatisation” and Difference and Repetition,85 Deleuze claims that, though 
positioned from Plato onwards as the question that best corresponds to the ‘discovery 
of the Idea’ or the ‘essence’, the question “what is x?” in fact presupposes the 
‘simplicity’ of the essence, its fundamental identity and unity, which is counterposed 
to the (theoretically unlimited) particular cases of the ‘example or the accident’, which 
relate to the essence only contingently (DI 95).  
 
This presupposition is, in fact, nothing other than the implicit presupposition of the 
dogmatic image of thought. If the question ‘what is x?’ corresponds to the distinction, 
‘dear to Plato’, between essence and appearance, this distinction itself relies upon the 
appeal to a ‘truthful world’ whose identity would subsist beyond the multiplicity of 
appearances (NP 89): ‘The truthful world is inseparable from […] the will to treat this 
world as appearance’. As we have heard, and as Deleuze, through Nietzsche, will 
stress, such an appeal to the truthfulness of the world is inevitably theological: ‘the 
answer to “What is X?” is always God as the locus of the combinatory of abstract 
predicates’ (DR 237). It is this appeal to (divine) transcendence as the guarantor of 
identity that underpins and validates the supersession of the truthful world over all 
appearances—and, on this same basis, grounds the priority of recognition in the image 
of thought. To recall, it is the presumed truthfulness of the world—the implicit 
presupposition of a truthful world beyond the apparent multiplicity of appearances—
that ‘guarantees the world an identity’ and ensures that thought ‘does not give itself 
anything to think that it has not first passed through the screen of the Same’ (DP 47). 
 
It follows, then, that the question of essence posed in relation to sound—“what is 
sound?”—cannot but situate our attempt to think sonority within the constraints of the 
image of thought as recognition, and, on this basis, we will be rendered ‘powerless to 
truly begin’ (DR 165). In this sense, we have drawn close to the position already 
audited through Sterne and Kim-Cohen: namely, that sound studies must not found 
itself upon an account of the essence of sonority. Yet, on the basis of the foregoing 
                                                        
85 Nietzsche and Philosophy was published after an eight-year gap following the publication of 
his first book Empiricism and Subjectivity, which Deleuze later referred to as a ‘hole in [his] 
life’ (quoted in Dosse 2010, 116); this text, as I will indicate, is of vital importance insofar as 
it sets out clearly a number of aspects of his work that would remain central across his entire 
career, and upon which much of my analysis in this chapter will hinge. Significantly, the 
eponymous concepts of both “The Method of Dramatisation” and Difference and Repetition 




analysis, it is not clear that we must give up attempting to think the essence of 
sonority, or hoping to provide some answer to the question of what, in sound studies, 
calls for thinking. Are there not, perhaps, other questions we might ask, if we suspect 
the question ‘what is x?’ may in fact be a ‘blunder’ (NP 71)? Might the question of 
essence itself require a revaluation? 
 
 
2. “Our Time” is Out of Joint 
 
In order to respond affirmatively—and in order to begin tracing out the questions that 
would guide us towards a thought without image in and through such a revaluation—I 
want to return to that other aspect of the question “what calls for sonic thinking 
today?” that has been a principle focus of this thesis: the today in which this yet-to-be-
determined “what” calls to us. I want to return to the question of “today” for three 
related reasons: firstly, to clarify that, for Deleuze as much as for Heidegger, 
contemporaneity itself is at stake in the question of how to begin thinking: creation, as 
the beginning of thinking is inseparable from—if not reducible to—an encounter with 
“our thought-provoking time”, the “at last” in which we hope to finally begin thinking. 
Secondly, and following from this, for Deleuze it is “our time” that, in fact, calls for a 
form of thinking that would not appeal to a truthful world beyond this one, but that 
would, on the contrary, affirm the necessity of thinking this world. In tracing out these 
two related aspects of Deleuze’s work, we will be able not only to understand more 
fully why the question “what is sound?” would fail to capture the contemporaneity of 
sound studies, but also begin to hear more clearly the demands placed upon any 
alternative. Finally, and as an extension of these preceding points, I want to stress that 
the distinction between recognition and creation is inseparable from an account of 
thought’s relationship to time; indeed, recognition and creation mark, at the same 
moment, two distinct conceptions of what it is to think and two divergent ‘readings’ of 
time (LS 8).  
 
In sum, then, if creation is taken to indicate the “nature” and the activity of a thought 
without image, and, from this, the ways in which such a form of thought could 
preserve the distancing-differing relation of thought to what it thinks (which is to say, 




temporality. What is more, such a conception is actively called for by the sonic 
problematic derived from Cage: for if, on the one hand, it was the static and 
unchanging quality of essence that allied it to the dogmatic image of thought, and thus 
requires critique, it was precisely the durational quality of sound that Cage identified 
as defining, in the last instance, such an essence. It is this tension, then, that requires a 
rethinking of essence and of temporality—or perhaps, of temporality as essence—
which, as I will show, Cage will undertake from within sonic practice. 
 
Let us, return, then, to “our thought-provoking time” as the time in which the call for 
thinking is to be audited. To recall: our thought-provoking time was analysed, in the 
second part of the first chapter, in terms of a fundamental disorientation, a technico-
temporal dismantling of the directionality by means of which time becomes 
habitable—or, at least, by means of which it had traditionally been inhabited. To 
borrow a phrase from Hamlet of which Deleuze was fond, we could say of such a time 
that it is out of joint—it lacks the cardinal points, the hinges (in Latin, cardo), upon 
and around which it turns, by means of which its movement is coordinated (KC vii; 
DR 111-12; Shakespeare 1996, 96). Certainly, Stiegler himself understands the nature 
of temporal orientation in these terms: disorientation, for Stiegler, marked the failure 
of ‘adjustment’ between socio-genesis and techno-genesis, an adjustment that had 
formerly been articulated through ‘cardinal points’ distinguishing here and there, past 
and future (T2 2-3). A time without orientation, a time stripped of such cardinal 
points—how could such a time provide a beginning for thought, when it would in 
principle place in question the directionality of time itself, stable beginnings as much 
as coherent ends? Would the thought adequate to such a time not be itself incapable of 
beginning—whether to think sonority, or anything else? 
 
For Deleuze, if “our time” does indeed provide a beginning for thought, it does so 
precisely by placing in question what it means to begin, and, by extension, thought’s 
relationship to time; it does so, moreover, in a manner that effectively demands an 
alliance between thought and creation. Our contemporaneity is encountered, for 
Deleuze, as a demand to think anew, to think differently, and to that degree requires 
that we hear and think beyond what is merely “present” within that present, its brute 
actuality. Thus, he claims that thought’s relation to the present is not one of 




(WP 108). Deleuze will repeatedly affirm Nietzsche’s definition of philosophy as 
untimely: ‘This is why philosophy has an essential relation to time: it is always against 
its time, critique of the present world’ (NP 107). To do philosophy is always to act 
‘counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of 
a time to come’ (DR xix; WP 112; Nietzsche 1997, 60).86 If “our time” provokes 
thought, then, for Deleuze this is not insofar as we must seek to think in accordance 
with it, but rather because we must think against it: to think from our time is certainly 
to think on basis of a relation to the present, but it is also to depart from it, to actively 
pursue a future of thinking. If thinking is resistance to the present, it is to the degree 
that it is an act of creation: ‘to think is to create’ (DR 185). 
 
What alternative conception of the relationship between thought and time is implicated 
here, beyond the obviously future-oriented sense of creation? This question is 
imperative, insofar as we might suppose, without such an alternative conception, that 
for thought to become creative it would be necessary to restore the cardinal points 
upon which time was oriented, and thereby to recover our capacity to act.87 An initial 
indication of such an alternative can be found by returning to Deleuze’s relation to 
Heidegger, which we are now able to specify more clearly. In the preceding chapter, I 
noted that Deleuze critiques Heidegger’s articulation of the call of thinking insofar as, 
on Deleuze’s reading, Heidegger appeals to an affinity between thought and what it 
thinks that suffices to reintroduce the image of thought as an implicit presupposition—
thought always already encompasses in principle that which it must “at last” come to 
think. Yet it must be noted that there is, in fact, a certain point on which Deleuze will 
repeatedly and affirmatively cite Heidegger: none other than the claim that ‘we are 
still not thinking’. Invoked as early as Nietzsche and Philosophy, and as late as his 
                                                        
86 As Deleuze puts it, succinctly: ‘The use of philosophy is to sadden. A philosophy that 
saddens no one, that annoys no one, is not a philosophy’ (NP 99). Deleuze is close to 
Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche on this point: ‘For what are the thoughts and experiences of 
a philosophy worth if they serve merely to guarantee the society from which he comes?’ 
(Klossowski 2005, 4). 
87 Such a misunderstanding plagues Žižek’s famous critique of Deleuze as ‘the ideologist of 
late capitalism’, imagining a ‘yuppie’ reading Deleuze with ‘enthusiasm’ as justifying and 
legitimating, for instance, his work of creating ‘publicities’ (Žižek 2012, 163); there are a 
number of important passages in What is Philosophy? designed to counteract such a reading—
in particular, through the contrast between creation and communication, and the repudiation of 
the confusion of the two in the “creation” of ‘commercial products’ or the work of ‘marketing’ 





final collaboration with Guattari, 1991’s What is Philosophy?, this claim clearly bears 
a vital importance for Deleuze—one coextensive, in fact, with the priority of the 
image of thought itself, which finds its first and last major engagements in the same 
two texts. 
 
In citing this phrase so consistently, Deleuze implicitly affirms two central aspects of 
Heidegger’s attempt to figure thinking through the call: firstly, the attempt to place 
thought in relation to a constitutive delay, a differing-deferral that unsettles its 
authority and its stability; and secondly, the relation of this delay to a “today” in which 
thought has yet to begin. Yet nevertheless, it seems that Heidegger’s work fails to 
pursue this impetus, remaining caught within an image that imprisons thought, and 
that strips the figure of the call of its radical potential, by aligning the “still not” with 
an always already that encompasses thinking in advance.88 Thus, Deleuze’s invocation 
of the claim that ‘we are still not thinking’ functions as a demand to hear this claim 
differently, beyond the contours of this image and the elimination of tele-phonics that 
it entailed. What other sense could this “still not” take on, and what other diagnosis of 
“our thought-provoking time” would it require? 
 
An initial clue can be found in a remark made by Claire Parnet in conversation with 
Deleuze, when she briefly refers to the latter’s relationship to Heidegger: 
 
…you are not a Heideggerean. […] You do not say that we are not yet 
thinking, and that there is a future of thought which plunges into the 
most immemorial past, and that, between the two, everything would be 
‘hidden from view’. (D2 17) 
 
Parnet, as we have heard, is only partly correct on this point: Deleuze does, in fact, say 
that we are not yet thinking, but he introduces into this claim a sense foreign to 
Heidegger’s own, one that Parnet correctly tracks to the temporal directionality 
implied, and to the concept of beginning invoked in each case. To begin thinking, for 
                                                        
88 This term passes from Heidegger (e.g. BT 476) to Derrida and Stiegler; for the latter, in 
particular, it is deployed in order to revise the sense of Dasein’s “guilt” in Being and Time as 
indicating what Stiegler calls the ‘de-fault of origin’—that is, Dasein is always already 
outside-of-itself, which is to say, technical. I use it here in its more typically Heideggerean 
sense, but indicate the expanded sense in order to suggest that there are ways in which 
Heidegger can be subverted “from within”, a strategy that Deleuze does not attempt (and 




Heidegger, would be to return to an always-already established proximity between 
thought and what it must think, and it is this that ultimately ensures the figure of the 
call is merely metaphorical. For Deleuze, something else is at stake: namely, creation. 
Creation explicitly orientates thinking towards the future, but does so in a fashion that 
refers not a particular future—a present yet to arrive—but rather to a form of time that 
‘eludes the present’ (LS 5); if thinking is creation, then the present in which thinking 
“takes place” is always undercut by the to-come toward which thinking proceeds, and 
which can never, in and of itself, become present. Thus, the “still not,” in Deleuze’s 
case, refers less to a future in which the past will recur than to a constitutive delay in 
which thought must always be re-created—with regard to the present, thinking will 
necessarily “still not” take place, for its operation is precisely to produce that which 
does not yet exist. 
 
There are a number of misreadings that are not only possible but even likely to arise 
from Deleuze’s insistent invocation of an essential relation between thinking and 
creation; not least as a result of Deleuze’s conception of philosophical stylistics: 
instead of ‘typographical cleverness’, ‘lexical agility’, or ‘syntactical boldness’ (TP 
24), Deleuze will evoke a ‘specifically philosophical taste’ in the naming of concepts, 
some of which will necessarily ‘make do with an ordinary and everyday word that is 
filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being imperceptible to a nonphilosophical 
ear’ (WP 8). Just as with Heidegger, then, we must be careful auditors of Deleuze: we 
must not hear too quickly, nor too easily, what might be meant by “thinking”, nor by 
“creation”. With these caveats in mind, I want to take up, initially, the sense in which 
thinking might begin only by turning against and resisting the present—our thought-
provoking time—and to ask what the conditions of such a resistance would be. 
Ultimately, these conditions will return us to the question of essence and of 
temporality; that is, of a renewed conception of essence capable of introducing time 
into thought—a conception that would thereby become adequate to Cage’s 
understanding of sound, albeit on condition of radically transforming the sense of this 
understanding. 
 
As noted above, our time is marked by a technico-temporal disorientation made 
audible in and through the stockpiling of time, and through a corresponding inability 




and the corresponding production of industrial temporal objects have led to a 
potentially irrecoverable divorce between socio-genesis and techno-genesis, whose 
relation had previously functioned to produce the (oriented) present; this différantial 
production of the present is elided by the ‘hypersynchronisation’ of the program 
industries whose effect is, ultimately, the eradication of all temporalisation (Stiegler 
2011, 57). Would resistance to the “present” (which is not, in fact, a present at all) 
therefore involve its re-construction—a re-orientation of temporality through the 
establishing of new cardinal points? Such a response to the undoubted sufferings of 
the disoriented contemporary—whether characterized as “liquid modernity” or a 
postmodern crisis of metanarratives89—is not uncommon, nor strictly conservative: 
even Stiegler has recently appealed to the continued radicality of the Enlightenment 
project and its characteristic modes of temporal individuation.90 Yet for Deleuze, at 
least, the crisis cannot be reversed—we can only ask “what happened?” (ATP 212-
228).  
 
Deleuze’s response to this question is clear, and, what is more, clearly related to that 
of Stiegler: what happened is ‘the break[ing] of the sensory-motor link’ (C2 260). For 
Stiegler, the failure of ‘adjustment’ between the social and the technical milieu 
entailed that we are no longer able to pro-ject a future that would constitute our 
response to the present situation, a space within which our intentional activities could 
find their fulfillment; so, for Deleuze, though for different reasons, does our encounter 
with the present fail to offer a coherent “situation” in which affection and action, 
stimulus and response, can be coordinated in a regular and consistent fashion. It 
becomes impossible to act, to respond to that which we encounter. Significantly, 
Deleuze diagnoses this break of the sensory-motor link in and through an encounter 
with the signs of the cinema, which, after the Second World War, no longer presents a 
coherent relation between perception, affection, and action (the movement-image as a 
whole); instead, we encounter  
 
situations to which one can no longer react, […] environments with which 
there are now only chance relations […] situations [that] no longer extend 
into action or reaction […]. These are pure optical and sound situations, 
in which the character does not know how to respond, abandoned spaces 
                                                        
89 See Bauman 2000; Lyotard 1984. 




in which he ceases to experience and to act so that he enters into flight, 
goes on a trip, comes and goes, vaguely indifferent to what happens to 
him, undecided as to what must be done. (C2 261, my emphases) 
 
Cinema presents us with, precisely, a time ‘out of joint’: a disorientated temporality 
whose proximity to our own encounter with the contemporary soundscape at the 
conclusion of the preceding chapter should be noted (C2 260). Cinema, as much as 
sonic practice, reveals the ‘modern fact’: ‘we no longer believe in this world’ (C2 
166). The world has lost its coherence, its orientation—it is no longer a space or a time 
within which we can move and act. This fact, as François Zourabichvili puts it, ‘leaves 
us with no defense against the excessive afflux of data we’re delivered over to daily, 
and modern man is overcome with vertigo—fascination or nausea’ (DP 190). Or, 
perhaps we could say, bearing in mind the remarks of musicians and journalists 
sampled previously: fascination ad nauseum. 
 
How, then, are we to respond to the provocations of our time, to our nausea and 
confusion, to the ‘chaos’ that assaults us? How can we re-act? For Deleuze, the task of 
thinking today, ‘our most difficult task’, is ‘believing in the world’ (WP 75): ‘Only 
belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears’ (C2 166). Yet belief 
in the world does not mean believing in its ‘existence’—that is, in its actuality91—but 
‘in its possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new 
modes of existence’ (WP 74); we do not believe in the world as it is, but as it is 
becoming. Does this reconnection through belief mean: to restore the sensory-motor 
link, to recover our orientation within time, so that we might act once again, and 
restore our movement? This is not strictly the case for Deleuze; for the breaking of the 
sensory-motor link does not take us out of the world, but rather this ‘modern fact’ 
reveals ‘a situation that exists in principle’ (DP 190): it reveals the essential 
divergence of the world itself, in which we are now tasked to believe. 
 
                                                        
91 As noted previously, Zourabichvili argues, against readings of Deleuze that would 
emphasise his supposed realism (that is, his commitment to the existence of the world 
independent of our minds), that ‘the existence or nonexistence of a world exterior to the 
thinking subject is not at stake here, and […] such a question has no meaning within the 
Deleuzian problematic’ (DPE 65). It should also be noted, with regard to the important 
Deleuzian distinction between actual and virtual (which will not be treated directly in this 
thesis), that the French actuel has, as Michael Hardt notes, a ‘primary French meaning’ of 




Thus, what is lost when the sensory-motor link is broken is not the world as such, but 
precisely the belief in a world that is ‘truthful […] identical to itself, a docile world 
faithful to our expectations whenever we try to know it’—and, indeed, to act upon it 
(47); the ‘truthful world’ is not this world, but ‘another world’, a ‘supersensible world’ 
that is the ‘negation of this world’, and belief in such a world is well lost (NP 139, my 
emphasis). This world, in which we must believe, is precisely the world without any 
transcendent beyond in which its identity could be grounded—the world as pure 
immanence: ‘belief replaces knowledge only when it becomes belief in this world, as it 
is’ (C2 166), but this “as it is” becomes something entirely new when it is no longer 
related to a stability or identity that could orientate it in advance and guarantee its 
coherence. 
 
What principally characterizes the distinction between “this world” and the truthful 
world, then, is its relationship to time. The truthful world serves to orientate “this 
world” according to a set of cardinal points that themselves are atemporal: ‘The hinge, 
Cardo, indicates the subordination of time to precise cardinal points, through which 
the periodic movements it measure passes’ (CC 27). Within this image, time is not 
encountered in itself; time is rather the measure of something else—it is the measure 
of movement. Moreover, the very precision of these cardinal points, and the periodicity 
they measure, stems from their own stasis: the ‘subordination of time’ to ‘the measure 
of movement […] will entail an entire hierarchization of movements according to their 
proximity to the Eternal’ (CC 27). That is to say, the subordination of time to 
movement via the imposition of static, cardinal points or hinges is dependent, in the 
last instance, upon the supervening of the supersensible world over the contingent 
becoming of “this world”; indeed, it is precisely what underpins the re-cognisability of 
this world, insofar as the subordination of time to the periodicity of movement 
effectively curves time, producing a ‘circular movement’ that guarantees the return of 
the same, and hence the recognition of what is encountered as having always-already 
been made comprehensible.  
 
Time out of joint, then, is the time of this world decoupled from the cardinal points 
that subordinated it to (circular, periodic) movement. It is this form of time that is 
presented by the breaking of the sensory-motor schema—time is no longer 




predictable fashion, but ‘aberrant movement depends on time’ (C2 39). It is in this 
sense that the ‘modern fact’ reveals something true in principle: ‘temporality showed 
itself as it really was for the first time’ (C2 102) and ‘we enter into temporality as a 
state of permanent crisis’ (C2 109). Time, no longer circular, unfolds as a ‘pure 
straight line, all the more mysterious in that it is simple, inexorable, terrible’ (CC 28).  
 
“Our problem”, then, is to know how thinking might respond to the demand of this 
encounter with situations stripped of their periodic and recognizable forms. How can 
thinking become the thought of a ‘pure and empty form of time’ (DR 108-111), 
without reverting to or restoring a naturalized image of thought, without appealing to 
the ‘clichés’ and ‘opinions’ that act as an ‘umbrella’ to ‘protect us from chaos’ (WP 
202), without attempting to restore the cardinal points linking this world to a truthful 
one that grounds and guarantees it? Which is to say, if we are to once again become 
capable of acting and of thinking, it is only through a revaluation of the conditions 
under which action and thought (or the action of thought) is possible.  
 
At the level of sonic practice, it was this same task that confronted Cage upon 
rejecting self-expression as the goal—which is to say, the orientation—of his work, in 
order to ‘let sounds be themselves’ (S 10). For Cage, it was necessary to stop acting in 
a predetermined and intentional fashion in order to begin to listen—that is, in order to 
encounter a “pure sound situation”—but this was not to simply give up the activity of 
composition entirely, or to avow an indeterminate freedom that was, for Cage, 
inevitably a return to preferences and habits. As he puts it:  
 
When this freedom is given to people who are not disciplined and who do 
not start—as I’ve said in so many of my writings—from zero (by zero I 
mean the absence of likes and dislikes) […] then, of course, the giving of 
freedom is of no interest whatsoever. (CWC 71) 
 
Or, as he remarks more succinctly elsewhere: ‘Permission granted, but not to do 
whatever you want’ (YM 28). Thus, the implied opposition between acting and 
listening is itself undercut by a deeper relation, in which listening itself becomes-
active on condition that action itself is divorced from simple (which is inevitably to 
say, habitual) volition. What is more, such a becoming-active is itself dependent upon 




temporality, that would evade recognition at the same moment as it demands a specific 
form of creative act, namely, the experiment. 
 
The problem of how to act in a non-predetermined fashion, then, indicates a shared 
premise between Deleuze and Cage that is ontological in scope—though the sense of 
this term must be carefully weighed: to affirm the univocity of Being (as Cage 
affirmed the essential unity of all-sound) is not to abolish the question of distribution 
and selection—ultimately, of evaluation—but rather to renew its sense. In Deleuze’s 
words, ‘the whole question […] is to know under what conditions […] disjunction is a 
veritable synthesis’ (LS 199), and how to thereby think relations between differences 
that do not pass by way of a prior identity. In Cage’s terms, composition becomes the 
attempt to assemble a ‘collection of extreme differences’ whose effect is that of an 
‘experience’ in which ‘the dimension of resemblance disappears’ (FTB 48). Yet such 
an assemblage of the different with itself is by no means a straightforward process, as 
we will hear: ‘it’s obviously difficult to let sounds be’ (MC 220). 
 
In sum, then, our thought-provoking time presents us with a time out of joint, and 
demands that we create new possibilities for responding and re-acting beyond the 
limitations of the question of essence—that is, if sound calls for thinking today, it calls 
for a form of thinking that would ask something other than “what is sound?” It is this 
task that both Deleuze and Cage encounter as one of construction, practice or 
production—all terms that Deleuze, at various points, uses to characterize the work of 
philosophy and/or art (see, for example, WP 7, C2 268-69, DR 192). It is the 
eminently practical problem of how thought can respond creatively to its encounter 
with chaos, rather than falling back upon the image of thought as the a priori 
imposition of recognizable order—a problem that requires a reconfiguration of 
thought’s relation to time itself, a time that is not simply “ours”.  
 
In order to approach this broader goal, I want to begin by indicating how the active 
production of an encounter with this world that does not seek to impose order upon it 
must, for both Deleuze and Cage, pass by way of the affirmation of chance. That is, it 
is only through a particular relation of chance and necessity that thought can be 
brought to confront the ‘pure and empy form of time’ as, precisely, an outside beyond 




that this thesis has insistently sought to make a positive condition of both thinking, in 
general, and sound studies in particular.  
 
Thus, we must continue to pursue the possibility of figuring thought in terms of 
difference between thought and what it thinks that is no longer that between subject 
and object as two predetermined terms whose relation is conditionally superadded in a 
given act of thinking; rather, we must think this relation as ‘external to its terms’, the 
very same goal that underpinned Deleuze’s lifelong identification with empiricism (D2 
41). It is this goal that explains the priority accorded by Deleuze to the middle and the 
between, as the paradoxical solution to the problem of how to begin thinking: ‘One 
begins again through the middle’ (D2 29). It is this relation of thought to difference 
that will constitute the conditions of real production of a thought without image, a 
mode of thinking that does not think only the recognizable but rather places thought in 
direct relation to both ‘that which is both unthinkable and that which must be thought’ 
(or, should we say, that calls for thinking?), to reach the point at which thought’s 
‘highest power’ is at the same moment its ‘inability to think’: ‘Henceforth, thought is 
also forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, its own natural “powerlessness” 
which is indistinguishable from its greatest power’ (DR 185). It is this disjunctive 
force of powerlessness that will ultimately pass under the name of chance for 
Deleuze—and that can be, as I hope to show, productively correlated with Cage’s own 




3. Force and Sense: The Truth(s) of Time 
 
On a purely exegetical basis, evidencing the centrality of chance to the conjunction 
between thinking and creation for Deleuze is easily done, and, what is more, it is 
worth noting that the interplay of these terms extends through Deleuze’s work to the 
exact extent of the thematic of the image of thought and the appeal to the 
Heideggerean ‘still not’. Deployed principally in relation to the Nietzschean figure of 
the dice-throw, the relation of thinking, creation and chance emerges first in Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, and plays an important role in both Difference and Repetition and The 




and his final collaboration with Guattari.92 To focus only on the first of these texts, the 
significance of this image for my argument is clear, insofar as Deleuze states 
unequivocally that ‘[t]o think is to send out a dicethrow’ (NP 30). The question, then, 
for Deleuze as for Cage, is that of the nature and significance of chance’s function in 
relation to creation—that is, under what conditions does chance function as a means to 
evade or elude the vicious circularity of recognition, and to, on the contrary, put 
thinking in contact with an outside beyond the merely relative exteriority of the 
truthful world? Ultimately, this is much as to ask: how does chance allow us to 
“respond” to the call of our encounter with chaos? 
 
In order to respond to such questions, it is necessary establish, firstly, whether there is 
a thought of essence that is not a thought of identity—and if we can think the “what” 
that calls, and respond to its calling, without imposing recognition upon it in advance. 
Deleuze affirms this possibility clearly, and to essence as identity he opposes a 
radically different conception: ‘essence is always sense and value’ (NP 72). Such a 
claim is, initially, obscure, though we can note the significance it plays for Deleuze in 
terms of philosophy’s contemporaneity: when asked how we would ‘define the 
problem of contemporary philosophy’, Deleuze responds, ‘using the notions of sense 
and value’ (DI 137), and to this degree, for Deleuze, ‘modern philosophy has largely 
lived off Nietzsche’ (NP 1, my emphasis). How, then, can we re-think the essence of 
sonority in terms of sense and value, and, more significantly, how can such a re-
thinking not simply evade the coordinates of the image of thought, but actually 
contribute to its destruction? 
 
Let us begin with sense—a complex term in Deleuze’s work, but one that we can 
initially understand simply as meaning or significance.93 Thus, the question of essence 
                                                        
92 In Foucault, Deleuze states: ‘thinking involves throwing the dice’ (F 87). Moreover, later in 
the same text we find the following proposition: ‘To think means to experiment […]’ (F 116); 
this latter phrase, moreover, is repeated almost word for word in What is Philosophy?: ‘To 
think is to experiment’ (WP 111). Finally, this latter text once again invokes the image of the 
dice-throw, in order to characterize the philosophical practice of creating concepts (WP 35). 
93 Both Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense expand upon the conception of sense 
articulated in Nietzsche and Philosophy, in order to rigorously distinguish sense from other 
forms of propositional meaning: specifically, denotation, manifestation and signification. I 
will rely here upon the earlier formulation, but it should be noted that the notion of sense will 
capture, in the later two texts, an important element of the distinction between thought and 




reformulated in terms of sense would be: what is called “sound”? What do we intend 
through this term? That this is not simply a variant on the question of essence becomes 
clear with the following, programmatic statement from the opening of Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, which I will quote at length before unpacking: 
 
We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or 
even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which 
appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is 
expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition 
but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. […] 
Even perception, in its divers aspects, is the expression of forces which 
appropriate nature. That is to say that nature itself has a history. The 
history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take 
possession of it and the coexistence of forces which struggle for 
possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense 
depending on the force which appropriates it. History is the variation of 
senses… (NP 3) 
 
There are a number of points that require attention here, but initially I want to read this 
passage alongside and against the debates regarding the “what” of sound studies 
discussed at the outset of the preceding chapter.  
 
To recall, these debates centered upon the ontological and epistemological status of 
sound, and emphasized two related difficulties: firstly, whether sound could be 
thought “in itself”, possessing a reality irreducible to our apprehension of it, or 
whether it must be thought “for us”, in terms of its context-dependent significations 
and socio-cultural functions; secondly, whether sound possesses a set of essential 
characteristics by means of which it can be determined in counterposition to, for 
instance, the visual or whether, on the contrary, its characteristics are mutable, 
determined cultural and historically and subject to technical modifications. Broadly 
speaking the first two positions are represented by Cox and Kim-Cohen, and the latter 
two by Evens and Sterne.94 Where does this passage fit, then, with regard to these 
various positions through which the object of sound studies has been articulated? 
                                                        
94 To be clear, this reductive matrix does not hope to capture the detail or complexity of the 
arguments of these authors, or to exhaust the possible relations between them. For instance, 
with regard to their relation to phenomenology, we can observe that Kim-Cohen’s Derridean 
critique of Husserl is allied to a positive invocation of Merleau-Ponty, whilst Evens directly 
positions his work as deploying a ‘phenomenological method’ (xv), and Cox, for his part, 





At the outset, Deleuze refers to a ‘something’ or ‘phenomenon’ that can be ‘human, 
[…] biological, or even […] physical’; thus, this ‘something’ remains, initially, 
undetermined with regard to the various positioned outlined—sound, therefore, could 
be conceived as belonging to any of these various instances. Indeed, it follows from 
the subsequent remarks that whether sound was figured as physical or physicological, 
or some combination of the two, would be dependent upon the ‘force’ that 
‘appropriates’ it in a given case. For, as Deleuze goes on to state, ‘perception’ is the 
‘expression of forces that appropriate nature’, while ‘nature itself has a history’ 
marked by the ‘succession of forces which take possession of it and the coexistence of 
forces that struggle for possession’; thus, the final remark cited, that ‘[h]istory is the 
variation of senses’, functions as a conclusion, insofar as from history through nature 
to perception we find a set of constantly varying determinations that the concept of 
force is ultimately intended to capture. 
 
On this basis, Deleuze (via Nietzsche) offers a solution to the forced choices set out by 
the positions outlined previously—either essence and the in-itself or history and 
culture; either realism or phenomenal idealism. The historical ‘variation of senses’ and 
its corresponding transformation of perception bears obvious proximity to Sterne’s 
invocation of Marx’s ‘history of the five senses’, yet does not thereby abjure reference 
to either essence or to the “natural”, nor to a ‘physical’ aspect of the phenomenon, as 
Sterne himself does.95 Further, Deleuze will refer to the ‘thing itself’ (NP 4), but 
without, as Kim-Cohen feared, thereby appealing to an ‘unchanging essence’, and thus 
without accepting the inevitable equivalence of essence and identity (14-15). From this 
perspective, then, Deleuze retains a conception of the in itself, but one that evades the 
limitations ascribed to it by its critics. Yet, from the reverse perspective—that is, from 
                                                                                                                                                                
instance, this reductive approach is taken to be justified insofar as my intent is not to offer a 
specific critique of the work of any of these authors, but rather to locate the broader terrain 
upon which sound studies has established itself—the coordinates of its problematic, to put it 
otherwise—and thereby to position the point at which Deleuze’s work can intervene. 
Obviously, this initial setting out of Deleuze’s relation to sound studies must be followed up 
with more precise engagements, to which this thesis hopes to function as a propaedeutic, or 
perhaps, more simply, an indication of some general possibilities. 
95 To be clear, Sterne references physical aspects of sonority—necessarily, insofar as his main 
interest in a history of its technical capture and reproduction—but depends, in the last 
instance, upon a definition of sound whose inescapable referent is the human auditory 




the perspective of the demand to think sound-in-itself—much the same can be said: 
though Deleuze certainly appeals to an ontological register that would be typically the 
province of a realism or materialism—for instance, the reference to ‘nature’ that 
would traditionally find its sense in opposition to history—he nevertheless retains a 
concept of sense that functions as an index for various ‘phenomena’, concepts that are 
explicitly phenomenological and—at the limit—Kantian in their derivation.96 Thus, 
though Deleuze affirms precisely that which Evens and Cox sought to assert against 
the limitations imposed by a narrowly idealist conception—namely, that thought could 
capture both the essential and the dynamic, that it could, indeed, make time itself 
essential—he does so in terms which Cox, at least, would consider redolent of a 
reductively idealist approach.  
 
It is here that we can begin to hear the true significance of Deleuze’s oft-cited but 
rarely elaborated claim, set out in one of his earliest publications, a 1954 review of 
Jean Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence: ‘Philosophy must be ontology, it cannot be 
anything else; but there is no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense’ 
(DI 15). Such an ontology cannot be, as Zourabichvili notes, ‘a metaphysical discourse 
which could inform us, in the last instance, what there is of reality’ (DP 36); rather, it 
serves to achieve ‘substitution of IS by means of AND or, what amounts to the same 
thing, substitution of becoming for being’ (37). At the same moment, the ontology of 
sense introduces difference and temporality into thinking—for the sense of what exists 
is dependent upon a mutable relation not simply with another “thing”, but with 
“itself”, as I will go on to emphasise. It is to this extent that philosophy becomes a 
‘symptomatology’ and ‘semeiology’: ‘Sense is therefore a complex notion: there is 
always a plurality of senses, a constellation, a complex of successions but also of 
coexistences which make interpretation an art’ (NP 3). This relation between ontology 
and sense is the fulcrum of a reversal of the relation between truth and time: the 
truthful world no longer stands against the becoming of this world, but instead truth 
becomes the plural ‘truths of time’ (NP 100): ‘To seek the truth is to interpret, to 
                                                        
96 Thus, Deleuze remarks that Kant’s substitution of the problem of distinguishing essence and 
appearance for the problem of the relation between apparition and sense makes him effectively 




decipher, to explicate. […] and the truth is always a truth of time’ (PS 12).97 This time, 
needless to say, is precisely not the recurrent and cyclical time by means of which the 
supersensible truthful world imposes itself upon “this world”, and becoming is 
subordinated to being; if, as we will hear, the search for truth is dependent upon the 
fortuitous and the contingent, it is to the degree that time in and for itself unfolds as, in 
a phrase of Borges, ‘the labyrinth made of a single straight line which is indivisible, 
incessant’ (CC 28; Borges 2000, 117) and in which only difference returns. 
 
To summarise, then: against the search for essence as an identity underpinned by the 
question “what is x?”, Deleuze poses an ‘empirical and pluralist art’ that ‘does not 
deny essence’ but ‘makes it depend, in each case, on an affinity of phenomena and 
forces, on a coordination of forces and will’ whose ultimate condition is a time out of 
joint (NP 71-72). Yet to what extent does the concept of sense allow us to retain a 
notion of essence without the traditional coordinates—identity, timelessness—of such 
a notion? The reference to affinity here indicates a vital clarificatory point: if ‘the 
notion of essence does not disappear here but takes on a new significance’, it is insofar 
as, though the ‘thing itself has as many senses as there are forces capable of taking 
possession of it’, nevertheless ‘the thing itself is not neutral and will have more or less 
affinity with the force in current possession’ (NP 4). Thus, ‘[e]ssence […] will be 
defined as that one, among all the senses of the thing, which gives it the force with 
which it has the most affinity’. This appeal to a concept of affinity, however, does not 
simply reintroduce an identical object “beneath” the various forces, because that upon 
which a force bears, and with which it may or may not exhibit an affinity, is precisely 
another force: 
 
Up to now we have presented things as if different forces struggled over 
and took successive possession of an almost inert object. But the object 
itself is force, expression of a force. This is where there is more or less 
affinity between the object and the force which takes possession of it. 
There is no object (phenomenon) which is not already possessed since in 
itself it is not an appearance but the apparition of a force. (NP 6) 
 
                                                        
97 Deleuze is clear, in Cinema 2, on the degree to which this relation between truth and time 
itself forms an element of, as well as a possible response to, the crisis in and of thought that 
marks “our time”: ‘If we take the history of thought, we see that time has always put the 




Thus, essence as affinity is not defined by the characteristics of a particular object 
upon which a series of forces would bear, but rather the differential relation of force to 
force. To read this back into the preceding passage, we would say that the history of a 
thing, the variation of its sense—and, thereby, the truth of time—is determined by the 
mutable state of this relation, by the way in which this thing exerts its force in relation 
to the forces that it encounters, contingently and fortuitously—a thing is defined by its 
‘capacity for being affected’ that Deleuze terms the ‘will to power’, as the ‘differential 
element […] that determines the relation of force with force’ (NP 57); it is will to 
power that provides the element of value that, in connection with sense, completes the 
renewed conception of essence. It follows that this will, and the relation of forces that 
it evaluates, is necessarily incomplete: we cannot know, in advance, what other force a 
given force may enter into relation with, and whether this relation will amplify or 
dampen this force’s capacity to act. Which is to say, the genealogical account of 
essence must be an experimentation of force.98 
 
This differential, temporal, and experimental ontology of force-sense, then, provides 
us with the means to think this world beyond the opposition between pre-established 
identity and pure indifference—it allows us to think essence as the relation of 
difference to difference, or, rather, as the relation of difference to itself, which does 
not require difference itself to be ‘tamed’ in advance and made re-cognisable 
according to the coordinates of the dogmatic image of thought (DR 330). On the basis 
of this initial presentation, I want to elaborate this relation between force, sense, value 
and will to power through an attempt to articulate the essence of sonority—that what 
that calls for thinking today—in these terms. How can we determine the essence of 
sonority in terms of a differential relation between forces? And, perhaps more 
significantly, to what extent does such an account of the essence of sound become 
audible in Cage’s work during the late nineteen-forties and early nineteen-fifties?  
 
In order to begin responding to this question, there are two things I wish to note 
immediately: firstly, that a force, in a given configuration, is determined as either 
                                                        
98 It is on this basis that ontology and ethics is inextricable for Deleuze. As de Beistegui puts 
it: ‘for Deleuze, as for Spinoza or Nietzsche, there is no longer any difference between the 
ontological and the ethical: the ethical is nothing outside our ability to realize or maximize our 
ontological potential, nothing, that is, outside our capacity to extend ourselves to the limit of 




active or reactive, and that this relation itself can be evaluated as affirmative or 
negative depending upon the degree to which this relation expresses the essence of a 
given thing—which is to say, the degree to which it affirms or negates this thing’s 
capacity to act; secondly, the will to power as value—as affirmation or negation—is, 
for Deleuze, a ‘sensibility, a sensation’ (NP 58). I want to return to the work of Cage, 
then, in order to begin outlining, concretely, the logic of such a renewed conception of 
the essence of sonority. 
 
 
4. The Listener as Spectator: Actions and Re-actions 
 
To begin, we can note how, for Cage, what became increasingly central to his 
articulation of a non-expressive all-sound music (which is to say, as indicated in the 
previous chapter, a music that would renounce expressivity to the very degree that it 
hopes to encompass the entirety of sound) was the necessity of allowing sound become 
active—it was a question of the activity of sound rather than the expression of feelings 
or ideas, as captured in the famous phrase, ‘let sounds be themselves’ (S 10). In the 
same piece (“Experimental Music”, from 1957), Cage remarks: 
 
New music: new listening. Not an attempt to understand something that is 
being said, for, if something were being said, the sounds would be given 
the shapes of words. Just an attention to the activity of sounds. (S 10) 
 
I want to place an emphasis upon the initial remark, to the degree that I would take the 
subsequent sentences as their elaboration: a colon both separates and unites ‘new 
music’ and ‘new listening’, the former being the creation of a music which no longer 
seeks to communicate, to express something using sound as a vehicle, but rather 
allows sound to act, with the latter being the renewed position of the auditor, whose 
‘attention’ now functions differently in order to encounter this activity—listening 
becomes active in order to reveal the activity of sound. My claim is as follows: in this 
reciprocal becoming-active, sound qua a relation of forces takes on a quality of 
affirmation that reveals the essence of sonority in an experimental fashion—that is, in 
and through the determination of concrete encounters in which the activity of these 





There are three questions that follow immediately from such a claim. Firstly, how do 
we distinguish active from reactive in the relation of forces? Secondly, how does the 
listener become-active? Thirdly, how does the affirmation derived from this 
becoming-active determine the essence of sound? I want to take these questions in 
turn, and articulate a response to them that is constructed between the terrain of 
Deleuze’s text, on the one hand—that is, through reading Nietzsche and Philosophy in 
terms of its applicability to the thinking of sound—and, on the other, through the 
concrete sonic practice of Cage, by means of which he explores and articulates an 
attempt to experimentally determine the essence of sonority as a contest between 
active and reactive forces, and the correlative possibility of an affirmation of the 
totality of sound that would preserve its inherently differential nature. 
 
Firstly, then, let us take the distinction of active and reactive: ‘an active force is one 
which goes to the limit of its consequences’ (NP 61). Or, in other words: ‘Every force 
which goes to the limit of its power is […] active’ (NP 54). Reactive force, then, is by 
contrast that which is ‘separated from what it can do’, and which, in relation to another 
force, ‘separates a force from what it can do’ (NP 54). Thus, to let sounds be 
themselves would mean to give sound, as a relation of forces, the power of going to 
the limit of what it can do—only under such a condition would we be able to affirm 
the activity of sound. This is yet another reason why essence, as sense, is necessarily 
the object of an experimental practice: we do not know in advance what a given force 
can do, of what relations it is capable.99 
 
To what extent does this imply that music, traditionally understood, is therefore 
reactive, separating sound from what it can do? On a merely intuitive level, we can 
note that, as Cage himself articulated from early in his career, music traditionally 
selects only a limited set of sounds that can be used—the ‘stepping stones’ within the 
field of sound that mark out the specifically musical elements (S 9, 16, 183)—and thus 
restricts the activity of sound, excluding, in principle, certain aspects of its capacity of 
                                                        
99 `As noted previously, Deleuze frequently cites Spinoza’s remark, from the Ethics, that we 
do not know what a body can do. If we note that ‘body’, on Deleuze’s interpretation, refers 
simply to ‘relations of motions and rest, of speeds and slownesses’ and a corresponding 
‘capacity for affecting and being affected’, then we can infer that what is being stated here is 
equivalent to claiming that what constitutes the activity, which is to say, the affective capacity, 




act (such as, for instance, its capacity to behave in a non-periodic and therefore 
unpitched and, traditionally, noisy fashion—see Chapter Two). Thus we can 
understand the equivalence drawn in Nietzsche and Philosophy, between reactive 
force, on the one hand, and utility or motive on the other (NP 68-69); utility requires 
that an action is evaluated with regard to an effect that is distinguished from that which 
acts, now hypostatized as cause. On this basis ‘force is split in two’ and separated 
from what it can do, to the degree that what it can do—the effects it can produce—are 
now distinct from it both logically and ontologically (NP 115). In this sense, music, in 
its expressive or communicative mode, requires sound to be reactive, insofar as those 
sounds that are permissible are so permitted due to their facility in providing pleasure 
for the auditor, or serving to communicate the intentions of the composer. 
 
It is this process of becoming-reactive through the judgment of an action according to 
its utility or motive—such as, for instance, its success in adequately communicating or 
providing pleasure—that allows us to understand the critical role performed by the 
listener in the becoming-reactive of force. For Deleuze, if the ‘becoming of forces’ 
bears a direct relation to ‘sensibility’ (NP 59), then reactive force indicates a particular 
mode of sense experience: the sensibility of the spectator. Two passages, in particular, 
make this point clearly: 
 
Who considers an action from the standpoint of its utility or 
harmfulness? Not the one who acts: he does not ‘consider’ action. It is 
rather the third party, the sufferer or the spectator. He is the person who 
considers the action that he does not perform – precisely because he 
does not perform it – as something to evaluate from the standpoint of the 
advantage which he draws or can draw from it. (NP 69) 
 
…who considers action from the standpoint of good and evil, of 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness? […] it is he who claims an 
interest in actions he does not perform… (NP 111) 
 
This mode of evaluation, for Deleuze, with its inherent ‘misrecognition of action’, is 
dominant; we might even suspect that ‘becoming-reactive is constituent of man’ (NP 
60).100 Language, for instance, is ‘usually judged from the standpoint of the hearer’ 
                                                        
100 The same is true of consciousness, which, for Deleuze, ‘is inseparable from a triple illusion 
which constitutes it: the illusion of finality, the illusion of freedom, and the theological 




(NP 69); and was it not precisely such a function of language that Cage saw separating 
the force of sound from what it could do, subjecting sound to the evaluation of a 
listener who sought something expressive within sound, and evaluated it on this basis? 
 
We can push this interpretation of the reactive listener-spectator further, as well as 
indicating the way in which it functions as a specifically contemporary diagnosis, by 
noting that becoming-reactive—the way in which active forces are separated from 
what they can do—involves a particular role attributed to memory. Firstly, we must 
assert that, from an ethical standpoint (as distinct from a moral one),101 the active 
‘type’—Cage’s “new listener”—does not only act; insofar as force always bears upon 
force, there is necessarily a relation of action to reaction in any given encounter, hence 
the evaluative priority, ultimately, of the concept of the will to power as the 
differential element of force, to which I will return shortly. The relation of force and 
sensibility, for Deleuze, makes this point clearly: sensibility is precisely the encounter 
between two distinct elements (typically, if problematically, framed in terms of a 
relation between interior and exterior), but this encounter, and sensation itself, is 
generally defined reactively—that is, as something passively felt by the one who 
experiences the sensation. Yet this latter is only a characteristic of the reactive type, 
and is itself a reactive evaluation of sensation: the active type ‘acts his reactions’, 
whereas the reactive type is incapable of doing so and instead the reactions are ‘felt’, 
experienced passively (NP 104). It is on this basis that Deleuze will indicate that the 
experience of a becoming-active would require ‘another sensibility, another way of 
feeling’ (NP 60)—or, a new listener. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
indicates, interestingly, the way in which the reactive elements of the human can be articulated 
as techniques for humanity’s modification—and, thereby, are revaluated, in technical terms, as 
elements of humanity’s becoming (Ansell Pearson 1997, 16). Ansell Pearson also indicates the 
importance of the relation between memory and forgetting on this point (25-27); as indicated 
previously, his work is therefore vital for a fuller investigation of the relations between 
Deleuze and Stiegler than can be offered here. 
101 Schematically, for Deleuze ethics refers to a ‘typology of immanent modes of existence’ 
evaluated according to the degree of power—that is, the capacity to affect and be affected—
implied in each case, whereas morality ‘always refers existence to transcendent values’ (SPP 
23). In this sense, the reactive judgment of the spectator is inevitably moralizing, while the 
active listener (who will be discussed in more detail below) would not necessarily suspend all 
judgment, but would rather evaluate their encounter with sonority only according to the 




How, then, does memory function to establish a reactive form of sensation, and to 
preserve and sustain the reactive type? Deleuze connects Nietzsche to Freud on this 
point: there must be a distinction between ‘the system which receives an excitation’ 
and the ‘system which retains a lasting trace of it’—that is, between perception and 
memory, but also between consciousness and the unconscious: ‘the same system could 
not at one and the same time faithfully record the transformation it undergoes and 
offer an ever fresh receptivity (NP 105).102 Though for Nietzsche these two systems 
together form the ‘reactive apparatus’, insofar as they both can only react to that which 
acts upon them, which is experienced as an exteriority over which they have no 
control, nevertheless there is an important distinction between them to which I will 
return shortly.  
 
Firstly, however, we must note that there must be another force in addition to these 
two: how can the system of perception offer an ‘ever fresh receptivity’, and prevent 
the trace from ‘invad[ing] consciousness’ (NP 106)? This is the task of the ‘active […] 
faculty of forgetting’, which ‘must be given the job of supporting consciousness and 
renewing its freshness, fluidity and mobile, agile chemistry at every moment’ (NP 
106). It is the failure of this active faculty that allows the reactive system of memory 
to dominate through a becoming-reactive of the psychical apparatus as a whole, such 
that one can no longer act one’s reactions. I will quote Deleuze’s summary on this 
point at length, as it is of vital importance for both his argument and my interest in it:  
 
Let us suppose that there is a lapse in the faculty of forgetting. It is as if 
the wax of consciousness were hardened, excitation tends to get 
confused with its trace in the unconscious and conversely, reaction rises 
into consciousness and overruns it. Thus at the same time as reaction to 
traces becomes perceptible, reaction ceases to be acted. The 
consequences of this are immense: no longer able to act a reaction, 
active forces are deprived of the material conditions of their functioning, 
they no longer have opportunity to do their job, they are separated from 
what they can do. We can thus finally see in what way reactive forces 
prevail over active forces: when the trace takes place of the excitation in 
                                                        
102 A principal reference point here would be Freud’s famous text “A Note Upon the Mystic 
Writing Pad” (Freud 2008); see also Derrida’s discussion of this text in ‘’Freud and the Scene 
of Writing’, in which the ‘metaphor’ of the mystic writing pad ‘opens up the question of 
technics’ and the ‘analogy between the physical apparatus and the nonphysical apparatus’, 





the reactive apparatus, reaction itself takes the place of action, reaction 
prevails over action. (NP 107) 
 
The possibility for reactive forces to dominate by separating active forces from what 
they can do, then, is dependent upon a certain distribution of perception and memory: 
perception only re-acts in relation to a preserved trace, which is to say, perception 
becomes recognition.  
 
This, then, is precisely the condition that Cage diagnoses in his critique of 
communication and the expressive function of music: the necessity for what is heard 
to relate, perceptibly, to a pre-established set of audible forms, in order that the listener 
may react in a predetermined and predictable manner, which is to say, in the same 
manner each time one listens. Indeed, the Western tradition of music itself, as 
established in Chapter Two, is, for Cage, only the set of coded conventions through 
which all sound is subordinated to this re-activity through which the auditory judges 
the sound heard with regard to its familiarity, its proximity to those traces of previous 
musical experiences. Thus, traditional structural elements such as ‘themes and 
secondary themes; their struggle; their development; the climax; the recapitulation’, 
for instance, are ‘bound up with memory’ and manifest the ‘belief that one may own 
one’s own home’—which is to say, that one may securely inhabit the space of music 
(S 11).  
 
Thus, Cage remarks that ‘it is so difficult to listen to music we are familiar with’, 
insofar as ‘memory has acted to keep us aware of what will happen next’; to listen, 
then, is precisely to hear without memory, to hear actively. For Cage, though ‘[w]e 
would be stupid if we didn’t have memory’, nevertheless, ‘it’s that memory that one 
has to become free of’ (MC 223). Further, it is on this basis that Cage will, on 
occasion, invoke his own evaluative criterion regarding what constitutes the 
distinction between good and bad with regard to his own work: if a work is ‘good’ it is 




before’ (MC 214). Or, more bluntly: ‘My tendency is to prefer music I haven’t heard 
to music I have heard’ (MC 186).103 
 
What is more, this diagnosis allows us to add a further degree of significance to the 
diagnosis of contemporaneity outlined both in the first chapter and at the outset of this 
one: for Stiegler, to recall, technics is the exteriorization of the memory apparatus, and 
contemporary disorientation is derived from the industrialization of this apparatus, 
which served to effectively eradicate temporal orientation as such. This manifested 
audibly in what Attali termed repetition, a mode of sonic and socio-cultural 
organization in which the stockpiling of sonic objects—that is, the constant expansion 
of auditory memory—and the consequent oversaturation of the present with the past 
prevented any coherent articulation of a future. “Our time”, then, can be defined as 
essentially reactive to the degree that the technical expansion of memory causes 
reaction to ‘overrun’ consciousness, to undermine our capacity to hear anew, and to 
reduce sonic experience to an encounter with the already-heard.104 
 
The question, then, is once again how we are to respond to this situation—how are we 
to become-active? Which is to say: how we are to resist this becoming-reactive, to 
restore our capacity to forget, and thereby to act our reactions? For Deleuze, it is 
precisely perception, as distinct from memory (at least in the latter’s reactive form—
which, I must stress, is not its only form), that offers the model of an acted reaction: 
‘when reactive forces take conscious excitation as their object, then the corresponding 
reaction is itself acted’ (NP 106). Which is to say, though the position of the spectator 
(at least within the remit of an existing sensibility) is inherently reactive, this reaction 
does not prevent the listener being of the active type—so long as their reactions are 
acted, which is to say so long as their object is a ‘conscious excitation’ not covered 
over by memory traces. It is this capacity that Cage sought to affirm in the listener, 
beginning with his critique of communication and self-expression: it was not an 
absence of reaction that Cage sought, not a suppression of feeling or emotion, but a 
                                                        
103 These claims regarding memory relate to Cage’s famous and problematic distaste for 
improvisation: ‘I’ve always been opposed to improvisation because you do only what you 
remember’ (MC 270). I will return to this opposition in the conclusion. 
104 Again, these considerations serve to explain not only Cage’s opposition to memory, but 
also to records: ‘I should like to make it clear that I do not have any records in my home…’ 




reaction that was in each case active. As he puts it: ‘sounds, when allowed to be 
themselves, do not require that those who hear them do so unfeelingly. The opposite is 
what is meant by response ability’ (S 10). This ability to respond—which is to say, to 
act one’s reactions—is dependent, for Cage as much as for Deleuze-Nietzsche, upon a 
disinvestment of memory; Cage frequently evokes a correspondence, if not an 
equivalence, between ‘taste and memory’ as those elements of the listener that allow 
for ‘value judgments’, preventing an encounter with sounds themselves to the degree 
that the listener thereby assumes the position of the spectator, seeking to evaluate, 
passively, the pleasure or use they stand to draw from the (re-)act of audition, and to 
affirm or deny, thereby, the value of the activity of sound itself (S 59). 
 
Under what conditions, then, can the listener be induced to act their reactions, and to 
encounter the objet of conscious perception in and through an active force of 
forgetting? As I will show, this capacity on the part of the listener is, for Cage, 
inseparable from the conditions under which sound itself would be able to act—and, 
therefore, from a renewed and specifically experimental encounter with the essence of 
sound. To establish this last point first, before taking up those conditions more fully, 
we can recall that an active conception of value (as opposed to the passive judgment of 
the spectator), as the correlate of sense, refers to a differential relation between forces, 
and that this relation is determined as either affirmative or negative, with these two 
poles bearing a ‘deep affinity, a complicity’ with active and reactive forces, 
respectively (NP 50). This is so insofar as, on the one hand, an active force is defined 
as a force going to the limit of what it can do, whereas an affirmative will is precisely 
the ‘power of becoming active’ (NP 50) to the degree that what is affirmed is the 
‘difference’ of the active force from that which it encounters (NP 57). Thus, Deleuze 
will state: ‘[b]ecoming active […] presupposes the affinity of action and affirmation: 
in order to become active it is not sufficient for a force to go to the limit of what it can 
do, it must make what it can do an object of affirmation’ (NP 63). Essence as sense 
and value, then, is redefined in terms of a relation between active force and affirmative 
will—the thing or phenomenon goes to the limit of what it can do, and in so doing 
affirms its difference, that what it can do is exactly what it can do by going to the limit 





The becoming-active of both sound and the listener, as forces whose relation 
constitutes the phenomenon of audition, thus requires the affirmation of difference, as 
distinct from the passive judgment of utility which itself turns upon the dominance of 
reactive memory traces; this affirmation would reveal a renewed essence of sonority to 
the degree that it would uncover what sound can do, the limits of its capacity to act. 
What is more, this affirmation would involve a corresponding distance between not 
only composer and listener, but between composer and listener both, on the one hand, 
and the activity of sound itself, on the other:105 affirmation of difference is at the same 
time the preservation of distance, and early in the text Deleuze posits their 
equivalence, such that the differential element of the relation of forces is precisely 
their intrinsic and ineradicable distance (NP 2, 6). This possibility leads us to pose the 
question that will be the final concern of this thesis: how do we affirm? That is, how 
does thought affirm its distance from what it thinks, in order that both thought and its 
object can become active? As I hope to indicate more fully, this is indistinguishable 
from the question I have pursued throughout both this chapter and the preceding one: 
how do we construct a thought without image? 
 
On this point, we can finally return to the relation between creation and chance 
indicated previously. My claim, which the remainder of this thesis will seek to 
elaborate and to defend, is that, for Deleuze as much as for Cage, the becoming-active 
of thought and sound involves not just the affirmation of difference, but, what is more, 
the ‘affirmation of chance’ (NP 24). In order to elaborate and defend this claim, we 
must pursue the sense in which chance forms precisely a condition for the affirmation 
of difference and distance that would allow both sound and listener to go to the limits 
of what they can do. I want to begin by tracing out the logic of Cage’s development on 
this point—that is, indicating how Cage’s critical engagement with self-expression and 
communication (defined in the preceding chapter through the image of thought as 
recognition), and his corresponding attempt to let sounds be themselves, ultimately 
turned upon the development of a renewed compositional method—that is, a method 
                                                        
105 The potential persistence of the subject-object relation, or a similar ‘point-system’ whose 
model is ultimately communicative, is thereby subverted (TP 324); instead, we reach what 
Cage calls a ‘situation involving multiplicity’ (S 101). Yet we must recall that, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, the multiple is attained by the subtraction of a supplementary dimension (TP 7), 
and not by the addition of new elements that can always, in the last instance, be reduced to the 




that would allow him to accomplish precisely such a “letting be”—in which chance 
procedures substituted for personal taste or value judgment. From this, I want to 
indicate how these procedures, and the conception of chance upon which they were 
based, allowed for a renewed, active relation between the listener and the sonic object 
that will be counterposed to the object of recognition analysed in the preceding 
chapter—a relation that Deleuze terms an encounter. Finally, I will indicate how 
Cage’s deployment of chance in order to produce objects of an encounter rather than 
of recognition ultimately demanded a revaluation of his own conception of the essence 
of sound—a revaluation that passes from identity to multiplicity, thus proceeding 




5. Affirming the Whole of Chance 
 
In order to begin, let us take up, once again, the problem Cage confronted in his 
pursuit of an ‘all-sound music of the future’ during the course of the nineteen-forties: 
the desire to allow music to “include” all sound—which would be to say, to allow 
sound to go to the limit of what it could do—is stymied by the predetermination of the 
available sonic material through the desire to communicate and/or an individually-
manifesting but inevitably socially-determined aesthetic preference for certain 
sounds—what Cage refers to as ‘musical habits,’ and which we have encountered 
above in terms of the reactive memory trace and the value judgment of the spectator (S 
9). Hence, Cage’s decision to forego self-expression, and the corresponding 
affirmation of a desire to ‘let sounds be themselves’ (S 10), are to be understood, in 
these terms, as a necessary condition for sonority to become liberated from such habits 
that would delimit in advance the sphere of the properly musical—which is to say, the 
recognizably musical—and allow both sound and listener to become active. How, 
then, did Cage pursue this becoming active after the perceived failure of his expressive 
works and the corresponding decision to ‘stop writing music until [he] found a better 
reason than “self-expression” for doing it’ (Larson 2013, 120; Cage 1991)? 
 
I want to stress, initially, that it was in this context that the term experimentation was 




“letting be” could be attained: ‘Those involved in experimental music find ways and 
means to remove themselves from the activities of the sounds they make’ (S 10, my 
emphasis); experimentation is thus defined as a means to let sound act. Yet Cage’s 
own attempt to uncover such ‘ways and means’ was neither simple nor 
straightforward, and my account will distinguish two central moments: the deployment 
of chance procedures, beginning with the Concerto for Prepared Piano and Chamber 
Orchestra in 1950, and the embrace of indeterminacy, whose foundational moment 
was Cage’s famous experience in the anechoic chamber at Harvard in 1952. With 
regard to each of these two stages, I wish to indicate how Cage’s compositional 
practice—which I want to figure here as a practice of thinking that takes place 
“through” sonority—proceeds in a manner analogous to Deleuze’s own attempt to 
renew the practice of philosophy. That is to say, in each case, what are sought are the 
conditions of a ‘true creation’ through the affirmation of chance (DR 176). 
 
The Concerto of 1950 is an exemplary work with regard to Cage’s solution to the 
difficulties he encountered with his expressive works of the nineteen-forties, outlined 
in the preceding chapter: it structurally dramatizes his conflictual relation to such 
expressive works, and the possibilities he envisaged for escaping their limitations and 
allowing sound to become active. Its significance for Cage’s overall development 
cannot be overstated: in Cage’s own words, the piece was ‘like the opening of another 
door’ (quoted in Silverman 2010, 99)—a door that led him towards the embrace of 
chance procedures that would ultimately come to dominate his working process for the 
rest of his life. The piece, composed following a galvanizing trip to Paris during which 
he began a short-lived but intense friendship with Pierre Boulez,106 consisted of three 
movements enacting a “dialogue” between the piano and the chamber orchestra; in the 
first two movements, the soloist and the ensemble each, in Cage’s own words, 
‘express’ an ‘opinion’ regarding whether music should be ‘felt’ or should rather ‘give 
up personal taste’, while the third movement would ‘[signify] the coming together of 
things that were opposed,’ and, in James Pritchett’s words, ‘completely integrate the 
piano and orchestra’ in a shared impersonality (66). As I will show, this piece is not 
                                                        
106 Boulez, who is a principal musical referent for Deleuze (see in particular TM 156-160, 292-
299), would subsequently distinguish his own use of chance in composition from that of Cage, 
and, partly for this reason, the friendship between the two would rapidly cool. For an 




only summary with regard to the methods Cage had developed during the nineteen-
forties for embracing the entirety of sound, but, in staging these methods as only 
preparative with regard to the elimination of expressivity, it demonstrates how this 
latter would, in fact, turn back upon some of the certainties that underpinned the 
former, and force Cage to entirely revise his approach to composition, as well as his 
conception of the essence of sound, which would take on a new sense and a new value 
through the conjunction of an active force and an affirmative will. 
 
In order to demonstrate this, let us consider the technical means of staging this 
“dispute” within the movements of the Concerto. The contrast between the two 
‘opinions’ was achieved by the renewed deployment of what Cage referred to as a 
‘gamut technique’ (Pritchett 1993, 40), developed during the late nineteen-forties as a 
way of practically subordinating the specific musical content of a piece (which at the 
time Cage was calling ‘form’) to its rhythmic structure—which, as discussed in the 
preceding chapter and briefly above, was central to Cage’s attempt to allow 
composition to formally embrace any possible sound, insofar as duration was, at this 
stage, taken by Cage to be the parameter of sound common to both the entirety of 
sound and to silence. Yet, as discussed previously, this structural element was 
maintained in explicit tension with expressivity at the level of ‘form,’ manifesting in a 
set of dualisms such as law and freedom, or grace and clarity.  
 
Thus, the gamut technique functioned, initially, as a practical means to the resolution 
of such dualisms, as a process of selection of sonic materials defined in advance of the 
process of composition; in Pritchett’s words, ‘[i]n this usage, a gamut is simply a 
specific collection of musical materials to be used in a piece, defined before the rest of 
the process of composition continues’ (40). Cage’s development of the gamut 
technique was initially conditioned, then, by the difficulty of relating the in-principle 
openness of the rhythmic structure—its embrace of all-sound—to concrete sounds; in 
the context of Cage’s first orchestral piece, the ballet score The Seasons (1947), this 
was specifically a problem of how to avoid ‘harmonic progression’ (41). By selecting 
sonorities in advance, and then placing them within the rhythmic structure by means of 
various permutations of these same basic materials, any familiar harmonic progression 




distaste for such progressions on Cage’s part, and his desire to avoid them on the basis 
of this personal preference. 
 
Yet clearly this technique was only a partial solution: there remained ‘a great deal of 
freedom in the use of the gamut in The Seasons’ (48), a freedom that, as we have 
heard, would become increasingly problematic to the degree that it continued to 
implicate a set of likes and dislikes—such as, in this case, Cage’s particular dislike of 
traditional harmony. The technique’s subsequent use in String Quartet in Four Parts 
(1949-50) would attempt to mitigate this aspect by restricting the material even further 
and limiting the combinations used, but Cage’s thinking at the time, expressed in 
particular in the text “Forerunners of Modern Music,” published in The Tiger’s Eye in 
1949 and subsequently collected in Silence, was pushing at the limits of this method. 
In this text, Cage maintains the tension between structure (as music’s ‘divisibility into 
successive parts’—hence necessarily durational by definition) and form (as ‘content’ 
or ‘continuity’), with the former ‘mind-controlled’ and determined through ‘precision, 
clarity, and the observance of rules’ while the latter ‘wants only freedom to be’ and 
‘belongs to the heart’ (S 62). Structure here is, once again, explicitly rhythmic, insofar 
as ‘[a]ny sounds of any qualities and pitches (known or unknown, definite or 
indefinite), any contexts of these, simple or multiple, are natural and conceivable 
within a rhythmic structure which equally embraces silence’ (S 65). 
 
Yet the question remains: if in principle any sound—that is, any form—can be 
contained within a rhythmic structure, how does one select a particular form in 
practice? Which is, it should be noted, a problem of how to determine the sense of 
Cage’s identification of the essence of sonority as duration: if rhythmic structure is 
‘correct’ to the degree that it corresponds to the essence of sonority, how is this 
correspondence to be affirmed in practice, and on the basis of what understanding of 
duration? Significantly, at this stage Cage names method as the ‘means of controlling 
the continuity’—which is to say, of relating form to structure—but remarks that 
method ‘may be planned or improvised’, and ‘[n]ormally the choice of sounds is 
determined by what is pleasing and attractive to the ear’ (S 62). As we have 
established, Cage would subsequently come to recognize that such a method would 
ultimately lead to a freedom that is ‘of no interest whatsoever’, and which could only 




composer—and that the corresponding listening experience would be, in Deleuze’s 
terms, fundamentally reactive, on the model of the passive spectator (CWC 72). Even 
at this stage, such a tension is manifest in Cage’s writing: the text features an interlude 
in which Cage cites Meister Eckhart on the search for ‘unselfconsciousness’ (S 64), 
and concludes with the claim that the ‘in-the-heart path of music’—which is to say, 
the determination and selection of form—‘leads now to self-knowledge through self-
denial’ (S 66). 
 
It is this tension that the divergent ‘opinions’ of the Concerto was to express and to 
resolve—but, as I will indicate, the very techniques Cage developed in order to 
dramatize this tension sonically would turn back upon the terms of the problem, 
providing not a solution but a demand to ask different questions in the pursuit of 
sound’s essence. In composing the parts that were to signify the giving up of personal 
taste, Cage deployed a development of the gamut technique in which the materials, 
instead of being deployed in a linear fashion, were arranged in a chart (in this case, 14 
by 16), wherein each “cell” contained simple sonorities, and the continuity (that is, the 
method) was determined by means of what Cage termed ‘moves of a thematic 
nature’—in effect, simple steps (e.g. two down, three across) that connected distinct 
sounds in a way that implied no continuous relation between elements. I will return to 
the conceptual implications of this process shortly, but, on a practical level, Cage was 
quick to see how this mode of arrangement—or, we could say, assemblage—could be 
pushed much further. The third movement was to express the resolution of the tension 
between structure and form, but far from constituting the dialectical resolution that 
Cage implicitly sought when describing it as ‘the coming together of things that were 
opposed’ (quoted in Pritchett 1993, 62), it effectively eliminated the dualisms with 
which Cage had been working in favour of an encounter with sound as pure 
difference. 
 
Significantly, this encounter was dependent upon the revelation of chance—a 
revelation whose implications would be drawn progressively over the subsequent 
eighteen months, and whose gradual ramifications I hope to trace through the 
remaining sections of this chapter. Initially, Cage noted how the use of what Pritchett 
calls ‘arbitrary moves’ on the charts, in Cage’s words, ‘brings [him] closer to a 




unite form (as the selection of sonic material) and structure (as that which allowed for 
the in principle equality of all sound) in the suspension of expressive intention (71). 
Prior to writing the third movement, Cage was famously gifted a copy of the I Ching 
by Christian Wolff, a Chinese divinatory text that provided responses to questions 
asked of it by the selection, through the tossing of yarrow stalks (traditionally), of one 
of sixty-four hexagrams and interpreting its associated meaning. Arriving at a 
fortuitous moment, the text offered a solution to both Cage’s compositional and 
metaphysical needs at that moment; indeed, we can note that Cage, by his own 
account, had first come across the I Ching in San Francisco Public Library in 1936, 
where Lou Harrison had introduced it to him, yet it was only when gifted the book by 
Wolff that he was ‘struck immediately by the possibility of using [it]’ (quoted in 
Larson, 174).  
 
What, then, had changed in the intervening years? Certainly, Cage had only come to 
discover the compositional necessity to renounce self-expression after the “failures” of 
the mid-nineteen-forties, but this discovery was itself inseparable from Cage’s 
development of a broader aesthetic and metaphysical position during this period, 
rooted in an encounter with South and East Asian thought. During the course of the 
nineteen-forties, Cage’s initial interest in Indian philosophy (established through his 
friendships with the Indian musician Gita Sarabhi and the mythologist Joseph 
Campbell) had developed and shifted into an engagement with Zen Buddhism, in 
particular thanks to the work of D. T. Suzuki, a scholar of Zen who gave a series of 
lectures in New York City in 1950 and ’51. Though Suzuki himself was, in Kay 
Larson’s words, ‘cautious’ about the I Ching, nevertheless Suzuki’s teaching was, for 
Cage, effectively a spiritual and metaphysical legitimation of his musical struggles, 
and of the use of the I Ching as a solution to them (179). Insofar as Suzuki’s teaching 
of Zen emphasized (at least on Cage’s reading) the necessity to relinquish the ego, 
Cage, on this basis, ultimately understood his use of the I Ching as related to, or a 
substitute for, the Buddhist practice of zazen—that is, literally, ‘to sit in meditation’ 
(Suzuki, 34n2). As Cage puts it:  
 
Following my studies with Suzuki Diasetz in the philosophy of Zen 
Buddhism, I have used in all my work […] I Ching chance operations in 
order to free my mind (ego) from its likes and dislikes, trusting that this 





Thus, the I Ching not only fulfilled Cage’s musical needs—the need, in particular, for 
the third movement of the Concerto to musically dramatise the “resolution” in favour 
of impersonality—but also aligned with his more general sense of the value and 
validity of relinquishing the merely personal. 
 
Though Cage’s reliance on Zen Buddhism to support and legitimize his compositional 
practices falls beyond the scope of this thesis, there are nevertheless two points that 
merit noting here. Firstly, it must be stressed that Cage’s use of Zen to formulate and 
defend his aesthetic practices was highly influential on key elements within the New 
York City art scene in the nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties, initially through 
talks presented at the Artists’ Club, including “Lecture on Nothing’ and “Lecture on 
Something”, and then through the class on ‘Experimental Composition’ Cage taught at 
the New School in 1957 and ’58 (see Kim 2011). Amongst Cage’s students in this 
class were many of the significant contributors to the Fluxus movement and early 
pioneers of conceptual art, including Allan Kaprow, George Brecht and Yoko Ono.107 
 
Secondly, and by contrast, Cage’s engagement with Zen has been subject to critique 
for the potentially Orientalist implications of his partial and instrumentalising usage, 
as well as for the way in which this partiality was often covered over by 
pronouncements that conveyed a degree of authority; indeed, though Cage may have 
remarked that ‘what I do I do not wish blamed on Zen’ (quoted in Patterson, 41), 
nevertheless there are no shortage of definitive claims in Cage’s writing regarding the 
meaning or significance of Zen. On the basis of this tension, that is manifested both 
conceptually and aesthetically in his work, both John Corbett and E. J. Crooks have 
argued that Cage displayed an ‘oblique’ (Corbett 2000, 169) or ‘affirmative’ 
Orientalism (Crooks 2011, 27), characterised by an autodidactic engagement with a 
relatively limited set of sources; this particular form of Orientalism is distinctive, 
musically, insofar as it influenced his conceptual approach to composition, rather than 
being used in a ‘decorative’ fashion  through an imitative resemblance with the 
musical traditions of East Asia (Corbett 2011, 172).108  
 
                                                        
107 Peter Osborne’s Conceptual Art emphasizes Cage’s significance in this regard (54-55). 




This aspect of Cage’s work is doubtless significant and has only recently received due 
attention; nevertheless, a closer consideration falls beyond the scope of this thesis, 
which will emhpasise, instead, the distinct musical logic of Cage’s development—
even if, though distinct, it is ultimately inseparable from his engagement with East 
Asian philosophy.109 Thus, as indicated previously, at the moment Cage was gifted the 
text by Christian Wolff, it served as an immediately practical solution to a 
compositional difficulty: the erasure of self-expression. Cage, noting the proximity 
between the arrangement of hexagrams in four columns in the back of the edition 
Wolff gifted him and the charts used for composing the Concerto, realized that the 
resolution of the final movement in favour of impersonality could be expressed by 
substituting the arbitrary moves between cells with the selection of cells using the I 
Ching, with each hexagram corresponding to a single cell. This method would serve 
not only for the completion of the Concerto, but also for the following year’s Music of 
Changes, a major work for piano composed entirely using the I Ching. 
 
It cannot be overstated the degree to which the discovery and subsequent use of 
chance procedures was revelatory for Cage—as he wrote to Boulez, ‘I have the feeling 
of just beginning to compose for the first time’ (quoted in Silverman 2010, 102). I 
want to indicate, initially, two principal consequences Cage drew from them, before 
turning to the relation between chance and affirmation. The first consequence bears 
upon the practice of composition. For Cage, chance, as a truly non-intentional method 
of composition, transformed what it was to make music: Cage’s compositions no 
                                                        
109 There are a number of brief allusions to Zen in The Logic of Sense—particularly regarding 
the relevance of the Zen koan to Deleuze’s theory of paradox—that suggest the possibility of 
incorporating Cage’s reading of Zen Buddhist texts into the Cage-Deleuze assemblage I am 
attempting to construct here; indeed, when asking after the person who would be capable of 
affirming univocity (a familiar Deleuzian move at this stage in his work), he remarks that it 
‘would be necessary to imagine someone one-third Stoic, one-third Zen, and one-third Carroll’ 
(LS 285, see also 11, 55, 66). I do not attempt such a task here for two related reasons: firstly, 
these references are so brief that expanding upon them in relation to Deleuze’s work would be 
a significant and demanding task in its own right; secondly, any engagement with this aspect 
of Cage’s work that does not endeavor to assess as fully as possible the specific limitations of 
Cage’s engagement with these traditions, and assess the degree of his deviations from them, 
would serve only to repeat and reinforce the Orientalising gestures to be found in Cage’s own 
work. As Crooks notes, ‘[w]riters surveying Cage’s work have frequently presented him as an 
authority on Asia,’ and if this imputation of authority to Cage—often, as noted, derived in the 
first instance from his own framing of his knowledge—is to be challenged, engagements with 
this topic must seek to far more specifically delineate the nature of his knowledge and the 




longer represented his ‘control’ over sounds—a control that would inevitably impose 
the form of recognition upon the object produced—but rather ‘questions that I’ve 
asked’: ‘I’ve merely changed my responsibility from making choices to asking 
questions’ (CWC 228). Yet, it remains nonetheless a responsibility—and, what is 
more, this does not manifest a contradiction, as some have suggested, but rather, in 
terms of my engagement with Deleuze, the way in which chance is active and 
affirmative, rather than reactive.110 What is vital is the following: for Cage, the 
affirmation of chance is not a question of dismissing all evaluation so as to embrace 
the totality of sound in a fashion that would render it an indifferent and abstract unity; 
rather, the deployment of chance remains an activity, but one whose terms and 
conditions radically reconfigure the sense of the creative act itself, and, moreover, one 
which remains subject to critique to the degree that, in Deleuze’s words, we are able to 
‘[apply] the test of truth and falsity to problems’, and the questions they manifest, 
rather than simply to the “facts” that function merely as cases of solution (DR 198). As 
Cage puts it, ‘[w]hat can be analysed in my work, or criticized, are the questions I ask’ 
(CWC 89). I will return to and amplify this argument shortly. 
 
The second consequence follows from this: the shift from making choices to asking 
questions is premised, for Cage, on a liberation from the necessity to impose relations 
upon sounds, relations that are inevitably predetermined by ‘musical habits’; rather, in 
the deployment of chance, Cage came to affirm that ‘[w]e don’t have to bring about 
relationships’ precisely because such relations occur in and of themselves: ‘all things 
are related’ (quoted in Larson, 173). Yet, again, this is not to appeal to a purely 
indifferent chaos or abstract generality; rather, the ‘complexity of chance’, in music as 
in life (and I will return to this uncertain equivalence), in which ‘layers of chance are 
superimposed at every moment,’ entails a relation of differences that are irreducible to 
prior identities, with the latter exemplified by the dualisms upon which Cage had 
previously relied: if chance ‘allows this and excludes that’, it nevertheless, at the same 
moment, evades ‘radical alternatives between opposites’ (FTB 94). It is this distinction 
                                                        
110 Kim-Cohen considers this necessity for continuing to make decisions as effectively in 
tension with Cage’s professed aim of letting sound act: ‘As aleatory and systems-generated 
works make apparent, one must always make a decision on how to begin (or whether to begin 
at all)’ (114). As I hope is clear from the foregoing, despite the immediate sense of some of 
Cage’s formulations—particularly regarding “letting be” or “acceptance”—his actual 
compositional practice recognized the necessity for actively constructing situations in which 




that is captured in the shift from choice to chance, rather than the facile opposition 
between aesthetic production as self-expression or a purportedly “complete” freedom. 
Thus, chance, as an experimental method, both generates and responds to a 
transformation in the sense/essence of sonority: sound manifests as an active force to 
the degree that what were once static characteristics become active capacities, and its 
durational nature is re-configured as a capacity to actively produce relations. 
 
Finally, then, at the methodological level the solution turns back upon the problem: the 
dialectic of structure and form, mind and heart, discipline and freedom, is subverted 
rather than resolved. The affirmation of chance implies a revaluation of the relation 
between action and intention, and between intention and freedom: chance is opposed 
to ‘purpose’ and to the ‘end to be obtained’ (NP 24-25).111 Indeed, in order to ‘abolish 
chance’, one needs only to proceed by ‘holding it in the grip of causality and finality’, 
and thereby to judge to the outcome in terms of its utility—which is to say, to remain a 
spectator. Thus, becoming active—which is to say, affirmation—is not to be opposed 
to discipline or constraint, but is rather conditioned by them; just as, for Deleuze, 
‘motives’ are a ‘superficial aspect of human activity’ (NP 29), so, for Cage, chance 
undoes the dichotomy which would oppose freedom in and through intentions to the 
constraint of structure; in both cases, action demands a paradoxical acceptance, in 
Cage’s words, or affirmation, in Deleuze’s, of what happens insofar as it happens—
amor fati, the love of fate, as the secret of all willing (LS 170-72). 
 
Yet this suggests an important point regarding the significance of chance—or rather, 
what it means to affirm chance. For chance is not necessarily affirmed; or rather, it is 
only affirmed once it is related to necessity. In order to understand this, let us return to 
the image of the dice-throw that, as noted previously, underpins the relation between 
chance, creation and thinking upon which Deleuze insists. In both Nietzsche and 
Philosophy and Difference and Repetition, as well as The Logic of Sense, a distinction 
is drawn between two ways in which one can throw the dice—which is to say, two 
deployments of chance, two different games or ways of playing (NP 35; Deleuze is 
                                                        
111 As Cage remarked to Boulez with regard to the use of the I Ching in the final movement of 
the Concerto: ‘By making moves on the charts I freed myself from what I had thought to be 





ambiguous on this point, see also LS 70). In the first case, the ‘bad player counts on 
several throws of the dice,’ in order to ‘[make] use of causality and probability to 
produce a combination that he sees as desirable’ (NP 25); thus, in making use of 
chance, one retains the reactive position of the spectator, who judges the outcome 
equally regardless of the shift from expression to chance procedures at the level of 
method. As Deleuze elaborates in Difference and Repetition, in this case ‘even when 
[man] is given a situation of chance or multiplicity,’ nevertheless ‘he understands 
affirmations as destined to impose limits upon it, his decisions as destined to ward off 
its effects’ by appealing to a ‘winning hypothesis’ (DR 141-42); affirmation becomes 
conditional on the “success” of the throw. The introduction of chance is thus mitigated 
by the evaluation of each “throw” according to an intended or predicted outcome that, 
by its nature, is external to the throw itself—as Deleuze puts it elsewhere, the criteria 
of evaluation are transcendent, rather than immanent, which is to say, the “truthful 
world” is reintroduced in order to ground the evaluation (SPP 23).112 
 
Cage’s own practical deployment of the experimental impetus, particularly through the 
use of chance procedures in his compositions from 1950 onwards, pursues precisely 
the same logic; as he puts it in an interview with Daniel Charles: ‘if we want to use 
chance operations, then we must accept the results. We have no right to use it if we are 
determined to criticize the results and seek a better answer’ (FTB 94). Or, as he 
remarks in an interview with Joan Retallack, in an even greater proximity to Deleuze’s 
reading of Nietzsche: ‘if you assume that you’re winning at every moment, then you 
proceed’ (MC 237). In sum, then, by evaluating chance according to an intention 
established at the outset, then, we fail to play insofar as we are not willing to affirm 
chance as such and as a whole; rather, we judge that which we encounter according to 
a rule that pre-exists, and determines whether we have won and lost. The connection to 
Cage’s definition of experimentation, cited by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus 
and considered initially in Chapter Two, is clear: it is to be understood ‘not as an act to 
be later judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as […] an act the outcome 
of which is unknown’ (S 13, cited at AO 405). As we have heard, for Deleuze this is 
precisely the condition of action as such—a force only goes to the limit of what it can 
do if it is not subordinated to the passive judgment of the spectator, for whom an act’s 
                                                        




value is determined ‘in terms of success or failure,’ which is to say, on the merit, or 
lack thereof, of its outcome. Affirmation, then, simply is becoming active to the very 
degree that it is an affirmation of chance, and, at the same moment and for the same 
reason, an affirmation of the necessity of chance: only on such a condition can the 
active force resist judgments stemming from ‘memory and habit,’ which, for Cage as 
much as for Deleuze, are ‘essentially reactive’ (NP 38), insofar as they inevitably 
separate force from what it can do, making what happens into the ‘act of a subject’ 
who was thereby ‘free to manifest [its force] or not’ (NP 115). 
 
Thus, if the affirmation of chance, and chance’s necessity—which is to say the 
affirmation of ‘the all of chance’ (DR 142)—inevitably turns back upon and 
reconfigures Cage’s dichotomous struggle between the freedom of the intentional act 
and the passive submission to the discipline of structure, it is because it separates 
activity from subjectivity—and therefore demands a transformation of the latter. As 
Cage puts it: ‘If I am unhappy after a chance operation, if the result does not satisfy 
me, by accepting it I at least have the chance to modify myself, to change myself’ 
(FTB 95). In a later interview with Joan Retallack, Cage summarizes this shift from 
communication to creation as follows: ‘instead of self-expression, I’m involved in 
self-alteration’ (CWC 139). This self-alteration is both condition and consequence of a 
suppression of subjectivity in the narrow, egoistic sense; thus, following his encounter 
with Zen, Cage will continually invoke the necessity of relinquishing ‘personal taste’ 
(S 30), ‘personal expression’ (S 68) or ‘individual taste and memory’ (S 59), without 
which it is impossible to ‘accept whatever comes’ (S 129).113  
 
Similarly, Deleuze will attribute a positive role to ‘self-destruction’ in the 
transformation of reaction into action: ‘it and it alone expresses the becoming-active of 
forces’ (NP 65). By extension, then, the conversion of the reactive spectator into a 
listener capable of acting their reactions proceeds not simply by affirmation—which, 
as we’ve established, is precisely becoming-active as such—but in an ‘active 
destruction’ by means of which they ‘destroy the reactive in themselves’ (NP 65). For 
                                                        
113 Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza indicates a way in which the concept of the individual can be 
revaluated according to relations between forces, as opposed to a pre-established identity: ‘An 
individual is first of all a singular essence, which is to say, a degree of power. A characteristic 
relation corresponds to this essence, and a certain capacity for being affected corresponds to 




Deleuze, this destruction passes by way of the ‘test’ of the eternal return—an 
important theme that this thesis will unfortunately not be able to treat in full—but for 
Cage we can say that it rather involves the test of the sonic encounter. I will consider 
Cage’s ultimate formulation of such a test subsequently, but initially we can simply 
note that Cage’s criticisms of those who are ‘not disciplined’, and the uninteresting 
uses they make of the freedom they are given, effectively refer to a failure to commit 
to such a destruction—they do not ‘start […] from zero’, and are thus not ‘changed 
individuals’, but rather ‘remain people will particular likes and dislikes’ (CWC 72). 
 
In summarizing the foregoing, I want to quote a number of remarks made by Cage in 
his interview with Daniel Charles, which will serve two functions beyond simply 
clarifying the development of my argument thus far: firstly, to emphasise, once again, 
the degree to which Deleuze (via Nietzsche) and Cage share a common project, even 
if, importantly, these projects proceed via distinct means; secondly, to return to the 
theme of the relation between thought and creation and, thus, the notion of a thought 
without image. For what remains to be established is the degree to which the concepts 
outlined in the foregoing—essence as sense and value, active and reactive force, 
affirmative will, chance and necessity—serve to resist and to contest the limitations of 
the dogmatic image of thought and the form of recognition by means of which it 
operates. How does the affirmation of chance make thought creative? Moreover, what 
relation does it imply between thought and time? In response to Charles’ claim—
which, as we have heard, constitutes a misinterpretation—that Cage seems ‘to profess 
a rejection of all the emotions’, Cage remarks: 
 
Emotions, like all tastes and memory, are too closely linked to the self, 
the ego. The emotions show that we are touched within ourselves, and 
tastes evidence our way of being touched on the outside. We have made 
the ego into a wall and the wall doesn’t even have a door through which 
the interior and exterior could communicate! […] What is important is 
to insert the individual into the current, the flux of everything that 
happens. And to do that, the wall has to be demolished: tastes, memory 
and emotions have to be weakened; all the ramparts razed. (FTB 56) 
 
Firstly, then, Cage’s remarks here constitute a condensed summation of the argument 
thus far. The self or ego, as repository of tastes and memory, is essentially reactive—it 




preservation of an interiority whose encounter with the outside is limited as far as 
possible, and that thus encounters only that which it has already circumscribed in 
principle, as a relative exteriority; against this, an active destruction must be pursued 
in order to ‘insert’ the individual into ‘the flux of everything that happens,’ whose 
condition would be an affirmation of, precisely, what happens, an affirmation which 
would be inextricable, moreover, from a becoming-active that pushes the subject 
beyond itself. Finally, and most significantly for my subsequent argument, we are 
returned to the thematic of this world—that is, the affirmation of ‘everything that 
happens’ is not simply a destruction of the self separated from the world, but of the 
conception of a supersensible world upon which such a separation is based. Thus, if 
Cage insistently criticizes the ‘gap between art and life’ (S 107), it is insofar as this 
gap or separation is itself premised on a conception of art that would attempt to 
preserve it from the ‘flux’ of the everyday. As Cage put it elsewhere: ‘Our intention is 
to affirm this life, not to bring order out of chaos nor to suggest improvements in 
creation, but simply to wake up to the very life we’re living, which is so excellent once 
one gets one’s mind and one’s desires out of the way and lets it act of its own accord’ 
(S 95). 
 
Ultimately, then, it is a conception of life as nothing other than the becoming of this 
world—and, therefore, as indexed to a form of time no longer subordinated to the 
measurement of repetitive, periodic movement—that joins and completes the “objects” 
of affirmation by means of which becoming active is achieved: from difference to 
chance to necessity and finally to life, it is a question of resisting that which is 
‘opposed to life’, that which is set above and beyond it and by means of which life is 
judged (NP 94). It is this opposition, as indicated above, the sits at the heart of the 
postulate of the truthful world, the transcendence that underpins it, and the image of 
thought as recognition that it sustains: the person who desires the truthful world 
necessarily ‘denies innocence’, ‘accuses and judges life’ and ‘wants life to be 
virtuous’ (NP 90). Such a person is the one who is incapable of affirming chance, of 
playing correctly—he or she is the spectator par excellence, the passive judge who can 
only react, and who seeks to separate force from what it can do.  
 
It is the image of thought as recognition, then, that the affirmation of chance finally 




creation. The only necessary thing, the only thing that thought must affirm, 
imperatively, in order to create, is the certainty that nothing is settled in advance: ‘That 
the universe has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes 
to be known—this is the certainty necessary to play well’ (NP 25). Time is no longer 
circular, and the same does not return—this is the sense in which Deleuze understands 
the affirmation of the eternal return: ‘The Identical does not return. The Same and the 
Similar […] do not return. Only affirmation returns—in other words, the Different, the 
Dissimilar’ (DR 372). Time out of joint, the pure and empty form of time, time as a 
straight-line labyrinth—these formulas, in their various ways, point towards the same 
thought: only difference returns. Cage himself will, in an intuitive fashion, express a 
similar interpretation: remarking to Daniel Charles that ‘the instant is always a 
rebirth’, in a discussion of his conception of time, Cage is then asked whether he 
‘take[s] exception to what Nietzsche envisioned under the label eternal return’—
clearly interpreting this latter as the return of the same, against Deleuze’s 
protestations; Cage remarks that ‘I would say that there is only eternal rebirth’ (FTB 
47). The degree to which this can be interpreted as aligning with Deleuze’s reading of 
Nietzsche is indicated when, as the discussion proceeds, Cage summarises his views 
by quoting René Char: ‘Each act is virgin, even the repeated one’ (FTB 48; the 
reference is to Char 1948).  
 
On this basis, then, thinking must ‘affirm life’ rather than being subordinated to ‘a 
knowledge that is opposed to life […]’ (NP 94):  
 
Life would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the 
affirmative power of life. Both would go in the same direction, carrying 
each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for 
step, in a burst of unparalleled creativity. Thinking would then mean 
discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life. (NP 94, original 
emphasis)114 
 
It is this active force of thought that would constitute the thought without image we 
have insistently sought: it is at this point that thought goes to the limit of what it can 
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Spinoza’s thought, life is not an idea, a matter of theory. It is a way of being…’ (SPP 13). The 
question, for Deleuze, then, is how theory itself can become a practice immanently related to 





do, becoming the ‘n-th power of thought’ (NP 101). Finally, then, we can begin to 
understand the degree to which a thought without image would involve an encounter 
with ‘that which can only be thought’ (DR 181), insofar as it is only within such an 
encounter that thought would affirm its own difference.  
 
Yet there is a vital element of such a claim that has yet to be elaborated. In the 
previous chapter, we have observed, in detail, the functioning of the dogmatic image 
of thought, to which the affinity of active force and affirmative will has been opposed; 
what is more, in relation to sonority, we have asserted that such an affirmation, and the 
corresponding becoming-active, would require that the difference and distance 
between sound and listener is preserved, and even made an ‘object of enjoyment’ (NP 
52); finally, it is the use of chance procedures that was to function as a means to 
engender such an affirmation. What remains to be established is how this is concretely 
achieved in a given listening experience; that is, though I examined, at length, how the 
image of thought comes to supervene upon thinking through the harmonious accord of 
the faculties and the identity of the object, we have yet to hear how thought may resist 
such a harmony in and through going to the limit of what it can do, and how, by the 
same token, the listener may come to affirm their own difference. Indeed, I have yet to 
even establish the relation between these two problems. In turning to these problems, 
then, I hope to ultimately return to the question of essence from which we began, and 
to clarify, finally, the way in which Cage’s initial attempt to determine the essence of 
sound, as discussed previously, under the pressure of his experimentation with chance 
as affirmation and becoming-active, was ultimately revaluated through a 
reconsideration of what, exactly, sound can do. 
 
 
 6. The Discordant Harmony of the Faculties 
 
I want to begin by recalling that, for Deleuze, ‘that which can only be thought […] 
signifies the highest power of thought only by designating the unthinkable or the 
inability to think’ (DR 181). The logical necessity for this claim is immediately 
evident, even if its precise meaning is not: if that which can only be thought were 
readily thinkable, there would be nothing to distinguish it from a traditional 




contrary, for Deleuze, that which must be thought ‘at the empirical level’ exceeds our 
capacity to think, and to this degree it is directly opposed to the object of recognition 
examined in the preceding chapter, which is defined by being cognized-in-advance. 
Indeed, it is in relation to precisely this point that Deleuze cites Heidegger: if ‘we are 
not yet thinking’ it is insofar as thought is ‘never the natural exercise of a faculty’, but 
that, on the contrary, thought will never go to the limit of what it can do ‘if forces do 
not do violence to it’ (NP 101). Thus, ‘[w]e are not going to think unless we are forced 
to go where the forces which give food for thought are, where the forces that make 
thought something active and affirmative are made us of’ (NP 102). The question, 
then, is under what conditions does sonority manifest such a force? My claim is not 
strictly that Cage’s chance-composed pieces function as “solutions” to this problem, 
but rather that they demonstrate Cage is posing a related question. Indeed, as Cage 
himself remarks: ‘A mind that is interested in changing […] is interested precisely in 
the things that are at extremes. [..] Unless we go to extremes, we won’t get anywhere’ 
(CWC 227). 
 
With this caveat in mind, let us consider what a form a piece of music must take in 
order to function in this manner. Deleuze is clear on this point—if the object of 
recognition sustains the image of thought, it is the object of the encounter that 
fractures it: ‘Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not 
of recognition but of a fundamental encounter’ (DR 176). Though this object ‘may be 
grasped in a range of affective tones’, nevertheless ‘its primary characteristic is that it 
can only be sensed’, and thus ‘it is opposed to recognition.’ There are two points that 
must be made here: firstly, this object, as Cage insisted, does not require the 
“spectator” to encounter it ‘unfeelingly’, but rather allows for a variety of affective 
responses; secondly, and by extension, this object is not an object of recognition to the 
degree that it fails to support the ‘harmonious exercise of the faculties upon a 
supposed same object’ (DR 169). On this basis, it is ‘in a certain sense imperceptible’: 
 
It is imperceptible precisely from the point of view of recognition—in 
other words, from the point of view of an empirical exercise of the 
senses in which sensibility grasps only that which also could be grasped 
by other faculties, and is related within the context of a common sense 






Here we find, once again, the complementarity of active force and affirmative will, 
this time at the level of the faculties: sensibility goes to the limit of its power in 
sensing that which can only be sensed, but in so doing affirms its difference and its 
distance from the other faculties; therefore, from the perspective of the model of 
recognition, which demanded the convergence of the faculties, what sensibility 
encounters is strictly imperceptible.  
 
By the same token, it is through an encounter with such an object that the spectator 
would become capable of acting their reactions—insofar as what is sensed cannot be 
recognized, the ‘conscious excitation’ is divested of memory, or at least, a particular, 
reactive form of memory. As I noted previously, Deleuze maintains a distinction 
between ‘two memories’ (NP 107), which is to say, in the context of Difference and 
Repetition, between two states of the faculty of memory. For the encounter with that 
which can only be sensed ‘moves the soul’ and ‘forces it to pose a problem’ (DR 176) 
whose initial character is to push memory itself to the limit of what it can do by 
evoking an ‘essential forgetting’ that subsists ‘within memory’ (DR 177). In the 
encounter with that which can only be sensed, which subverts the empirical, reactive 
function of memory, forgetting itself becomes an active power. Finally, and most 
significantly, this force is transmitted, once more, to thought itself: ‘it forces thought 
to grasp that which can only be thought’, the ‘essence’ as the ‘final power of thought’ 
(DR 177, my emphasis), which is ultimately nothing other than the ‘problem’ that 
passes ‘from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility, capable of 
engendering in each case, according to their own order, the limit- or transcendent-
object of each faculty’ (DR 183).  
 
The problem, then, as the divergent object of each faculty, which is to say the object of 
the encounter, is nothing other than the Idea as multiplicity, the essence said of 
difference itself (DR 230); the Idea’s origin, moreover, is nothing other than the dice 
throw insofar as the latter, as we will hear, expresses the problematic unity of the 
multiple (DR 354). For Deleuze, art itself is inseparable from the dramatization of 
Ideas, insofar as the latter constitute, in the (divergent and differential) relation 
between thought and sensation that they express, ‘complexes of space and time’, 
whose function is, ultimately, to ‘reunite the two parts of Aesthetics so unfortunately 




experimentation’ (DR 356). On this point, music and theory, at least as I articulate 
them here, intersect, or rather interfere: if they both constitute experimental practices 
of thought it is to the degree that their object is, ultimately, nothing other than the 
relation between the Idea, as differential and problematic essence, and the spatio-
temporal dynamisms that incarnate it, a relation, moreover, whose distance must be 
the object of an affirmation. It is dramatization that, ultimately, offers us an alternative 
to the question “what is x?”—if such a question, as noted above, implicitly presumes 
the simplicity and identity of the essence, the differential and problematic Idea is 
dramatized through the questions ‘who? how much? where and when? in which case?’ 
(DI 96, original emphasis). What is at stake in such questions is the essence not as a 
static identity but as determined in and through its concrete effectuations, and the 
spatio-temporal dynamisms from which it is inseparable—ultimately, it is here that 
philosophy and art can and must intersect as practices. I will return to this point at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
This summary provides us with the alternative to the model of recognition outlined 
previously: rather than the convergence of the faculties harmoniously upon a single, 
identical object, each faculty encounters its own limit, and the object itself becomes a 
problem to the degree that the faculties no longer converge upon it—from the 
perspective of such a convergence, the object is strictly imperceptible and unthinkable. 
Deleuze will thus invoke a ‘discordant harmony’ of the faculties, in which ‘each 
communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own difference 
and its divergence from the others’ (DR 183). Significantly, this discordant harmony is 
figured in terms of an unhinging: ‘Each faculty is unhinged, but what are the hinges if 
not the form of a common sense which causes all the faculties and functions to 
converge?’ (DR 177).  
 
Here we encounter, once again, the problem from which my analysis in this thesis 
began: our thought-provoking time. That is to say, for Deleuze, as indicated above, 
contemporary disorientation is to be understood as a time out of joint to the degree that 
it no longer believes in a truthful world that would provide it with an orientation in 
advance—it can no longer believe in the transcendence that guaranteed the stability 
and unity of the dogmatic image of thought. The task we are faced with, today, is 




causes to be known’ (NP 25). What we are offered here, then, with the conception of a 
thought without image as discordant harmony of the faculties, is precisely what we 
have sought throughout: a way of responding to the chaos of such a world without 
appealing to a natural image of thought, or the stability and identity of a predetermined 
essence; the faculties affirm their difference, and in so doing grasp ‘difference in 
itself’ (DR 181). 
 
Three questions arise with regard to this model of a thought without image, a thought 
within which the faculties no longer merely recognize that which is determined in 
advance but rather undergo a genesis insofar as they reach their own unique limit, 
which, as established, cannot be determined in advance: firstly, to what degree does 
this model correspond to or capture Cage’s intention in relation to his chance-
composed pieces?; secondly, and from this, to what extent could such pieces actually 
succeed in no longer functioning as objects of recognition and become, instead, 
objects of an encounter?; finally, to what degree is the problematic Idea that is the 
‘both the final power of thought and the unthinkable’ related to the affirmation of 
difference and the corresponding becoming-active that Deleuze evoked in his book on 
Nietzsche (DR 177)? 
 
To begin with the first question, it seems clear that the divergence of the faculties 
would function to describe precisely the ‘new listening’ that Cage sought to evoke. 
Such a listening, to recall, was intended to allow for the divergence of responses 
amongst listeners, rather than the ‘imposition of feelings’; thus the piece is necessarily 
unrecognizable, insofar as the ‘affective tones’ in which it might be grasped are not 
appended to it as properties of a single, same object, but are distinct in each case; 
indeed, in referring to this aspect of his work, Cage remarked ‘[m]y wish is to leave 
the attention of the faculties free’ (FTB 149). Or, at least, such is the intent.  
 
To what degree does this manifest in practice? The listener is presumed to be no 
longer able to rely on ‘musical habits’ insofar as, in the case of Music of Changes for 
instance, every element of the piece, from pitches to durations and dynamics, is 
determined by chance, and thus presents no familiar continuity, no pre-established 
relation between sonic elements. Thus not only is the piece as a whole strictly 




predetermined concept that would allow it to become an object of recognition through 
the collaboration of sense and thought—but even the individual sonic events occur as 
a ‘shock to thought’ to the degree that they cannot be predicted, but appear uniquely at 
each moment (C2 151). Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the fact that the 
process of composition is itself inaudible in performance returns us to the distinction 
between new music and new listening intimated above: not only do the resultant 
sonorities not resemble in any way the process of composing, but this divergence itself 
is affirmed as an element of the becoming-active of the listener. As Cage put it: 
‘composing’s one thing, performing’s another, listening’s a third. What can they have 
to do with one another?’ (S 15). Thus, the divergence of the faculties is concretely 
dramatized at the level of sonic practice: composer, listener and performer encounter 
and engage their unique object, and relate to one another only insofar as they affirm 
their difference. 
 
Yet it is within this last point that we can observe the possibility for a critique that 
Cage himself was to subsequently articulate—a critique that would ultimately 
transform his conception of the essence of sound and the means by which one could 
let sound express this essence by going to the limit of what it can do. In 1958, Cage 
reflected on Music of Changes in particular, and made the following remarks: 
 
Though no two performances of the Music of Changes will be identical 
[…], two performances will closely resemble one another. Though 
chance operations brought about the determinations of the composition, 
these operations are not available in performance. The function of the 
performer in the case of the Music of Changes is that of a contractor 
who, in following an architect’s blueprint, constructs a building. (S 36) 
 
Music of Changes, regardless of its method of compositions, remains a recognizable 
object at a certain level, to the degree that, once completed, it is fully determined, as 
much as any of the ‘masterpieces’ of ‘Western music’ (S 36). The piece thereby 
becomes recognizable for the repeat listener (for instance, the listener whose auditory 
archive includes a CD copy or an mp3), and in performance it functions as a 
‘Frankenstein’s monster’ insofar as it functions to ‘control a human being’—that is, 
insofar as Cage was ‘still making an object’ (Larson 2013, 261). Whatever the degree 
to which chance was affirmed in its composition, at the level of both performance and 




musical objecthood, and to this extent reverts, in the last instance, to a familiarly 
musical form—or, put otherwise, to the form of musical familiarity. 
 
Cage’s remarks, taken from his series of lectures at Darmstadt, indicate the distance 
covered by Cage between the early chance pieces—Music of Changes was the first 
major work produced using the I Ching, composed immediately following the 
Concerto for Prepared Piano and Chamber Orchestra in 1951—and his work in the 
late-fifties and onwards. I want to now turn to a pivotal moment in this period, one that 
marked not only Cage’s definitive reconsideration of his attempt to articulate the 
essence of sonority, but a renewal of the methods by which this essence could be 
expressed: the famous experience in the anechoic chamber in Harvard, in 1952, and 
the premiere of 4’33’’ the same year. As the title of this piece indicates, what is at 
stake is the claim from which my engagement with Cage in this chapter began: the 
relationship between duration and the essence of sonority. I want to read this piece as, 
effectively, both an exemplification of the renewed sense and value this relation takes 
on as an effect of the affirmation of chance and, from this, the dramatization of this 
sense and value in and through a concrete experience in which affirmation is 
practically achieved—and to this extent, constitutes a test, for Cage as much as for the 
listener, of what sound can do. 
 
 
7. There is No Such Thing as Silence 
 
In order to establish this, I want to begin by setting out some of the familiar 
biographical elements that led to the production of the piece. Firstly, let us recall 
Cage’s account of the essence of sound that determined his compositional practice 
throughout the nineteen-forties: ‘Sound has four characteristics: pitch, timbre, 
loudness and duration’ and ‘[t]he opposite and necessary coexistent of sound is 
silence’ (S 63). When asked about these characteristics by Joan Retallack in 1992, 
Cage remarked: ‘At the time, of thinking that, I thought silence existed’ (MC 206). 
Yet, in his own words, he had ‘never put silence to the test.’ Thus, in 1952, Cage 
sought to encounter silence, to finally make audible the premise upon which his 
compositional methods had been based—that is, to produce a piece of music that was 




Robert Rauschenberg; with regard to the latter’s White Paintings, Cage remarked: 
‘[w]hen I saw those, I said, “Oh yes, I must; otherwise I’m lagging, otherwise music is 
lagging”’ (CWC 71). Yet the notion of producing a silent piece had, by his own 
admission, been on his mind since at least the late nineteen-forties: in a 1948 lecture 
titled “A Composer’s Confessions”, Cage described his ‘absurd’ but ‘serious’ idea to 
‘compose a piece of uninterrupted silence and sell it to Muzak Co.’; the piece, titled 
Silent Prayer, would be ‘3 or 4 ½ minutes long—those being the standard lengths of 
canned music’ (quoted in Kahn 1999, 178). 
 
By 1952, then, Cage was positioned to finally pursue this project—a project that 
would be the ultimate declaration of his own position regarding the essential nature of 
sound in and through its ‘opposite,’ silence. In entering the anechoic chamber at 
Harvard, he ‘really expected to hear nothing’, and for his compositional practice to be 
validated in experience (CWC 270). This, of course, was not the case. He would tell 
and re-tell the story of the ensuing experience throughout the rest of his life:  
 
For certain engineering purposes, it is desirable to have as silent a 
situation as possible. Such a room is called an anechoic chamber, its six 
walls made of a special material, a room without echoes. I entered one at 
Harvard University several years ago and heard two sounds, one high 
and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he 
informed me that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the 
low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And 
they will continue following my death. (S 8)115 
 
Thus, as Cage put it elsewhere, what he discovered was simply that ‘there is no such 
thing as silence’ (S 50-51). ‘[S]o-called silence’ now designated not the absence of 
sounds, which was impossible, but simply those sounds that were ‘not intended’; thus, 
we can understand ‘so-called silence’ as, in this case, referring to the activity of sound 
going to the limit of what it can do, unconstrained by the reactive viewpoint of the 
spectator who assesses this activity according to its utility, its expressive value, or its 
facility in fulfilling a particular motive.  
 
                                                        





It is on this basis that we can understood Cage’s initial deployment of chance as being, 
in effect, a preliminary moment—if it required Cage to align his critical account of 
music as self-expression and communication with a corresponding active self-
destruction through the affirmation of what happens, it nevertheless did not yet reach 
as far as the affirmation of sound’s capacity to act, insofar as the limit of this capacity 
had not been reached. What was revealed in the anechoic chamber, then, was precisely 
the essence of sound as active force and affirmative will: 
 
A sound does not view itself as thought, as ought, as needing another 
sound for its elucidation, etc.; it has no time for any consideration—it is 
occupied with the performance of its characteristics […]. Urgent, 
unique, uninformed about history and theory, beyond the imagination, 
central to a sphere without surface, its becoming is unimpeded, 
energetically broadcast. There is no escape from its action. (S 14).  
 
Sound goes to the limit of what it can do in affirming its difference from thought, and 
the irreducibility of its activity to ‘thought’ or ‘imagination’, at least insofar as these 
two faculties attempt to separate sound from what it can do by making it serve 
specific, predetermined intentions. When the distinction between sound and silence is 
recast as a distinction between intended and unintended sound, what is necessarily 
affirmed is the excess of the force of sound over our capacity to hear or to understand 
them, and, indeed, to produce them: ‘sounds don’t worry about whether them make 
sense or whether they’re heading in the right direction. They don’t need that direction 
or mis-direction to be themselves. They are, and that’s enough for them’ (FTB 150). 
 
What remains at stake, then, is the sense in which sounds are—a sense, moreover, that 
may not “make sense” according to the demands of recognition—and the way in 
which this sense is revealed in and through an encounter with what had been called 
silence. As the preceding quotations indicate, such a sense is, for Cage, inextricable 
from the ‘action’ and ‘becoming’ that becomes audible in the encounter with silence, 
from the ‘performance of [sounds’] characteristics’ that silence reveals (S 14). This 
last phrase is particularly telling: if, formerly, Cage had enumerated  ‘four 
characteristics’ of sound as constituting the ‘nature of the material’ (S 63), grounded in 
the opposition between sound and silence, then the question is to what extent the 
emphasis on the ‘performance’ of such characteristics modifies or transforms this 




concluding, then, I want to analyse the construction of 4’33’’ as effectively 
dramatizing and explicating this shift, or, in Cage’s words, the ‘turning around’, by 
means of which the emphasis on action and performance in relation to the essence of 
sound demands a revaluation of the conception of essence as such (quoted in Larson 
2013, 271) . My claim is as follows: insofar as sound performs its characteristics, 
duration ceases to be one (static, identical) characteristic amongst many, and becomes 
a condition under which essence itself is expressed—that is, a condition under which 
sound explores and unfolds the indeterminate limit of its capacity to act—and it is this 
shift that the sonorous inaudiblity of 4’33’’, its imperceptible sensibility, transmits to 
us. 
 
To begin, then, let us consider the basic elements of the piece. Its compositional 
history is complex, insofar as there exist at least three distinct versions of the score, 
the most well-known of which is not the one initially performed by David Tudor at 
Woodstock in 1952—nevertheless, it is to this famous version I will refer (see Gann 
2010, 178-87). The score marks out three movements, each containing only the 
instruction ‘Tacet’, indicating that the musician is to remain silent. An accompanying 
note states that the title of the work indicates the complete length, as well as describing 
the length of the movements in the initial performance, and the fact that the beginning 
and ending of each movement was indicated by the opening and closing of the piano 
lid; however, it then states that ‘the work may be performed by any instrumentalist or 
combination of instrumentalists and last any length of time’ (quoted in Gann 2010, 
183). Thus, at its limit the piece contains only one instruction: to do nothing, to let 
sound act. Which is not to say that the piece necessarily places performer or auditor in 
an inevitably reactive position, or demands the disinterested apprehension of the 
spectator: these latter two would involve, as indicated, a recognizable relation between 
cause and effect, between action and intention, in order to ground their evaluations. To 
the contrary, all intentional action is suspended, time as the correlation between 
stimulus and response—coordinated by the periodicity of cardinal points—is undone 
by a ‘pure and empty form of time’ (DR 346), and performers and listeners alike are 
tasked with acting their re-actions, unleashing the active power of forgetting now 





In order to establish the validity of such a reading, it is important to emphasize the 
way in which Cage understood 4’33’’ as not only a work of distinctive significance 
but as a work that had a functional and effective transformative capacity. Thus, Cage 
explicitly referred to 4’33’’ as the most radical of his works (CWC 71) but this 
importance was itself derived from the fact that the piece served not simply as a 
demonstration of the pivotal discovery of Cage’s work (and it is of course significant 
that Cage’s first published collection of writings was titled Silence) but as its practical 
effectuation and a corresponding test. Cage thus remarked, on the one hand, that 
silence itself constitutes a ‘change of mind,’ and, on the other, that ‘no day goes by 
without my making use of [4’33’’] in my life’ (quoted in Larson, 271, 276-77). 
Further, Cage considered that those who understood the work as being a silent piece, 
in the sense of a simple absence of sound, had ‘missed the point’ to the degree that 
‘they didn’t know how to listen’ (CWC 71). If the piece had a ‘use’ then, it was to 
demand the renunciation of utility: ‘the essential meaning of silence is the giving up of 
intention’ (CWC 198). This essence—and the sense it indicates—is itself dependent 
on sound’s own renewed essential sense: in giving up intention, sound is revealed to 
act in a manner that cannot be determined in advance, whose limits have yet to be 
determined, and whose capacities are irreducible to the ‘established values’ by which 
the listener-as-spectator might evaluate them. 
 
Finally, then, Cage’s encounter with the problematic Idea of sound as/and silence 
transformed his conception of the essence of sound away from a static identity 
determined through a set of stable parameters, of which silence formed the 
dialectically-framed ‘opposite and necessary coexistent,’ toward a ‘situation involving 
multiplicity’ (S 101), a situation that is ‘essentially non-dualistic’ (S 36) but whose 
unity is, to again borrow from Deleuze, only said of multiplicity, a ‘multiple unity’ 
(FTB 198): ‘I have always sought to grasp the plurality of the figure one’ (FTB 77). 
4’33’’ is not only the same piece in each performance, but the performance itself is 
ongoing—in “making use” of the piece, Cage remarks that ‘it’s going on 
continuously’ and he simply ‘turn[s] [his] attention towards it’ (Larson 2013, 277); 
that is, he begins to listen, to act his reactions through the power of forgetting, and 
affirms the unity of all sound, without division—which is to say, he attends to the 





Yet if this unity, and the essence corresponding to it, is said only of multiplicity, then 
this entails that it is said only of the continuous activity of sound that escapes a priori 
determination, and which acts anew at each moment, going to the limit of what it can 
do. That unity is said only of multiplicity follows directly from the affirmation of non-
duality—which is to say, of this world, in its immanence: to affirm ‘all that appears’ is 
inevitably to affirm the multiple (NP 16), insofar as what appears is not static being 
but becoming, what Cage referred to as the ‘flux of everything that happens’. To the 
degree that this becoming cannot be opposed to or distinguished from anything which 
would be ‘beyond’ it—such as a truthful world—then ‘[m]ultiplicity is the affirmation 
of unity’ (NP 22); there is ‘no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity’. 
If being thus lacks any essential division—and if distinctions such as intentional and 
non-intentional are partial, reactive and conditional—then the unity, or non-duality, of 
being that follows from this can be said only of multiplicity itself—it can be said only 
of this world. Hence the famous Deleuzian theme of univocity: ‘Being is said in a 
single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said 
differs: it is said of difference itself’ (DR 45). 
 
In sum, then, though the piece presents, strictly, nothing, nevertheless, as Cage himself 
had established, the “silence” of the piece is, in fact, be ‘full of accidental sounds’ 
(CWC 70); these sounds are unpredictable, never alike from one performance to the 
next—and ultimately, unrecognizable.116 That is to say, they can only be heard, but 
                                                        
116  On a certain level, this is inaccurate: the piece inevitably presents to us many recognizable 
sounds that may, therefore, be understood in terms of objecthood in the Kantian sense: the 
shuffling of feet, traffic in the street outside, my own breathing, the creaking of chairs, and so 
on; the “same” sounds as I have heard many times before. Yet these are precisely not the 
objects I would expect within the context of the musical performance – they do not emanate 
from the performer, they are not subject to control, and they are not regulated according to the 
mandate of a score that would allow for multiple experiences of a single, uniform piece; if we 
recall that “something” obtains its sense through a relation of forces, then, it seems clear that 
these “same” sounds can thus be appropriated, in Deleuze’s words, by a distinctive force, and 
therefore must be evaluated according to the concrete situation. In the case of 4’33’’, the 
sounds I experience are encountered as present where they should not be, “within” the musical 
situation, at the same moment as those sounds I would expect are missing from their place. 
These are precisely the characteristics that Deleuze attributes to the object of the encounter: it 
moves between (at least) two series, causing them to resonate with one another, without its 
belonging to either yet simultaneously being included in both – Deleuze will refer to it, for this 
reason, as the paradoxical element and the empty square, and declare 'there is no structure 
without the empty square that makes everything function' (LS 61). The degree to which this 
revaluation of recognizable sounds is effectively dependent upon the traditionally- and 




are nevertheless, according to the collaboration between sensibility, memory and 
thought characteristic of common sense, imperceptible. But, for this very reason, this 
is not to say that the essence of sonority, thus dramatized, is unthinkable—rather, it 
manifests a ‘violence’ that can be transmitted to thought, that ‘forces us to think’ (DR 
176, NP 101). If, as Cage hoped, the listener acknowledges that ‘the sounds of their 
environment constitute a music’ (CWC 70), then the listener will encounter precisely 
what Cage himself did in the anechoic chamber: the unity of all-sound that is said only 
of difference, the flux of becoming that is the concrete encounter with the being of 
sonority going to the limit of its capacity to act. This multiple unity itself cannot be 
heard but only thought as the imperceptible limit of every performance, the 
paradoxical unity of a piece which can only differ in every “case”, in every actual 
listening experience. 
 
That this essence remains problematic entails, as noted above, that it can never be 
given in advance, nor completely determined in actuality—what sound can do is never 
the object of propositional knowledge or of verifiable fact, just as the capacity of 
thinking itself cannot be circumscribed in advance without appealing, once again, to a 
natural capacity for thought. It is rather the object of experimentation—of a pluralist 
and ‘superior’ empiricism (DR 180). It is in this sense, then, that affirmation links 
chance to creation: if, until our encounter with something that forces us to think, we 
are ‘not yet thinking’, then thought itself must be created in and through this 
encounter. In going to the limit of what it can do, thought does not activate a 
preexistent natural capacity of which it had not previously made use—rather, we 
encounter the ‘genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself’ (DR 176). 
. 
To conclude, then, we can return to my initial claim: it is only by affirming the 
distancing-differing function of the call that we can evade the insinuation of a 
dogmatic image of thought, precisely because such difference, as object of affirmation, 
immanently disrupts any appeal to the transcendence of a truthful world. Finally, we 
are in a position to understand Deleuze’s claim that a thought without image would 
have ‘no ally but paradox’ (DR 168): it is only by rendering sound unthinkable that we 
could at least begin to hear the call for sonic thinking, and understand what is at stake 
in our response, today. Thought must affirm its own capacities in and through its very 




thereby, being contained by or merging with it (NP 97-98). It is, finally, time itself that 
designates the unfolding of this difference: the ‘pure and empty form of time’—of 
which 4’33’’ functions as a continually-renewable concretion—functions as a 
‘caesura’ which distributes future and past unequally on either side; time ceases to 
‘rhyme’, and the ‘beginning and end no longer [coincide]’ (DR 111). The empty form 
of time is ‘the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change’ 
(DR 111); the unity of sound, thought, and time as a continual transformation. 
 
It is this ‘fracture’ of time that ensures thought relates to what it encounters (which is 
to say, to sensibility as the struggle between forces) as to an ‘other’ (CC 29); the active 
determination of thought bears only upon the ‘passive, or rather receptive, “self” that 
experiences changes in time’, across the fracture of time that separates the two: ‘The I 
and the Self are thus separated by the line of time, which relates them to each other 
only under the condition of a fundamental difference’ (CC 29). It is through this 
fracture that chance is affirmed and the dice throw passes: ‘The fracture […] is the 
pure and empty form of time through which pass the throws of the dice’ (DR 355). 
Thus, the relation of thought to sensation is one of ‘modulation’ or ‘continuous 
variation’ (CC 30); in A Thousand Plateaus and Francis Bacon, it becomes the 
‘thought synthesizer functioning to make thought travel, make it mobile’ (ATP 379). It 
is this, finally, than constitutes the ‘precise moment within Kantianism’ with which 
Deleuze was concerned—the point at which time fractures the unity of thought and 
sensation, and allows each faculty to go to the limit of what it can do; a limit, 
moreover, that is not given in advance, but is rather the object of a genesis or, as 
Deleuze otherwise puts it, a true creation (DR 70). Ultimately, then, if the essence of 
sound is duration, this claim not only requires a revaluation of the conception of 
essence—in relation to active forces and an affirmative will—but reintroduces 
distance and difference into thought itself.  
 
Finally, then, we return to the opening problem of this thesis, without a response but 
with a renewed sense of the question posed. How do we begin thinking sound? To 
respond to the call for thinking “at last” is, in the last instance, to make of thought 
itself a calling—that is, a differentiating, deferring and delaying process, a force that 
affirms its difference from other forces at the same moment that it makes difference 




us to think—that is, it does violence to thought by forcing thought to go to the limit of 
what it can do, a limit that cannot be determined in advance. As an object, sound is a 
problematic and differential Idea, whose practical effectuation is the goal of an 
ongoing, experimental practice. We know neither what sound nor thought can do, and 
it is across and between these two unknowns that creation will “take place”, at last. 
 
On this basis, then, the claim made at the outset can be affirmed with a distinct sense 
and value: sound studies’ emergency must be maintained and extended, to the degree 
that this term indicates not sound studies’ uncertain existence, but rather the 
uncertainties of its existence, manifested in and through the distancing-deferring 
relation between theory and its supposed “object”. It is theory that, in the last instance, 
must be constrained to affirm its own unique capacities, which are distinct from those 
of musical practice, but with which it can enter into an active, mutually-creative 
relation. The preceding analyses have been at once the demonstration and the 
dramatization of such a claim, insofar as it was precisely Cage’s experimental practice 
that is here affirmed at a theoretical level—but precisely to the degree that theory 





















Conclusion: The Others of Experimentalism 
 
In the preface to Difference and Repetition, Deleuze remarks that ‘[t]he weaknesses of 
a book are often the counterparts of empty intentions that one did not know how to 
implement’, and that, on this basis, ‘a declaration of intent is evidence of a real 
modesty in relation to the ideal book’ (DR xvii). Insofar as this thesis began with such 
a declaration, it is certainly possible, and indeed worthwhile, to attend to the ways in 
which certain of its intentions were not implemented; yet what is perhaps more 
pressing is to consider the ways in which those intentions themselves remain 
inevitably partial and preliminary. Yet if, in the latter case, elisions and occlusions are 
necessary and inevitable, they therefore cannot be necessarily said to constitute 
weaknesses with regard to the work itself; indeed, to the contrary, they mark, in a 
certain sense, precisely its success, insofar as what was intended was the construction 
and elaboration of an experiment, the value of which rests upon it being able to affirm 
its own contingency, and to provoke its own recommencement. Thus, in the same 
preface, Deleuze asks: ‘How else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t 
know, or knows badly? It is precisely there we imagine having something to say’ (DR 
xx). By way of a conclusion, then, I wish to reflect upon what this thesis has said, and, 
on this basis, indicate its limits, in a positive sense—that is, to throw into relief those 
themes and elements that remain to be explored, but whose possibilities are revealed 
by and through those very limitations. 
 
In the first instance, these limitations are evident in the relatively circumscribed extent 
of my consideration of both Deleuze and Cage—in each case, an emphasis is placed 
upon a set of initial, in a certain sense preparatory moves. One reason for this is that, 
in each case, the logic of their divergent but related practices is most fully evident in 
the initial, establishing steps, which mark out, in each case, their attempt to distinguish 
and differentiate themselves from their milieu; if, in the case of Deleuze, his creative 
rereadings of Kant and Nietzsche (alongside Hume, Bergson and Proust) were a way 
of resisting the dominance of ‘Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger’ (D2 9) in French 
philosophy of the period while nevertheless laying claim to a ‘subject’ that was 
‘manifestly in the air’ (DR xvii), so too did Cage seek to progressively distinguish 




biography, by Schoenberg, through constructing his own alternate genealogy: Ives, 
Satie, Duchamp.  
 
As a result, my analysis of their work effectively stops at the moment they had each 
finally begun to establish their own, distinctive contributions—even if, throughout, I 
have cited later texts in which they each revaluate or reaffirm these early 
developments. Yet it must be stressed that both Deleuze and Cage would not only 
explore and extend the implications of their early works in diverse domains—
Deleuze’s texts on Francis Bacon and cinema, for instance, or Cage’s text-based 
compositions and works of visual art—but also, in doing so, critically reflect upon and 
challenge their own previous developments. As such, they too dramatized their own 
conclusions—philosophy and composition, as experimental practices, must 
continually affirm the openness of their tasks, the necessity to reactivate them. 
 
If, to stress once again, this indicates a partiality that I consider to be inevitable, there 
is nevertheless a particular way in which both Deleuze and Cage proceeded with their 
practices beyond the framing set out in the body of this thesis that merits emphasizing: 
the turn to politics. What marks both Cage’s work subsequent to his revelation 
regarding the essence of sonority in 4’33’’ and Deleuze’s work following his 
encounter with Guattari in 1969, a year after the publication of Difference and 
Repetition, is a reconsideration of the political dimensions of their work. This is not to 
say that their work, to a certain point, was apolitical; to consider only two isolated 
examples, Deleuze, as discussed previously, had consistently framed his account of the 
image of thought in terms of ‘established values’ or ‘doxa’ (DR 170-73), while Cage, 
for his part, would eventually publish “Other People Think,” a piece on the United 
States’ relationship to the countries of Latin America that won him a high school 
oratory prize, and which presaged, in an interesting way, some of his later political 
views (Kostelanetz 1970, 45-49). 
 
Yet undeniably the tenor and extent of their engagement with political questions 
would transform subsequent to the period discussed in this thesis, in a manner that 
necessarily reflects back upon this earlier work. Again, I will offer two brief examples. 
In Deleuze’s case, we can read the claim, from the famous introduction to A Thousand 




must be made’ as implicitly remarking upon the limitations of his earlier account of 
how multiplicity was conceived—which is to say, that it was precisely conceived 
rather than assembled, and hence the pronounced ethico-political focus of the 
collaborative works required the concept of the assemblage, invented in collaboration 
with Guattari, which became of primary importance for the remainder of his career 
(TP 7, original emphasis). For Cage, meanwhile, his turn to indeterminate scores, 
exemplified in the Variations series composed between 1958 and 1967, was explicitly 
an attempt to ‘[give] freedom to the individual performer’ (CWC 72) and thereby to 
critique the authoritarian function of the composer as ‘someone who tells other people 
what to do’ (YM ix)—a position explicitly aligned with Cage’s increasing 
identification with anarchism, and, indeed, an attempt to ‘show […] the practicality of 
anarchy’ (CWC 72). This, then, functions as another dimension to Cage’s 
retrospective critique of Music of Changes outlined in the preceding chapter—if that 
piece was a ‘Frankenstein monster’ to the degree that it functioned to ‘control’ the 
performer, then, on this very same basis, it was almost, in fact, a ‘dictator’ (S 36). 
 
What is most important, however, and what validates the approach this thesis has 
taken, even if such an approach inevitably obscured or occluded, to a degree, this more 
“directly” political aspect, is the way in which this turn to the political was as much a 
question of the political status of philosophy or composition as a practice than any 
specific political claim regarding the constitution of the state or the ideal arrangement 
of social space. This is not to say that Deleuze and Cage make no substantive political 
claims—as indicated above, Cage, in particular, explicitly referred to himself as an 
anarchist and as an opponent of government—yet these claims are ultimately 
significant only as an extension the way in which they are carried out, or we could say, 
dramatized in their work as a concrete activity.  
 
So, for instance, Deleuze’s work with Guattari would continue to emphasise the 
question of the nature of thinking as an ethically and politically (over)determined 
activity; thus, the famous distinction between the rhizome and the tree consists less in 
a specific set of propositional claims regarding the nature of reality or of the social 
realm than in two different images of thought, each of which can itself be evaluated in 
terms of its relation to particular kinds of behavior or modes of social organization (as 




constitute a break from, but rather an extension of, the position articulated in Nietzsche 
and Philosophy:  
 
We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we 
conceive, of the value of what we believe. […] The truth of a thought must 
be interpreted according to the forces or power that determine it to think 
and to think this rather than that (NP 97).  
 
Indeed, the preface to the English edition, written in 1983, will reinterpret this very 
claim in terms derived from his collaboration with Guattari (as well as the increased 
prominence accorded to Spinoza): ‘a proposition always reflects a mode of existence’ 
(NP ix).  
 
In this sense, what is at stake for Deleuze is less a change of subject than a shift of 
emphasis, and a corresponding revaluation: it is the struggle between the image of 
thought and the thought without image, between recognition and creation, that itself 
becomes the terrain of a political struggle—not a struggle between two competing 
claims or propositions regarding political realities or actions, but a struggle over the 
material effects and implications of thinking as a practice. For Cage, on a similar 
basis, his political engagements and evaluations extend from, complicate and unsettle 
the premises of his early work—in particular, the critique of self-expression and the 
affirmation of chance—and are, on this basis, impossible to evaluate without tracing 
them from this foundational moment. 
 
Thus, if this thesis, as indicated at the outset, is intended as a contribution to Deleuze 
studies and sound studies with regard to the question of practice—which is to say, in 
retrospect, with regard to the relation between thought and what it thinks, the 
differing-deferring dynamic of the call for thought, and the image that risks 
suppressing such a dynamic in favour of direct, im-mediate contact that appeals, in the 
last instance, to the recognizable and established values—then to this extent it serves 
as the necessary groundwork for broader evaluations of specific instances of such 
practices by raising the question of evaluation as such. Indeed, as noted in the third 
chapter, in particular, what have been insistently, if often implicitly, at stake are 
precisely the conditions and criteria of such evaluations—what would it mean to 




thought implied, the possibilities of life revealed, the mode of existence entailed? 
What connection would such evaluations have to interrogations of concrete positions 
and positive claims—given that the very premises of the former would complicate any 
easy distinction between form and content, for instance? 
 
These questions, then, are actively posed by the foregoing work, as its necessary 
extension—that is, as that which this work itself calls for, as the problems it implicates 
in and through its own attempt to articulate the conditions of a truly creative and 
experimental theoretical practice. In the remainder of this conclusion, I wish to specify 
one particular avenue which demands such an extension, and one which, moreover, 
inextricable from the uncertain status of the political during the stage of Deleuze and 
Cage’s work considered here: the complex and ambiguous historico-cultural 
significance of the experimental.117 I noted that Deleuze and Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus, 
cite affirmatively Cage’s own definition of experimentation, and, in the body of this 
thesis, I have been attempting to unpack and amplify the premises and the implications 
of such a definition with regard to its application to the activity of thinking; what is 
more, doing so has placed a particular emphasis on the method of dramatization, 
insofar as it involved allowing sonic practice to demand—or to call for—a revaluation 
of theoretical practice, constituting, thereby, Deleuze’s ‘interference’ between 
practices (C2 268). Yet this definition offered by Cage is neither neutral nor 
uncontested within the history of sonic practice itself, and the ways in which it has 
been challenged, expanded and undermined will therefore be of great importance in 
continuing to explore the possibilities and potentials of theory as experimentation. In 
sum, then: the interference must (always) be extended. 
 
In offering, by way of a conclusion, a preliminary account of such an extension—and 
emphasizing, thereby, the ways in which it builds upon the preceding work—I wish to 
distinguish two key points: firstly, the problematic relation between control and 
freedom in Cage’s account of experimentation, with regard to a more nuanced account 
of musical and institutional power; secondly, and by extension, the way in which this  
account was both historically and theoretically constituted through an exclusion of—
                                                        
117 Though I will focus on the tensions surrounding this definition as they manifest within the 
limitations of the Western concert tradition, Joanna Demers, in Listening Through the Noise, 




and often, direct opposition to—vernacular traditions and musical practices of a 
directly African-American heritage, in particular that of improvisation. My point, 
throughout, will be that, in an extension of the method of this thesis, these theoretical 
concerns regarding the status and nature of experimentation are immanently explored 
in and through the developments of sonic practice—in particular, in this case, through 
what Tony Conrad referred to as the ‘post-Cagean crisis in music composition’ 
(quoted in Grubbs 2014, 30). 
 
The political and institutional dimensions of this crisis were exemplified most directly 
by the work of Conrad, Henry Flynt and, in particular, La Monte Young. Young 
trained as a saxophonist with a background in jazz improvisation and would become 
most known for his use of long sustained drones and exploration of alternate tuning 
systems,118 both of which were explored with Conrad and others (including, for a time, 
John Cale, later of the Velvet Underground) in the Theater of Eternal Music group 
during the nineteen-sixties. His important role in negotiating the post-Cagean crisis 
began at the Darmstadt International Summer Courses in 1959, where, one year after 
Cage’s controversial substitution for Pierre Boulez,119 Young heard Cage’s Concert 
for Piano and Orchestra, whose Solo for Piano was the most extensive and detailed 
indeterminate composition Cage had completed to date, as well as having opportunity 
to ‘study [Cage’s] scores and writings’ (Joseph 2008, 74). This encounter had an 
‘immediate impact on his production’ (85), but Young would, in Branden W. Joseph’s 
words, ‘not be content to remain in Cage’s shadow for long’ (90). To the contrary, 
Young and his ‘circle’—including Conrad and Flynt—would almost immediately 
begin to explore the limitations of Cage’s conception of composition as an 
experimental practice, particularly with regard to the power relations it implied. 
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in two pieces from Young’s Composition 1960 
series. As Joseph describes, Composition 1960 #3 is effectively a reworking of 4’33’’ 
in which the performer, rather than remaining silent, acts as an ‘announcer’, who not 
only informs the audience of the start and end point of the piece, but ‘states […] that 
members of the audience can do whatever they like for this amount of time’ (97). 
Composition 1960 #4 is ‘largely the same’ except ‘the lights will be extinguished for 
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the length of the performance.’ What is directly challenged here is Cage’s conception 
of freedom; as noted throughout, Cage’s appeal to freedom demanded that the person 
being granted freedom ‘only when nothing is taken as the basis’, which is to say, when 
intentions (and the habits and tastes that, for Cage, such intentions necessarily implied) 
are relinquished (CWC 71). Thus, from Cage’s perspective, the audience for Young’s 
pieces were precisely not free to the extent that they were not forced to relinquish their 
personal taste by an imposed discipline, and they did not thereby engage in the process 
of self-transformation that was the condition of the ‘new listening’ the Cage sought. 
 
Yet what Young’s piece demonstrates clearly is the central point of a major critique 
directed at Cage’s work during this period: insofar as Cage’s work bore a pedagogical 
intent, it necessarily maintained a power differential between the composer and the 
performer or listener, as its demonstrative quality requires a disciplined attention of 
the latter to the demands of the former. What is more, this discipline is in many 
respects indistinguishable, certainly in effect, from the role of the audience 
characteristic of concert music as an institution—silent and focused attentiveness. 
Indeed, on this basis Douglas Kahn critically contrasts 4’33’’ with its precursor, the 
never-realised Silent Prayer: the shift from the latter to the former was a ‘retreat from 
the social’, insofar as 4’33’’ was ‘removed to the special space of Western art music’ 
(Kahn 1999, 188) 
 
This particular instance, as illuminated through Young’s works during this period, is 
one element of a more general critique that would emphasise, as Benjamin Piekut 
notes, how Cage ‘folded his output very easily into the conventional concert-music 
tradition, where it was later taken up by willing performers’ (17). Two further 
examples will serve to specify this. Firstly, as Piekut notes, Cage was heavily reliant, 
through the nineteen-fifties and sixties, upon David Tudor and other ‘preferred 
musicians’ as those Cage would effectively trust to, paradoxically, realize his 
intention—even to the point of allowing a degree of improvisation on the part of 
Tudor and James Tenney, for example, in the performance of Cartridge Music—as 
opposed to those who ‘could not be trusted to handle the freedoms of indeterminacy’ 





This giving of freedom to the individual performer began to interest me 
more and more. And given to a musician like David Tudor, of course, it 
provided results that were extraordinarily beautiful. When the freedom 
is given to people who are not disciplined and do not start […] from 
zero (by zero I mean the absence of likes and dislikes) […] then of 
course the giving of freedom is of no interest whatsoever. (CWC 72) 
 
This position can, as I have shown, be unfolded in accordance with a Deleuzian-
Nietzschean logic in which the becoming-active of the individual—that is, their going 
to the limit of their capacity to act—is dependent upon a self-destruction that would 
divest them of their allegiance to ‘established values’ (which, it must be asserted, 
refers not this or that particular set of values but rather an entire mode of evaluation 
from which particular instances are derived).120 Yet it also indicates a possible 
limitation at the level of concrete effectuation that, in turn, demands reconsideration 
with respect to theory—so long as it is understood that this “concrete effectuation” 
refers as much to composition as it does to theory. That is to say, the dynamic of 
compositional practice can and must be allowed to interfere with theoretical practice, 
as an element in the latter’s own critical-creative and experimental dynamic; which is 
not to say that theory must “conform” to that which it engages with, but rather that it 
must acknowledge the practices with which it intersects can reveal its own 
unthematised limitations. 
 
To expand and clarify this point with regard to the performer, rather than the audience, 
we can refer to another of Young’s pieces from the same year, which also responds to 
4’33’’; the Piano Piece for David Tudor #2, which instructs the performer (by 
implication, Tudor) to attempt to open and close the cover of the piano keyboard 
without making any audible sound, with the duration of the piece being determined by 
how long it takes the performer to succeed or to give up (see Joseph, 95). Here, then, 
the performance of 4’33’’ is restaged in a manner that lays out its implications starkly: 
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once again, of two different ‘readings’ of time, as discussed in Chapter Three (LS 72), and, 




rather than simply attending to silence as non-intended sound, that performer must 
strive to avoid producing the very sounds that are an inevitable correlate of his 
intentional acts—but it remains ambiguous whether these sounds themselves would be 
qualified as intentional or not. Further, the disciplining of the performer is imposed 
even more explicitly: how much care and precision is required, how many 
interminable attempts, before success it achieved and the performance is complete? 
One recalls the infamous lengths David Tudor would pursue in order to learn Cage’s 
pieces—including, notoriously, ‘solv[ing] the rhythmic difficulties of Music of 
Changes by calculating the duration of each phrase in seconds and then using a 
stopwatch in performance’ (Pritchett 1993, 102); indeed, it was precisely this 
discipline that marked him out as one deserving of Cage’s “freedom”.  
 
Cage, for his part, would go on to avowedly embrace this aspect of his work with a 
number of pieces in the nineteen-seventies, including the Etudes Australes for piano 
and the Freeman Etudes for violin, which were explicitly designed to push the limits 
of physical and instrumental capacity in order to indicate ‘the possibility of doing the 
impossible’ (quoted in Silverman 2010, 282); Paul Zukofsky, a violinist who 
collaborated with Cage on the Freeman Etudes, considered them ‘the most difficult 
music he had ever played’ (Silverman 2010, 282). Further, the implication that any 
and all activity inevitably produces sound and can therefore be considered a musical 
performance was explored in Cage’s “sequel” to 4’33’’, 1962’s 0’00’’, which instructs 
the performer to ‘perform a disciplined action,’ the sound of which would be 
amplified. 
 
This latter piece is exemplary in another respect regarding Cage’s legitimizing appeal 
to concert music traditions: as David Grubbs notes, ‘Cage never ceased to create 
works in the form of copyrighted musical compositions that unambiguously identify 
Cage as author and that are published by the C F. Peters Corporation’ (77). Elsewhere, 
Grubbs quotes Henry Flynt on this point: ‘[Cage] persisted in a professional life which 
could not be reconciled with his own pronouncements’ (Flynt, quoted in Grubbs 2014, 
25). Indeed, in the very first performance of 0’00’’, undertaken by Cage himself, the 
‘disciplined action’ was, in fact, the writing of the score itself—and, as Benjamin 
Piekut notes, in other cases Cage would create scores for a piece retrospectively, after 




to whatever degree Cage may challenge or unsettle its premises, he still situates 
himself squarely and visibly within by means of exactly such gestures. 
 
This point becomes even more pressing if we return to the conception of experimental 
that is implied in and through this specific institutional framing—and, from this, avow 
that this conception is itself not neutral in relation to those histories and practices that 
it includes and excludes, those it directly challenges and those it simply dismisses. 
Thus, Cage’s infamous opposition to improvisation, as well as his evident pride, as 
Henry Flynt reported it, in being ‘out of touch’ with regard to popular music: 
according to Flynt, upon telling Cage that he was influenced by Bo Diddley and 
Chuck Berry, Cage initially recognized neither name, and, upon it being explained to 
Cage who they were, remarked to Flynt, ‘If that’s what you’re interested in, well, what 
are you doing here?’’ (quoted in Grubbs 2012, 39-40). 
 
On the one hand, then, Cage’s distinction between improvisation and indeterminacy is 
grounded in the logic elaborated in the body of this thesis: improvisation relies, at least 
for Cage, on habit and repetition, whilst indeterminacy requires the performer to 
undergo a self-altering submission to the score, unfolding it according to its own rules 
in a manner that inevitably produces an unforeseen outcome. Thus, improvisation 
remains recognizable, while indeterminacy does not. Yet, on the other hand, such an 
evaluation is itself grounded, in the last instance, in a constitutive exclusion of an 
alternative that is dismissed out of hand, based on virtually nonexistent scrutiny—and 
which therefore inevitably excludes both a specific analysis of the historical contours 
and power relations implied by such a distinction and, just as significantly, the 
possibility for productive contact and contestation between the two. Finally, then, what 
I wish to stress is the way in which this conception of experimentation as, in effect, 
unequally distributed between two distinct traditions cannot but constitute, on the one 
hand, a spur for compositional practice and, on the other hand and on that very basis, 
serve as a primary point of departure for further interferences between this practice 
and that of theory.  
 
For as both Piekut and Grubbs note, based on the pioneering work of George E. Lewis, 
this distinction between indeterminacy and improvisation as specifying the nature of 




the legitimizing forces of concert music as an institution, and, in particular, the 
racialized construction of this institution and its corresponding musical tradition. As 
Lewis puts it: ‘Coded qualifiers to the word “music” […] such as “experimental” […] 
are used […] to delineate a racialized location of this tradition within the space of 
whiteness’ (Lewis 1996, 102). At another point, he quotes composer Anthony 
Braxton: ‘Both aleatory and indeterminism are words which have been coined […] to 
bypass the word improvisation and as such the influence of non-white sensibility’ 
(quoted in Lewis 1996, 99). Thus, when Piekut poses to us the question ‘[w]hat was 
experimentalism?’, we are induced to consider the ways in which compositional 
practice has been and continues to be a process of contestation and construction whose 
power dynamics must register at the level of theory. 
 
On this basis, Piekut poses the important suggestion with which this thesis will 
conclude: the necessity of dismantling the racializing institutional logics separating 
indeterminacy and improvisation, and to reconstruct a concept of experimental 
practice adequate to the work with which it hopes to intersect. If it is necessary, as 
Piekut avows, to ‘register the ambivalence of the connections between these two 
avant-gardes’—which is to say, between jazz improvisation and, to use Lewis’ term, 
Eurological indeterminacy—it is in order to make theory itself adequate to the 
complexity of sonic experimentalism itself, from the post-Cagean turn to 
improvisation by groups such as AMM to the jazz-derived compositional practices of 
the Jazz Composers’ Guild. What would an experimental practice of theory adequate 
to this complexity be? Not only can we “still not “answer this question, but this is so to 
the degree that the problem itself remains to be dramatized. 
 
In sum, then, this thesis has sought to establish an initial account of an experimental 
practice of thinking that operates between music and theory—insofar as, indeed, for 
Deleuze and Guattari both are forms of thinking. In engaging Cage’s work, it hoped to 
provide a dramatization that would attain its fullest scope with regard to the possible 
connections between Deleuze studies and sound studies, as well as to articulate key 
elements of the logic of a body of work that continues to set the terms under which 
sonic experimentalism is engaged and understood, in both compositional and 
theoretical practice. Yet, by the same token, this can and must remain only an initial 




paradigm that is its privileged referent, and, on this basis, the meta-theoretical work of 
constituting theory itself as an experimental practice will have much to learn from the 
struggles of the post-Cagean crisis, the directions pursued out of it—and, perhaps most 
significantly, those forms of practice that were never caught up in it in the first place. 
 
This brings me to my final point, returning once again to the problem of 
contemporaneity. I have attempted to establish the degree to which the Cagean 
problem, and, more general, the problem of experimentation in thinking, constitutes a 
provocation for thought, today. In closing, I wish simply to emphasise that, with 
regard to the “objects” of thinking—that is, both that which it attempts to articulate 
and that which it aims to achieve—there is neither a priority of the new in the sense of 
the more recent, nor can we rely on appeals to historical significance or audibility. 
Rather, it is a question of the needs and demands of the “thought provoking-time”: ‘If 
one can still be Platonist, Cartesian or Kantian today, it is because one is justified in 
thinking that their concepts can be reactivated in our problems and inspire those 
concepts that need to be created’ (WP 28). In presenting a Deleuzian-Cagean thesis, 
then, I hope to have demonstrated that one can still be Deleuzian or Cagean on this 
very basis; yet, by the same token, in being Deleuzian or Cagean, one is impelled to, in 
Deleuze’s words, ‘trim [one’s] own arrows, or gather those which seem to us the finest 
in order to try to send them in other directions, even if the distance covered is not 
astronomical but relatively small’ (DR xiii). Doubtless, the distance has been small; 
but this conclusion is intended as an indication of those other directions that, on the 
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